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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Kuwait
Index
Despite the devastation of the Kuwaiti economy during
the
invasion and occupation, recovery has proceeded with
surprising
speed. This was partly because some damage, particularly
of the
infrastructure, was not as serious as first feared and
partly
because the government, anxious to restore the
population's
weakened confidence in its ability to administer, has
given
reconstruction and recovery of basic services a high
priority.
The oil industry, which was badly damaged, has been a
top
priority because it is the source of revenues to sustain
other
government spending programs. The most dramatic economic
reconstruction effort went toward capping the more than
700 oil
wells set afire by retreating Iraqi forces. In addition to
an
estimated 2 percent of the country's 100 billion barrels
of
reserves lost in the oil fires, Kuwait had to pay for
putting out
fires and repairing damaged refineries, pipelines, and
other oil
infrastructure. By January 1992, oil output had risen to
550,000
bpd. By June 1992, it was back to nearly 1 million bpd.
Nineteen
new wells were drilled to replace those damaged by the
occupation.
The government hoped to raise production to 2 million
bpd by
the end of 1993. During the invasion, Iraq destroyed or
incapacitated Kuwait's entire 700,000 bpd refining
capacity at
its three refineries. But by April 1992, production levels
rose
to 300,000 bpd. Nonetheless, there was concern that the
rapid
return to production might have damaged Kuwait's oil
reservoirs
beyond the damage done by retreating Iraqi forces,
lowering its
total future reserves. Accordingly, KOC contracted with
several
international companies to assess reservoir damage.
However, the
government also has been under tremendous pressure to
increase
oil production quickly to pay for war and postwar
expenses. In
the mid-1980s, overseas investments outstripped oil as the
primary source of revenues. The expenses of war, postwar
reconstruction, and investment irregularities that were
being
uncovered in late 1992 have forced the government to use
substantial portions of its investment principal, and in
the
1990s oil is again expected to be the major revenue
source.
Restoring oil operations was expensive. In January
1992, the
minister of oil announced Kuwait had already spent US$1.5
billion
for putting out fires and planned to spend another US$8 to
US$10
billion to repair further damage. A National Bank of
Kuwait
report in mid-1992 estimated that reconstruction expenses
in the
oil sector for the 1992-95 period would reach US$6.5
billion.
The rest of the economy also suffered, although the
effects
were not as severe as the oil-well fires. The banking
sector,
suffering the shock waves of the Suq al Manakh stock
market crash
in 1982, recovered slowly from the combined effects of
that crash
and the invasion. The agenda of the returned government
included
bank reform. In December 1991, the government announced a
comprehensive settlement plan for bad debts, the
outstanding
issue of the Suq al Manakh crash. The plan involved
government
purchase of the entire domestic loan portfolio of the
country's
local banking system. The government agreed to buy US$20
billion
of domestic debt from eleven commercial banks and
investment
companies in exchange for bonds. This plan removed the
concerns
of Kuwaitis, who would be obliged to repay debts, if at
all, on
more modest terms, and of banks, concerned about
nonperforming
loans. Although Shaykh Salim al Abd al Aziz Al Sabah,
governor of
the Central Bank of Kuwait, said the plan is needed to
prevent
the collapse of banks, it clearly also is intended as part
of a
series of government payments to Kuwaiti nationals and
businesses
aimed at restoring confidence in the government prior to
the
October election. The plan, announced but as yet
incomplete, left
the entire banking system in a state of limbo in late
1992.
Banks have suffered less from the physical damage of
the war
and more from the sudden reduction in the number of
employees,
many of whom in the prewar period were foreigners. Some
banks
reported postwar staff levels at half that before the
invasion.
Although there has been speculation that postwar reform
will
include mergers involving state-controlled banks (notably
the
Kuwait Investment Company, the Kuwait International
Investment
Company, and the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting, and
Investment Company, known together as the three Ks) and
privatesector banks, no formal action had been taken as of late
1992.
The bank that survived the invasion in the best shape was
the
largest commercial bank, the National Bank of Kuwait. It
handled
the exiled government's finances during the crisis.
According to a National Bank of Kuwait report issued in
mid-1992, several additional factors hurt the private
sector's
recovery. The first was the government's decision to
restrict the
number of nonnationals, which hampered efforts to import
skilled
and unskilled labor and left Kuwait with a smaller market.
The
second was the lower level of government investment in
industry
as a result of reduced government income and the
government
decision to invest more in defense and focus in the short
run on
restoring basic services. The non-oil manufacturing
sector,
although small, was hurt by the looting and damage done by
Iraqi
troops. The government has been in no position to
subsidize
industries at the level it had in the past. Infrastructure
projects incomplete before the invasion have not been
resumed or
have been delayed.
The only sector of the economy to prosper in the
immediate
postwar period is trade because of the need to replace
inventory
emptied during the occupation. Returning Kuwaitis and the
government have created a small boom for investors. By
mid-1992,
however, the return demand largely had been met, and many
goods,
notably automobiles and consumer durables, were available
in
excess supply. In an effort to boost the private sector,
the
government approved an offset program in July 1992
requiring
foreign companies to reinvest part of their
government-awarded
contracts locally. Companies with contracts valued at more
than
US$17 million have been obliged to reinvest 30 percent of
the
contract sum.
Despite some speculation that the government would turn
more
functions over to the private sector following its return,
widespread privatization has not occurred. In February
1992, the
government announced plans to start privatizing the public
telecommunications network, a move that was expected to
generate
US$1 billion for the government. In May the government
announced
it would privatize seventy-seven local gas stations. There
have
been, however, no indications of more substantial
denationalizations.
Reconstruction costs, which some foreign observers
initially
put as high as US$100 billion, appear to be more modest,
perhaps
in the range of US$20 to US$25 billion. The largest
postwar
expense the government faces is not reconstruction, but
the debt
it incurred to coalition allies to help pay for Operation
Desert
Storm, an amount that came to at least US$20 billion, and
continuing high defense expenditures (see
table 12,
Appendix).
Reconstruction costs have been met largely from Kuwait's
reduced
investments (the Financial Times estimated in
February
1992 that Kuwait had lost as much as US$30 billion of its
prewar
investment portfolio); from returning oil revenues, which
for
fiscal year 1992 were only expected to generate US$2.4
billion;
and from borrowing on international money markets. In
October
1991, the government announced plans to borrow US$5
billion for
the first phase of a five-year loan program. The loan
would be
the largest in history. In mid-1992 one study indicated
that as
much as 30 percent of 1993 revenue will be needed to pay
interest
on various government debts, which were expected to exceed
US$37
billion by the end of 1992.
Despite the apparently dire economic situation, the
government has felt politically obliged to sustain insofar
as
possible the prewar standard of living. Some of the
largest
domestic postwar government expenditures have gone
directly to
Kuwaiti households. The banking debt buyout was but one of
a
series of measures taken by the government to help
nationals hurt
by the invasion. The government decided to pay all
government
employees (the majority of working nationals) their wages
for the
period of the occupation. In March 1992, the government
raised
state salaries. The government also agreed to write off
about
US$1.2 billion in consumer loans, a measure benefiting
more than
120,000 Kuwaitis. It wrote off US$3.4 billion worth of
property
and housing loans made before the invasion. Each Kuwaiti
family
that stayed in Kuwait through the occupation received
US$1,750.
In July 1992, the government exempted Kuwaitis from
charges for
public services due as a result of the occupation, such as
bills
for electricity, utilities, and telephone service and for
rents
on housing.
Data as of January 1993
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