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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Kuwait
Index
Kuwait's postwar foreign policy is therefore based on
two
assumptions. The first is that security, notably with
regard to
Iraq, is its primary concern. The second is that security
ultimately can be guaranteed only by the United States. It
is
clear that Kuwait alone, or even Kuwait with the support
of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), established in May 1981,
and
other Arab members of the coalition--a formal plan, known
as the
Damascus Declaration, to include Egypt and Syria in gulf
defense
arrangements was moribund soon after its issuance--cannot
provide
for its own defense needs
(see Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council
, ch. 7). In August 1991, Kuwait and
the
United States signed a US$81 million Foreign Military
Sales
agreement. In September 1991, Kuwait signed a formal
ten-year
defense agreement with the United States that permits the
United
States to pre-position weapons and conduct military
exercises in
Kuwait at Kuwaiti expense. However, the agreement does not
provide for establishing a permanent United States base
there. In
1992 Kuwaiti and United States forces carried out joint
exercises
under the defense agreement. Kuwait has backed up its
formal
security arrangements with a close political and economic
relationship with the United States. It has given much of
its
postwar reconstruction business to United States firms,
including
civil reconstruction contracts that have been awarded
through the
United States Army Corps of Engineers and many contracts
directly
related to defense needs. The new pro-United States policy
is not
without its detractors. In the summer of 1992, the speaker
of
Kuwait's since-disbanded National Council asserted that
the
United States ambassador was interfering in internal
Kuwaiti
affairs. The Kuwaiti government and numerous Kuwaitis,
however,
condemned these remarks.
Kuwait maintains similarly close ties with other
members of
the coalition, signing defense agreements with Britain and
in
1992 negotiating an agreement with France. It is seeking
similar
agreements with the remaining Security Council permanent
members,
Russia and China. It remains very close to Saudi Arabia.
Relations with a regionally resurgent Iran remain
ambivalent.
Kuwait's relationship with Iran improved dramatically
after the
Iraqi invasion, which, in drawing attention to Iraq's
expansionist ambitions, seemingly vindicated Iran's
wartime
position. An inevitable conflict remains, however, between
Kuwait's postwar aim of maintaining a high and visible
level of
United States support and Iran's desire to limit United
States
presence in the gulf. In mid-1992 this tension was seen in
a
minor dispute over the fate of Kuwait Airways passenger
aircraft
flown by Iraq to Iran during the war. Kuwait demanded the
swift
return of the aircraft, whereas Iran demanded US$90
million for
servicing them while they remained in Iran.
Kuwaiti policy toward states that had supported Iraq
has been
unforgiving. One of the hard lessons Kuwait's rulers
learned from
the Iran-Iraq War is that foreign aid does not buy
popularity or
enduring political support. Some of its largest aid was to
Jordan, Sudan, and Yemen, countries that nonetheless
failed to
support the coalition. Kuwait cut those countries from its
foreign aid program once sovereignty was restored. Kuwait
was
also a major donor to the Palestine Liberation
Organization
(PLO). The PLO's wartime support of Iraq also resulted in
severance of Kuwaiti monetary and political support. In
June
1992, the National Council approved denying economic aid
to Arab
countries that supported Iraq's invasion. Although foreign
aid
will continue as a feature of Kuwait's foreign policy,
Kuwait's
limited postinvasion revenues and its experience during
the
occupation indicate that such aid would decrease.
Data as of January 1993
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