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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iraq
Index
In modern Iraq, the armed forces have intervened in the
political life of the state. Military interventions were
concentrated in two periods, the first from 1936 to 1941, when
there were seven coups d'etat, and the second between 1958 and
1968, when there were five military seizures of power. Because
Iraq had a highly developed military institution and chronically
weak civilian regimes, the armed forces felt that they alone were
capable of providing strong and stable governments; however,
personal and ideological factionalization within the armed forces
fostered heightened instability and a cycle of coups that
culminated in the Baathist takeover on July 17, 1968.
As the leadership in the previous military regime became
increasingly fragmented and weak, and as resistance movements
grew, Baathist officers, intending to end the cycle of military
intervention in the government, carried out a coup. Baath Party
officials believed the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and various
Kurdish movements were using the military as a vehicle to promote
their own interests. Consequently, the Baath decided to weaken
the military's political power gradually and to turn the army
into a loyal and strong defensive force. Accordingly, they
steadily reduced military participation in the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC); whereas the five-member 1968 RCC was
composed exclusively of military men, only three of the RCC's
twenty-two members in 1978 were active-duty officers.
To transform the military into an ideological army (Al Jaysh
al Aqidi), the Baath undertook purges of the armed forces and
granted military posts to civilians. They also tried to "purify"
the armed forces by providing propaganda pamphlets and
indoctrination lectures.
To institutionalize its control of the army, the Baath Party
adopted an eclectic strategy. First, it restricted admission to
military colleges and institutions to members of the Baath Party.
Those accepted could expect generous financial rewards if they
remained loyal, but, if they did not, they could expect the death
penalty. Second, discrimination, in recruitment and in promotion,
on religious and nationality grounds was intensified. At one
point in 1979, all senior posts were restricted to officers
related to Saddam Husayn or to other individuals from Tikrit.
The Ideological Army advocated national socialism, and the
Baath Party used the army to fulfill Baath objectives. By 1980
the Ideological Army was an organized, modern force capable of
rapid movement and, strengthened by an overwhelming feeling of
historical responsibility. The officers were firmly convinced
that theirs was an elite role, that of the leading patriotic
force in Iraqi society, and they, too, were inspired to carry out
the national "historical mission." In short, the Baathization of
the armed forces, based on an indoctrination in national
socialism, in reliance on force, and in a vision of this
historical mission, completed the emergence of the new army as a
national force.
During the 1970s, military officers unsuccessfully attempted
to overthrow the Baathist regime, however, on at least two
occasions. In January 1970, an attempted coup led by two retired
officers, Major General Abd al Ghani ar Rawi and Colonel Salih
Mahdi as Samarrai, was discovered and thwarted as the
conspirators entered the Republican Palace. In June 1973, a plot
by Nazim Kazzar, a Shia and the director of internal security, to
assassinate President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr and Saddam Husayn was
foiled. Kazzar, who resented both Sunni and Tikriti domination of
the Baath Party, had taken a prominent part in organizing the
massacre of communists in the anarchy that followed the
military's seizure of power in February 1963. He had acquired a
reputation as a torturer, and the old palace that he had taken
over as headquarters was known as "Qasr an Nihayah," the "Palace
of the End." Few who entered ever came out, nor did their bodies
receive public burial. When his coup plans failed, Kazzar fled
toward the Iranian border. Before being apprehended, he killed
the minister of defense, Hammad Shihab, who happened to be in the
area inspecting border posts. Shortly afterward he was executed.
Both coup attempts were followed by summary trials, executions,
and purges of the armed forces.
Although rumors about foiled coup attempts have circulated
periodically, the most serious attempt to assassinate Saddam
Husayn reportedly occurred in 1982, after both a military defeat
on the battlefield and an erosion in the economy. On July 11,
1982, the presidential party was traveling through the mixed
Shia-Sunni village of Ad Dujayl, about sixty kilometers northeast
of Baghdad, when it was surrounded by Shia villagers and held for
several hours before it was rescued by the army. Subsequent
reports revealed that a number of Saddam's bodyguards and of the
villagers were killed. As punishment, the Baath government
deported the villagers to Iran and razed their houses.
Data as of May 1988
Iraqi units at Khorramshahr, Iran, October 1980
Courtesy Photri/Lehtikuva
Status in National Life
In modern Iraq, the armed forces have intervened in the
political life of the state. Military interventions were
concentrated in two periods, the first from 1936 to 1941, when
there were seven coups d'etat, and the second between 1958 and
1968, when there were five military seizures of power. Because
Iraq had a highly developed military institution and chronically
weak civilian regimes, the armed forces felt that they alone were
capable of providing strong and stable governments; however,
personal and ideological factionalization within the armed forces
fostered heightened instability and a cycle of coups that
culminated in the Baathist takeover on July 17, 1968.
As the leadership in the previous military regime became
increasingly fragmented and weak, and as resistance movements
grew, Baathist officers, intending to end the cycle of military
intervention in the government, carried out a coup. Baath Party
officials believed the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and various
Kurdish movements were using the military as a vehicle to promote
their own interests. Consequently, the Baath decided to weaken
the military's political power gradually and to turn the army
into a loyal and strong defensive force. Accordingly, they
steadily reduced military participation in the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC); whereas the five-member 1968 RCC was
composed exclusively of military men, only three of the RCC's
twenty-two members in 1978 were active-duty officers.
To transform the military into an ideological army (Al Jaysh
al Aqidi), the Baath undertook purges of the armed forces and
granted military posts to civilians. They also tried to "purify"
the armed forces by providing propaganda pamphlets and
indoctrination lectures.
To institutionalize its control of the army, the Baath Party
adopted an eclectic strategy. First, it restricted admission to
military colleges and institutions to members of the Baath Party.
Those accepted could expect generous financial rewards if they
remained loyal, but, if they did not, they could expect the death
penalty. Second, discrimination, in recruitment and in promotion,
on religious and nationality grounds was intensified. At one
point in 1979, all senior posts were restricted to officers
related to Saddam Husayn or to other individuals from Tikrit.
The Ideological Army advocated national socialism, and the
Baath Party used the army to fulfill Baath objectives. By 1980
the Ideological Army was an organized, modern force capable of
rapid movement and, strengthened by an overwhelming feeling of
historical responsibility. The officers were firmly convinced
that theirs was an elite role, that of the leading patriotic
force in Iraqi society, and they, too, were inspired to carry out
the national "historical mission." In short, the Baathization of
the armed forces, based on an indoctrination in national
socialism, in reliance on force, and in a vision of this
historical mission, completed the emergence of the new army as a
national force.
During the 1970s, military officers unsuccessfully attempted
to overthrow the Baathist regime, however, on at least two
occasions. In January 1970, an attempted coup led by two retired
officers, Major General Abd al Ghani ar Rawi and Colonel Salih
Mahdi as Samarrai, was discovered and thwarted as the
conspirators entered the Republican Palace. In June 1973, a plot
by Nazim Kazzar, a Shia and the director of internal security, to
assassinate President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr and Saddam Husayn was
foiled. Kazzar, who resented both Sunni and Tikriti domination of
the Baath Party, had taken a prominent part in organizing the
massacre of communists in the anarchy that followed the
military's seizure of power in February 1963. He had acquired a
reputation as a torturer, and the old palace that he had taken
over as headquarters was known as "Qasr an Nihayah," the "Palace
of the End." Few who entered ever came out, nor did their bodies
receive public burial. When his coup plans failed, Kazzar fled
toward the Iranian border. Before being apprehended, he killed
the minister of defense, Hammad Shihab, who happened to be in the
area inspecting border posts. Shortly afterward he was executed.
Both coup attempts were followed by summary trials, executions,
and purges of the armed forces.
Although rumors about foiled coup attempts have circulated
periodically, the most serious attempt to assassinate Saddam
Husayn reportedly occurred in 1982, after both a military defeat
on the battlefield and an erosion in the economy. On July 11,
1982, the presidential party was traveling through the mixed
Shia-Sunni village of Ad Dujayl, about sixty kilometers northeast
of Baghdad, when it was surrounded by Shia villagers and held for
several hours before it was rescued by the army. Subsequent
reports revealed that a number of Saddam's bodyguards and of the
villagers were killed. As punishment, the Baath government
deported the villagers to Iran and razed their houses.
Data as of May 1988
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