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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Laos
Index
Relations with Vietnam
Relations with Vietnam had secretly set the strategy
for the
LPRP during the struggle to achieve full power, and the
"sudden"
opportunity to establish the LPDR in 1975 left no leeway
to
consider foreign policy alignments other than a
continuation of the
"special relations" with Vietnam. The relationship
cultivated in
the revolutionary stage predisposed Laos to Indochinese
solidarity
in the reconstruction and "socialist construction" phases
and all
but ensured that relations or alignments with China and
Thailand
would be wary and potentially unfriendly. Further, the
LPRP, unlike
the Cambodian communists under Pol Pot, was far too
accustomed to
accepting Vietnamese advice to consider striking out on
its own.
The final seizure of power by the hitherto secret LPRP in
1975
brought both a public acknowledgment of the previously
hidden North
Vietnamese guidance of the party and genuine expressions
of
gratitude by the LPRP to its Vietnamese partners. The
challenge
facing the ruling group--the construction of a socialist
society--
was seen as a natural extension of past collaboration with
North
Vietnam. The revolution was simply entering a new phase in
1975,
and the LPRP leaders congratulated themselves upon ousting
the
"imperialists" and looked forward to advice and economic
as well as
military support, which was not available from any
neighbor or
counterrevolutionary state.
LPRP leaders were accustomed to discussing policies as
well as
studying doctrine in Hanoi. They formalized governmental
contacts
with their mentors at biannual meetings of the foreign
ministers of
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam starting in 1980 and through
the joint
Vietnam-Laos Cooperative Commission, which met annually to
review
progress of various projects. Other levels of cooperation
between
Laos and Vietnam existed, for example, party-to-party
meetings and
province-to-province exchanges, as well as mass
organizations for
youths and women. Meetings of the commission were held
regularly.
The primary channels for Vietnam's influence in Laos,
however,
were the LPRP and the LPA
(see Structure and Administration of the Armed Forces
, ch. 5). In the LPRP, long-standing
collaboration and
consultation at the very top made special committees
unnecessary,
whereas in the LPA, the Vietnamese advisers, instructors,
and
troops on station constituted a pervasive, inescapable
influence,
even though they scrupulously avoided public exposure by
sticking
to their designated base areas. Cooperation in the
military field
was probably the most extensive, with logistics, training,
and
communications largely supplied by Vietnam throughout the
1970s and
1980s (heavy ordnance and aircraft were provided by the
Soviet
Union).
The phrase "special relations" came into general use by
both
parties after 1976, and in July 1977, the signing of the
twentyfive -year Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation
legitimized the stationing of Vietnamese army troops in
Laos for
its protection against hostile or counterrevolutionary
neighbors.
Another element of cooperation involved hundreds of
Vietnamese
advisers who mentored their Laotian counterparts in
virtually all
the ministries in Vientiane. Hundreds of LPRP stalwarts
and
technicians studied in institutes of Marxism-Leninism or
technical
schools in Hanoi.
The resources that Vietnam was able to bestow upon its
revolutionary partner, however, were severely limited by
the
physical destruction of war and the deadening orthodoxy of
its
economic structures and policies. However, it could put in
a good
word for its Laotian apprentices with the Soviet Union,
which in
turn could recommend economic assistance projects to its
East
European satellite states. Yet, Vietnam's influence on
Laos was
determined by economic assistance and ideology as well as
by
geographical and historical proximity. The two nations fit
together, as the leaders liked to say, "like lips and
teeth."
Vietnam provided landlocked Laos a route to the sea, and
the
mountainous region of eastern Laos provided Vietnam a
forward
strategic position for challenging Thai hegemony in the
Mekong
Valley.
During the 1980s, Vietnam's regional opponents
attributed to it
a neocolonial ambition to create an "Indochina
Federation." This
phrase can be found in early pronouncements of the ICP in
its
struggle against the French colonial structures in
Indochina. The
charge, exaggerated as it was, lost its currency once
Vietnam
withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989 and subsequently
from
Laos. Laos's dependence on Vietnam since 1975 could then
be
perceived as a natural extension of their collaboration
and
solidarity in revolution rather than as domination by
Vietnam.
With the departure of Vietnamese military
forces--except for
some construction engineers--and the passing of most
senior
Vietnamese revolutionary partners, the magnetism of the
special
relationship lost its grip. Further, Vietnam was never
able to
muster large-scale economic aid programs. It launched only
200
assistance projects between 1975 and 1985, whereas the
Soviet Union
generated considerably more in the way of contributions.
In 1992
the long-standing Vietnamese ambassador to Laos, a veteran
of
fourteen years' service, characterized the relationship as
composed
"d'amitiƩ et de coopƩration multiforme entre les pays" (of
friendship and diverse cooperation between the two
countries). This
pronouncement was far less compelling than the "objective
law of
existence and development" formulation sometimes expressed
in the
past.
Although Vietnam's historical record of leadership in
the
revolution and its military power and proximity will not
cease to
exist, Laos struck out ahead of Vietnam with its New
Economic
Mechanism to introduce market mechanisms into its economy.
In so
doing, Laos has opened the door to rapprochement with
Thailand and
China at some expense to its special dependence on
Vietnam. Laos
might have reached the same point of normalization in
following
Vietnam's economic and diplomatic change, but by moving
ahead
resolutely and responding to Thai and Chinese gestures,
Laos has
broadened its range of donors, trading partners, and
investors
independent of Vietnam's attempts to accomplish the same
goal.
Thus, Vietnam remains in the shadows as a mentor and
emergency
ally, and the tutelage of Laos has shifted dramatically to
development banks and international entrepreneurs.
Data as of July 1994
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