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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Ivory Coast
Index
By early 1988, Houphouët-Boigny had given no indication
of when
he might resign. However, there were increasingly clear
signs that
his control, like his health, was slipping. To avoid the
kind of
damaging and embarrassing circumstances that surrounded
the
political demise of Tunisian leader Habib Bourguiba, who
in 1987
was declared unfit to govern, senior members of the PDCI
pressed
Houphouët-Boigny to step down. In early 1988, observers
reported
that Houphouët-Boigny might heed their advice to retire by
year's
end, although he intended to remain as head of the PDCI.
Presumably, he would then be able to lend his authority to
his
successor and thereby prevent an acrimonious struggle
among
potential contenders in the presidential election that,
according
to the Constitution, would shortly follow.
Article 11 of the Ivoirian Constitution, amended on
October 12,
1985, states that if the office of the presidency is
vacated by
death, resignation, or incapacitation as attested by the
Supreme
Court, the functions of the president shall be performed
on a
provisional basis by the president of the National
Assembly. After
at least forty-five but no more than sixty days, elections
will
determine the new leader, who may also have been the
provisional
president. As president of the Assembly, Henri Konan Bedié
appeared
to have an advantage over his potential rivals, including
Yacé. At
the same time, Yacé appeared to have a larger following in
the PDCI
Political Bureau, where the ultimate decision would be
made if
there was to be a single, unanimous choice by the party.
Much of
Yacé's popularity derived from his years of faithful
service to
state and party. As younger Ivoirians replaced older party
stalwarts in the government and party, Yacé's support
would
diminish and that of Bedié, his chief rival, would grow.
By mid-1988 Houphouët-Boigny had avoided naming or even
suggesting a successor, reportedly believing that were he
to do so,
party loyalty would split between the heir apparent and
other
candidates, his own power would shrink, and the successor
he
selected would immediately become the target of political
criticism. Consequently, the president allowed the
political
process to take its course, which led to a standoff
between Bedié
and Yacé, the two leading candidates. Houphouët-Boigny's
decision
to allow politics to determine the choice also
demonstrated his
belief that the Ivoirian polity was sufficiently mature to
pursue
its own interests without recklessly endangering the
system.
Meanwhile, the succession debate continued. Many
Ivoirians
stressed the importance of choosing a member of a minority
ethnic
group as a compromise acceptable to the Baoulé, Bété, Kru,
Sénufo,
and Mandé groups
(see Ethnic Groups and Languages
, ch. 2).
Others
stressed the importance of choosing an elder statesman,
thus
avoiding a possible crisis of confidence should a younger,
less
experienced leader be named. Still others insisted that
choosing a
young, educated technocrat was the only way to resolve the
country's daunting economic and social problems.
Data as of November 1988
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