MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Kuwait
Index
The invasion and occupation had a transformative effect
on
virtually every aspect of Kuwaiti life. Iraqi troops
plundered
and looted the city of Kuwait. Iraqi occupation forces,
according
to reports of human rights monitoring groups, tortured and
summarily executed those suspected of involvement in the
underground opposition movement that quickly emerged.
In the course of the occupation, more than half the
population, foreigner and citizen alike, fled Kuwait.
After the
reestablishment of Kuwaiti sovereignty in February 1991,
and the
restoration of basic services soon afterward, the
population
began to return. In May 1991, the government opened the
doors to
all Kuwaiti citizens who wished to return. The government
was far
more reluctant to readmit nonnationals, whom it considered
a
security risk and whom it regarded as not needed in prewar
numbers owing to the postwar constriction of the economy.
Consequently, relatively fewer nonnationals were allowed
to
return. A National Bank of Kuwait report estimated the
total
population of Kuwait in March 1992 at 1,175,000 people, 53
percent of whom were Kuwaitis, compared with an estimated
27
percent Kuwaitis of the 2,155,000 population on the eve of
the
Iraqi invasion in 1990.
The postoccupation Kuwaiti population differs sharply
from
that before the invasion. The population is divided
psychologically between those who experienced the direct
horror
of the Iraqi occupation and survived and those who spent
the war
abroad in what seemed a relatively comfortable exile to
many of
those who stayed in Kuwait. But the shared experience has
unified
the country in other ways. Because Kuwait is a small
country with
large family groups, almost every Kuwaiti lost family
members to
the Iraqi forces, and there is continuing uncertainty over
the
600 or more Kuwaitis that remain prisoners in Iraq. The
fate of
those who disappeared is an issue of national concern.
Regardless
of personal losses and experiences during the occupation,
the
society as a whole has been traumatized by the memory of
the
invasion and by the uncertain future. A government led by
a
ruling family that fled in the face of the Iraqi danger
can do
little to dispel this ambient fear. One expression of the
insecurity is a general concern about lawlessness, both a
breakdown in some of the peaceable norms that had united
prewar
Kuwait and a breakdown in the government's ability to
enforce
those norms owing to the widespread possession of guns (a
result
of the war) and the reluctance of a still fearful
population to
return those guns to the state. After the initial lawless
months
following liberation, the government recovered control of
internal security and reinstituted the rule of law.
The position of nonnationals in postwar Kuwait is very
different from that of citizens. Perhaps two-thirds of the
foreign population fled during the invasion and
occupation. Most
of those who fled have not been allowed to return, notably
the
large Palestinian population, who, owing to the public
support of
Iraq by many prominent Palestinians outside Kuwait, became
the
target of public and private animosity in the months after
liberation. Before the war, Palestinians composed Kuwait's
largest foreign population, numbering perhaps 400,000. By
1992
that number had fallen to fewer than 30,000. In the first
postwar
days, many Palestinians who remained became victims of
private
vigilante groups, of which some were apparently linked to
members
of the ruling family. Human rights monitoring
organizations such
as Amnesty International and Middle East Watch have
reported the
murder of dozens of Palestinians and the arrest and
torture of
hundreds more. The most dramatic transformation is the
exodus of
the bulk of the Palestinian population. The reaction
against
Palestinians and other members of groups or states whose
leaders
had supported Iraq expressed itself in 1991 in a series of
show
trials of alleged collaborators, carried out, according to
international observers and human rights monitoring
groups, with
little regard for due process. In the face of
international
criticism, the amir commuted the many death sentences,
some given
for rather small offenses, that the court had handed down.
Trials
that took place in late 1992, however, were regarded by
international human rights groups as being fair and
respecting
due process.
One of the first policy decisions the government made
on
returning to Kuwait was to reduce Kuwait's dependence on
foreign
labor in an effort to ensure that Kuwaitis would
henceforth
remain a majority in their country. Former foreign workers
are
unhappy with this policy, but there is little they can do.
Divided between those who oppose Iraq and those who do
not, they
pose no unified threat. Their energy has been dissipated
by
individual efforts to arrange to stay. The government and
population alike remain deeply suspicious of the
nonnational
population.
After the war, the government announced it planned to
restrict the number of resident foreigners, to keep the
nonnational population below 50 percent of the total
population,
and to ensure that no single non-Kuwaiti nationality would
make
up more than 10 percent of the total population. In
December
1991, the government closed most domestic staff employment
agencies and drew up new regulations covering the
licensing of
domestic staff. In early 1992, the Ministry of Interior
announced
new rules for issuing visas to dependents of expatriate
workers,
limiting them to higher wage earners. Looking further into
the
future, the government approved a resolution in March 1992
doubling to US$14,000 the sum given to young men at
marriage in
an effort to encourage local population growth. In June
1992, the
government announced it had set aside US$842 million for
end-of-
service payments to foreigners.
The new policy of limiting the number of foreign
workers has
had serious economic consequences. Foreigners represent
many of
Kuwait's top technical and managerial workers. The exodus
of most
of the nonnational population has created special problems
for an
education system that in 1990 was still heavily dependent
on
foreign teachers. The direct damage inflicted on school
property
and looting by Iraqi forces aggravated the education
problem.
Nonetheless, in September 1991 the university and
vocational
schools reopened for the first time since the occupation.
The exodus of foreigners also has hampered the health
care
system, as did the systematic looting of some the
country's
modern health equipment by Iraqi forces. The invasion and
war
added some new health concerns, which include long-term
deleterious health effects owing to the environmental
damage and
to the psychological impact of the war.
Nevertheless, the same forces that generated a prewar
need
for labor remain operative. A number of years are needed
to train
Kuwaitis for many of the positions held by foreigners. In
the
interim, indications are that the preinvasion shift away
from
Arab and toward Asian labor will continue. One small
benefit of
the new labor policy is that the government will save some
money
on services previously provided to the larger foreign
population.
The basic shortage of sufficient quantities of national
manpower,
coupled with a political and social reluctance to increase
womanpower, limit the extent to which the government can
do
without imported labor.
Data as of January 1993
Postwar Society
The invasion and occupation had a transformative effect
on
virtually every aspect of Kuwaiti life. Iraqi troops
plundered
and looted the city of Kuwait. Iraqi occupation forces,
according
to reports of human rights monitoring groups, tortured and
summarily executed those suspected of involvement in the
underground opposition movement that quickly emerged.
In the course of the occupation, more than half the
population, foreigner and citizen alike, fled Kuwait.
After the
reestablishment of Kuwaiti sovereignty in February 1991,
and the
restoration of basic services soon afterward, the
population
began to return. In May 1991, the government opened the
doors to
all Kuwaiti citizens who wished to return. The government
was far
more reluctant to readmit nonnationals, whom it considered
a
security risk and whom it regarded as not needed in prewar
numbers owing to the postwar constriction of the economy.
Consequently, relatively fewer nonnationals were allowed
to
return. A National Bank of Kuwait report estimated the
total
population of Kuwait in March 1992 at 1,175,000 people, 53
percent of whom were Kuwaitis, compared with an estimated
27
percent Kuwaitis of the 2,155,000 population on the eve of
the
Iraqi invasion in 1990.
The postoccupation Kuwaiti population differs sharply
from
that before the invasion. The population is divided
psychologically between those who experienced the direct
horror
of the Iraqi occupation and survived and those who spent
the war
abroad in what seemed a relatively comfortable exile to
many of
those who stayed in Kuwait. But the shared experience has
unified
the country in other ways. Because Kuwait is a small
country with
large family groups, almost every Kuwaiti lost family
members to
the Iraqi forces, and there is continuing uncertainty over
the
600 or more Kuwaitis that remain prisoners in Iraq. The
fate of
those who disappeared is an issue of national concern.
Regardless
of personal losses and experiences during the occupation,
the
society as a whole has been traumatized by the memory of
the
invasion and by the uncertain future. A government led by
a
ruling family that fled in the face of the Iraqi danger
can do
little to dispel this ambient fear. One expression of the
insecurity is a general concern about lawlessness, both a
breakdown in some of the peaceable norms that had united
prewar
Kuwait and a breakdown in the government's ability to
enforce
those norms owing to the widespread possession of guns (a
result
of the war) and the reluctance of a still fearful
population to
return those guns to the state. After the initial lawless
months
following liberation, the government recovered control of
internal security and reinstituted the rule of law.
The position of nonnationals in postwar Kuwait is very
different from that of citizens. Perhaps two-thirds of the
foreign population fled during the invasion and
occupation. Most
of those who fled have not been allowed to return, notably
the
large Palestinian population, who, owing to the public
support of
Iraq by many prominent Palestinians outside Kuwait, became
the
target of public and private animosity in the months after
liberation. Before the war, Palestinians composed Kuwait's
largest foreign population, numbering perhaps 400,000. By
1992
that number had fallen to fewer than 30,000. In the first
postwar
days, many Palestinians who remained became victims of
private
vigilante groups, of which some were apparently linked to
members
of the ruling family. Human rights monitoring
organizations such
as Amnesty International and Middle East Watch have
reported the
murder of dozens of Palestinians and the arrest and
torture of
hundreds more. The most dramatic transformation is the
exodus of
the bulk of the Palestinian population. The reaction
against
Palestinians and other members of groups or states whose
leaders
had supported Iraq expressed itself in 1991 in a series of
show
trials of alleged collaborators, carried out, according to
international observers and human rights monitoring
groups, with
little regard for due process. In the face of
international
criticism, the amir commuted the many death sentences,
some given
for rather small offenses, that the court had handed down.
Trials
that took place in late 1992, however, were regarded by
international human rights groups as being fair and
respecting
due process.
One of the first policy decisions the government made
on
returning to Kuwait was to reduce Kuwait's dependence on
foreign
labor in an effort to ensure that Kuwaitis would
henceforth
remain a majority in their country. Former foreign workers
are
unhappy with this policy, but there is little they can do.
Divided between those who oppose Iraq and those who do
not, they
pose no unified threat. Their energy has been dissipated
by
individual efforts to arrange to stay. The government and
population alike remain deeply suspicious of the
nonnational
population.
After the war, the government announced it planned to
restrict the number of resident foreigners, to keep the
nonnational population below 50 percent of the total
population,
and to ensure that no single non-Kuwaiti nationality would
make
up more than 10 percent of the total population. In
December
1991, the government closed most domestic staff employment
agencies and drew up new regulations covering the
licensing of
domestic staff. In early 1992, the Ministry of Interior
announced
new rules for issuing visas to dependents of expatriate
workers,
limiting them to higher wage earners. Looking further into
the
future, the government approved a resolution in March 1992
doubling to US$14,000 the sum given to young men at
marriage in
an effort to encourage local population growth. In June
1992, the
government announced it had set aside US$842 million for
end-of-
service payments to foreigners.
The new policy of limiting the number of foreign
workers has
had serious economic consequences. Foreigners represent
many of
Kuwait's top technical and managerial workers. The exodus
of most
of the nonnational population has created special problems
for an
education system that in 1990 was still heavily dependent
on
foreign teachers. The direct damage inflicted on school
property
and looting by Iraqi forces aggravated the education
problem.
Nonetheless, in September 1991 the university and
vocational
schools reopened for the first time since the occupation.
The exodus of foreigners also has hampered the health
care
system, as did the systematic looting of some the
country's
modern health equipment by Iraqi forces. The invasion and
war
added some new health concerns, which include long-term
deleterious health effects owing to the environmental
damage and
to the psychological impact of the war.
Nevertheless, the same forces that generated a prewar
need
for labor remain operative. A number of years are needed
to train
Kuwaitis for many of the positions held by foreigners. In
the
interim, indications are that the preinvasion shift away
from
Arab and toward Asian labor will continue. One small
benefit of
the new labor policy is that the government will save some
money
on services previously provided to the larger foreign
population.
The basic shortage of sufficient quantities of national
manpower,
coupled with a political and social reluctance to increase
womanpower, limit the extent to which the government can
do
without imported labor.
Data as of January 1993
|
|