MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Ivory Coast
Index
Starting with independence, the Ivoirian polity
experienced an
unusual reorientation of political and moral values not
found
elsewhere in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Strong economic
growth (at
least through the mid-1970s) and relatively high rates of
urbanization and literacy, in combination with a pervasive
media,
have exposed the polity to Western cultural values and the
politics
of consumption. In few other countries was materialism as
open and
avowed an ideology as in Côte d'Ivoire. Consequently, the
salient
divisions in the Ivoirian polity were economic rather than
ethnic
or religious. Stratification by class was congruent with
the
fundamental difference between rulers and ruled. In many
instances,
class differences also coincided with ethnic divisions,
which
tended to exaggerate the importance of ethnicity while
permitting
some observers to diminish the importance of class
membership. This
was no new phenomenon--the same stratification
characterized most
precolonial societies in Côte d'Ivoire. Nevertheless, the
expanded
opportunities for material consumption and the manifest
extremes of
wealth and poverty that subsequently emerged were new.
Members of
the elite translated the struggle for independence into a
quest for
privilege. They insisted that the interests of all
Ivoirians were
in harmony, a supposition that allowed them to rationalize
the use
of public policy on their behalf. For their part, the
have-nots not
only envied the elite for its material attainments but
also knew
how the elite, using the political system, attained them.
So while
rich and poor--the rulers and the ruled--nurtured vastly
different
expectations of the political system, they shared a clear
understanding of its ultimate purpose.
Historically, the political elite included the
wealthiest 10
percent of the plantation owners. By the late 1980s,
however, with
the bureaucratization of the state, the nature of the
elite had
changed markedly. Most often its members were high-level
bureaucrats and party officials. Simultaneously, and as a
direct
consequence of their political connections, many held
directorships
in locally based corporations or were minority
shareholders in
multinational corporations. Characteristically, the
businesses in
which members of the elite invested required relatively
small
investments in comparison with anticipated returns. That
situation
was especially common in real estate, where investors
typically
sought a full return on investment within three years.
Another
industry favored by the elite was transportation. Finally,
some
members of the elite invested in agriculture, exporting
bananas and
pineapples, the prices of which, unlike the prices of
coffee and
cocoa, were not regulated by the government.
Significantly, the elite was not a true entrepreneurial
class;
that is, its members did not save and invest capital.
Rather, they
created a favorable environment for schemes initiated by
foreigners
and subsequently mediated (for a fee) between bureaucracy,
business, and politicians. Instead of investing, the elite
consumed. Its members sent their offspring to France for
at least
part of their education. They became accustomed to
imported food,
clothing, and high-technology consumer goods. Perhaps most
important, the elite nurtured--and in turn
sought--legitimacy in an
ethos that openly elevated materialism to the level of
political
and moral ideology. According to one observer, the elite
became, in
effect, a class that could not afford to lose power.
To sustain its position of privilege, the elite
formulated a
political strategy based on limited participation and the
politics
of co-optation to vent the pressures linked to rapid
change. Thus,
with independence the government banned any opposition
political
parties or voices, incorporated nearly all unions into the
party,
and handpicked National Assembly candidates who then ran
on a slate
presented to voters who either cast a "yea" ballot or did
not vote.
Even after the government permitted contested elections
for the
assembly, the party, acting as surrogate for the
government, passed
on the acceptability of all candidates. Similarly, the
indigenous
private sector was unable to compete with the vast
resources that
the elite-dominated public sector could marshall and
effectively
was excluded from participating in economic
transformation.
Appreciative of the importance of political stability,
the
government ostensibly compromised by permitting small
changes for
the sake of order. Nevertheless, none of the demands for
change,
which in the past may have included pay raises, better
working
conditions, scholarship aid, or improved relations between
groups,
required a substantial change in governing institutions or
procedures, and they were generally co-opted by
Houphouët-Boigny's
expressions of concern and the appointment of a commission
to study
the problem. Finally, the government bought compliance
from its
more articulate and therefore more serious critics by
offering them
resources such as land, licenses, forestry rights, or
positions in
the party and government.
Counterpoised to the modern elite were the peasantry,
students,
middle- and lower-level civil servants, and a growing
urban
underclass. Because of explicit public policy decisions,
few
members of that group benefited directly from Côte
d'Ivoire's
vaunted economic growth. This group was no less
politicized than
the elite, but it lacked avenues of expression.
Accordingly, this
underclass responded to restrictions either by refusing to
participate in the political process or by challenging
public
policy. Nonparticipation was generally a rural phenomenon,
and in
some areas less than 40 percent of eligible voters cast
ballots in
the 1985 elections, in which Houphouët-Boigny boasted of
having
received more than 99 percent of the vote. Challenges to
public
policy took the form of riots against unemployment,
student
protests, and demonstrations against high prices,
shrinking
subsidies, land confiscation, foreigners, and high taxes
(see Internal Dissent and Further Consolidation of Power
, ch. 1;
Internal Security
, ch. 5). The government customarily
responded to
conflict with force followed by a demand for loyalty to
the ruling
regime. Groups demonstrating their political support
received
benefits in the form of clinics, schools, investment in
infrastructure, markets, and other public facilities.
Conversely,
those withholding support were simply denied any resources
for
economic development.
Data as of November 1988
|
|