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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Israel
Index
Figure l3. Comparison of Military Forces of Israel and Neighboring
Countries, 1987
Source: Based on information from International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1987-1988,
London, 1987, 96-114.
Israeli forces withdrawing from occupied area of southern
Lebanon, June 1978
Courtesy United Nations (Y. Nagata)
As of 1988, experts considered the IDF superior to any
combination of Arab forces that was likely to be massed against it
in a future conflict. The total manpower and firepower that could
be directed against Israel far outweighed the battlefield resources
that Israel could muster, yet Israel's dynamic military leadership,
troop proficiency, and sophisticated weaponry still promised to be
decisive, as they had been in previous wars. The Arab nations
remained deeply divided over a host of issues in mid-1988,
including their postures toward Israel. Although the Camp David
peace process between Egypt and Israel failed to achieve
normalization of relations, Israel no longer considered Egypt part
of the circle of hostile states. Nevertheless, Israeli planners did
not rule out an upheaval in Egyptian politics that would renew the
risk of military confrontation. With the Sinai region effectively
demilitarized, the element of surprise that had initially worked in
Egypt's favor in the October 1973 War would not be available. In
any future conflict, Egyptian forces would have to cross 130
kilometers of desert exposed to Israeli air power. Jordan's
military weakness vis-à-vis Israel and its exposure to Israeli
retaliation seemed to rule out military action except as a
reluctant ally in a larger Arab coalition. The modernization of
Jordan's army and air force was continuing, however, with the help
of the United States and France. Many important Israeli targets
were within the range of Jordanian artillery and rockets.
Syria posed the paramount threat. The Syrian armed forces had
pursued a massive build-up of offensive and defensive manpower and
equipment in an effort to maintain parity with Israel. Although the
inflexibility of their military strategy had resulted in crushing
defeats in engagements with the IDF, the Syrians had proved to be
skillful and stubborn fighters during the Lebanon conflict. The
concentrations of Syrian troops facing the Golan Heights probably
could make initial gains in a thrust against the IDF, but would
absorb heavy punishment once the Israelis mobilized for a
counterattack.
Like other Arab states, Saudi Arabia had upgraded its naval and
air arms, improving its capability to defend its air space and
control activities in the Red Sea area. Saudi Arabia's outlook and
strategic doctrine were primarily defensive, and its primary
objective was stability in the Middle East to minimize the danger
to its oil facilities and other vital installations. Nevertheless,
from Israel's perspective, that country had the potential to
undertake offensive air operations in conjunction with other Arab
air forces. In the eyes of Israeli strategists, Saudi Arabia's 1988
purchase of long-range missiles from China and its acquisition of
Tornado fighter-bombers from Britain enhanced its role in a future
conflict.
The Iraqi army had not played a decisive role in previous wars.
During the October 1973 fighting, two Iraqi brigades were quickly
overcome in the IDF drive toward Damascus. If Iraq again attempted
to advance its forces to support Syria and Jordan, they would, like
those of Egypt, be vulnerable to Israeli air strikes. Nevertheless,
as of late 1988, Israeli officers were less confident of their
ability to neutralize Iraq's armed potential. During the war with
Iran, the Iraqi army had expanded to more than twenty divisions and
had acquired combat experience and skill in the use of
sophisticated weaponry. Iraq also had demonstrated the capacity and
willingness to resort to chemical weapons. On the other hand, Iraq
was economically drained and presumably tired of fighting after the
eight-year struggle with Iran. Israeli military analysts felt,
moreover, that tensions would persist in the Persian Gulf and that
Iraq's armed forces would be unlikely to welcome military
involvement elsewhere.
The buildup of the Arab armies between the October 1973 War and
the mid-1980s was both qualitative and quantitative. Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan had expanded the total of their divisions from twenty to
twenty-five during this period. Of these, the number of armored and
mechanized divisions rose from ten to twenty-two. Israeli planners
estimated that Iraq could contribute another ten divisions,
increasing the Arab disparity over Israel even more
(see
fig. 13).
The lifting of restrictions on arms sales by the Western
powers, combined with the increased resources at the disposal of
oil-exporting countries, enabled the Arab powers vastly to expand
their sophisticated weaponry between 1973 and 1988. The tank
inventories of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria rose by 60 percent, while
their stocks of aircraft, helicopters, and armored personnel
carriers roughly doubled. Both Syria and Iraq had acquired high
performance aircraft of Soviet design. To the Arab countries'
primary land weapons had been added more self-propelled artillery,
guided antitank missiles, new munitions--including cluster and
homing shells--improved fire-control systems, and laser
rangefinders. Previously vulnerable air defenses now could be
shielded using advanced mobile missile systems acquired from both
East and West. Most of the strategic sites in Israel were exposed
to Syrian striking power in the form of Soviet-supplied SS-21 SSMs,
with a range of 120 kilometers and far greater accuracy than the
earlier generation FROG-7 (70 kilometers) and Scud-B (300
kilometers).
Israel could draw only tentative conclusions regarding the
improvement in Arab military leadership and manpower resources.
Arab field commanders had not yet demonstrated the successful
adaptation of modern command and control systems to battlefield
situations. Arab forces had in the past shown greater effectiveness
in static defense than in mobile offensive operations. The paucity
of qualified technical personnel in the Arab armies, attributed to
deficiencies in education and training, continued to detract from
the ability of the Arab armed forces to employ modern weaponry with
full efficiency. The superior skills of Israeli pilots had been
decisive in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and in earlier
engagements. Although the rising level of weapons technology
presented more of a problem to the Arab nations than to Israel, the
Arabs' Soviet systems were simpler to use and maintain than their
more sophisticated United States counterparts. The improved
performance of the Iraqi air force against Iran after 1985 offered
some evidence that the disparity in pilot skills and experience
might be narrowing.
Data as of December 1988
The Arab Military Threat
Figure l3. Comparison of Military Forces of Israel and Neighboring
Countries, 1987
Source: Based on information from International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1987-1988,
London, 1987, 96-114.
Israeli forces withdrawing from occupied area of southern
Lebanon, June 1978
Courtesy United Nations (Y. Nagata)
As of 1988, experts considered the IDF superior to any
combination of Arab forces that was likely to be massed against it
in a future conflict. The total manpower and firepower that could
be directed against Israel far outweighed the battlefield resources
that Israel could muster, yet Israel's dynamic military leadership,
troop proficiency, and sophisticated weaponry still promised to be
decisive, as they had been in previous wars. The Arab nations
remained deeply divided over a host of issues in mid-1988,
including their postures toward Israel. Although the Camp David
peace process between Egypt and Israel failed to achieve
normalization of relations, Israel no longer considered Egypt part
of the circle of hostile states. Nevertheless, Israeli planners did
not rule out an upheaval in Egyptian politics that would renew the
risk of military confrontation. With the Sinai region effectively
demilitarized, the element of surprise that had initially worked in
Egypt's favor in the October 1973 War would not be available. In
any future conflict, Egyptian forces would have to cross 130
kilometers of desert exposed to Israeli air power. Jordan's
military weakness vis-à-vis Israel and its exposure to Israeli
retaliation seemed to rule out military action except as a
reluctant ally in a larger Arab coalition. The modernization of
Jordan's army and air force was continuing, however, with the help
of the United States and France. Many important Israeli targets
were within the range of Jordanian artillery and rockets.
Syria posed the paramount threat. The Syrian armed forces had
pursued a massive build-up of offensive and defensive manpower and
equipment in an effort to maintain parity with Israel. Although the
inflexibility of their military strategy had resulted in crushing
defeats in engagements with the IDF, the Syrians had proved to be
skillful and stubborn fighters during the Lebanon conflict. The
concentrations of Syrian troops facing the Golan Heights probably
could make initial gains in a thrust against the IDF, but would
absorb heavy punishment once the Israelis mobilized for a
counterattack.
Like other Arab states, Saudi Arabia had upgraded its naval and
air arms, improving its capability to defend its air space and
control activities in the Red Sea area. Saudi Arabia's outlook and
strategic doctrine were primarily defensive, and its primary
objective was stability in the Middle East to minimize the danger
to its oil facilities and other vital installations. Nevertheless,
from Israel's perspective, that country had the potential to
undertake offensive air operations in conjunction with other Arab
air forces. In the eyes of Israeli strategists, Saudi Arabia's 1988
purchase of long-range missiles from China and its acquisition of
Tornado fighter-bombers from Britain enhanced its role in a future
conflict.
The Iraqi army had not played a decisive role in previous wars.
During the October 1973 fighting, two Iraqi brigades were quickly
overcome in the IDF drive toward Damascus. If Iraq again attempted
to advance its forces to support Syria and Jordan, they would, like
those of Egypt, be vulnerable to Israeli air strikes. Nevertheless,
as of late 1988, Israeli officers were less confident of their
ability to neutralize Iraq's armed potential. During the war with
Iran, the Iraqi army had expanded to more than twenty divisions and
had acquired combat experience and skill in the use of
sophisticated weaponry. Iraq also had demonstrated the capacity and
willingness to resort to chemical weapons. On the other hand, Iraq
was economically drained and presumably tired of fighting after the
eight-year struggle with Iran. Israeli military analysts felt,
moreover, that tensions would persist in the Persian Gulf and that
Iraq's armed forces would be unlikely to welcome military
involvement elsewhere.
The buildup of the Arab armies between the October 1973 War and
the mid-1980s was both qualitative and quantitative. Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan had expanded the total of their divisions from twenty to
twenty-five during this period. Of these, the number of armored and
mechanized divisions rose from ten to twenty-two. Israeli planners
estimated that Iraq could contribute another ten divisions,
increasing the Arab disparity over Israel even more
(see
fig. 13).
The lifting of restrictions on arms sales by the Western
powers, combined with the increased resources at the disposal of
oil-exporting countries, enabled the Arab powers vastly to expand
their sophisticated weaponry between 1973 and 1988. The tank
inventories of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria rose by 60 percent, while
their stocks of aircraft, helicopters, and armored personnel
carriers roughly doubled. Both Syria and Iraq had acquired high
performance aircraft of Soviet design. To the Arab countries'
primary land weapons had been added more self-propelled artillery,
guided antitank missiles, new munitions--including cluster and
homing shells--improved fire-control systems, and laser
rangefinders. Previously vulnerable air defenses now could be
shielded using advanced mobile missile systems acquired from both
East and West. Most of the strategic sites in Israel were exposed
to Syrian striking power in the form of Soviet-supplied SS-21 SSMs,
with a range of 120 kilometers and far greater accuracy than the
earlier generation FROG-7 (70 kilometers) and Scud-B (300
kilometers).
Israel could draw only tentative conclusions regarding the
improvement in Arab military leadership and manpower resources.
Arab field commanders had not yet demonstrated the successful
adaptation of modern command and control systems to battlefield
situations. Arab forces had in the past shown greater effectiveness
in static defense than in mobile offensive operations. The paucity
of qualified technical personnel in the Arab armies, attributed to
deficiencies in education and training, continued to detract from
the ability of the Arab armed forces to employ modern weaponry with
full efficiency. The superior skills of Israeli pilots had been
decisive in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and in earlier
engagements. Although the rising level of weapons technology
presented more of a problem to the Arab nations than to Israel, the
Arabs' Soviet systems were simpler to use and maintain than their
more sophisticated United States counterparts. The improved
performance of the Iraqi air force against Iran after 1985 offered
some evidence that the disparity in pilot skills and experience
might be narrowing.
Data as of December 1988
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