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Israel-The Arab Military Threat INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SECURITY CONCERNS
Israel
Index
Figure l3. Comparison of Military Forces of Israel and Neighboring
Countries, 1987
Source: Based on information from International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1987-1988,
London, 1987, 96-114.
Israeli forces withdrawing from occupied area of southern
Lebanon, June 1978
Courtesy United Nations (Y. Nagata)
As of 1988, experts considered the IDF superior to any
combination of Arab forces that was likely to be massed against it
in a future conflict. The total manpower and firepower that could
be directed against Israel far outweighed the battlefield resources
that Israel could muster, yet Israel's dynamic military leadership,
troop proficiency, and sophisticated weaponry still promised to be
decisive, as they had been in previous wars. The Arab nations
remained deeply divided over a host of issues in mid-1988,
including their postures toward Israel. Although the Camp David
peace process between Egypt and Israel failed to achieve
normalization of relations, Israel no longer considered Egypt part
of the circle of hostile states. Nevertheless, Israeli planners did
not rule out an upheaval in Egyptian politics that would renew the
risk of military confrontation. With the Sinai region effectively
demilitarized, the element of surprise that had initially worked in
Egypt's favor in the October 1973 War would not be available. In
any future conflict, Egyptian forces would have to cross 130
kilometers of desert exposed to Israeli air power. Jordan's
military weakness vis-à-vis Israel and its exposure to Israeli
retaliation seemed to rule out military action except as a
reluctant ally in a larger Arab coalition. The modernization of
Jordan's army and air force was continuing, however, with the help
of the United States and France. Many important Israeli targets
were within the range of Jordanian artillery and rockets.
Syria posed the paramount threat. The Syrian armed forces had
pursued a massive build-up of offensive and defensive manpower and
equipment in an effort to maintain parity with Israel. Although the
inflexibility of their military strategy had resulted in crushing
defeats in engagements with the IDF, the Syrians had proved to be
skillful and stubborn fighters during the Lebanon conflict. The
concentrations of Syrian troops facing the Golan Heights probably
could make initial gains in a thrust against the IDF, but would
absorb heavy punishment once the Israelis mobilized for a
counterattack.
Like other Arab states, Saudi Arabia had upgraded its naval and
air arms, improving its capability to defend its air space and
control activities in the Red Sea area. Saudi Arabia's outlook and
strategic doctrine were primarily defensive, and its primary
objective was stability in the Middle East to minimize the danger
to its oil facilities and other vital installations. Nevertheless,
from Israel's perspective, that country had the potential to
undertake offensive air operations in conjunction with other Arab
air forces. In the eyes of Israeli strategists, Saudi Arabia's 1988
purchase of long-range missiles from China and its acquisition of
Tornado fighter-bombers from Britain enhanced its role in a future
conflict.
The Iraqi army had not played a decisive role in previous wars.
During the October 1973 fighting, two Iraqi brigades were quickly
overcome in the IDF drive toward Damascus. If Iraq again attempted
to advance its forces to support Syria and Jordan, they would, like
those of Egypt, be vulnerable to Israeli air strikes. Nevertheless,
as of late 1988, Israeli officers were less confident of their
ability to neutralize Iraq's armed potential. During the war with
Iran, the Iraqi army had expanded to more than twenty divisions and
had acquired combat experience and skill in the use of
sophisticated weaponry. Iraq also had demonstrated the capacity and
willingness to resort to chemical weapons. On the other hand, Iraq
was economically drained and presumably tired of fighting after the
eight-year struggle with Iran. Israeli military analysts felt,
moreover, that tensions would persist in the Persian Gulf and that
Iraq's armed forces would be unlikely to welcome military
involvement elsewhere.
The buildup of the Arab armies between the October 1973 War and
the mid-1980s was both qualitative and quantitative. Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan had expanded the total of their divisions from twenty to
twenty-five during this period. Of these, the number of armored and
mechanized divisions rose from ten to twenty-two. Israeli planners
estimated that Iraq could contribute another ten divisions,
increasing the Arab disparity over Israel even more
(see
fig. 13).
The lifting of restrictions on arms sales by the Western
powers, combined with the increased resources at the disposal of
oil-exporting countries, enabled the Arab powers vastly to expand
their sophisticated weaponry between 1973 and 1988. The tank
inventories of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria rose by 60 percent, while
their stocks of aircraft, helicopters, and armored personnel
carriers roughly doubled. Both Syria and Iraq had acquired high
performance aircraft of Soviet design. To the Arab countries'
primary land weapons had been added more self-propelled artillery,
guided antitank missiles, new munitions--including cluster and
homing shells--improved fire-control systems, and laser
rangefinders. Previously vulnerable air defenses now could be
shielded using advanced mobile missile systems acquired from both
East and West. Most of the strategic sites in Israel were exposed
to Syrian striking power in the form of Soviet-supplied SS-21 SSMs,
with a range of 120 kilometers and far greater accuracy than the
earlier generation FROG-7 (70 kilometers) and Scud-B (300
kilometers).
Israel could draw only tentative conclusions regarding the
improvement in Arab military leadership and manpower resources.
Arab field commanders had not yet demonstrated the successful
adaptation of modern command and control systems to battlefield
situations. Arab forces had in the past shown greater effectiveness
in static defense than in mobile offensive operations. The paucity
of qualified technical personnel in the Arab armies, attributed to
deficiencies in education and training, continued to detract from
the ability of the Arab armed forces to employ modern weaponry with
full efficiency. The superior skills of Israeli pilots had been
decisive in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and in earlier
engagements. Although the rising level of weapons technology
presented more of a problem to the Arab nations than to Israel, the
Arabs' Soviet systems were simpler to use and maintain than their
more sophisticated United States counterparts. The improved
performance of the Iraqi air force against Iran after 1985 offered
some evidence that the disparity in pilot skills and experience
might be narrowing.
Data as of December 1988
The Arab Military Threat
Figure l3. Comparison of Military Forces of Israel and Neighboring
Countries, 1987
Source: Based on information from International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1987-1988,
London, 1987, 96-114.
Israeli forces withdrawing from occupied area of southern
Lebanon, June 1978
Courtesy United Nations (Y. Nagata)
As of 1988, experts considered the IDF superior to any
combination of Arab forces that was likely to be massed against it
in a future conflict. The total manpower and firepower that could
be directed against Israel far outweighed the battlefield resources
that Israel could muster, yet Israel's dynamic military leadership,
troop proficiency, and sophisticated weaponry still promised to be
decisive, as they had been in previous wars. The Arab nations
remained deeply divided over a host of issues in mid-1988,
including their postures toward Israel. Although the Camp David
peace process between Egypt and Israel failed to achieve
normalization of relations, Israel no longer considered Egypt part
of the circle of hostile states. Nevertheless, Israeli planners did
not rule out an upheaval in Egyptian politics that would renew the
risk of military confrontation. With the Sinai region effectively
demilitarized, the element of surprise that had initially worked in
Egypt's favor in the October 1973 War would not be available. In
any future conflict, Egyptian forces would have to cross 130
kilometers of desert exposed to Israeli air power. Jordan's
military weakness vis-à-vis Israel and its exposure to Israeli
retaliation seemed to rule out military action except as a
reluctant ally in a larger Arab coalition. The modernization of
Jordan's army and air force was continuing, however, with the help
of the United States and France. Many important Israeli targets
were within the range of Jordanian artillery and rockets.
Syria posed the paramount threat. The Syrian armed forces had
pursued a massive build-up of offensive and defensive manpower and
equipment in an effort to maintain parity with Israel. Although the
inflexibility of their military strategy had resulted in crushing
defeats in engagements with the IDF, the Syrians had proved to be
skillful and stubborn fighters during the Lebanon conflict. The
concentrations of Syrian troops facing the Golan Heights probably
could make initial gains in a thrust against the IDF, but would
absorb heavy punishment once the Israelis mobilized for a
counterattack.
Like other Arab states, Saudi Arabia had upgraded its naval and
air arms, improving its capability to defend its air space and
control activities in the Red Sea area. Saudi Arabia's outlook and
strategic doctrine were primarily defensive, and its primary
objective was stability in the Middle East to minimize the danger
to its oil facilities and other vital installations. Nevertheless,
from Israel's perspective, that country had the potential to
undertake offensive air operations in conjunction with other Arab
air forces. In the eyes of Israeli strategists, Saudi Arabia's 1988
purchase of long-range missiles from China and its acquisition of
Tornado fighter-bombers from Britain enhanced its role in a future
conflict.
The Iraqi army had not played a decisive role in previous wars.
During the October 1973 fighting, two Iraqi brigades were quickly
overcome in the IDF drive toward Damascus. If Iraq again attempted
to advance its forces to support Syria and Jordan, they would, like
those of Egypt, be vulnerable to Israeli air strikes. Nevertheless,
as of late 1988, Israeli officers were less confident of their
ability to neutralize Iraq's armed potential. During the war with
Iran, the Iraqi army had expanded to more than twenty divisions and
had acquired combat experience and skill in the use of
sophisticated weaponry. Iraq also had demonstrated the capacity and
willingness to resort to chemical weapons. On the other hand, Iraq
was economically drained and presumably tired of fighting after the
eight-year struggle with Iran. Israeli military analysts felt,
moreover, that tensions would persist in the Persian Gulf and that
Iraq's armed forces would be unlikely to welcome military
involvement elsewhere.
The buildup of the Arab armies between the October 1973 War and
the mid-1980s was both qualitative and quantitative. Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan had expanded the total of their divisions from twenty to
twenty-five during this period. Of these, the number of armored and
mechanized divisions rose from ten to twenty-two. Israeli planners
estimated that Iraq could contribute another ten divisions,
increasing the Arab disparity over Israel even more
(see
fig. 13).
The lifting of restrictions on arms sales by the Western
powers, combined with the increased resources at the disposal of
oil-exporting countries, enabled the Arab powers vastly to expand
their sophisticated weaponry between 1973 and 1988. The tank
inventories of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria rose by 60 percent, while
their stocks of aircraft, helicopters, and armored personnel
carriers roughly doubled. Both Syria and Iraq had acquired high
performance aircraft of Soviet design. To the Arab countries'
primary land weapons had been added more self-propelled artillery,
guided antitank missiles, new munitions--including cluster and
homing shells--improved fire-control systems, and laser
rangefinders. Previously vulnerable air defenses now could be
shielded using advanced mobile missile systems acquired from both
East and West. Most of the strategic sites in Israel were exposed
to Syrian striking power in the form of Soviet-supplied SS-21 SSMs,
with a range of 120 kilometers and far greater accuracy than the
earlier generation FROG-7 (70 kilometers) and Scud-B (300
kilometers).
Israel could draw only tentative conclusions regarding the
improvement in Arab military leadership and manpower resources.
Arab field commanders had not yet demonstrated the successful
adaptation of modern command and control systems to battlefield
situations. Arab forces had in the past shown greater effectiveness
in static defense than in mobile offensive operations. The paucity
of qualified technical personnel in the Arab armies, attributed to
deficiencies in education and training, continued to detract from
the ability of the Arab armed forces to employ modern weaponry with
full efficiency. The superior skills of Israeli pilots had been
decisive in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and in earlier
engagements. Although the rising level of weapons technology
presented more of a problem to the Arab nations than to Israel, the
Arabs' Soviet systems were simpler to use and maintain than their
more sophisticated United States counterparts. The improved
performance of the Iraqi air force against Iran after 1985 offered
some evidence that the disparity in pilot skills and experience
might be narrowing.
Data as of December 1988
- Israel-CHAPTER 3 - The Economy
- Israel-PALESTINE BETWEEN THE ROMANS AND MODERN TIMES
- Israel-GEOGRAPHY
- Israel-Reserve Duty
- Israel-INDUSTRY
- Israel-The Orthodox-Secular Cleavage
- Israel-NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
- Israel-THE IDF IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
- Israel-Strategic Depth
- Israel-Civilian Administration in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
- Israel-The Role of Judaism
- Israel-GEOGRAPHY
- Israel-FOREIGN RELATIONS
- Israel-Acknowledgments
- Israel-Biotechnology
- Israel-Relations with Asian States
- Israel-Minorities in the IDF
- Israel-Electronics
- Israel-The Ulpan and Merkaz Klita
- Israel-Ethnicity and Social Class
- Israel-Climate
- Israel-Women in the IDF
- Israel-Penal System
- Israel-Navy
- Israel-Relations with the Soviet Union
- Israel-DEFENSE PRODUCTION AND SALES
- Israel-The State Comptroller
- Israel-The October 1973 War
- Israel-ORIGINS OF ZIONISM
- Israel-Judaism, Civil Religion, and the "New Zionism"
- Israel-HEALTH
- Israel-SOCIAL STRUCTURE
- Israel-Training
- Israel-World War II and Zionism
- Israel-Orthodox Judaism
- Israel-TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
- Israel-The IDF as a Socializing Factor
- Israel-Morocco
- Israel-INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
- Israel-The Ashkenazi-Oriental Distinction
- Israel-The Palestinian Revolt, 1936-39
- Israel-Discipline and Military Justice
- Israel-Relations with African States
- Israel-The Second Israel
- Israel-Autonomy
- Israel-Alignment Parties
- Israel-Criminal Justice in the Occupied Territories
- Israel-Preface
- Israel-THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
- Israel-NATIONAL SECURITY
- Israel-The Cabinet
- Israel-FOREIGN TRADE
- Israel-The Peace Process
- Israel-Arab Parties
- Israel-ISRAEL
- Israel-Agudat Israel
- Israel-Kibbutz and Moshav
- Israel-Introduction
- Israel-War of Independence
- Israel-ANCIENT ISRAEL
- Israel-Judicial System
- Israel-Palestinian Uprising, December 1987
- Israel-World War I: Diplomacy and Intrigue
- Israel-Provision of Civilian Services
- Israel-CHAPTER 5 - National Security
- Israel-Slowdown of Economic Growth
- Israel-CHAPTER 4 - Government and Politics
- Israel-Conscription
- Israel-Relations with the United States
- Israel-HELLENISM AND THE ROMAN CONQUEST
- Israel-CRIMINAL JUSTICE
- Israel-The Likud Bloc
- Israel-Tourism
- Israel-AGRICULTURE
- Israel-SOCIETY
- Israel-Changes in Labor Force
- Israel-1982 Invasion of Lebanon
- Israel-Clothing and Textiles
- Israel-Israeli Arabs, Arab Land, and Arab Refugees
- Israel-October 1973 War
- Israel-Taxation
- Israel-Lekem
- Israel-June 1967 War
- Israel-POPULATION
- Israel-The Histadrut
- Israel-Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM)
- Israel-Defense Industries
- Israel-Ingathering of the Exiles
- Israel-Government Budget
- Israel-Historical Background SECURITY: A PERSISTENT NATIONAL CONCERN
- Israel-Israeli Action in Lebanon, 1978-82
- Israel-Pay and Benefits
- Israel-Rank, Insignia, and Uniforms
- Israel-The Occupied Territories
- Israel-Ground Forces
- Israel-Revisionist Zionism
- Israel-The President GOVERNMENT
- Israel-Command Structure THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES
- Israel-Oriental Jews
- Israel-Air Force
- Israel-EDUCATION
- Israel-Nahal
- Israel-The Military in Political Life
- Israel-The Druzes
- Israel-WELFARE
- Israel-Zionist Precursors
- Israel-The Siege of Beirut and Its Aftermath
- Israel-Palestinian Terrorist Groups
- Israel-FINANCIAL SERVICES
- Israel-CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
- Israel-Aman
- Israel-ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
- Israel-The Holocaust
- Israel-Nuclear Weapons Potential
- Israel-The Arab Military Threat INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SECURITY CONCERNS
- Israel-Relations with Western Europe
- Israel
- Israel-Arab Nationalism EVENTS IN PALESTINE, 1908-48
- Israel-Histadrut
- Israel-PROSPECTS FOR ELECTORAL REFORM
- Israel-Foreign Military Sales and Assistance
- Israel-CHAPTER 1 - Historical Setting
- Israel-Foreword
- Israel-ECONOMY
- Israel-Cultural Zionism
- Israel-Religious Institutions
- Israel-Shas
- Israel-Distinctive Social Institutions
- Israel-Relations with Latin America
- Israel-GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
- Israel-Potential Causes of War
- Israel-1956 War
- Israel-Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics
- Israel-Military Government
- Israel-The Knesset
- Israel-Jewish Ethnic Groups
- Israel-Extraparliamentary Religio-Nationalist Movements
- Israel-Shin Bet
- Israel-Energy
- Israel-The Emergence of the IDF
- Israel
- Israel-Dormant War
- Israel-The Arab Community During the Mandate
- Israel
- Israel-The Jewish Community under the Mandate
- Israel-Higher Education
- Israel-Awards and Decorations
- Israel-THE ISRAEL POLICE
- Israel
- Israel-The Decline of the Labor Party
- Israel-Varieties of Israeli Judaism
- Israel
- Israel -COUNTRY PROFILE
- Israel-CHAPTER 2 - The Society and Its Environment
- Israel-Prelude to Statehood
- Israel-Jordan
- Israel-THE BEGIN ERA
- Israel-Construction
- Israel-Mapam
- Israel-Youth Movements and Organizations
- Israel-Changes in Investment Patterns
- Israel
- Israel-Political Zionism
- Israel-The Arab-Jewish Cleavage
- Israel-Right-Wing Ultranationalist Parties Central Religious Camp
- Israel-Changes in Industrial Structure
- Israel-Police Reform
- Israel-World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency
- Israel-THE PUBLIC SECTOR
- Israel-The Judicial System
- Israel-Extensive Threat
- Israel
- Israel-Iran
- Israel-COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA
- Israel-TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
- Israel-The Civil Service
- Israel-Etatism PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE, 1948-67
- Israel-MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
- Israel-Nuclear and Conventional Deterrents
- Israel-National Religious Party
- Israel-Labor Zionism
- Israel-Economic Impact ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY
- Israel-BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
- Israel-Religious Parties
- Israel-Topography
- Israel-OVERVIEW OF THE 1948-72 PERIOD
- Israel-The "Who Is a Jew?" Controversy
- Israel-Minority Groups
- Israel-Shinui (Change)
- Israel-Gadna
- Israel
- Israel-POLITICAL FRAMEWORK: ELITE, VALUES, AND ORIENTATIONS
- Israel-Relations with Middle Eastern States
- Israel-Jewish Terrorist Organizations
- Israel-MULTIPARTY SYSTEM
- Israel-Mossad
- Israel
- Israel-Provision of Defense Services
- Israel-Interest Groups
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Background | | Following World War II, the British withdrew from their mandate of Palestine, and the UN partitioned the area into Arab and Jewish states, an arrangement rejected by the Arabs. Subsequently, the Israelis defeated the Arabs in a series of wars without ending the deep tensions between the two sides. The territories Israel occupied since the 1967 war are not included in the Israel country profile, unless otherwise noted. On 25 April 1982, Israel withdrew from the Sinai pursuant to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. In keeping with the framework established at the Madrid Conference in October 1991, bilateral negotiations were conducted between Israel and Palestinian representatives and Syria to achieve a permanent settlement. Israel and Palestinian officials signed on 13 September 1993 a Declaration of Principles (also known as the "Oslo Accords") guiding an interim period of Palestinian self-rule. Outstanding territorial and other disputes with Jordan were resolved in the 26 October 1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace. In addition, on 25 May 2000, Israel withdrew unilaterally from southern Lebanon, which it had occupied since 1982. In April 2003, US President BUSH, working in conjunction with the EU, UN, and Russia - the "Quartet" - took the lead in laying out a roadmap to a final settlement of the conflict by 2005, based on reciprocal steps by the two parties leading to two states, Israel and a democratic Palestine. However, progress toward a permanent status agreement was undermined by Israeli-Palestinian violence between September 2003 and February 2005. In the summer of 2005, Israel unilaterally disengaged from the Gaza Strip, evacuating settlers and its military while retaining control over most points of entry into the Gaza Strip. The election of HAMAS to head the Palestinian Legislative Council froze relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Ehud OLMERT became prime minister in March 2006 and presided over a 34-day conflict with Hizballah in Lebanon in June-August 2006 and a 23-day conflict with Hamas in the Gaza Strip during December 2008 and January 2009. OLMERT, who in June 2007 resumed talks with PA President Mahmoud ABBAS, resigned in September 2008. Prime Minister Binyamin NETANYAHU formed a coalition in March 2009 following a February 2009 general election. Peace talks are currently stalled.
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Location | | Middle East, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Egypt and Lebanon
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Area(sq km) | | total: 22,072 sq km land: 21,642 sq km water: 430 sq km
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Geographic coordinates | | 31 30 N, 34 45 E
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Land boundaries(km) | | total: 1,017 km border countries: Egypt 266 km, Gaza Strip 51 km, Jordan 238 km, Lebanon 79 km, Syria 76 km, West Bank 307 km
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Coastline(km) | | 273 km
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Climate | | temperate; hot and dry in southern and eastern desert areas
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Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Dead Sea -408 m highest point: Har Meron 1,208 m
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Natural resources | | timber, potash, copper ore, natural gas, phosphate rock, magnesium bromide, clays, sand
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Land use(%) | | arable land: 15.45% permanent crops: 3.88% other: 80.67% (2005)
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Irrigated land(sq km) | | 1,940 sq km (2003)
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Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 1.7 cu km (2001)
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Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 2.05 cu km/yr (31%/7%/62%) per capita: 305 cu m/yr (2000)
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Natural hazards | | sandstorms may occur during spring and summer; droughts; periodic earthquakes
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Environment - current issues | | limited arable land and natural fresh water resources pose serious constraints; desertification; air pollution from industrial and vehicle emissions; groundwater pollution from industrial and domestic waste, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides
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Environment - international agreements | | party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands, Whaling signed, but not ratified: Marine Life Conservation
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Geography - note | | there are about 340 Israeli civilian sites - including 100 small outpost communities in the West Bank - as well as 42 sites in the Golan Heights, 0 in the Gaza Strip, and 29 in East Jerusalem (July 2008 est.); Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) is an important freshwater source
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Population | | 7,233,701 note: includes about 187,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, about 20,000 in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and fewer than 177,000 in East Jerusalem (July 2009 est.)
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Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 27.9% (male 1,031,629/female 984,230) 15-64 years: 62.3% (male 2,283,034/female 2,221,301) 65 years and over: 9.9% (male 311,218/female 402,289) (2009 est.)
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Median age(years) | | total: 29.1 years male: 28.4 years female: 29.8 years (2009 est.)
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Population growth rate(%) | | 1.671% (2009 est.)
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Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 19.77 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 5.43 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
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Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | 2.37 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 92% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 1.7% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
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Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.03 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.77 male(s)/female total population: 1 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
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Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 4.22 deaths/1,000 live births male: 4.39 deaths/1,000 live births female: 4.05 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
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Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 80.73 years male: 78.62 years female: 82.95 years (2009 est.)
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Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 2.75 children born/woman (2009 est.)
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Nationality | | noun: Israeli(s) adjective: Israeli
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Ethnic groups(%) | | Jewish 76.4% (of which Israel-born 67.1%, Europe/America-born 22.6%, Africa-born 5.9%, Asia-born 4.2%), non-Jewish 23.6% (mostly Arab) (2004)
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Religions(%) | | Jewish 76.4%, Muslim 16%, Arab Christians 1.7%, other Christian 0.4%, Druze 1.6%, unspecified 3.9% (2004)
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Languages(%) | | Hebrew (official), Arabic used officially for Arab minority, English most commonly used foreign language
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Country name | | conventional long form: State of Israel conventional short form: Israel local long form: Medinat Yisra'el local short form: Yisra'el
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Government type | | parliamentary democracy
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Capital | | name: Jerusalem geographic coordinates: 31 46 N, 35 14 E time difference: UTC+2 (7 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time) daylight saving time: +1hr, begins last Friday in March; ends the Sunday between the holidays of Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur note: Israel proclaimed Jerusalem as its capital in 1950, but the US, like nearly all other countries, maintains its Embassy in Tel Aviv
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Administrative divisions | | 6 districts (mehozot, singular - mehoz); Central, Haifa, Jerusalem, Northern, Southern, Tel Aviv
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Constitution | | no formal constitution; some of the functions of a constitution are filled by the Declaration of Establishment (1948), the Basic Laws of the parliament (Knesset), and the Israeli citizenship law; note - since May 2003 the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee of the Knesset has been working on a draft constitution
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Legal system | | mixture of English common law, British Mandate regulations, and, in personal matters, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim legal systems; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
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Suffrage | | 18 years of age; universal
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Executive branch | | chief of state: President Shimon PERES (since 15 July 2007) head of government: Prime Minister Binyamin NETANYAHU (since 31 March 2009) cabinet: Cabinet selected by prime minister and approved by the Knesset elections: president is largely a ceremonial role and is elected by the Knesset for a seven-year term (one-term limit); election last held 13 June 2007 (next to be held in 2014 but can be called earlier); following legislative elections, the president assigns a Knesset member - traditionally the leader of the largest party - the task of forming a governing coalition election results: Shimon PERES elected president; number of votes in first round - Shimon PERES 58, Reuven RIVLIN 37, Colette AVITAL 21; PERES elected president in second round with 86 votes (unopposed)
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Legislative branch | | unicameral Knesset (120 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms) elections: last held 10 February 2009 (next scheduled election to be held in 2013) election results: percent of vote by party - Kadima 23.2%, Likud-Ahi 22.3%, YB 12.1%, Labor 10.2%, SHAS 8.8%, United Torah Judaism 4.5%, United Arab List 3.5%, NU 3.4%, Hadash 3.4%, The Jewish Home 3%, The New Movement-Meretz 3%, Balad 2.6%; seats by party - Kadima 28, Likud-Ahi 27, YB 15, Labor 13, SHAS 11, United Torah Judaism 5, United Arab List 4, NU 4, HADASH 4, The Jewish Home 3, The New Movement-Meretz 3, Balad 3
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Judicial branch | | Supreme Court (justices appointed by Judicial Selection Committee - made up of all three branches of the government; mandatory retirement age is 70)
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Political pressure groups and leaders | | B'Tselem [Jessica MONTELL, Executive Director] monitors human rights abuses; Peace Now [Yariv OPPENHEIMER, Secretary General] supports territorial concessions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; YESHA Council of Settlements [Danny DAYAN, Chairman] promotes settler interests and opposes territorial compromise
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International organization participation | | BIS, BSEC (observer), CERN (observer), EBRD, FAO, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt (signatory), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, MIGA, OAS (observer), OECD (accession state), OPCW (signatory), OSCE (partner), Paris Club (associate), PCA, SECI (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
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Flag description | | white with a blue hexagram (six-pointed linear star) known as the Magen David (Shield of David) centered between two equal horizontal blue bands near the top and bottom edges of the flag
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Economy - overview | | Israel has a technologically advanced market economy with substantial, though diminishing, government participation. It depends on imports of crude oil, grains, raw materials, and military equipment. Despite limited natural resources, Israel has intensively developed its agricultural and industrial sectors over the past 20 years. Israel imports substantial quantities of grain but is largely self-sufficient in other agricultural products. Cut diamonds, high-technology equipment, and agricultural products (fruits and vegetables) are the leading exports. Israel usually posts sizable trade deficits, which are covered by large transfer payments from abroad and by foreign loans. Roughly half of the government's external debt is owed to the US, its major source of economic and military aid. Israel's GDP, after contracting slightly in 2001 and 2002 due to the Palestinian conflict and troubles in the high-technology sector, has grown by about 5% per year since 2003. The economy grew an estimated 3.9% in 2008, slowed by the global financial crisis. The government's prudent fiscal policy and structural reforms over the past few years have helped to induce strong foreign investment, tax revenues, and private consumption, setting the economy on a solid growth path.
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GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $203.4 billion (2008 est.) $195.2 billion (2007 est.) $185.6 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP (official exchange rate) | | $202.1 billion (2008 est.)
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GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 4.2% (2008 est.) 5.2% (2007 est.) 5.3% (2006 est.)
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GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $28,600 (2008 est.) $27,900 (2007 est.) $27,000 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 2.6% industry: 32.4% services: 65% (2008 est.)
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Labor force | | 2.957 million (2008 est.)
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Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture: 2% industry: 16% services: 82% (30 September 2008)
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Unemployment rate(%) | | 6.1% (2008 est.) 7.3% (2007 est.)
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Population below poverty line(%) | | 21.60% note: Israel's poverty line is $7.30 per person per day (2005)
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Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: 2.6% highest 10%: 24.2% (2007)
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Distribution of family income - Gini index | | 38.6 (2005) 35.5 (2001)
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Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP) | | 18.1% of GDP (2008 est.)
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Budget | | revenues: $59.98 billion expenditures: $64.21 billion (2008 est.)
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Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | 4.6% (2008 est.) 0.5% (2007 est.)
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Stock of money | | $NA (31 December 2008) $15.36 billion (31 December 2006)
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Stock of quasi money | | $NA (31 December 2008) $154.3 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of domestic credit | | $NA (31 December 2008) $113.4 billion (31 December 2006)
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Market value of publicly traded shares | | $134.5 billion (31 December 2008) $236.4 billion (31 December 2007) $173.3 billion (31 December 2006)
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Economic aid - recipient | | $240 million from US (FY06)
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Public debt(% of GDP) | | 76.8% of GDP (2008 est.) 104.5% of GDP (2004 est.)
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Agriculture - products | | citrus, vegetables, cotton; beef, poultry, dairy products
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Industries | | high-technology projects (including aviation, communications, computer-aided design and manufactures, medical electronics, fiber optics), wood and paper products, potash and phosphates, food, beverages, and tobacco, caustic soda, cement, construction, metals products, chemical products, plastics, diamond cutting, textiles, footwear
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Industrial production growth rate(%) | | 3.5% (2008 est.)
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Current account balance | | $2.213 billion (2008 est.) $4.185 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports | | $57.16 billion (2008 est.) $50.07 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports - commodities(%) | | machinery and equipment, software, cut diamonds, agricultural products, chemicals, textiles and apparel
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Exports - partners(%) | | US 32.5%, Belgium 7.5%, Hong Kong 6.7% (2008)
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Imports | | $64.4 billion (2008 est.) $55.93 billion (2007 est.)
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Imports - commodities(%) | | raw materials, military equipment, investment goods, rough diamonds, fuels, grain, consumer goods
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Imports - partners(%) | | US 12.3%, Belgium 6.5%, China 6.5%, Switzerland 6.1%, Germany 6% (2008)
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Reserves of foreign exchange and gold | | $42.51 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $28.52 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Debt - external | | $86.08 billion (31 December 2008) $89.58 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - at home | | $56.93 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $55.7 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad | | $54.55 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $48.47 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Exchange rates | | new Israeli shekels (ILS) per US dollar - 3.56 (2008 est.), 4.14 (2007), 4.4565 (2006), 4.4877 (2005), 4.482 (2004)
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Currency (code) | | new Israeli shekel (ILS); note - NIS is the currency abbreviation; ILS is the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) code for the NIS
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Telephones - main lines in use | | 2.9 million (2008)
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Telephones - mobile cellular | | 8.902 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: most highly developed system in the Middle East although not the largest domestic: good system of coaxial cable and microwave radio relay; all systems are digital; four privately-owned mobile-cellular service providers with countrywide coverage international: country code - 972; submarine cables provide links to Europe, Cyprus, and parts of the Middle East; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) (2008)
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Internet country code | | .il
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Internet users | | 2.106 million (2008)
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Airports | | 47 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | gas 176 km; oil 442 km; refined products 261 km (2008)
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Roadways(km) | | total: 17,870 km paved: 17,870 km (includes 146 km of expressways) (2007)
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Ports and terminals | | Ashdod, Elat (Eilat), Hadera, Haifa
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Military branches | | Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israel Naval Forces (INF), Israel Air Force (IAF) (2009)
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Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 18 years of age for compulsory (Jews, Druzes) and voluntary (Christians, Muslims, Circassians) military service; both sexes are obligated to military service; conscript service obligation - 36 months for enlisted men, 21 months for enlisted women, 48 months for officers; reserve obligation to age 41-51 (men), 24 (women) (2008)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 1,717,362 females age 16-49: 1,636,574 (2008 est.)
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Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 1,474,966 females age 16-49: 1,404,712 (2009 est.)
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Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 61,223 female: 58,219 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | 7.3% of GDP (2006)
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Disputes - international | | West Bank and Gaza Strip are Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement - permanent status to be determined through further negotiation; Israel continues construction of a "seam line" separation barrier along parts of the Green Line and within the West Bank; Israel withdrew its settlers and military from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the West Bank in August 2005; Golan Heights is Israeli-occupied (Lebanon claims the Shab'a Farms area of Golan Heights); since 1948, about 350 peacekeepers from the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) headquartered in Jerusalem monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating, and assist other UN personnel in the region
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Refugees and internally displaced persons | | IDPs: 150,000-420,000 (Arab villagers displaced from homes in northern Israel) (2007)
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Electricity - production(kWh) | | 50.41 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 99.9% hydro: 0.1% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
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Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 46.15 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 2.081 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 5,246 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 235,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 69,580 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 318,900 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 1.94 million bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
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Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 1.19 billion cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 1.19 billion cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008)
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Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 30.44 billion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | 0.1% (2007 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | 5,100 (2007 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - deaths | | fewer than 200 (2007 est.)
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Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 97.1% male: 98.5% female: 95.9% (2004 est.)
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School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years) | | total: 15 years male: 15 years female: 16 years (2006)
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Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | 6.9% of GDP (2004)
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