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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Israel
Index
Another premise was that every Arab country was at least a
potential member of a unified pan-Arab coalition that could attack
Israel--a concept sometimes referred to by Israeli strategic
planners as the "extensive threat." To confront this extensive
threat, the IDF aimed to have the capability to defend Israel not
only against an attack by a single Arab adversary or an alliance of
several Arab states, but also against the combined forces of all
Arab countries. Israeli strategists felt that planning for such a
worst-case scenario was prudent because Arab states had often
rhetorically threatened such a combined attack. The concept of
extensive threat also justified requests for greater military aid
from the United States and protests against United States military
support of moderate Arab states that, from the American
perspective, posed no credible threat to Israel's security.
Some Israeli military leaders insisted that, despite the 1978
Camp David Accords, Egypt remained a major potential enemy in any
future Arab-Israeli war. Moreover, some Israeli strategists worried
about threats from outside the Arab world. In a 1981 speech, then
Minister of Defense Sharon stated that "Israel's sphere of
strategic and security interests must be broadened in the 1980s" to
confront new adversaries in Africa and Asia, and cited Pakistan as
one potential threat. Some strategists even envisioned Israeli
clashes with Iran and India.
At the other end of the spectrum were those who felt that the
concept of extensive threat exaggerated the danger to Israel. Some
Israeli strategists argued in the late 1980s that the Arab-Israeli
conflict was evolving into a bilateral contest between Israel and
Syria to which other Arab actors were becoming peripheral. They
considered that the IDF for pragmatic reasons should deploy its
limited resources to counter the threat of a cross-border attack by
Syria. Speaking in 1987, Minister of Defense Rabin stated that
Egypt had placed itself "outside the circle of nations at war with
Israel" and that the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel had
"significantly altered the Middle East balance of power in Israel's
favor."
Demographic and geographic pressures arising from Israel's
small size and concentrated population meant that a war fought
within Israel would be extremely costly in terms of civilian
casualties and damage to the economic infrastructure. Morale and,
hence, future immigration would also suffer. It was therefore an
ironclad rule of Israeli strategists to transfer military action to
enemy territory, and no regular Arab troops have hit on Israeli
soil since 1948. Because Israel could never defeat its Arab enemy
permanently, no matter how many victories or "rounds" it won on the
battlefield, and because in each full-scale war it incurred the
risk, however minimal, of combat being conducted on its territory
or even a defeat that would destroy the state, Israel's official
policy was to avoid all-out war unless attacked. Deterrence
therefore became the main pillar of Israel's national security
doctrine.
Data as of December 1988
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