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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Laos
Index
After December 1975, the newly formed LPDR was faced
with
disarming and neutralizing former rightist soldiers and
police,
countering armed resistance efforts by those who had fled
to
Thailand and by their supporters who had remained in Laos,
and
preventing Thailand from interfering in political
developments in
Laos. The ease with which the Pathet Lao had managed to
neutralize
the rightist armed forces and police and form a coalition
government reflected how tired the Laotians were of war.
The
prevailing attitude at the time seemed to be general
relief that
the civil war was over. Even most middle- and
lower-ranking
officers in the Royal Lao Army--who had spent their adult
lives
fighting the insurgents of the Neo Lao Xat (Lao Patriotic
Front--
LPF; see Glossary)--were
prepared to cooperate in building
a united
and socialist Laos. When opposition to the new regime
materialized,
it came mainly from across the Mekong River in Thailand.
Insurgents
found sanctuary across the 1,000-kilometer boundary with
Thailand,
where, under the new, strongly anticommunist government,
the
military provided them with supplies and intelligence
data.
The armed resistance movement--a shadow force of
several
thousand persons--never gained enough momentum to become
any more
than a nuisance to the communist government because the
combination
of approximately 50,000 Vietnamese troops stationed in
Laos and the
LPA ensured adequate protection against the relatively
minor
threat. Broad security measures, including control of the
media,
were implemented.
Nonetheless, armed resistance was led mainly by
individuals who
had played a military role during the hostilities of the
1970s.
Former members of the Royal Lao Army and the special
guerrilla
units supported by the CIA intermittently harassed
government
installations such as police stations and army posts,
blasted
bridges, ambushed vehicles, and blocked roads. The
honeymoon period
following the communist takeover ended abruptly when
thousands of
members of the previous government and military apparatus
failed to
be released from remote reeducation centers or "seminar
camps" (see
"Seminar Camps" and the Death of King Savang Vatthana, ch.
1).
In cooperation with Vietnamese forces in Laos, the
government
launched a military campaign intended to control
dissidents,
notably the irregular forces--made up of ethnic tribes who
had long
resisted Vietnamese and Laotian communists from their
mountain
hideouts. The military campaign, along with deteriorating
economic
conditions and government attempts to enforce political
control,
prompted an exodus of lowland Lao and Hmong in the early
years of
LPDR rule. About 10 percent of the
population--approximately
300,000 persons--fled Laos after 1975, passing through
refugee
camps in Thailand on their way to receiving refugee status
and
taking up residence in the United States, France,
Australia, and
other countries. Those who remained in the refugee camps
in
Thailand provided the recruits for the resistance
movements,
supported by funds sent from their friends and relatives
who had
resettled abroad. Resistance forces continued operating
from
sanctuaries in refugee camps across the border in
Thailand--with
numerous reports of cross-border resistance actions--much
as the
Pathet Lao had originally operated from sanctuaries in
North
Vietnam. Resistance forces are perceived as a stumbling
block for
the repatriation of individuals in refugee camps in
Thailand.
The deteriorating political situation between China and
Laos in
1980 worked in favor of the resistance forces. And,
following the
outbreak of hostilities between China and Vietnam, China
took a
greater interest in the Laotian resistance movement by
providing
sanctuary, military training, and equipment to various
resistance
elements including Kong Le's Neutralists. China's
involvement was
intended both to tie up the Vietnamese troops stationed in
Laos and
to provide China with intelligence on Vietnamese troop
movements
along the border. China also supported the political
activity of
Laotian exiles and reportedly established insurgent
training camps
in Yunnan Province for as many as 3,000 Laotian resistance
fighters. Despite training and equipment from China, the
influx of
newly trained resistance fighters were no match for the
LPA and
Vietnamese troops. The resistance was relegated to
committing acts
of sabotage against government facilities and mounting
small unit
attacks on troops. China cut off support to the resistance
when
moves toward normalization of relations between Laos and
China
began in 1986.
In 1985 the resistance movement escalated its military
campaign
against the government. Laotian resistance groups based in
Thailand
claimed to have as many as 7,000 to 8,000 members in 1985.
These
groups were active in mounting limited guerrilla
operations, such
as harassing LPA transportation routes and sabotaging
military
supply depots, and reportedly bombed the Wattai Airport in
Vientiane in 1985. In April 1985, the guerrillas
reportedly downed
a helicopter, killing several senior LPA officers, as well
as three
Soviet military advisers and two Vietnamese major
generals. General
Phoumi Nosavan's death in exile in Thailand in November
1985,
however, left a significant leadership void and caused a
serious
setback to the resistance movement.
Although the resistance movement was losing momentum in
the
early 1990s, and resistance operations do not appear to
threaten
the stability of the communist government in Vientiane,
incidents
continue. In March 1992, fighting between resistance
forces and
Laotian troops took place at Ban Tak Huai Sao. Scores of
people on
both sides were wounded and killed by artillery and small
arms
fire. In June 1992, there were reports of 300 Laotian
rebels
attacking LPDR military positions in Muang Sanakham across
the
Mekong from Chiang Khan, Thailand. In July 1992, Thai
military
officials reported sporadic antigovernment activities and
skirmishes in different parts of Laos, especially in the
remote
mountainous border areas with Thailand.
Laos continued to seek Thai action against rebel forces
remaining in Thailand, and the decline in resistance
activity was
attributable both to an improvement in relations between
Laos and
Thailand and to the once isolationist LPDR's successful
negotiations with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (see Glossary)
to close refugee camps in Thailand and
repatriate
the remaining inmates, mostly Hmong tribespeople. Not only
did
these negotiations cut off the sanctuaries, but they also
cut off
the traditional sources of new recruits and arms. Further,
the Thai
government began steps in 1992 to stop anti-LPDR forces
from using
Thailand as a base to stage attacks into Laos. Also, the
United
States pressured Thailand to cut back on tacit military
assistance
to Hmong resistance elements. As a result of these
developments,
armed resistance was reduced by mid-1994 to isolated
incidents of
little more than armed banditry--hardly a threat to the
stability
of Laos.
As of the early 1990s, it remained difficult to garner
and
confirm information about the strength of the various
resistance
forces and their activities because of the nature of their
operations and the remoteness of their locations. The main
resistance forces are the Lao National Liberation Movement
(also
known as the United Lao National Liberation Front) and the
Ethnic
Liberation Organization of Laos. The former resistance
movement,
remnants of the "Secret Army" led by Vang Pao, is
estimated to have
approximately 2,000 members in the early 1990s and is a
bitter
enemy of the latter. The Lao National Liberation Movement
continues
to work toward replacing the government with a coalition
of
opposition groups.
Data as of July 1994
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