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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Israel
Index
The Wailing Wall on the Temple Mount, Jerusalem
Courtesy Jean E. Tucker
Blowing of the Shofar during Rosh Hashanah, Jewish New
Year
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington
As has been seen, Israeli Judaism in the late 1980s exerted its
influence on society through a complex interplay of ethnicity,
halakah, and political and ideological ferment--as well as through
the notions of Israeli Jewish citizenship, nationality, security,
and sovereignty. In part because of the institutionalization of the
status quo arrangements of the late 1940s and early 1950s, in part
because of the disproportionate power available to small
(religious) political parties in the Israeli parliamentary system,
traditional Judaism both pervades and structures much of everyday
life
(see Multiparty System
, ch. 4). Because many of the Orthodox
of various persuasions view the status quo as the baseline from
which to advance, they are accused by many secular Israelis of
trying to impose additional cultural controls and religious
structures. As an example of Orthodox pressures, when Begin formed
his first coalition government in 1977, the religious parties took
advantage of this change in the political status quo to push for
changes in the religious status quo as well. Thirty-five of the
forty-three clauses in the 1977 multiparty coalition agreement
submitted to the Knesset dealt with religious questions.
Since the early 1970s, neo-Orthodox youths have been more
assertive and less defensive in their religious observance--a
charge leveled against their elders in the 1950s and 1960s. The
"knitted skullcap generation" of the post-June 1967 War era has in
some ways replaced the Labor Zionist kibbutzniks of a former era as
the pioneering vanguard of Israeli society. Meanwhile, the
ultra-Orthodox in 1988 were as willing as ever to challenge secular
authorities, on the streets and with violence if need be, to
protect their prerogatives and to preserve the special character of
their enclave communities.
The results of these trends have been twofold: a growing
traditionalization of Israeli society in terms of religion, and the
sharpening of conflict between the extremist Orthodox and their
sympathizers and the secularists who oppose the Orthodox Jews and
their agendas. Despite the sharp rift, a sort of modus vivendi has
emerged, which is what the status quo agreements intended. But the
status quo itself has not been stable or stagnant; on the contrary
it has been dynamic, gradually shifting toward religion.
Data as of December 1988
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