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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Israel
Index
Israel made clear to the Arabs that certain actions, even if
not overtly hostile or aimed at Israel, would trigger an Israeli
preemptive attack. Israel announced various potential causes of
war. Some causes, such as interference with Israeli freedom of
navigation in the Strait of Tiran, were officially designated as
such. In 1982 Sharon listed four actions that would lead to an
attack: the attempt by an Arab country to acquire or manufacture an
atomic bomb, the militarization of the Sinai Peninsula, the entry
of the Iraqi army into Jordan, and the supply of sophisticated
United States arms to Jordan. In 1988 the government of Israel
continued to communicate potential causes to its Arab adversaries.
Their tacit acquiescence in these unilateral Israeli demands
constituted a system of unwritten but mutually understood
agreements protecting the short-term status quo.
Since the establishment of Israel, the IDF has been obliged to
deal with terrorist actions, cross-border raids, and artillery and
missile barrages of the various Palestinian organizations under the
loose leadership of the PLO. The IDF's approach in contending with
PLO activity has combined extreme vigilance with prompt and
damaging retaliatory measures, including punishment of Arab nations
giving sanctuary to terrorists and guerrillas. The presence of
innocent noncombatants was not accepted as a reason for withholding
counterstrikes. Although striving to limit harm to uninvolved
persons, the Israelis gave priority to the need to demonstrate that
acts of terrorism would meet with quick retribution in painful and
unpredictable forms.
Israeli strategists believed the periodic outbreak of war to be
virtually inevitable and that once war broke out it was essential
that it be brief and lead to decisive victory. The requirement of
a rapid war followed from at least two factors. During full
mobilization, virtually the entire Israeli population was engaged
in the defense effort and the peacetime economy ground to a halt.
Sustaining full mobilization for more than several weeks would
prove disastrous to the economy, and stockpiling sufficient
supplies for a long war would be difficult and very costly.
Experience from past wars also showed Israel that prolonged
hostilities invited superpower intervention. As a result, Israeli
strategists stressed the need to create a clear margin of victory
before a cease-fire was imposed from the outside. This concept was
extended in the 1980s, when Israeli military leaders formulated the
strategy of engaging in a "war of annihilation" in the event of a
new round of all-out warfare. Israel's goal would be to destroy the
Arab armies so completely as to preclude a military threat for ten
years. Such a scenario might prove elusive, however, because
destroyed equipment could be quickly replaced, and the Arab
countries had sufficient manpower to rebuild shattered forces.
Data as of December 1988
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