MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Kyrgyzstan
Index
In fact, whereas the other Central Asian republics have sometimes
complained of Russian interference, Kyrgyzstan has more often wished for
more attention and support from Moscow than it has been able to obtain.
For all the financial support that the world community has offered,
Kyrgyzstan remains economically dependent on Russia, both directly and
through Kazakstan. In early 1995, Akayev attempted to sell Russian
companies controlling shares in the republic's twenty-nine largest
industrial plants, an offer that Russia refused.
Akayev has been equally enthusiastic about more direct forms of
reintegration, such as the Euro-Asian Union that Nazarbayev proposed in
June 1994. Because Kyrgyzstan presumably would receive much more from such
a union than it would contribute, Akayev's enthusiasm has met with little
response from Russia and the other, larger states that would be involved
in such an arrangement. Akayev's invitation for Russian border guards to
take charge of Kyrgyzstan's Chinese border, a major revision of his policy
of neutrality, was another move toward reintegration (see Armed Forces,
this ch.).
The Kyrgyzstani government also has felt compelled to request Russia's
economic protection. The harsh reality of Kyrgyzstan's economic situation
means that the nation is an inevitable international client state, at
least for the foreseeable future. Despite concerted efforts to seek
international "sponsors," Akayev has not received much more than
a great deal of international good will. Even if the president had not
lived seventeen years in Russia himself and even if his advisers, family,
and friends were not all Soviet-era intellectuals with a high degree of
familiarity with Russia, economic necessity probably would push Kyrgyzstan
further toward Russia.
On his February 1994 visit to Moscow, Akayev signed several economic
agreements. Having promised the republic a 75-billion-ruble line of credit
(presumably for use in 1994) and some US$65 million in trade agreements,
Russia also promised to extend to Kyrgyzstan most-favored-nation status
for the purchase of oil and other fuels. For its part, Kyrgyzstan agreed
to the creation of a Kyrgyzstani-Russian investment company, which would
purchase idle defense-related factories in the republic to provide
employment for the increasingly dissatisfied Russian population of
Kyrgyzstan. In early 1995, prime ministers Jumagulov of Kyrgyzstan and
Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia signed a series of agreements establishing
bilateral coordination of economic reform in the two states, further
binding Kyrgyzstan to Russia. After lobbying hard for inclusion,
Kyrgyzstan became a member of the customs union that Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakstan established in February 1996.
For its part, Russia sees aid to Kyrgyzstan as a successful precedent in
its new policy of gaining influence in its "near abroad," the
states that once were Soviet republics. Russia does not want a massive
in-migration of Russians from the new republics; some 2 million ethnic
Russians moved back to Russia between 1992 and 1995, with at least that
many again expected by the end of the century. Akayev, on the other hand,
must find a way to stem the loss of his Russian population, which already
has caused an enormous deficit of doctors, teachers, and engineers.
For these reasons, despite opposition from Kyrgyz nationalists and other
independence-minded politicians, in 1995 Akayev granted the request of
Russian president Boris N. Yeltsin to review the constitutional provision
making Kyrgyz the sole official language. Early in 1996, Kyrgyzstan took
legal steps toward making Russian the republic's second official language,
subject to amendment of the constitution. That initiative coincided with
the customs union signed with Russia, Kazakstan, and Belarus in February
1996. The long-term success of Akayev's search for reintegration is
questionable because of Kyrgyzstan's minimal strategic importance and the
potential cost to an outside country supporting the republic's shaky
economy.
Data as of March 1996
|
|