MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Ivory Coast
Index
The trappings of political power were concentrated in a
single
party, the PDCI, to which all adult citizens were required
to
belong. The principal goal of the party was stability, and
compared
with parties in other sub-Saharan states, it had achieved
its
objective. By and large, political conflict took place
within
constitutional bounds. To continue that tradition in the
1980s, the
government expanded political participation and
discouraged
political--and especially ideological--competition. The
party
embraced what it defined as centrist policies, and
although
Ivoirian citizens did not enjoy democratic freedoms in the
Western
tradition, foreign observers considered Ivoirian society
among the
freest in Africa.
Party membership was synonymous with citizenship. At
its
inception and during the late stages of colonial rule, the
party
was a broad coalition, less nationalist than nativist, and
calling
itself populist, consultative, and representative. At that
time,
the PDCI enjoyed considerable grass-roots support,
especially on
issues pertaining to forced labor and the
indigénat
(see Glossary;
Colonial Administration
, ch. 1). After
independence,
however, the party came under increasingly tight
presidential
control. Instead of political mobilization, the government
demanded
of the citizenry what Philippe Yacé called "active
acquiescence."
The party leaders closest to the president, almost all of
whom had
been plantation owners, wielded great power in their home
(ethnic)
constituencies, where they were able to influence the
distribution
of patronage in the form of public and party offices,
contracts,
public works, and other benefits. This enabled them to
increase
their own wealth and further secure their positions in the
political system. Over time, patronage supplanted
political
organization, and many local PDCI committees in rural
areas
withered.
In the 1980s, with the anticolonialist struggles long
over and
the era of Houphouët-Boigny and his fellow political
militants
waning, the party continued to lose its vitality. The
party's dated
preoccupation with unity deflected attention from the
pressing
issues in Côte d'Ivoire. Economic development demanded
greater
technological sophistication and gave rise to conflicts
pitting
cities against the rural periphery and young against old.
Incrementally, technocrats and developmentalists with
modern
Western values replaced party militants in the government
bureaucracy. The new elite did not challenge the
militants, who
continued to dole out party offices, nor did they insist
that the
government become more democratic or less authoritarian.
The new
elite simply had different concerns: government rather
than the
party and bureaucratic rationality rather than party
mobilization.
Without the infusion of competing ideas, the party
atrophied as
a creative political force. To be sure, the governing
elite
remained members of the party; however, as the state
became more
complex and bureaucratized, the distinction between party
and state
blurred. The government and not the party assumed
responsibility
for national integration. By the late 1980s, the party
served
primarily as a sinecure for old party stalwarts, and the
PDCI
administration became a vehicle for self-advancement and
the
protection of narrow interests. That situation was not
entirely
true in the case of party activities at village levels
where,
reversing an earlier trend, the position of party
secretary (the
local party representative) became an openly contested
electoral
office. Increasingly, political neophytes viewed the
office as an
initial step to higher office, and so they invested
resources in
campaigns and tried to fulfill their campaign obligations.
Data as of November 1988
The Party
The trappings of political power were concentrated in a
single
party, the PDCI, to which all adult citizens were required
to
belong. The principal goal of the party was stability, and
compared
with parties in other sub-Saharan states, it had achieved
its
objective. By and large, political conflict took place
within
constitutional bounds. To continue that tradition in the
1980s, the
government expanded political participation and
discouraged
political--and especially ideological--competition. The
party
embraced what it defined as centrist policies, and
although
Ivoirian citizens did not enjoy democratic freedoms in the
Western
tradition, foreign observers considered Ivoirian society
among the
freest in Africa.
Party membership was synonymous with citizenship. At
its
inception and during the late stages of colonial rule, the
party
was a broad coalition, less nationalist than nativist, and
calling
itself populist, consultative, and representative. At that
time,
the PDCI enjoyed considerable grass-roots support,
especially on
issues pertaining to forced labor and the
indigénat
(see Glossary;
Colonial Administration
, ch. 1). After
independence,
however, the party came under increasingly tight
presidential
control. Instead of political mobilization, the government
demanded
of the citizenry what Philippe Yacé called "active
acquiescence."
The party leaders closest to the president, almost all of
whom had
been plantation owners, wielded great power in their home
(ethnic)
constituencies, where they were able to influence the
distribution
of patronage in the form of public and party offices,
contracts,
public works, and other benefits. This enabled them to
increase
their own wealth and further secure their positions in the
political system. Over time, patronage supplanted
political
organization, and many local PDCI committees in rural
areas
withered.
In the 1980s, with the anticolonialist struggles long
over and
the era of Houphouët-Boigny and his fellow political
militants
waning, the party continued to lose its vitality. The
party's dated
preoccupation with unity deflected attention from the
pressing
issues in Côte d'Ivoire. Economic development demanded
greater
technological sophistication and gave rise to conflicts
pitting
cities against the rural periphery and young against old.
Incrementally, technocrats and developmentalists with
modern
Western values replaced party militants in the government
bureaucracy. The new elite did not challenge the
militants, who
continued to dole out party offices, nor did they insist
that the
government become more democratic or less authoritarian.
The new
elite simply had different concerns: government rather
than the
party and bureaucratic rationality rather than party
mobilization.
Without the infusion of competing ideas, the party
atrophied as
a creative political force. To be sure, the governing
elite
remained members of the party; however, as the state
became more
complex and bureaucratized, the distinction between party
and state
blurred. The government and not the party assumed
responsibility
for national integration. By the late 1980s, the party
served
primarily as a sinecure for old party stalwarts, and the
PDCI
administration became a vehicle for self-advancement and
the
protection of narrow interests. That situation was not
entirely
true in the case of party activities at village levels
where,
reversing an earlier trend, the position of party
secretary (the
local party representative) became an openly contested
electoral
office. Increasingly, political neophytes viewed the
office as an
initial step to higher office, and so they invested
resources in
campaigns and tried to fulfill their campaign obligations.
Data as of November 1988
|
|