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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iraq
Index
During the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the Iraqi armed
forces underwent many changes in size, structure, arms supplies,
hierarchy, deployment, and political character. Headquartered in
Baghdad, the army--of an estimated 1.7 million or more Iraqis,
including reserves (actual numbers not available) and
paramilitary--in 1987 had seven corps, five armored divisions
(each with one armored brigade and one mechanized brigade), and
three mechanized divisions (each with one armored brigade and two
or more mechanized brigades). An expanded Presidential Guard
Force was composed of three armored brigades, one infantry
brigade, and one commando brigade. There were also thirty
infantry divisions, composed of the People's Army (Al Jaysh ash
Shaabi--also cited as the Popular Army or People's Militia)
brigades and the reserve brigades, as well as six Special Forces
brigades.
This growth in the manpower and equipment inventories of the
Iraqi armed forces was facilitated by Iraq's capacity to pay for
a large standing army and was occasioned by Iraq's need to fight
a war with Iran, a determined and much larger neighbor. Whereas
in 1978 active-duty military personnel numbered less than
200,000, and the military was equipped with some of the most
sophisticated weaponry of the Soviet military arsenal, by 1987
the quality of offensive weapons had improved dramatically, and
the number of new under arms had increased almost fourfold (see
table 10, Appendix).
Army equipment inventories increased significantly during the
mid-1980s. Whereas in 1977 the army possessed approximately 2,400
tanks, including several hundred T-62 models, in 1987 the
International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that Iraq
deployed about 4,500 tanks, including advanced versions of the T72 . Other army equipment included about 4,000 armored vehicles,
more than 3,000 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, a
number of FROG-7 and Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles with a
range of up to 300 kilometers, and an array of approximately
4,000 (some self-propelled) antiaircraft guns. The vast majority
of the army's equipment inventory was of Soviet manufacture,
although French and Brazilian equipment in particular continued
to be acquired in Iraq's ongoing attempt to diversify its sources
of armaments (see
table 11, Appendix). This mammoth arsenal gave
Iraq a clear-cut advantage over Iran in 1987. Iraq had an
advantage of more than four to one in tanks (4,500 to 1,000);
four to one in armored vehicles (4,000 to 1,000); and two to one
in artillery and antiaircraft pieces (7,330 to 3,000). Despite
this quantitative and qualitative superiority, the Iraqi army by
the end of 1987 had not risked its strength in a final and
decisive battle to win the war.
Headquartered in Basra, the 5,000-man navy was the smallest
branch of the armed forces in early 1988, and, in contrast to the
Iranian navy, had played virtually no role in the war. Iraq's
second naval facility at Umm Qasr took on added importance after
1980, in particular because the Shatt al Arab waterway, which
leads into Basra, was the scene of extensive fighting. It was at
Umm Qasr that most of the Iraqi navy's active vessels were based
in early 1988. Between 1977 and 1987, Iraq purchased from the
Soviet Union eight fast-attack OSA-class patrol boats--each
equipped with Styx surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). In late
1986, from Italy, Iraq obtained four Lupo class frigates, and six
Wadi Assad class corvettes equipped with Otomat-2 SSMs. Although
the four frigates and the six corvettes was held in Italy under
an embargo imposed by the Italian government, these purchases
signaled Iraq's intention to upgrade its naval power. Observers
speculated that the end of the war with Iran could be followed by
a rapid expansion of the Iraqi navy, which could exercise its
influence in northern Persian Gulf waters (see
table 12,
Appendix).
In 1987 the Iraqi air force consisted of 40,000 men, of whom
about 10,000 were attached to its subordinate Air Defense
Command. The air force was headquartered in Baghdad, and major
bases were located at Basra, H-3 (site of a pump station on the
oil pipeline in western Iraq), Kirkuk, Mosul, Rashid, and Ash
Shuaybah. Iraq's more than 500 combat aircraft were formed into
two bomber squadrons, eleven fighter-ground attack squadrons,
five interceptor squadrons, and one counterinsurgency squadron of
10 to 30 aircraft each. Support aircraft included two transport
squadrons. As many as ten helicopter squadrons were also
operational, although these formed the Army Air Corps. The Air
Defense Command piloted the MiG-25, MiG-21, and various Mirage
interceptors and manned Iraq's considerable inventory of surfaceto -air missiles (SAMs).
The equipment of the air force and the army's air corps, like
that of the other services, was primarily of Soviet manufacture.
After 1980, however, in an effort to diversify its sources of
advanced armaments, Iraq turned to France for Mirage fighters and
for attack helicopters. Between 1982 and 1987, Iraq received or
ordered a variety of equipment from France, including more than
100 Mirage F-1s, about 100 Gazelle, Super-Frelon, and Alouette
helicopters, and a variety of air-to-surface and air-to-air
missiles, including Exocets. Other attack helicopters purchased
included the Soviet Hind equipped with AT-2 Swatter, and BO-105s
equipped with AS-11 antitank guided weapons. In addition, Iraq
bought seventy F-7 (Chinese version of the MiG-21) fighters,
assembled in Egypt. Thus Iraq's overall airpower was considerable
(see
table 13, Appendix).
Although Iraq expanded its arms inventory, its war efforts
may have been hindered by poor military judgment and by lack of
resolve. Saddam Husayn was the country's head of state and
premier as well as the chairman of both the RCC and the Baath
Party; moreover, in 1984 he assumed the rank of field marshal and
appointed himself commander in chief of the Iraqi armed forces.
Iraqi propaganda statements claimed that Saddam Husayn had
"developed new military ideas and theories of global importance,"
but few Western military analysts gave credence to such claims.
Since 1980 General Adnan Khairallah, who served as both deputy
commander in chief of the armed forces and minister of defense,
was the highest officer in the military chain of command. In 1987
he also assumed the position of deputy prime minister. His
multiple roles reflected the predominance of the army in the
organizational structure of the armed forces. Sattar Ahmad Jassin
was appointed secretary general of defense and adjutant of the
armed forces in 1985. General Abd al Jabar Shanshal assumed the
position of chief of the armed forces general staff in 1984.
Frequent changes at the general staff level indicated to foreign
observers that Iraq's military failures were primarily the result
of poor leadership and an overly rigid command structure.
Defective leadership was evident in the lack of clear orders and
in the poor responses by the army in the occupation of Susangerd.
In October 1980, armored units twice advanced and withdrew from
the city, and later in the same operation, the army abandoned
strategic positions near Dezful. Rigid control of junior officers
and of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) frustrated their
initiative and may have been the reason for the high casualty
figures in the infantry, where initiative and spontaneity in
decision making can be of paramount importance. The command
structure reportedly was even more inflexible and slow in the
People's Army detachments, where political commanders routinely
made military decisions.
Data as of May 1988
Size, Equipment, and Organization
During the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the Iraqi armed
forces underwent many changes in size, structure, arms supplies,
hierarchy, deployment, and political character. Headquartered in
Baghdad, the army--of an estimated 1.7 million or more Iraqis,
including reserves (actual numbers not available) and
paramilitary--in 1987 had seven corps, five armored divisions
(each with one armored brigade and one mechanized brigade), and
three mechanized divisions (each with one armored brigade and two
or more mechanized brigades). An expanded Presidential Guard
Force was composed of three armored brigades, one infantry
brigade, and one commando brigade. There were also thirty
infantry divisions, composed of the People's Army (Al Jaysh ash
Shaabi--also cited as the Popular Army or People's Militia)
brigades and the reserve brigades, as well as six Special Forces
brigades.
This growth in the manpower and equipment inventories of the
Iraqi armed forces was facilitated by Iraq's capacity to pay for
a large standing army and was occasioned by Iraq's need to fight
a war with Iran, a determined and much larger neighbor. Whereas
in 1978 active-duty military personnel numbered less than
200,000, and the military was equipped with some of the most
sophisticated weaponry of the Soviet military arsenal, by 1987
the quality of offensive weapons had improved dramatically, and
the number of new under arms had increased almost fourfold (see
table 10, Appendix).
Army equipment inventories increased significantly during the
mid-1980s. Whereas in 1977 the army possessed approximately 2,400
tanks, including several hundred T-62 models, in 1987 the
International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that Iraq
deployed about 4,500 tanks, including advanced versions of the T72 . Other army equipment included about 4,000 armored vehicles,
more than 3,000 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, a
number of FROG-7 and Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles with a
range of up to 300 kilometers, and an array of approximately
4,000 (some self-propelled) antiaircraft guns. The vast majority
of the army's equipment inventory was of Soviet manufacture,
although French and Brazilian equipment in particular continued
to be acquired in Iraq's ongoing attempt to diversify its sources
of armaments (see
table 11, Appendix). This mammoth arsenal gave
Iraq a clear-cut advantage over Iran in 1987. Iraq had an
advantage of more than four to one in tanks (4,500 to 1,000);
four to one in armored vehicles (4,000 to 1,000); and two to one
in artillery and antiaircraft pieces (7,330 to 3,000). Despite
this quantitative and qualitative superiority, the Iraqi army by
the end of 1987 had not risked its strength in a final and
decisive battle to win the war.
Headquartered in Basra, the 5,000-man navy was the smallest
branch of the armed forces in early 1988, and, in contrast to the
Iranian navy, had played virtually no role in the war. Iraq's
second naval facility at Umm Qasr took on added importance after
1980, in particular because the Shatt al Arab waterway, which
leads into Basra, was the scene of extensive fighting. It was at
Umm Qasr that most of the Iraqi navy's active vessels were based
in early 1988. Between 1977 and 1987, Iraq purchased from the
Soviet Union eight fast-attack OSA-class patrol boats--each
equipped with Styx surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). In late
1986, from Italy, Iraq obtained four Lupo class frigates, and six
Wadi Assad class corvettes equipped with Otomat-2 SSMs. Although
the four frigates and the six corvettes was held in Italy under
an embargo imposed by the Italian government, these purchases
signaled Iraq's intention to upgrade its naval power. Observers
speculated that the end of the war with Iran could be followed by
a rapid expansion of the Iraqi navy, which could exercise its
influence in northern Persian Gulf waters (see
table 12,
Appendix).
In 1987 the Iraqi air force consisted of 40,000 men, of whom
about 10,000 were attached to its subordinate Air Defense
Command. The air force was headquartered in Baghdad, and major
bases were located at Basra, H-3 (site of a pump station on the
oil pipeline in western Iraq), Kirkuk, Mosul, Rashid, and Ash
Shuaybah. Iraq's more than 500 combat aircraft were formed into
two bomber squadrons, eleven fighter-ground attack squadrons,
five interceptor squadrons, and one counterinsurgency squadron of
10 to 30 aircraft each. Support aircraft included two transport
squadrons. As many as ten helicopter squadrons were also
operational, although these formed the Army Air Corps. The Air
Defense Command piloted the MiG-25, MiG-21, and various Mirage
interceptors and manned Iraq's considerable inventory of surfaceto -air missiles (SAMs).
The equipment of the air force and the army's air corps, like
that of the other services, was primarily of Soviet manufacture.
After 1980, however, in an effort to diversify its sources of
advanced armaments, Iraq turned to France for Mirage fighters and
for attack helicopters. Between 1982 and 1987, Iraq received or
ordered a variety of equipment from France, including more than
100 Mirage F-1s, about 100 Gazelle, Super-Frelon, and Alouette
helicopters, and a variety of air-to-surface and air-to-air
missiles, including Exocets. Other attack helicopters purchased
included the Soviet Hind equipped with AT-2 Swatter, and BO-105s
equipped with AS-11 antitank guided weapons. In addition, Iraq
bought seventy F-7 (Chinese version of the MiG-21) fighters,
assembled in Egypt. Thus Iraq's overall airpower was considerable
(see
table 13, Appendix).
Although Iraq expanded its arms inventory, its war efforts
may have been hindered by poor military judgment and by lack of
resolve. Saddam Husayn was the country's head of state and
premier as well as the chairman of both the RCC and the Baath
Party; moreover, in 1984 he assumed the rank of field marshal and
appointed himself commander in chief of the Iraqi armed forces.
Iraqi propaganda statements claimed that Saddam Husayn had
"developed new military ideas and theories of global importance,"
but few Western military analysts gave credence to such claims.
Since 1980 General Adnan Khairallah, who served as both deputy
commander in chief of the armed forces and minister of defense,
was the highest officer in the military chain of command. In 1987
he also assumed the position of deputy prime minister. His
multiple roles reflected the predominance of the army in the
organizational structure of the armed forces. Sattar Ahmad Jassin
was appointed secretary general of defense and adjutant of the
armed forces in 1985. General Abd al Jabar Shanshal assumed the
position of chief of the armed forces general staff in 1984.
Frequent changes at the general staff level indicated to foreign
observers that Iraq's military failures were primarily the result
of poor leadership and an overly rigid command structure.
Defective leadership was evident in the lack of clear orders and
in the poor responses by the army in the occupation of Susangerd.
In October 1980, armored units twice advanced and withdrew from
the city, and later in the same operation, the army abandoned
strategic positions near Dezful. Rigid control of junior officers
and of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) frustrated their
initiative and may have been the reason for the high casualty
figures in the infantry, where initiative and spontaneity in
decision making can be of paramount importance. The command
structure reportedly was even more inflexible and slow in the
People's Army detachments, where political commanders routinely
made military decisions.
Data as of May 1988
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