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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Israel
Index
The Jewish military organizations of Palestine before Israeli
independence were fiercely political. The Haganah and Palmach were
closely associated with socialist-labor Mapai
(see Appendix B) and the kibbutz programs, whereas the Irgun was intimately connected with the right-wing Revisionist Zionism of Vladimir Jabotinsky and his disciple, Begin (see
Revisionist Zionism
, ch. 1). As the chief
architect of the IDF, Ben-Gurion was determined to eliminate all
political overtones from Israel's unified, national army and to
establish clear civilian supremacy over the military. He was
extraordinarily successful in his efforts in that during the first
forty years of its history the IDF never overtly challenged the
authority of the civilian government. This did not mean, however,
that the IDF was a nonpolitical institution. On the contrary, in
the late 1980s the political impact of the armed forces remained
pervasive and profound. IDF officers influenced government foreign
affairs and national security policy through official and
unofficial channels. Under Ben-Gurion's successor, Levi Eshkol, the
political system was opened to permit greater interaction between
the civilian leadership and the military high command. The shift
permitted the chief of staff to advance the views of the IDF
directly to the cabinet and Knesset committees. The growing number
of former officers in political life also helped to legitimate the
involvement of the military in strategic policy debates.
Under Israeli law, the cabinet, which could be convened as the
Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs in order to enforce the
secrecy of its proceedings, set policy relating to national
security. The Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset
approved national security policy. The minister of defense often
was the principal policy formulator (although this depended on his
personality and the personalities of the prime minister and the
chief of staff) and could make decisions without consulting fellow
cabinet members if an urgent need arose. During the first twenty
years of Israel's existence, membership in the ruling Labor Party
often was a prerequisite for appointment to a high level staff
position. Political qualifications for top assignments gradually
declined in importance during the 1970s, although the chief of
staff's perceptions of Israel's security were necessarily consonant
with the aims of the government.
When Prime Minister Begin served as his own minister of defense
from 1980 to 1981, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Rafael
Eitan, could assert the IDF position not only on defense matters
but also on foreign policy and economic questions. When Sharon--a
retired major general highly respected within the officer corps--
became defense minister in 1981, the focus of decision making in
both defense and foreign policy shifted to him. The minister of
defense after 1984, Rabin, also was a retired officer. Under him,
the balance of authority continued to rest with the Ministry of
Defense as opposed to the military establishment; however, Rabin
did not exercise the monopoly of control that had existed under
Sharon.
Although considered primarily the implementer of policy, the
IDF influenced many sectors of society. It had a major voice in
strategic planning, in such social matters as education and the
integration of immigrants, and in the government's role in the
occupied territories. Moreover, the enormous impact of the defense
establishment on the economy made its claims on the nation's
resources of major political significance.
The high command had ample opportunity to convey its views to
the civilian leadership. The chief of staff and the chief of
military intelligence met regularly with the Committee on Foreign
Affairs and Security and the Finance Committee of the Knesset. The
chief of staff participated regularly in cabinet meetings and gave
opinions on government security policy. The setbacks at the outset
of the October 1973 War gave rise to an exceptional period when
senior officers influenced political decisions through their
contacts with members of the cabinet and the Knesset. The situation
was complicated by the involvement of former senior officers who
had entered political life and who served as reserve officers in
the war. A committee created to investigate the errors committed
during the first days of the war led to the enactment in 1976 of
the new Basic Law: the Army governing the IDF. The government
expended much effort to redefine the roles of the prime minister,
minister of defense, and chief of staff. The new legal
requirements, however, proved less important than the personalities
of the individuals holding those positions at any given time.
Private consultations with the high command were viewed as
essential in light of the cabinet's need to be informed on security
issues. Public statements of opinion concerning Israel's defense
policy (such as when and where to go to war, or when, how, or with
whom to make peace) were generally considered to be in the realm of
politics and improper for active-duty personnel. It became clear
that many senior officers had moral and political reservations over
the scope and tactics employed in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, but
their dissent did not escalate into open protest. One exception was
the highly controversial case of Colonel Eli Geva, who asked to be
relieved of his command when his brigade was given the mission of
leading the army's entry into Beirut, an act that was bound to
cause many civilian casualties. Many officers regarded Geva's
conduct as outright insubordination. Others agreed that it was
proper for him to decline the performance of his military
obligations when they conflicted with his conscience. In spite of
his outstanding record as a combat leader, Geva was released from
further service.
Members of the IDF could vote and engage in normal political
activity, albeit with certain restraints. They could join political
parties or politically oriented groups and attend meetings, but
they were barred from taking an active role as spokespersons either
for the IDF or for a political group. Analysts found little
difference between the political orientation of military personnel
and of civilians. Retired officers entering politics were not
concentrated in a particular part of the political spectrum. Few
officers were associated with the small minority of groups
upholding autocratic political values. Most appeared to accept
unreservedly the prevailing democratic political culture. Compared
with most countries, Israel had far less separatism, distinction
between life styles, or social distance between civilians and the
officer corps.
The vast majority of the citizenry did not regard the practice
of retired officers "parachuting into politics" as threatening to
civilian control of the military. No ex-IDF officer had assumed a
cabinet position until 1955, and not until after the June 1967 War
did it become a common practice. Israeli law prohibited retired
officers from running for the Knesset until 100 days after their
retirement, but no such law existed regarding cabinet positions.
Retired officers pursuing political careers were likely to be
called back to active duty because retired officers remained
reserve officers until age fifty-five. The problems that eventually
could arise became apparent in 1973, when Major General Sharon
retired in July to join the opposition Likud Party only to be
recalled to active duty during the October 1973 War. Sharon was
highly critical of the conduct of the war, becoming the most vocal
participant in the so-called War of the Generals, in which a number
of active, retired, and reserve general officers engaged in a
public debate over the management of the war for several months
during and after the hostilities. Sharon was elected to the Knesset
in the December 1973 elections. Once there, he continued to
criticize government policy while he remained a senior reserve
officer. As a result of this situation, the government barred
Knesset members from holding senior reserve appointments.
Despite the prominence and visibility of former military
officers at the highest level of government, former officers have
not formed a cohesive and ideologically united group. Although two
of the most prominent military figures of the period, Sharon and
Eitan (chief of staff from 1978 to 83) were regarded as right wing
on Arab-Israeli issues, many more senior officers were moderates,
less persuaded than the Likud government or the public that
military force was the answer.
There has been little evidence of an identifiable military or
officer caste dedicated to protecting the army's own interests.
Militarism was deeply antithetical to the democratic,
civilian-oriented concept of Israeli society held by the vast
majority of Israelis. Society has, however, held prominent military
personalities in high esteem and treated them as national heroes.
This was particularly true after the stunning victory of the June
1967 War. After the near disaster in 1973 and the controversies
surrounding operations in Lebanon in 1982, however, the prestige of
the professional military suffered. The Lebanon experience raised
in its most acute form the question of how effectively the civilian
government could control the military establishment. IDF operations
ordered by Sharon and Eitan often had been contrary to the
government's decisions and the cabinet had been kept ignorant of
the military situation. The cabinet's inability to oppose
effectively Sharon and Eitan was made possible by the passive
attitude of Prime Minister Begin, the relative lack of operational
military experience among other cabinet ministers, and the
deliberate manipulation of reports on the fighting. For a time, the
checks and balances that had previously prevented the defense
establishment from dominating the civilian decision-making
authority seemed in jeopardy. Political protest arose in the
government, among the public, in the news media, and even in
sectors of the army that forced a reassessment of the actions of
the military leadership. Although no structural changes were
introduced, Sharon was removed from the Ministry of Defense and a
more normal pattern of military-civilian relations was restored. In
1988, Chief of Staff Shomron, Deputy Chief of Staff Major General
Ehud Barak, and West Bank Commander Major General Amrah Mitzna, all
were perceived to be political liberals. They were, however,
careful not to draw attention in public to possible differences
with the government over its handling of the uprising in the
occupied territories.
Data as of December 1988
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