MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Ivory Coast
Index
The party-government in the mid-1980s most closely
resembled an
old-fashioned political machine. Although it called itself
a
one-party democracy, Côte d'Ivoire was not a political
democracy in
the Western sense. There was no institutionalized
opposition,
although by the 1980s National Assembly elections were
being
contested. As under the French, civil liberties remained
limited.
Although Côte d'Ivoire appeared to be a country of laws,
those laws
were tailored to suit a set of rulers who could easily
alter the
laws at their discretion.
By the end of the 1980s, the Ivoirian political system
was
facing serious problems. Because the structure, form,
tone, and
policies of the government were the personal creations of
the
president, who was said to be in his late eighties, the
succession
question had substantial implications. Moreover, no
candidate
enjoyed the charisma or stature of Houphouët-Boigny. In
1988 rivals
seeking to succeed Houphouët-Boigny barely maintained any
pretense
of unity. No plausible candidate--with the possible
exception of
Yacé--had the experience or preparation necessary to
assume the
office.
By the late 1980s, two decades of rapid economic growth
followed by serious economic setbacks had transformed
social mores
and altered civil society. Students and teachers were
protesting
the continuing control of government by a small number of
party
leaders for the benefit of a privileged class of
landowners and
bureaucrats. Corruption in the business community was
becoming
embarrassingly obvious, particularly among textile
importers.
Uncontrolled urbanization had weakened family ties and had
prompted
sharp increases in unemployment, underemployment, drug
use, and
violent crime.
(see Crime and Punishment
, ch. 5). On a
different
plane, economic austerity had abruptly curtailed the
rising
expectations of the middle class and pitted ethnic groups
against
one another in the competition for scarce resources.
Economic austerity also exacerbated tensions between
Ivoirians
and resident foreign nationals. Students and members of
the
political elite expressed resentment over the continuing
presence
of French nationals in important government positions.
Ivoirian
wage laborers resented competition from immigrants from
Côte
d'Ivoire's poorer neighbors. Dramatic increases in violent
crime
were attributed to Ghanaians and business corruption to
the
Lebanese.
Perhaps more important, the governing institutions
created by
Houphouët-Boigny to mediate conflict were weak and
unresponsive.
That was especially true of the state-owned media, which
carefully
managed information by releasing only what it deemed
harmless.
Consequently, rumors often passed for news on the streets
of
Abidjan.
Data as of November 1988
Political Issues
The party-government in the mid-1980s most closely
resembled an
old-fashioned political machine. Although it called itself
a
one-party democracy, Côte d'Ivoire was not a political
democracy in
the Western sense. There was no institutionalized
opposition,
although by the 1980s National Assembly elections were
being
contested. As under the French, civil liberties remained
limited.
Although Côte d'Ivoire appeared to be a country of laws,
those laws
were tailored to suit a set of rulers who could easily
alter the
laws at their discretion.
By the end of the 1980s, the Ivoirian political system
was
facing serious problems. Because the structure, form,
tone, and
policies of the government were the personal creations of
the
president, who was said to be in his late eighties, the
succession
question had substantial implications. Moreover, no
candidate
enjoyed the charisma or stature of Houphouët-Boigny. In
1988 rivals
seeking to succeed Houphouët-Boigny barely maintained any
pretense
of unity. No plausible candidate--with the possible
exception of
Yacé--had the experience or preparation necessary to
assume the
office.
By the late 1980s, two decades of rapid economic growth
followed by serious economic setbacks had transformed
social mores
and altered civil society. Students and teachers were
protesting
the continuing control of government by a small number of
party
leaders for the benefit of a privileged class of
landowners and
bureaucrats. Corruption in the business community was
becoming
embarrassingly obvious, particularly among textile
importers.
Uncontrolled urbanization had weakened family ties and had
prompted
sharp increases in unemployment, underemployment, drug
use, and
violent crime.
(see Crime and Punishment
, ch. 5). On a
different
plane, economic austerity had abruptly curtailed the
rising
expectations of the middle class and pitted ethnic groups
against
one another in the competition for scarce resources.
Economic austerity also exacerbated tensions between
Ivoirians
and resident foreign nationals. Students and members of
the
political elite expressed resentment over the continuing
presence
of French nationals in important government positions.
Ivoirian
wage laborers resented competition from immigrants from
Côte
d'Ivoire's poorer neighbors. Dramatic increases in violent
crime
were attributed to Ghanaians and business corruption to
the
Lebanese.
Perhaps more important, the governing institutions
created by
Houphouët-Boigny to mediate conflict were weak and
unresponsive.
That was especially true of the state-owned media, which
carefully
managed information by releasing only what it deemed
harmless.
Consequently, rumors often passed for news on the streets
of
Abidjan.
Data as of November 1988
|
|