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Ivory Coast
Index
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Côte d'Ivoire, 1988
OBSERVERS OF AFRICA have often characterized Côte d'Ivoire
as
different from the rest of Africa. Borrowing the metaphor
of Félix
Houphouët-Boigny, president of Côte d'Ivoire, they have
described
it as an oasis of political stability and economic
prosperity--in
short, the "Ivoirian miracle." Indeed, if judged on the
basis of
political stability and economic performance during its
first
twenty years of independence, Côte d'Ivoire does appear
unique: it
has had only one president and no coups since gaining
independence,
and between 1960 and 1979 the gross national product
(GNP--see Glossary)
grew by almost 8 percent per year, compared with
minimal
or negative growth rates elsewhere in Africa. However,
that growth
produced large--some would have said
dysfunctional--disparities in
wealth and income and skewed development. Consequently,
the country
was ill prepared when, in the late 1970s, world prices for
coffee
and cocoa, Côte d'Ivoire's principal export commodities,
dropped,
while prices for its principal imports rose. Meanwhile,
foreign
borrowing to finance massive investments in infrastructure
and
public enterprises (that lost money) raised Côte
d'Ivoire's foreign
debt beyond its ability to meet its obligations. Budget
reductions
and a structural adjustment program forced the vast
majority of the
population to lower its expectations, which in turn
contributed to,
among other social ills, heightened frustrations and a
sharp
increase in violent crime. By the end of the 1980s, Côte
d'Ivoire
was confronting the same problems of political and
economic
development as other African countries and having to
respond with
many of the same difficult and often inadequate solutions.
In the early precolonial period, the dense forests
covering the
southern half of the area that became Côte d'Ivoire
created
barriers to large-scale sociopolitical organizations. In
the
savanna region to the north, dissimilar populations had
neither the
incentive nor the strength to overcome ethnic differences
and forge
a larger state. Prior to the eighteenth century, polities
consisted
of villages or clusters of villages whose contacts with
the larger
world were filtered through long-distance traders.
European--in this case French--interest in the area
remained
desultory until late in the nineteenth century. Following
the
Franco-Prussian War in 1871, for example, the French
ministry
responsible for colonies offered to exchange Côte d'Ivoire
with the
British for the Gambia, which bisected the French colony
of
Senegal. The British refused, and France officially
abandoned the
territory. By the late 1880s, however, the scramble for
colonies
gripped both France and Britain. In the
western Sudan (see Glossary),
French military officers and freebooters
extended French
domains, often without the knowledge or consent of the
home
government. Unsubstantiated rumors of gold and a lucrative
trade in
the hinterland of Côte d'Ivoire once again stimulated
French
interest in the colony. In 1886 France again exercised
direct
control over the trading posts on the Ivoirian coast, and
in 1887
and 1888 Captain Louis Binger and Maurice Treich-Laplène
negotiated
a series of agreements with local chiefs in the
north-central and
northeastern regions of Côte d'Ivoire to bolster French
claims of
effective occupation. Thus, by the end of the decade,
France
exercised sovereignty over most of the coastal region of
Côte
d'Ivoire and claimed influence over certain regions of the
interior. In 1893 Côte d'Ivoire became a colony, and
Binger served
as its first governor.
Over the next twenty years, French administrators used
the
military to subdue African populations that, with few
exceptions,
openly resisted French intrusions. In the 1890s, Samori
Touré,
seeking to construct a kingdom across much of the Sahel,
including
northern Côte d'Ivoire, withstood French (and British)
forces until
he was captured in 1898. At about the same time in eastern
Côte
d'Ivoire, the Agni (Anyi) and Abron peoples first resisted
the
French and, after military setbacks, either sabotaged or
circumvented the colonial administration. In the early
twentieth
century, the Baoulé of central Côte d'Ivoire openly defied
colonial
authorities until forcibly subdued in a bloody, so-called
pacification campaign undertaken in 1906 by Governor
Gabriel
Angoulvant.
The French administered Côte d'Ivoire in a more direct,
systematic style than did their British counterparts, who
preferred
indirect rule. French authorities routinely dismissed
locally
selected chiefs, replacing them with others having no
legitimate
claim to authority, and regrouped or consolidated villages
in an
attempt to impose a uniform administration throughout the
country.
As late as 1958, Paris still appointed governors, who
administered
the colony using a system of direct, centralized rule that
left
little room for Ivoirian participation. Most of the
inhabitants
were considered subjects of France with no political
rights and a
separate system of law. Thus, all adult males were forced
to work
ten days for no pay each year, often on plantations owned
by the
French, as part of a tax obligation to the state, and
rural males
were routinely drafted to work, again for no pay, on
public works
projects like roads and the railroad.
World War II profoundly affected all of French West
Africa
(Afrique Occidentale Française--AOF; see Glossary).
The rapid
surrender of France and the institution of highly
discriminatory
policies under the Vichy regime alienated the African
political
elite, many of whom had served France in World War I and
expected
greater respect. During the immediate postwar years, an
emergent,
educated African elite demanded reforms in colonial
policy. In
response, France joined with its colonies in 1946 to form
a
community known as the French Union and granted to African
members
rights of free speech, free association, and free
assembly. France
also eliminated separate legal codes and the practice of
unlimited
forced labor.
Despite these concessions, wealthy Ivoirian planters
were still
incensed at having to work on the plantations of French
settlers,
who by law received more for their crops than they
themselves did.
As a result, the Ivoirian planters formed the African
Agricultural
Union (Syndicat Agricole Africain--SAA) to fight for equal
rights.
In 1946 the SAA gave rise to Côte d'Ivoire's sole
political party,
the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (Parti Démocratique
de Côte
d'Ivoire--PDCI) under the leadership of Félix
Houphouët-Boigny.
During the postwar years, the party, in cooperation with a
regional
coalition of anticolonialist groups, militantly challenged
French
policies in Côte d'Ivoire. Confrontation led to such
violence and
repression that by 1951 the party was in near ruin. To
stave off a
collapse, Houphouët-Boigny abandoned his alliance with the
French
Communist Party and the radical politics of earlier years
in favor
of practical cooperation with French authorities. France
then
granted significant political and economic concessions to
the
colony, which soon became the wealthiest in French West
Africa.
In 1956 the French government authorized for all of its
African
colonies a series of momentous and fundamental reforms,
which in
effect substituted autonomy for integration with France as
the
cornerstone of French colonial policy. Two years later,
under the
leadership of President Charles de Gaulle, the
constitution of the
French Fifth Republic provided for the free association of
autonomous republics within the French Community, in which
France
was the senior partner. Côte d'Ivoire voted in favor of
the
constitution, which was thought to be a more pragmatic
course than
complete independence. Nevertheless, following the lead of
Senegal
and Mali, Côte d'Ivoire withdrew from the French Community
and in
August 1960 declared its independence. Houphouët-Boigny
became Côte
d'Ivoire's first president, an office he still held in
late 1989.
The original drafters of the Ivoirian Constitution of
October
1960 intended to establish a democratic government with a
presidential system incorporating the principles of the
separation
of powers and an independent judiciary. Within a short
time,
however, governance became highly authoritarian. Party
leadership
equated a unified state with unanimous support for the
PDCI under
the untested belief that competition among parties would
waste
resources, lead to corruption, and destroy unity. By
circumscribing
the prerogatives of the National Assembly and tailoring
election
laws, Houphouët-Boigny effectively denied the assembly an
independent voice; and by doling out patronage, co-opting
opponents, and pitting rivals against one another, he
tightened his
grip on government.
Even those who objected to Houphouët-Boigny's style
admired the
results of his policies: twenty years of economic growth
and
political stability. Nevertheless, invidious habits and
attitudes
that had developed over the twenty years of economic
growth posed
a potential threat to the political order. In few other
countries
was materialism as open and avowed an ideology. By the
1980s, the
elite, using its official positions and connections to
obtain
wealth, had replaced the struggle for independence with
the pursuit
of privilege, leading to manifest extremes of wealth and
poverty.
This elite was infected with consumerism, and it could not
afford
to lose or even share power. At the same time, the sharp
economic
downturn of the 1980s and Houphouët-Boigny's advancing age
caused
fears that the ethnic rivalries he sought to dampen might
ignite
under a less charismatic successor.
For Côte d'Ivoire, ethnicity was a particularly thorny
problem.
The population included some sixty indigenous ethnic
groups. The
largest group (that of Houphouët-Boigny) was the Baoulé,
which
comprised 15 percent of the population and was centered in
the
forest region southeast of Bouaké. The Baoulé were part of
the
larger Akan ethnic cluster, which also included the Abron
and the
Agni groups. The chief rivals of the Baoulé were the Bété,
who in
the 1980s made up approximately 6 percent of the
population. During
the twentieth century, the Bété achieved recognition for
their
success in cash cropping and for their widespread
acceptance of
Christianity. Because the Bété nurtured strong beliefs in
the
superiority of their culture and had a long history of
resistance
to foreign domination, they have often been accused of
fomenting
antigovernment dissent. Other major ethnic groups included
the Dan,
the Malinké, the Juula, the Sénoufo, and the Agni. The
largest
single foreign minority group was the Burkinabé (natives
of Burkina
Faso, formerly known as Upper Volta), who were generally
Mossi.
They were concentrated in rural areas, where they worked
as farm
laborers. The Lebanese, officially estimated at 60,000 but
possibly
numbering 180,000, dominated sectors of the wholesale and
retail
trade. In 1988 there were approximately 30,000 French
citizens in
Côte d'Ivoire, or about the same number as at
independence.
Because no single ethnic group held a preponderance of
power,
none could automatically impose its will. Ethnic politics,
therefore, were important in Côte d'Ivoire,
notwithstanding
presidential statements to the contrary. And because of
that
cultural diversity, Houphouët-Boigny, making a virtue of
necessity,
perfected the politics of inclusion. All major ethnic
groups were
represented in his cabinet and the major policy-making
bodies of
the PDCI, making it easier to deflect responsibility at a
time when
the rising expectations of Ivoirians were being thwarted.
The Ivoirian economy in the late 1980s continued its
downward
spiral, primarily because world prices for coffee and
cocoa, the
country's two principal exports, remained low. At the same
time,
exports of timber, the third largest source of foreign
exchange,
declined because of continued overexploitation. Two
offshore
petroleum fields, which in the early 1970s were projected
to make
Côte d'Ivoire self-sufficient in fuel, failed to achieve
projected
outputs, let alone self-sufficiency. Because of the
relatively low
world prices for petroleum and Côte d'Ivoire's high
production
costs, all the wells in one field were capped.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the government undertook a
major
effort to diversify the export economy by expanding
production of
palm oil, natural rubber, coconut oil, cotton, sugar, and
tropical
fruits. Ten years later, the government implemented a
program to
modernize its import substitution industries, sell off
unprofitable
parastatals, and further expand exports to include
processed foods,
textiles, wood, and such nonagricultural products as
building
materials, chemicals, and electronics.
The results of all three plans were mixed. The market
for palm
and coconut oils was eroded by substitutes with less
saturated fat;
sugar, produced by a grossly inefficient parastatal,
simply added
to a world surplus; and in other areas Côte d'Ivoire was
competing
with other states of Africa and Asia producing many of the
same
tropical agricultural goods. Exports produced under the
industrial
expansion program were more expensive--at least
initially--than
similar goods produced elsewhere and so required export
subsidies.
Subsidies, however, required scarce funds. Meanwhile,
Houphouët-
Boigny adamantly refused to cut producer prices for coffee
and
cocoa; consequently, production levels increased--some
estimates
for the 1988-89 cocoa harvest were as high as 700,000
tons--,which
further depressed commodity prices. Finally, divestment
from
parastatals yielded lower returns than anticipated.
Moreover, the
larger, more profitable companies were purchased by
foreign
interests, further adding to capital flight.
The lack of investment capital was the undoing of the
Ivoirian
miracle. To finance development, Côte d'Ivoire borrowed
substantial
amounts abroad, especially during the mid-1970s when
unusually high
coffee and cocoa prices led planners to overestimate the
potential
of the economy. Thus, by 1976 high debt payments together
with
repatriated profits and foreign worker remittances had
produced a
negative net reserve position for the first time in the
country's
history. Debt servicing costs continued to mount to the
extent that
in May 1987 the government announced that it would suspend
payments
on its foreign debt.
To stave off a financial collapse, Côte d'Ivoire
negotiated an
economic recovery and structural adjustment program with
the
Paris Club (see Glossary),
the International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary), and the
London Club (see Glossary) that
provided a
respite from debt repayment. The subsequent retrenchments
mandated
by the programs affected all income groups in the country,
but they
had the greatest impact on the poor. These measures gave
rise to
such symptoms of violent social dislocation as drug abuse
and
crime--which required additional expenditures and new
political
options from the government.
The party-government of Côte d'Ivoire in the mid-1980s
most
closely resembled an old-fashioned political machine.
Although it
called itself a one-party democracy, Côte d'Ivoire was not
a
democracy in the Western sense: the government controlled
the
press, limited civil liberties, and allowed no
institutionalized
opposition to frame debate. As economic austerity
exacerbated
political tensions, individuals and informal groups called
for
greater political choice, which the government seemed
unprepared to
grant.
Meanwhile, students protested against the role of
foreigners in
the economy and the government, which they saw as
controlled by a
small number of party leaders for the benefit of a
privileged class
of bureaucrats and landowners. Corruption in the business
community, long considered an affliction of other African
states,
was becoming embarrassingly obvious in Côte d'Ivoire.
Reduced
services, coupled with wage freezes and higher costs, were
alienating mid-level civil servants and professionals. And
increasingly brazen attacks against expatriates by
well-armed
bandits were affecting tourism and foreign investment.
A growing number of Ivoirians was questioning whether
these
problems could be solved by a government dominated by an
octogenarian president with no apparent successor.
In the late 1980s, the choice of a successor to
Houphouët-
Boigny remained a dominant issue in Ivoirian politics.
Because the
style, form, tone, and policies of the government were the
personal
creation of the president, the succession question had
substantial
implications. Two plausible contenders in 1989 were
Philippe Yacé
and Henri Konan Bedié, representing, respectively, the
first and
second generations of Ivoirian politics. Houphouët-Boigny
refused
to designate an heir and left the decision to the
political
process, believing that the Ivoirian polity was mature
enough to
make a decision without recklessly endangering national
security or
precipitating military intervention into civilian
politics.
With the exception of a small uprising (the true size
of which
has never been documented) in 1970 near Gagnoa in the Bété
region,
the military has played no role in domestic peacekeeping.
Moreover,
Houphouët-Boigny co-opted the military with sufficiently
attractive
perquisites (including high salaries and positions in the
party) so
that the senior officer corps had little interest in
political
meddling. To further promote satisfaction, the military
was
equipped with advanced equipment purchased from France.
In its foreign affairs, Côte d'Ivoire either befriended
or
attempted to isolate its immediate neighbors. Recognizing
that the
"oasis never encroaches upon the desert," Houphouët-Boigny
sought
mutually beneficial ties with Côte d'Ivoire's neighbors
despite
ideological differences. And for good measure, he insisted
that
France maintain a battalion of marines near Abidjan to
buttress his
own military.
As Côte d'Ivoire faced the 1990s, the problems of
finding a
successor to Houphouët-Boigny, discontent on the campus of
its only
university, an ossified party, and a beggar-thy-neighbor
materialism concerned Ivoirians. At the same time, a
history of
political stability coupled with a tradition of civilian
rule and
an apparent willingness on the part of the second and
third
generation of Ivoirian politicians to liberalize the
political
process and accommodate divergent views promised a less
troubled
future for the country.
October 6, 1989
In mid-1989, as the economy continued its decline, even
leading
members of the establishment began voicing discontent,
albeit in
guarded terms. In September 1989, Houphouet-Boigny invited
political leaders--critics and supporters--to Abidjan for
what was
called "five days of dialogue." Uncharacteristically sharp
and
candid criticisms of the party and government over the
five days
conveyed a lack of confidence in the ruling elite, which
was
labeled narrow and selfish, and called for a more
responsive party
in a multi-party system. Less than a month later on
October 16,
1989, Houphouet-Boigny reshuffled his cabinet and, in
response to
World Bank recommendations, reduced it from 29 to 21
members.
Four months later, students protested recently
announced wage
cuts, tax increases, and the longstanding issue of single
party
rule with large scale demonstrations that at times turned
into
violent confrontations with police in the streets of
Abidjan and,
in one instance, in Abidjan's Roman Catholic cathedral. In
April
and May 1990, army and air force recruits protesting the
cost-
cutting decision to limit their military service to a
single tour
of duty demonstrated in bases across Côte d'Ivoire; a
group of
armed air force recruits even took over the international
airport
outside Abidjan for twelve hours. Police and firefighters
also
staged highly visible protests for higher wages. By
mid-May,
Houphouet-Boigny had capitulated on the issues of military
duty and
higher wages for police and firefighters, and he scrapped
plans to
increase income taxes. Most significantly, he pledged for
the first
time to legalize opposition parties and promised to name a
successor, although as of June 1990, he had not yet done
either.
July 1, 1990
Robert Handloff
Data as of November 1988
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