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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Kuwait
Index
In the summer of 1990, Kuwait had an estimated
population of
2,155,000. The most dramatic division in this preinvasion
population was that between the national population of
Kuwaiti
citizens and the larger population, more than 60 percent
of the
total population, of foreign workers (see
table 2,
Appendix).
The percentage of foreigners in the population grew
steadily
after World War II, following the rise in oil revenues and
the
consequent government development programs with their
sudden need
for substantial labor. The labor market came to consist
increasingly of foreigners for a number of reasons. The
most
important factor was the small size of the indigenous
population
and, in the early years, their low level of education. As
oil
revenues and government investment in education produced a
generation of highly educated Kuwaitis, they began to
replace
foreigners at the highest levels of employment, but even
this
highly educated population was small. The low
participation rates
of women in the work force also contributed to the
reliance on
foreign workers. Restrictions on female dress and behavior
in
public and consequently on labor force participation are
not as
strong as they are elsewhere in the gulf, notably in Saudi
Arabia. Customary norms, however, coupled with higher
family
incomes, which reduce the need to employ more family
members and
lessen the incentive for individuals to undertake the more
unpleasant sorts of work, combine to promote a lower labor
force
participation rate in the national population.
The importance of foreign workers to the economy in the
postWorld War II period is difficult to exaggerate. Most of
these
foreigners are male. Most are employed by the state. Most
are in
Kuwait for relatively short periods (40 percent stay less
than
five years); Arabs stay somewhat longer than non-Arabs.
Historically, Arabs constituted the bulk of the
non-Kuwaiti
population. In addition to a large number of Palestinian
workers,
estimated at 400,000 in 1990, there are numerous
Egyptians,
Iraqis, Syrians, and Lebanese. A smaller but significant
and
growing number of workers come from Asia. In the early
1980s, the
composition of the work force shifted, and by 1985
slightly more
than one-half the foreign workers (52 percent) were Asian
and
less than one-half (46 percent) were Arab. Africans,
Europeans,
and United States citizens constitute the remainder. The
government favors Asian workers because of their lower
labor
costs, and, because they are unable to speak Arabic or lay
a
claim to oil revenues on the basis of Arab nationalism,
Asian
workers are more apt to return home in a few years, thus
raising
fewer social and political issues.
The foreign population does not enjoy the economic and
political rights of the national population. Not being
citizens,
they can neither vote nor run for seats in the National
Assembly.
They are not allowed to own real property. They cannot
form their
own unions; although they can join Kuwaiti unions, they
are
prohibited from voting or running for union offices.
Acquiring
Kuwaiti citizenship is very difficult, and the number of
naturalized citizens remains low.
The large number of foreigners creates social tensions
between foreigners and the indigenous population. Foreign
workers, particularly those who have worked many years in
Kuwait,
resent the discrimination against them. Citizens often
view
foreign workers with suspicion, if not hostility. Even
before the
Persian Gulf War, public debate often focused on a
perceived
compromise between Kuwait's economic needs and its
security
needs.
Although the most important social division in the
country is
between citizens and foreigners, the indigenous population
is
internally divided along a number of lines as well. The
first is
sectarian. The majority of Kuwaiti nationals are
Sunnis (see Glossary)
Muslims; the minority are
Shia (see Glossary).
Figures
have never been published on the number of Shia, but
estimates in
the 1980s ranged from 15 to 25 percent of the national
population. Shia are a diverse group. Some are Arab, many
the
descendants of immigrants from Ash Sharqiyah (Eastern
Province)
in Saudi Arabia or from Bahrain. Others come from Arab
families
who moved from the Arabian side of the gulf to Iran,
stayed
awhile, and then returned. Others are of Iranian origin,
who
often speak Farsi as well as Arabic at home and sometimes
maintain business or family ties with Iranians across the
gulf.
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent
Iran-Iraq
War of 1980-88, this Shia community experienced a renewed
sense
of sectarian identification. The identification resulted
from
sympathy with their revolutionary coreligionists in Iran
and from
increasing government and social discrimination. During
the
1980s, the tension between Sunnis and Shia, which had
erupted
occasionally in the past, became somewhat sharper.
Kuwaitis are also divided to a certain extent along
class
lines. Although the national population is generally well
off
because of the state's generous employment policies
regarding
nationals and its extensive social services, important
divisions
nonetheless exist between the country's economic elite and
the
rest of the population. The wealthiest Kuwaitis are
members
either of the ruling family or of what was once a powerful
and
still distinct merchant class. Many of these are
descendants of
the Bani Utub, the original central Arabian tribe that
settled
Kuwait in the eighteenth century. The most important and
wealthiest of the Bani Utub are members of the Al Sabah,
the
ruling family of Kuwait. The economic elite is largely
Sunni.
However, some Shia families and individual Shia are also
wealthy.
Despite these internal divisions, the national
population is
also characterized by a strong sense of national identity.
There
are no important ethnic divisions: the national population
is
overwhelmingly Arab. The major sectarian divisions are
subsumed
in the larger shared Islamic identity. And unlike many of
its
neighbors, Kuwait is not a twentieth-century colonial
fabrication. It has been an autonomous political and
social unit
since the eighteenth century. In the intervening years, a
strong
sense of local identity has arisen. This national sense
has been
deeply reinforced by the Iraqi occupation.
Data as of January 1993
Traditional dhow, characteristic of Persian Gulf fishing
and trading
Courtesy Aramco World
Population
In the summer of 1990, Kuwait had an estimated
population of
2,155,000. The most dramatic division in this preinvasion
population was that between the national population of
Kuwaiti
citizens and the larger population, more than 60 percent
of the
total population, of foreign workers (see
table 2,
Appendix).
The percentage of foreigners in the population grew
steadily
after World War II, following the rise in oil revenues and
the
consequent government development programs with their
sudden need
for substantial labor. The labor market came to consist
increasingly of foreigners for a number of reasons. The
most
important factor was the small size of the indigenous
population
and, in the early years, their low level of education. As
oil
revenues and government investment in education produced a
generation of highly educated Kuwaitis, they began to
replace
foreigners at the highest levels of employment, but even
this
highly educated population was small. The low
participation rates
of women in the work force also contributed to the
reliance on
foreign workers. Restrictions on female dress and behavior
in
public and consequently on labor force participation are
not as
strong as they are elsewhere in the gulf, notably in Saudi
Arabia. Customary norms, however, coupled with higher
family
incomes, which reduce the need to employ more family
members and
lessen the incentive for individuals to undertake the more
unpleasant sorts of work, combine to promote a lower labor
force
participation rate in the national population.
The importance of foreign workers to the economy in the
postWorld War II period is difficult to exaggerate. Most of
these
foreigners are male. Most are employed by the state. Most
are in
Kuwait for relatively short periods (40 percent stay less
than
five years); Arabs stay somewhat longer than non-Arabs.
Historically, Arabs constituted the bulk of the
non-Kuwaiti
population. In addition to a large number of Palestinian
workers,
estimated at 400,000 in 1990, there are numerous
Egyptians,
Iraqis, Syrians, and Lebanese. A smaller but significant
and
growing number of workers come from Asia. In the early
1980s, the
composition of the work force shifted, and by 1985
slightly more
than one-half the foreign workers (52 percent) were Asian
and
less than one-half (46 percent) were Arab. Africans,
Europeans,
and United States citizens constitute the remainder. The
government favors Asian workers because of their lower
labor
costs, and, because they are unable to speak Arabic or lay
a
claim to oil revenues on the basis of Arab nationalism,
Asian
workers are more apt to return home in a few years, thus
raising
fewer social and political issues.
The foreign population does not enjoy the economic and
political rights of the national population. Not being
citizens,
they can neither vote nor run for seats in the National
Assembly.
They are not allowed to own real property. They cannot
form their
own unions; although they can join Kuwaiti unions, they
are
prohibited from voting or running for union offices.
Acquiring
Kuwaiti citizenship is very difficult, and the number of
naturalized citizens remains low.
The large number of foreigners creates social tensions
between foreigners and the indigenous population. Foreign
workers, particularly those who have worked many years in
Kuwait,
resent the discrimination against them. Citizens often
view
foreign workers with suspicion, if not hostility. Even
before the
Persian Gulf War, public debate often focused on a
perceived
compromise between Kuwait's economic needs and its
security
needs.
Although the most important social division in the
country is
between citizens and foreigners, the indigenous population
is
internally divided along a number of lines as well. The
first is
sectarian. The majority of Kuwaiti nationals are
Sunnis (see Glossary)
Muslims; the minority are
Shia (see Glossary).
Figures
have never been published on the number of Shia, but
estimates in
the 1980s ranged from 15 to 25 percent of the national
population. Shia are a diverse group. Some are Arab, many
the
descendants of immigrants from Ash Sharqiyah (Eastern
Province)
in Saudi Arabia or from Bahrain. Others come from Arab
families
who moved from the Arabian side of the gulf to Iran,
stayed
awhile, and then returned. Others are of Iranian origin,
who
often speak Farsi as well as Arabic at home and sometimes
maintain business or family ties with Iranians across the
gulf.
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent
Iran-Iraq
War of 1980-88, this Shia community experienced a renewed
sense
of sectarian identification. The identification resulted
from
sympathy with their revolutionary coreligionists in Iran
and from
increasing government and social discrimination. During
the
1980s, the tension between Sunnis and Shia, which had
erupted
occasionally in the past, became somewhat sharper.
Kuwaitis are also divided to a certain extent along
class
lines. Although the national population is generally well
off
because of the state's generous employment policies
regarding
nationals and its extensive social services, important
divisions
nonetheless exist between the country's economic elite and
the
rest of the population. The wealthiest Kuwaitis are
members
either of the ruling family or of what was once a powerful
and
still distinct merchant class. Many of these are
descendants of
the Bani Utub, the original central Arabian tribe that
settled
Kuwait in the eighteenth century. The most important and
wealthiest of the Bani Utub are members of the Al Sabah,
the
ruling family of Kuwait. The economic elite is largely
Sunni.
However, some Shia families and individual Shia are also
wealthy.
Despite these internal divisions, the national
population is
also characterized by a strong sense of national identity.
There
are no important ethnic divisions: the national population
is
overwhelmingly Arab. The major sectarian divisions are
subsumed
in the larger shared Islamic identity. And unlike many of
its
neighbors, Kuwait is not a twentieth-century colonial
fabrication. It has been an autonomous political and
social unit
since the eighteenth century. In the intervening years, a
strong
sense of local identity has arisen. This national sense
has been
deeply reinforced by the Iraqi occupation.
Data as of January 1993
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