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Israel
Index
When Israel became independent, its founding political elite,
associated mainly with Mapai, had almost three decades of
experience in operating self-governing institutions under the
British Mandate. The top Mapai/Labor Party leaders continued to
dominate Israeli politics for another three decades. Their
paramount influence for over half a century as founders,
architects, and prime movers of a Jewish national homeland has had
an enduring effect on their successor generation and the political
scene in Israel. The elite, political culture, social structure,
and social makeup of any nation entwine in complex ways and in the
process shape the character and direction of a given political
system. This process holds true especially in Israel, where
ideological imperatives and their institutionalization have
constituted an important part of the country's evolution.
The first generation of Israeli leaders came to Palestine
(which they called Eretz Yisrael, or Land of Israel) mainly during
the Second
Aliyah (see Glossary)
between 1900 and 1920
(see Labor Zionism
, ch. 1). The Ashkenazim (Jews of European origin), who
constituted the majority among the Yishuv's mostly Labor Zionist
political and socioeconomic elites, were impelled by Zionist
ideals. The majority held to Labor Zionism, while others adhered to
moderate General Zionism (sometimes called Political Zionism) or
right-wing Revisionist Zionism. To the early immigrants, the themes
promoted by the different Zionist movements provided powerful
impulses for sociopolitical action. These pioneers were essentially
Labor Zionists with an abiding faith in the rectitude of values
that stressed, among other things, the establishment of a modern
Jewish nation promoting mutual assistance under the principle of
"from each according to his ability, to each according to his
needs," abolition of private ownership of the means of production,
and the idea that human consciousness and character were
conditioned by the social environment. They also held that Jewish
land should be developed in a collectivist agricultural framework,
that well-to-do Jews in the Diaspora should materially aid the
cause of the Jewish homeland, and that the Jews of the Diaspora
should seek the fullest measure of redemption by immigrating to the
new Yishuv. In addition, collectivist values of East European and
Central European origin, in which the founding generation had been
socialized, affected the political orientation of Israel both
before and after independence.
The value system of the first generation came to be exemplified
first and foremost in the communal and egalitarian kibbutz and to
a lesser extent in the moshav. Together these institutions
accounted for less than 3 percent of the Jewish population at any
given time, but they have held a special place in Israeli society
as the citadel of pioneer ideology. They also gave Israel a
distinctive self-image as a robust, dedicated, egalitarian,
"farmer- or citizen-soldier" society. The kibbutzim also produced
numbers of national leaders out of proportion to their small
population; they also provided the country with some of its best
soldiers and officers.
The founding generation of Israeli leaders, including David
Ben-Gurion, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Berl Katznelson, Moshe Sharett, and
later, Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, in effect shaped the country's
socioeconomic structures and political patterns. These people were
instrumental in establishing the original Labor Zionist parties
beginning in 1905, in merging them to establish Mapai in 1930, and
in organizing the Histadrut and Jewish self-defense institutions,
such as the
Haganah (see Glossary),
which later became the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) in 1920. These formative, nation-building
organizations, along with the quasi-governmental Elected Assembly
(Asefat Hanivharim--see Glossary),
the National Council (Vaad
Leumi), the WZO, and the Jewish Agency, served as the Yishuv's
national institutions, shaping the character of postindependence
Israel.
From its earliest days, Mapai, which had an interlocking
leadership with the Histadrut, dominated Israeli public life,
including the top echelons of the IDF, the WZO, and the Jewish
Agency. Its legitimacy as a ruling party was seldom questioned
because it was identified with the mystique of the Zionist struggle
for independence, patriotism, and the successful consolidation of
statehood. The essentially secular political values espoused by
Mapai leaders were endorsed by most of the Jewish population. The
absence of effective alternative governing elites or countervalues
within the country's multiparty coalition-type government system
made it difficult to challenge the Mapai-controlled political
mainstream. Moreover, political patterns from the 1920s until the
June 1967 War generally discouraged the rise of radical right-wing
or left-wing destabilizing tendencies. This trend was rooted in the
overall political dominance of Israel's Labor Party and its
predecessors and the strength of the mutual restraints inherent in
Israel's political subcultures.
Mainstream Israeli society is composed of persons who represent
pluralistic cultural and political backgrounds. Politically, some
Israeli Jews have liberal West European orientations; others were
reared in more collectivist Central European and East European
environments, or in authoritarian Middle Eastern political
cultures. Some are religiously more traditional than others, but
even among Orthodox Jews, shades of conviction vary substantially
over the role of Jewish customary laws and the relationship between
the state and religion. Thus, the founding generation had to
develop a political system that reconciled and accommodated the
varied needs of a wide range of groups.
The political system within Israel proper, excluding the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, is geared to the broadest possible level
of public participation. Political activities are relatively free,
although authoritarian and antidemocratic tendencies were evident
among some of the leaders and supporters of right-wing
ultranationalist parties and factions. In the late 1980s, the
impetus to "agree to disagree" within the democratic framework of
conciliation began to show some weakening as a result of intense
polarizing controversies over the future of the occupied
territories and various disputes over issues concerning the state
and religion.
By the early 1970s, Jews of Sephardic origin (popularly
referred to in Israel as Oriental Jews) outnumbered their
Ashkenazic counterparts as a demographic group. The older Sephardim
were, in general, from politically authoritarian and religiously
traditional North African and Middle Eastern societies that
regarded the Central European and West European secular and social
democratic political value spectrum as too modern and far-reaching
as compared to their own. They were accustomed to strong
authoritarian leaders rather than ideals emphasizing social
democratic collectivism and popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, a
sizable proportion of Sephardim joined Labor's ranks both as
leaders and rank-and-file party members.
Oriental Jews came to be referred to in the 1960s as "the
Second Israel"--the numerically larger but socially, culturally,
economically, and politically disadvantaged half of the nation
(see Jewish Ethnic Groups
, ch. 2). Not all Orientals were economically
deprived, but nearly all of those who were relatively poor belonged
to Sephardic communities. The communal gap and attendant tensions
between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews have naturally engaged the
remedial efforts of successive governments, but results have fallen
far short of Oriental expectations. The problem was partly rooted
in the country's political institutions and processes. Ashkenazic
dominance of sociopolitical and economic life had been firmly
institutionalized before independence. Over the years, however,
Sephardic representation substantially increased in the country's
major political parties, and as of the 1980s, Sephardic Jews
occupied leadership positions in many municipalities.
Not surprisingly, beginning in the 1950s, most Sephardim tended
to vote against Mapai and its successor, Labor. Both were perceived
as representing the Ashkenazic establishment, even though Sephardim
were always represented among the ranks of party leaders. In the
1950s and early 1960s, while many Sephardim were impressed with
Ben-Gurion's charismatic and authoritative leadership, they
nevertheless tended to support Herut, the major opposition party
led by Menachem Begin, whose right-wing populism and
ultranationalist, anti-Arab national security posture appealed to
them. Paradoxically, the socialist-inspired social welfare system,
a system built by Mapai and sustained by Labor and the
Labor-dominated Histadrut, benefited the Sephardim particularly. In
general, the Sephardim tended to support the right-wing Gahal/Likud
blocs that for years had advocated a substantial modification of
the welfare system so as to decrease its socialist emphasis. In
terms of long-range electoral trends, the Sephardic position did
not augur well for the Labor Zionist elite of the Labor Party.
Pressure for greater political representation and power has
come from the younger, Israeli-born generation of both Ashkenazic
and Sephardic origins. As a group, they were less obsessed with the
past than their elders. The youth have been moving toward a strong,
industrialized, capitalist, Western-style, middle-class society as
the national norm. Although some younger right-wing
ultranationalists and right-wing religious advocates continued to
be imbued with the extremist nationalism and religious messianism
of their elders--as shown, for example, by their support of parties
favoring annexation of the occupied territories--most of the
younger generation were more secular, pragmatic, and moderate on
such issues.
The concerns of secular young people went beyond the question
of "Who is a Jew"--which they continuously had to confront because
of right-wing religious pressures--to such critical issues as the
quality of education, social status, economic conditions, and the
comforts of modern life. Their primary interests have been how to
make Israel more secure from external threat and how to improve the
quality of life for all. Nevertheless, for many Israelis, the
founding ideologies remained a ritualized part of national
politics.
Urbanization and industrialization were equally potent forces
of change; their adulterating effect on Israel's founding ideology
has been particularly significant. They have led to new demands,
new opportunities, and new stresses in social and economic life
affecting all social and political strata. The older commitment to
agriculture, pioneering, and collectivism has crumbled before the
relentless pressure of industrialization and the bridging of the
gap between urban and rural life. Collective and communal
settlements have become increasingly industrialized; factories and
high-technology industries have been set up; the mass media have
faciliated an influx of new information and ideas; and additional
layers of bureaucratic and institutional arrangements have emerged.
Kibbutz idealism, the pride of Israel, has declined, especially
among increasingly individualistic and consumer-oriented young
people. To stem this tide and to retain young members, kibbutz
federations and individual kibbutzim have established many
educational and vocational programs and activities.
As the 1970s began, the social base of Israeli politics had
become highly complex, and political fluidity resulted. A major
catalyst in creating a new mood was the October 1973 War, known in
Israel as the Yom Kippur War, which dealt a crushing blow to
popular belief in Israel's strength and preparedness in the face of
its Arab adversaries
(see The October 1973 War
, ch. 5). The result
was a loss of confidence in the political and national security
elite, headed at the time by Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister of
Defense Moshe Dayan, and Minister-without-Portfolio Israel Galilee.
After the war, in which Egyptian and Syrian forces scored military
gains, many charges and countercharges concerned inadequate
military preparedness. Nevertheless, Meir's government returned to
power in the country's parliamentary elections held on December 31,
1973. Apparently, despite widespread misgivings, many Israelis
believed that continuity was preferable to change and uncertainty
under Begin's newly formed and untried center-right Likud Bloc
(see The Likud Bloc
, this ch.).
Meir's resignation from the prime ministership in April 1974
resulted in a succession crisis and the departure of the last of
Labor's old guard party leaders, mostly in their late sixties and
seventies, such as Meir, Pinchas Sapir, and Israel Galilee. Meir's
departure triggered political infighting among the Labor elite,
specifically between the former Mapai and Rafi (Israel Labor
List--see Appendix B) factions; a new generation centered around
the triumvirate of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yigal Allon,
succeeded Meir.
The second most striking political development in the 1970s was
the ascendance of a new right-wing counterelite in May 1977. An
upset victory in the ninth parliamentary elections, called an
"earthquake" by some, brought Begin's center-right Likud to power,
ending Labor's half a century of political dominance. The new
political elite won primarily because of the defection of former
Labor leaders and previous Labor voters to the Democratic Movement
for Change (DMC), which had been founded in 1976 by Yigal Yadin and
several other groups. Despite the subsequent collapse of the DMC
and the defection of moderates from the Likud-led cabinet--for
example, former Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman formed his own
list Yahad (Together--see Appendix B) in 1981 and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan created Telem--Likud's success in the
tenth parliamentary elections of 1981 resulted from its continued
ability to present itself as a viable governing group and a party
dedicated to ultranationalism and territorial expansionism.
The top echelons of the Israeli political elite as of the late
1980s were still predominantly of European background; many of them
had either immigrated to Palestine during the 1930s and the 1940s
or had been born in the Yishuv to parents of East European or
Central European origin. A growing number of Oriental politicians,
however, were making their mark in the top ranks of all the major
parties and at the ministerial and subministerial levels. A
majority of the elite had a secular university education, while a
minority had a more traditional religious education. The political
elite was overwhelmingly urban--most resided in Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem, or Haifa. A minority, particularly the Sephardim, came
from the newer development towns. Among the elite who resided in
rural areas most, especially members of Labor and its satellites,
represented communal kibbutzim and, to a lesser extent, moshavim.
By occupational category, professional party politicians
constituted by far the largest single group, followed, in numerical
order, by lawyers, kibbutz officials, educators, Histadrut or
private sector corporate managers, journalists, ex-military
officers, and, to a lesser degree, functionaries of religious
institutions. Many of the elite were in the forty-to-mid-sixty age
bracket. In 1988 the political elite numbered more than 200
individuals, excluding the broader social elite encompassing
business, military, religious, educational, cultural, and
agricultural figures. The number would be greater if senior
officials in such key offices as the Office of the Prime Minister
and the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, finance, and
commerce, as well as the Histadrut and its industrial and financial
enterprises and trade unions, were included.
The power of individual members of the elite varied depending
on their personal reputation and their offices. The most
influential were found in the cabinet. Members of the Knesset came
next. Elected mayors of large municipalities such as Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem, and Haifa had considerable importance because of the
influence of local politics on national-level politics. In
addition, the president, Supreme Court justices, and the head of
the Office of the State Comptroller had the prestige of cabinet
members although they lacked decision-making responsibility.
During the late 1980s, the criteria for entrance into the top
elite were more open and competitive than previously. Political
parties, and, to some extent, the civil service, continued to be
the principal vehicles for upward mobility. Under the country's
electoral system of proportional representation, participation in
party politics remained essential for gaining top positions, except
in limited cases of co-optation from nonparty circles, principally
the military. In earlier periods, party nominating committees
primarily determined a politician's entry into a parliamentary
delegation; in the 1980s, internal party elections increasingly
governed this decision. This system placed a high premium on
partisan loyalty, membership in a party faction, and individual
competence.
The political establishment, whether in office or in
opposition, secularist or Orthodox, left-wing or right-wing, has
remained basically loyal to the state. Establishment
interpretations of classical Zionist ideologies have varied
according to the adherents' diverse backgrounds and political and
religious orientations, but internal political cleavages have not
undermined the essential unity of Israeli society and political
institutions. Except for certain segments among a minority of
extremist right-wing religious or secular ultranationalists, most
Israeli citizens have sought to maintain democratic values and
procedures; their differences have centered mainly on tactics
rather than on the goal of realizing a modern, democratic,
prosperous social welfare state.
Data as of December 1988
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