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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Ivory Coast
Index
Gold leaf over wooden sculpture of a leopard, a symbol
of power among the Akan
ITS ADMIRERS HAVE lauded Côte d'Ivoire's international
security
policy as moderate, pragmatic, flexible, realistic,
conservative,
and responsible; its critics have derided it as
reactionary and
neocolonialist. Its principal objective, according to
President
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, was to maintain regional peace and
security
in order to promote economic development at home.
Diplomacy--rather
than the threat of military intervention--was the vehicle
he
employed to achieve this objective.
Côte d'Ivoire does not have a long or distinguished
national
military history. Even after the country gained
independence in
1960, the Ivoirian military continued to rely on French
advisers,
troops, and military aid. The military structure and the
culture of
French colonial rule remained virtually intact in the
nascent
Ivoirian nation, preserved by Houphouët-Boigny's
deliberate
reliance on the former colonial power for security
guarantees and
assistance. Consequently, the Franco-Ivoirian relationship
had a
profound impact on the organization, mission, matériel,
and
political behavior of the armed forces. Whereas at least
half of
the countries in Africa were under military rule in the
mid-1980s,
and all but a few had experienced at least one successful
military
coup d'état, the Ivoirian army was notably quiescent. The
armed
forces of Côte d'Ivoire were not actively involved in the
independence movement. They had not fought in any foreign
wars,
executed any coups, or had to defend the country from
external
aggression. In early 1988, they remained a relatively
small,
lightly armed, and politically mute force, heavily
influenced by
French doctrine, equipment, and advisers.
In the late 1980s, the central mission of the Ivoirian
armed
forces was self-defense. The military was not prepared by
doctrine
or available resources for offensive operations. The armed
forces
had modest overland mobility, some light weaponry, and
limited
armor and air defense capabilities; the navy was suited
only for
coastal defense missions; and the air force, with its
small fleet
of aircraft, could carry out only token air defense,
interdiction,
transport, and support operations. The air force had no
helicopters
for tactical mobility or attack. With the establishment in
1984 of
a radar network linking Bouaké and Yamoussoukro, some
territorial
surveillance was possible, but the military had no
long-range
ground or maritime surveillance capability.
These limited resources were consistent with the
national
defense policy and mission and appeared adequate and
appropriate in
the context of Côte d'Ivoire's regional security needs.
Côte
d'Ivoire had a larger military establishment than any of
its
immediate neighbors. Although in 1987 the armies of Ghana
and
Guinea--with 9,000 and 8,500 troops, respectively--were
technically
larger than Côte d'Ivoire's armed forces, their equipment
was
neither numerically nor qualitatively superior. Until the
mid1980s , Ghana had a substantially larger navy (numbering
1,200
personnel), but it had no offensive capability. Only the
Malian air
force, with twenty-seven combat aircraft, posed a
potential threat.
Data as of November 1988
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