MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Israel
Index
On May 30, mounting public opinion led to the appointment of
Dayan as minister of defense. Levi Eshkol, who had been both prime
minister and minister of defense since Ben-Gurion's resignation in
1963, retained the prime minister's position. Dayan immediately
made a series of public declarations that war could be avoided,
while secretly planning a massive preemptive strike against the
Arab enemy. On the morning of June 5, Israel launched a devastating
attack on Arab air power, destroying about 300 Egyptian, 50 Syrian,
and 20 Jordanian aircraft, mostly on the ground. This action, which
virtually eliminated the Arab air forces, was immediately followed
by ground invasions into Sinai and the Gaza Strip, Jordan, and
finally Syria. Arab ground forces, lacking air support, were routed
on all three fronts; by the time the UN-imposed cease-fire took
effect in the evening of June 11, the IDF had seized the entire
Sinai Peninsula to the east bank of the Suez Canal; the West Bank
of Jordan, including East Jerusalem; and the Golan Heights of
Syria. Unlike the aftermath of the 1956 War, however, the IDF did
not withdraw from the areas it occupied in 1967.
Israel was ecstatic about its swift and stunning victory, which
had been achieved at the relatively low cost of about 700 lives.
The IDF had proven itself superior to the far larger forces of the
combined Arab armies. More important, it now occupied the territory
that had harbored immediate security threats to Israel since 1948.
For the first time since independence, the Israeli heartland along
the Mediterranean Sea was out of enemy artillery range. The
exploits of what was known in Israel as the Six-Day War soon became
legend, and the commanders who led it became national heros.
Although control of the occupied territories greatly improved
Israel's security from a geographical standpoint, it also created
new problems. The roughly 1 million Arabs within the territories
provided potential cover and support for infiltration and sabotage
by Arab guerrillas. From shortly after the June 1967 War until
1970, a steady stream of men and weapons were sent into the West
Bank by a number of guerrilla groups, in particular Al Fatah
(see Palestinian Terrorist Groups
, this ch.). Incidents of sabotage and
clashes with Israeli security forces were commonplace. In the
spring of 1970, the guerrilla strategy reverted to shelling Israeli
towns from across the Jordanian and Lebanese borders. International
terrorism, aimed at focusing world attention on the grievances of
Palestinian Arabs against Israel, also appeared after the June 1967
War.
Hostilities on the Egyptian front were far more serious. The
decimated Egyptian army was rapidly resupplied with advanced Soviet
weapons, and the Soviet presence at the Suez Canal increased
dramatically. In October 1967, the Israeli destroyer and flagship
Elat was sunk by a missile fired from an Egyptian ship
docked in Port Said; Israel retaliated with the destruction of
Egyptian oil refineries at Suez. A year later, shelling began along
the canal, and a new round of fighting, commonly known as the War
of Attrition, commenced. For nearly two years, until a new
cease-fire was imposed on August 7, 1970, Egypt (with growing and
direct support from the Soviet Union) threw an increasingly heavy
barrage of artillery and missiles at fortified Israeli positions
along the east bank of the canal, while Israel stood its ground and
launched a series of fighter-bomber raids deep into the Egyptian
heartland. This deadly but inconclusive conflict culminated on July
30, 1970, when Israeli and Soviet-piloted fighters clashed in a
dogfight near the Suez Canal. Israeli pilots reportedly shot down
four MiGs and lost none of their own, but this direct confrontation
with a nuclear superpower was a frightening development and helped
bring about the cease-fire.
Although activity aimed against Israel by Palestinian
guerrillas continued throughout the early 1970s, Israel felt
relatively secure vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors after the War of
Attrition. Israel's military intelligence was convinced that Syria
would launch a war only in concert with Egypt and that Egypt would
go to war only if it were convinced that its air power was superior
to Israel's. This theory, which became so institutionalized in
Israeli military thinking as to be dubbed "the concept,"
contributed to the country's general sense of security. Defense
expenditures declined markedly from 1970 levels, the annual reserve
call-up was reduced from sixty to thirty days, and in 1973 the
length of conscription was reduced from thirty-six to thirty-three
months.
Data as of December 1988
|
|