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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Israel
Index
Arrival of Egyptian president Anwar as Sadat at BenGurion Airport, Lod, near Tel Aviv, November 21, 1977
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington
The international climate at the time of Begin's rise to power
in May 1977 leaned strongly toward some type of superpowersanctioned settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute. New United
States president Jimmy Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev both
advocated a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement that would
include autonomy for the Palestinians. On October 1, 1977, in
preparation for a reconvened Geneva conference, the United States
and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement committing themselves
to a comprehensive settlement incorporating all parties concerned
and all questions.
Nevertheless, the idea of a Geneva conference on the Middle
East was actively opposed and eventually defeated by a
constellation of Israeli, Egyptian, and powerful private American
interests. Begin proclaimed that he would never accept the
authority of an international forum to dictate how Israel should
deal with its territory, especially because, aside from Washington,
the Israelis would lack allies at such a meeting. Inside the United
States, the Jewish lobby and anti-Soviet political groups
vehemently opposed the Geneva conference idea. Sadat also opposed
a Geneva conference, seeing it as a way for Syria, supported by the
Soviet Union, to gain leverage in an Arab-Israeli settlement. Sadat
realized that if an international conference were held, Egypt's
recovery of Sinai, which was his primary objective in dealing with
Israel, would be secondary to the Palestinian issue and the return
of the Golan Heights to Syria.
To stave off an international conference and to save Egypt's
rapidly collapsing economy, Sadat made the boldest of diplomatic
moves: he offered to address the Knesset. Begin consented, and in
November 1977 Sadat made his historic journey to Jerusalem, opening
a new era in Egyptian-Israeli relations. Although Sadat expressed
his commitment to the settlement of the Palestinian issue and to
that issue's centrality in Arab-Israeli relations, his main
interest remained Israel's return of Egyptian territory. Begin's
acceptance of the Egyptian initiative was based on the premise that
Sinai, but not the West Bank, was negotiable. He foresaw that
exchanging Sinai for a peace treaty with Egypt would remove Egypt
from the Arab-Israeli military balance and relieve pressure on
Israel to make territorial concessions on the West Bank. President
Carter, who had been a major advocate of a Geneva conference, was
forced by the momentum of Sadat's initiative to drop the
international conference idea. Subsequently, he played a crucial
role in facilitating an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement.
Following nearly a year of stalled negotiations, Begin, Sadat,
and Carter met at Camp David near Washington, D.C., for two weeks
in September 1978. The crux of the problem at Camp David was that
Begin, the old-time Revisionist who had opposed territorial
concessions to the Arabs for so many years, was reluctant to
dismantle existing Sinai settlements. Finally, on September 17 he
consented, and the Camp David Accords were signed. On the following
day, Begin obtained Knesset approval of the accords.
The Camp David Accords consisted of two agreements: one dealt
with the future of the West Bank and the other with the return of
Sinai. The sections on the West Bank were vague and open to various
interpretations. They called for Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and "the
representatives of the Palestinian people to negotiate about the
future of the West Bank and Gaza." A five-year period of
"transitional autonomy" was called for "to ensure a peaceful and
orderly transfer of authority." The agreement also called for peace
talks between Israel and its other Arab neighbors, namely Syria.
The other part of the accords was more specific. It provided for
"the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the
internationally recognized border," as well as for the Israeli
right of free passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez
Canal. The agreements were accompanied by letters. A letter from
Begin to Carter promised that the removal of settlers from Sinai
would be put to Knesset vote. A letter from Sadat to Carter stated
that if the settlers were not withdrawn from Sinai, there would be
no peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. It was also understood
that to make the agreement more palatable the United States would
significantly increase aid to both countries.
Begin's limited view of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank
became apparent almost immediately after the agreement known as the
Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel was signed in March 1979.
The following month his government approved two new settlements
between Ram Allah and Nabulus. The military government established
civilian regional councils for the Jewish settlements. Finally, and
most provocative, autonomy plans were prepared in which Israel
would keep exclusive control over the West Bank's water,
communications, roads, public order, and immigration.
In effect, the acceleration of settlements, the growth of an
increasingly militaristic Jewish settler movement, and Israel's
stated desire to retain complete control over resources in the
territories precluded the participation in the peace process of
either moderate Palestinians, such as the newly formed National
Guidance Committee composed of West Bank mayors (the PLO refused
from the beginning to participate in the peace process) or King
Hussein of Jordan. No Arab leader could accept Begin's truncated
version of autonomy. Hussein, who had initially withheld judgment
on the accords, joined hands with the Arab radicals in a meeting in
Baghdad that denounced the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty
and ostracized Egypt. Sadat protested Israeli actions in the
occupied territories, but he was unwilling to change his course for
fear that doing so would leave Sinai permanently in Israeli hands.
President Carter objected to the new settlements but was unable to
force the Begin government to change its settlement policy.
Although ambassadors were exchanged; commercial, trade, and
cultural ties were established; and Sinai was returned in May 1982,
relations between Israel and Egypt remained chilly.
Data as of December 1988
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