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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Israel
Index
A street demonstration in the occupied territories;
Palestinians are carrying the Palestinian flag, which is forbidden.
Courtesy Palestine Perspectives
The tradition of the IDF as a social service institution dates
from 1949, when it played a major role in tackling sudden and
widespread epidemics in transit camps for the flood of immigrants
to the new nation. In the same year, Ben-Gurion envisioned a vital
educational mission for the military. The IDF has fulfilled this
mission both indirectly and directly. The common experience of
conscription for about 90 percent of Jewish males and 50 percent of
Jewish females has itself fostered the homogenization of disparate
elements of Israeli society. The IDF made a concerted effort to
integrate within its various units persons from different social
backgrounds. Sephardim and Ashkenazim, men and women from kibbutzim
and cities, and sabra and immigrant Jewish youth often mixed for
the first time in their lives in the IDF.
More specifically, the IDF administered an educational program
that helped immigrant Sephardic youth, many of whom had been
deprived of basic education as children, to integrate into the
Ashkenazi-dominated society of Israel. Perhaps the most important
educational function of the IDF was the teaching of the national
language, Hebrew. Young immigrants could defer their entry until
they had an adequate grasp of the language and if needed could be
assigned to a three-month intensive course in Hebrew at the
beginning of their service.
Conscripts who had failed to complete grade school attended a
special school prior to discharge in order to bring them to junior
high school level. In 1981, 60 percent of conscripts had the
equivalent of a high school education. It was estimated that by
1990 this percentage would increase to 80 percent, while those
insufficiently educated for military service would diminish to
almost none. A variety of other educational opportunities,
including secondary and vocational school courses, was available to
soldiers. The IDF educational system also extended to civilians.
Gadna and Nahal members were deployed in rural settlements of
recent immigrants, where they taught material similar to that
taught immigrant soldiers and informed the new arrivals of state
services available to them
(see Nahal;
Gadna
, this ch.).
Some Israeli sociologists, however, have criticized the IDF's
treatment of immigrant Sephardim. A 1984 study found that new
Oriental Jewish immigrants held lower ranks than did sabra
Ashkenazim of similar qualifications. Oriental immigrants also
tended to be assigned to the least prestigious IDF corps. A
disproportionate number of new immigrants served in peripheral
support corps, such as the Civil Defense Corps, the Guard Corps,
and the General Service Corps. Oriental immigrants were
underrepresented in the air force and in glamorous elite units, and
those who served in combat instead of support corps were
overrepresented in the Artillery Corps and the Combat Engineering
Corps, where they were relegated to the most dangerous and
physically laborious positions. These newer immigrants also were
more liable to serve in units posted far from their homes and to be
taught skills that could not be transferred to the civilian job
market. The study concluded, however, that this situation was
caused not by prejudice in the IDF but, on the contrary, by
regulations permitting a shorter period of service for those who
were beyond the regular recruitment age of eighteen or who were
married and had children. The majority of newer immigrants served
less than one-third the time that nonimmigrants did, and most
remained at the rank of private. The brief service experience
limited their absorption into military life and mobility within the
defense organization. Their immigrant status and their adjustment
to Israeli society were thus prolonged and the likelihood of
improving their status later as civilians was reduced.
A newer aspect of the social impact of the IDF was its role in
the socialization of delinquent and formerly delinquent youth. In
the early 1970s, the IDF reversed its previous policy and began
conscripting all but the most serious offenders among delinquent
youth in an attempt both to increase its manpower pool and to
provide remedial socialization in the context of military
discipline. By 1978 it was clear that the policy was only partially
successful. Approximately half the youths (generally the less
serious offenders) released from detention to join the IDF had
adjusted successfully; the other half had been less successful.
Many returned to criminal activity and contributed to growing
disciplinary problems within the IDF that included rising drug use
among soldiers and thefts and violent crimes within IDF units.
Others could not adjust to army life and simply left or were
expelled from the IDF. Despite the problems associated with the new
policy, IDF officials were proud of their role in youth
rehabilitation and felt that the opportunity afforded delinquent
youth to be reintegrated into society outweighed the associated
disciplinary problems.
Data as of December 1988
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