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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iraq
Index
A Kurd from Salah ad Din
Courtesy Mokhless Al-Hariri
Kurds represent by far the largest non-Arab ethnic minority,
accounting in 1987 for about 19 percent of the population, or
around 3.1 million. They are the overwhelming majority in As
Sulaymaniyah, Irbil, and Dahuk governorates. Although the
government hotly denies it, the Kurds are almost certainly also a
majority in the region around Kirkuk, Iraq's richest oilproducing area. Kurds are settled as far south as Khanaqin.
Ranging across northern Iraq, the Kurds are part of the larger
Kurdish population (probably numbering close to 16 million) that
inhabits the wide arc from eastern Turkey and the northwestern
part of Syria through Soviet Azarbaijan and Iraq to the northwest
of the Zagros Mountains in Iran. Although the largest numbers
live in Turkey (variously estimated at between 3 and 10 million),
it is in Iraq that they are most active politically.
The Kurds inhabit the highlands and mountain valleys and have
traditionally been organized on a tribal basis. In the past it
was correct to distinguish the various communities of Kurds
according to their tribal affiliation, and to a large extent this
was still true in the 1980s; tribes like the Herkki, the Sorchi,
and Zibari have maintained a powerful cohesion. But increasingly
groups of Kurds organized along political lines have grown up
alongside the tribal units. Hence, the most northern and extreme
northeastern areas of Iraq are heavily infiltrated by elements of
the so-called Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
(see
The Emergence of Saddam Hasayn
, ch. 1). The area around Kirkuk and south to
Khanaqin is the preserve of the Faili Kurds, who, unlike the
majority of Kurds, are Shias. Many of the Faili Kurds belong to
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The far northwestern
region of Iraq around Sinjar is spotted with enclaves claimed by
the Iraqi Communist Party, the bulk of whose cadres are composed
of Kurds.
Once mainly nomadic or seminomadic, Kurdish society was
characterized by a combination of urban centers, villages, and
pastoral tribes since at least the Ottoman period. Historical
sources indicate that from the eighteenth century onward Kurds in
Iraq were mainly peasants engaged in agriculture and
arboriculture. By the nineteenth century, about 20 percent of
Iraqi Kurds lived in historic Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk, As
Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil. The migration to the cities,
particularly of the young intelligentsia, helped develop Kurdish
nationalism.
Since the early 1960s, the urban Kurdish areas have grown
rapidly. Kurdish migration--in addition to being part of the
general trend of urban migration--was prompted by the escalating
armed conflict with the central authorities in Baghdad, the
destruction of villages and land by widespread bombing, and such
natural disasters as a severe drought in the 1958-61 period. In
addition to destroying traditional resources, the severe fighting
has hindered the development of education, health, and other
services.
The historic enmity between the Kurds and the central Arab
government has contributed to the tenacious survival of Kurdish
culture. The Kurds' most distinguishing characteristic and the
one that binds them to one another is their language. There are
several Kurdish dialects, of which Kirmanji tends to be the
standard written form. Kurdish is not a mere dialect of Farsi or
Persian, as many Iranian nationalists maintain. And it is
certainly not a variant of the Semitic or Turkic tongues. It is a
separate language, part of the Indo-European family.
The Kurds have been locked in an unremittingly violent
struggle with the central government in Baghdad almost since the
founding of the Iraqi republic in 1958
(see The Kurdish Problem
, ch. 5). It appeared in the early 1970s that the dissident Kurds--
under the generalship of the legendary leader Mulla Mustafa
Barzani--might actually carve out an independent Kurdish area in
northern Iraq. In 1975, however, the shah of Iran--the Kurds'
principal patron--withdrew his support of the Kurds as part of
the Algiers Accord between Tehran and Baghdad, leading to a sharp
decline in the Kurdish movement. The signing of the Algiers
Accord caused a breakaway faction to emerge from the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masud Barzani, the son of Mulla
Mustafa Barzani. The faction that left the KDP in opposition to
the accord formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under
Jalal Talabani. The PUK continued to engage in low-level
guerrilla activity against the central government in the period
from 1975 to 1980. The war between Iraq and Iran that broke out
in 1980 afforded the PUK and other Iraqi Kurdish groups the
opportunity to intensify their opposition to the government.
The future of the Kurds in Iraq is uncertain because of the
war. In 1983 the KDP spearheaded an Iranian thrust into northern
Iraq and later its cadres fanned out across the border area
adjacent to Turkey where they established a string of bases.
Meanwhile, Talabani's PUK has maintained a fighting presence in
the Kirkuk region, despite ruthless attempts by the central
government to dislodge them. Thus, as of early 1988, most of the
northern areas of Iraq--outside the major cities--were under the
control of the guerrillas. On the one hand, if the present
government in Iraq survives the war--which in early 1988 seemed
likely--it is almost certain to punish those Kurds who
collaborated with the Iranians. On the other hand, a number of
large and powerful Kurdish tribes as well as many prominent Kurds
from nontribal families, have continued to support the central
government throughout the war, fighting against their fellow
Kurds. These loyal Kurds will expect to be rewarded for their
allegiance once the war ends.
Data as of May 1988
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