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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Kuwait
Index
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied
Kuwait.
On February 26, 1991, United States-led coalition forces
restored
Kuwaiti sovereignty. These paired events represented both
the
failure and the success of Kuwait's foreign policy.
The primary impetus for the invasion lay in the
dynamics of
internal Iraqi politics--economic and political concerns
after
the long, debilitating, and ultimately unsuccessful
Iran-Iraq
War. However, economic and political relations between
Iraq and
Kuwait provided the context for conflict.
Iraq's first financial disagreement with Kuwait related
to
oil policy. Iraq objected to Kuwait's production beyond
OPEC
quotas and the consequent contribution that overproduction
made
to lowering oil prices internationally. Iraq also claimed
Kuwait
was siphoning oil from the shared Ar Rumaylah oil field
straddling the Iraq-Kuwait border. During the Iran-Iraq
War, Iraq
ceased production from its side of the field while Kuwait
continued operations. Kuwait asserted it had taken oil
only from
its own side of the field; Iraq claimed it had poached.
Another
financial disagreement with Kuwait concerned the estimated
US$13
billion that Kuwait had lent Iraq during the Iran-Iraq
War, a
debt that Iraq wished Kuwait to forgive. These financial
claims
were set in a broader context. The Iraqi government
experienced
serious financial strains following the war with Iran;
nearby
Kuwait had apparently ample resources. To obtain these
resources,
Iraq put forward whatever financial claims it could.
In addition to economic issues, Iraq also disagreed
with
Kuwait over borders. This claim had two somewhat
contradictory
dimensions. Iraq first disputed the location of the border
and
then reaffirmed its claim to all of Kuwait. The latter
claim
rested on the argument that Iraq had once ruled Kuwait.
This
assertion to historical sovereignty over Kuwait was not
solidly
grounded: Kuwait had always been a self-governing
political
entity. Despite Ottoman Iraq's historic interest in
Kuwait, it
had never ruled the shaykhdom. When Kuwait was first
established,
the area was under the control of the Bani Khalid of
Arabia, not
the Ottomans. For a brief period in the late nineteenth
century,
Kuwait moved closer to the Ottomans, and for a short time
Abd
Allah as Salim held the Ottoman title of qaimaqam,
or
provincial governor; part of the Iraqi claim invoked this
fact
(see Ruling Family
, this ch.). After Britain and Kuwait
signed
the 1899 treaty, Ottoman forces, anxious to overthrow
Mubarak,
had no place in the shaykhdom. British forces came to
Mubarak's
support as needed in favor of Kuwaiti independence.
Kuwait's status was again a matter of international
discussion in the period around World War I. In 1913
British and
Ottoman representatives drew up the draft Anglo-Ottoman
Convention in which Britain recognized Ottoman suzerainty
over
Kuwait but at the same time declared Kuwait an autonomous
district of the Ottoman Empire. The convention conditioned
recognition of Ottoman interests in Kuwait on the promise
of
Ottoman noninterference in the internal affairs of Kuwait.
The
Iraqi government's later assertion that this constituted
British
recognition of Iraqi jurisdiction in Kuwait was weak. The
document specifically recognized Kuwait's historical
political
autonomy and disallowed Iraqi interference in Kuwait's
domestic
affairs. In any event, the document was never ratified,
and at
the beginning of World War I, Britain moved closer to
Kuwait, not
further away. At the end of World War I, the Ottoman
Empire was
dissolved. In the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey
renounced
claims to all former Ottoman provinces.
In the interwar years, the border question again arose.
In
1922 the British convened a conference at Al Uqayr in
Saudi
Arabia that set Saudi Arabia's borders with Kuwait and
Iraq but
not Kuwait and Iraq's border with each other. However, in
1923
the British high commissioner in Iraq sent a memorandum to
the
political agent in Kuwait laying out the border between
Kuwait
and Iraq. When in 1932 Iraq applied to the League of
Nations for
membership as an independent state, it included
information on
the borders from the memorandum.
Iraq thus seemed to be moving toward acceptance of its
border
with Kuwait when the discovery of oil, the promise of more
Kuwaiti oil revenues, and the related Majlis Movement
occurred.
As the Majlis Movement grew, Iraq began to support
dissidents in
Kuwait and simultaneously put forward claims to Kuwait.
Iraq also
explored the idea of building a port on Kuwait's coast to
give
Iraq an alternative to its port of Basra. Iraq began
expressing
interest in the islands of Bubiyan and Warbah as well. The
Majlis
Movement in Kuwait failed, however, and Iraq had to await
another
opportunity.
As long as Britain was there to support Kuwait, Iraq
could do
little more than assert a verbal claim. When Kuwait became
independent in 1961, the Iraqi government tested Britain's
resolve by bringing forces to Kuwait's border in support
of its
claims on the shaykhdom. British and Arab League forces,
however,
forestalled any Iraqi military action.
In 1963 a new government came to power in Iraq. Anxious
to
mend fences, this government formally recognized Kuwait
and
signed an agreement recognizing the borders between the
two
states as those set forth in Iraq's 1932 application to
the
League of Nations. Iraq then dropped its objection to
Kuwait's
membership in the UN and in the Arab League and
established
diplomatic relations, including the exchange of
ambassadors, with
Kuwait.
Nonetheless, tensions lingered. During the 1960s and
1970s, a
series of border incidents took place, and there was
continuing
Iraqi pressure for Kuwait to relinquish, or at least offer
longterm leases on, the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. In the
1980s,
relations between the two states appeared to improve as
Iraq,
desperate for Kuwaiti financial support in its war with
Iran, was
careful not to press its unpopular claims. Both sides
claimed
sincerity in their historical effort to negotiate the
border
issue. When the war ended, however, the border issue
reappeared.
The dispute itself does not seem to have been a
precipitating
factor in the invasion. When Iraq entered Kuwait in August
1990,
it claimed to do so in support of a Kuwaiti rebellion.
When no
pro-Iraqi rebellion (or even bloc) emerged, and Iraq found
itself
unable to set up a pliable Kuwaiti government, it was
forced to
resort to direct occupation. It was only at this point
that the
Iraqi claim to Kuwait resurfaced. On August 9, one week
after the
invasion, Iraq formally annexed Kuwait, adding the
northern part
of the country, including the Ar Rumaylah oil field and
the
islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, to Iraq's province of Basra
and
creating a separate province out of the rest of Kuwait.
After Kuwait's liberation, the UN established a
five-member
boundary commission to demarcate the Kuwait-Iraq boundary
in
accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687, which
reaffirmed the inviolability of the Iraq-Kuwait border. In
April
1992, the commission announced its findings, which
demarcated the
Kuwaiti border with Iraq about 570 meters to the north
near the
Iraqi town of Safwan and slightly north in the region of
the
contested Ar Rumaylah oil field. These modifications gave
Kuwait
six oil wells in the field and part of the Iraqi naval
base of
Umm Qasr. Kuwait accepted the commission's finding and
announced
it intended to build a security fence along its border
with Iraq
as an advance warning system. Iraq responded to the
findings with
an angry letter in May to the UN secretary general
rejecting the
commission's findings. Domestically, it continued to refer
to
Kuwait's territory as an integral part of Iraq. Physical
demarcation of the land boundary was completed in November
1992.
The postwar period thus opened with many of the issues
still
unresolved that had played a role in precipitating the
invasion
and war. In Iraq the government of Saddam Husayn continued
to
assert its prewar claim to Kuwait, coloring Kuwait's
postwar
foreign policy. As long as Saddam Husayn remains at the
helm in
Iraq, Kuwait can feel no real security. Even were he to be
replaced, much of the insecurity that haunts Kuwait and
drives
its foreign policy would remain. Kuwaitis see the war as
one
waged by the Iraqi people and remember previous Iraqi
promises to
respect Kuwait's sovereignty. Kuwait will continue to see
Iraq as
a serious threat, regardless of what transpires in Iraq's
leadership.
Data as of January 1993
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