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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Israel
Index
During the first twenty years of Israeli occupation, security
in the territories fluctuated between periods of calm and periods
of unrest. Discontent was chronic, however, especially among the
younger Palestinians in refugee camps. Nearly half the Arab
population of the occupied territories lived in twenty camps in the
West Bank and eight camps in the Gaza Strip, in overcrowded and
unsanitary conditions. The camps had existed since the flight of
Arabs displaced after the partition of Palestine in 1948. Communal
conflict was liable to break out at any time between Palestinians
and Israeli settlers. Friction also arose from security measures
taken by Israeli authorities to counter perceived threats to order.
An upsurge of instability and violence in 1987 resulted partly
from deliberate provocations by PLO factions and PLO dissident
groups, but much of it generated spontaneously. Violence by Israeli
settlers increased, including the initiation of unauthorized armed
patrols and physical harassment of Palestinians. Although some
settlers were arrested, the Palestinians asserted that the
authorities were lenient with Israelis who violated security
regulations.
The escalating level of Palestinian unrest precipitated a
series of protests and violent demonstrations that began on
December 9, 1987, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and later
spread to Arab communities in Jerusalem and Israel itself.
Thousands of mostly teen-aged Palestinians banded together, setting
up barricades in refugee camps, confronting soldiers and Border
Police, and attacking road traffic with rocks. Unlike previous
demonstrations, the violence did not appear to be directed or
coordinated by the PLO and continued almost unabated for many
months. By October 1988, more than 250 Palestinians had been killed
and 5 Israeli deaths had occurred. Although mass violence had
diminished, many individual incidents of rock-throwing and the
tossing of gasoline bombs by small roving bands continued to occur.
The army's retaliation was tougher and more rapid, with aggressive
use of clubs and plastic bullets, demolition of houses, orchards,
wells, and gardens, and economic sanctions against recalcitrant
villages.
The young IDF conscripts called upon to impose order at first
responded erratically, in some cases with restraint and in other
cases with brutality. Lacking proper equipment and training in riot
control, the soldiers often fired indiscriminately at Arab
protesters, causing many casualties. Later, after troops were
ordered to use batons and rifle butts, demonstrators were often
badly beaten both before and after arrest, suffering fractured
bones. There were reports of soldiers entering Arab houses to
administer collective punishment and beating and harassing doctors
and nurses in hospitals where wounded Arabs were being treated.
Under mounting international criticism for the harsh and
undisciplined behavior of the IDF, the military authorities
acquired additional riot control equipment, including rubber and
plastic bullets, tear gas, and specially-equipped command cars. New
tactics were introduced, notably the deployment of large forces to
snuff out riots as soon as they began. The IDF instituted a code of
conduct and a special one-week training program in internal
security.
The uprising forced the IDF to cancel normal troop training and
exercises. About 15,000 soldiers--several times the normal number--
were assigned to maintain security in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. The military authorities later replaced most of the
conscripts with reservists who had demonstrated greater restraint
when confronted by rock-throwing demonstrators. Nonetheless,
several hundred reservists, disagreeing with Israeli policy,
refused to serve in the occupied territories.
As of mid-1988, fifteen soldiers had been court-martialed for
some of the most serious offenses, including a widely publicized
case in which four Arab demonstrators had been severely beaten and
then buried under a load of sand. Other soldiers had faced
lower-level disciplinary proceedings. There was growing evidence
that the morale of the IDF was eroding as a result of the stress of
daily confrontations with hostile demonstrators. Senior officers
contended that the riot control mission had induced a crisis of
confidence that would affect the army's performance in orthodox
conflict. The IDF's reputation as a humane, superbly trained, and
motivated force had clearly been tarnished.
IDF commanders said that they had reduced the number of
soldiers assigned to riot control duty by nearly one-third since
the mass demonstrations had tapered off but feared that the cost of
controlling the uprising (estimated at US$300 million) would
necessitate curtailing IDF equipment purchases. Although they
foresaw that the violence might continue indefinitely, they did not
regard it as a serious threat in strategic terms.
Data as of December 1988
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