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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Ivory Coast
Index
After the 1963 alleged coup plot, Houphouët-Boigny took
steps
to ensure party and military loyalty. His success over the
ensuing
years lay in his carefully crafted system of checks and
balances,
using ethnic differences, political animosities, and
co-optation to
guarantee his own supremacy. To satisfy the the political
elite, he
resorted to state and party patronage, mostly in the form
of highpaying jobs. To diffuse the potential for ethnic conflict
resulting
from perceived inequalities in the development process, he
divided
cabinet appointments among representatives of Côte
d'Ivoire's major
ethnic groups.
To fortify his hold over the armed forces, he assumed
direct
control of the police and military, the size of which he
reduced
from 5,300 to 3,500 members. He divided responsibility for
internal
security among seven groups--a 3,000-man militia linked to
the
party and composed almost exclusively of Baoulé
(Houphouét-Boigny's
ethnic group); a 3,000-man gendarmerie; the police; a
special
presidential guard; a small navy; a small air force; and
the army.
He also broadened his executive powers so that he alone
could
appoint and promote senior military officers. With the
removal of
political rivals following the 1962 and 1963 conspiracy
trials,
Houphouët-Boigny's was unchallengeable.
In the 1970s, as the Ivoirian polity became somewhat
more
sophisticated, Houphouët-Boigny of necessity refined his
style. He
began replacing aging and loyal party militants with
younger
intellectuals and highly trained technocrats for whom he
often
created positions in his government--and who therefore
owed him
fealty. After the 1970 party congress, Houphouët-Boigny
also began
naming younger members to the political bureau and as
candidates to
the National Assembly. He ingratiated himself with the
middle and
lower classes by speaking out frequently about the
failures of
government officials. His preferred method of addressing
popular
issues was through dialogues in which the public could air
their
grievances to their seemingly attentive leader. During the
first
dialogue in January 1974 with 2,000 party workers,
Houphouët-Boigny
invited criticisms and appointed various committees to
study and
recommend reforms. In March a second dialogue with foreign
and
local business leaders elicited resolutions and warnings
to
inefficient and corrupt cadres and to the Lebanese and
French
business communities. No reforms of substance occurred
following
either of these sessions, but by allowing public criticism
albeit
in a tightly controlled environment, the president
remained
informed about popular dissatisfaction. Subsequently he
could take
steps either to remedy or to suppress problems while
maintaining
his firm grip over Ivoirian politics.
Houphouët-Boigny also continued to invite traditional,
or
ethnic, leaders to participate in both party and
government at the
local level so that he could maintain constructive ties
with the
traditional elite. Nevertheless, he was not always able to
extinguish all micronationalist sentiments. For example,
the Agni
of Sanwi claimed that their kingdom had become part of
Côte
d'Ivoire without their consent
(see Ethnic Groups and Languages
, ch. 2). In December 1969, the Sanwi king called for the
kingdom to
secede and led a separatist revolt. Government troops
swiftly
suppressed the rebellion. In November 1970, a Bété leader,
Gnagbé
Niabé (also known as Gnabé Opadjelé) proclaimed himself
grand
chancellor of Côte d'Ivoire. When Houphouët-Boigny refused
to
accept Gnabé's candidacy for president or grant his
request for a
cabinet post, Gnabé gathered a large group of supporters
and
marched on Gagnoa. Again, government troops captured the
rebel
leader, ending the small rebellion.
Houphouët-Boigny's ability to maintain stability lay in
his
belief in strong management and organization, which led
him from
independence to building an administration based on the
solid,
bureaucratic institutions left by the French. In fact, the
large
number of French bureaucrats and entrepreneurs remaining
in Côte
d'Ivoire supported Houphouët-Boigny's monopoly on
political power
and thereby contributed to the perceived effectiveness of
the
public and private sectors of the Ivoirian economy. In
November
1975, he was reelected president, claiming nearly 100
percent of
the vote.
In the early 1970s, notwithstanding political calm and
rapid
economic growth, underemployment and unemployment
continued to pose
problems in Côte d'Ivoire. Immigrants continued to flood
the lowest
end of the job market, while whites continued to dominate
the top
executive jobs. In addition, the uneven distribution of
social
services and jobs throughout the country exacerbated the
regional
economic disparities arising from the growing
concentration of
wealth in the south. And finally, the adverse effects of
the 1973
Sahelian drought on northern farmers caused even greater
dissatisfaction among the rural population.
Houphouët-Boigny relied on his charisma and the
government's
offers to dispel discontent. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, he
gained popular favor by alternating Ivoirian independence
festivities between Abidjan and the different prefecture
capitals.
Prefecture capitals hosting the festivities underwent
massive
rehabilitation, which included jobs in construction for
new
governmental buildings, streets, and housing. And when
neither
charisma nor largess mollified his critics,
Houphouët-Boigny
skillfully blamed others. In July 1977, he reorganized his
cabinet,
dismissing four of the country's most influential
political
figures, who, although instrumental in the growth of the
Ivoirian
economy, were also accused of involvement in fraudulent
schemes to
enrich themselves. These figures became useful scapegoats
for
continuing fraud and maldistribution of the nation's
wealth.
On two occasions in the early 1970s, Houphouët-Boigny
traveled
to the north to convince local populations that he was not
to blame
for the state of affairs and to dispense politically
timely aid in
the form of development programs. The enthusiasm generated
by the
president's northern visits spread to other regions
seeking largess
from a presidential visit. Eager to exploit this
nationwide burst
of personal support, the government scheduled presidential
trips
throughout the country over the next several years.
The military also showed signs of restlessness. An
alleged coup
conspiracy by a group of discontented young officers, in
June 1973
followed by the 1974 military overthrow of Niger's Hamani
Diori,
Houphouët-Boigny's lifelong friend, undermined
Houphouët-Boigny's
confidence in the government's security and precipitated
changes in
the military. Although many Ivoirian political observers
thought
that the conspirators of the alleged coup had done nothing
more
than discuss among themselves the need for greater
economic
equality in Côte d'Ivoire, the government dealt with them
harshly.
Shortly thereafter, Houphouët-Boigny replaced two senior
French
military officers, who had allegedly fomented discontent
among
Ivoirian officers, with Ivoirians. Further changes,
designed to
instill military loyalty by giving the armed forces more
scope in
national affairs, took place in July 1974, when
Houphouët-Boigny
appointed military officers to both high- and low-level
positions
in the civil administration. And finally, in February
1979,
Houphouët-Boigny appointed eight army officers as prefects
and
subprefects to give the military a greater stake in
maintaining the
status quo.
Data as of November 1988
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