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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iraq
Index
The war with Iran changed the Baathist perception of what
constituted the principal threat to Arab unity. Prior to 1980,
the Baath leaders had identified Zionism as the main danger to
Arab nationalism. After the war had begun, Iranian nationalism
was perceived as the primary force threatening the Arabs. Under
the pressures of war, Iraq became reconciled with Egypt and
moderated its once-uncompromising stance on Israel. This
reconciliation was ironic, because Iraq had taken the lead in
1978 and in 1979 in ostracizing Egypt for recognizing Israel and
for signing a separate peace treaty with the latter state. The
war with Iran helped to transform Egypt from an excoriated
traitor into a much-appreciated ally. Factories in Egypt produced
munitions and spare parts for the Iraqi army, and Egyptian
workers filled some of the labor shortages created by the
mobilization of so many Iraqi men. As early as 1984, Iraq
publicly called for Egypt's readmission into pan-Arab councils,
and in 1987 Iraq was one of the countries leading the effort to
have Egypt readmitted to the Arab League.
The Baath also abandoned its former hostility to countries
such as Jordan, Morocco, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North
Yemen). On a smaller scale than Egypt, Jordan provided Iraq with
tanks and with laborers, and it served as a transshipment point
for goods intended for Iraq.
The most ideologically significant consequence of the war was
the evolution of Baathist views on the issue of Palestine. Prior
to 1980, Iraq had opposed any negotiations that might lead to the
creation of a Palestinian state on the Israeli-occupied West Bank
and in the Gaza Strip on the ground that these territories
constituted only part of historic Palestine. Accordingly, Iraq
supported the most extreme Palestinian guerrilla groups, the socalled "rejectionist" factions, and was hostile toward the
mainstream Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Thus, Iraq
provided financial and military aid to such forces as George
Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Arab Liberation Front.
The latter group had actually been founded by the Baath in 1969.
In addition, Iraq was widely believed to have links to various
Palestinian terrorist groups such as the "Special Operations
Branch" of the PFLP, Black June, the Arab Organization of the
15th May, and the Abu Nidal Organization.
Beginning in 1980, Iraq gradually retreated from its longheld position that there could never be any recognition of
Israel. In 1983 Baath leaders accepted the de facto partition of
pre-1948 Palestine by stating publicly that there could be
negotiations with Israel for a peaceful resolution of the ArabIsraeli dispute. Consequently, Iraq cut its ties to the extremist
Palestinian factions, including that of Abu Nidal, who was
expelled from the country in November; he subsequently
established new headquarters in Syria. Iraq shifted its support
to the mainstream Palestinian groups that advocated negotiations
for a Palestinian state. Yasir Arafat's Al Fatah organization was
permitted to reopen an office in Baghdad. Arafat, whose proposed
assassination for alleged treason against the Palestinians had
been clandestinely supported by Iraq in the late 1970s, was even
invited to visit the country. This shift represented a
fundamental revolution in the thinking of the Iraqi Baath. In
effect, by 1986 the Baath Party was saying that the Palestinians
had to determine for themselves the nature of their relationship
with Israel.
Iraq's most bitter foreign relationship was with the rival
Baath government in Syria. Although there were periods of amity
between the two governments--such as the one immediately after
the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the one in October 1978,
when Iraq and Syria both opposed Egypt's plans for a separate
peace with Israel--the governments generally were hostile to one
another. Relations began to deteriorate once again at the end of
1980 following the outbreak of the war with Iran. Syria
criticized Iraq for diverting Arab attention from the real enemy
(Israel) and for attacking a regime (Iran) supportive of the Arab
cause. Relations worsened throughout 1981 as each country accused
the other of assisting antiregime political groups. In April
1982, Syria closed its borders with Iraq and cut off the flow of
Iraqi oil through the pipeline that traversed Syrian territory to
ports on the Mediterranean Sea. The cessation of Iraqi oil
exports via this pipeline was a severe economic blow; Iraq
interpreted the move as a confirmation of Syria's de facto
alliance with Iran in the war.
The hostility between Iraq and Syria has been a source of
concern to the other Arab states. King Hussein of Jordan, in
particular, tried to reconcile the Iraqi and Syrian leaders.
Although his efforts to mediate a meeting between Saddam Husayn
and Syrian president Hafiz al Assad were finally realized in
early 1987, these private discussions did not lead to substantive
progress in resolving the issues that divided the two countries.
Intense diplomatic efforts by Jordan and by Saudi Arabia also
resulted in the attendance of both presidents, Saddam and Assad,
at the Arab League summit in Amman in November 1987. The Iraqis
were irritated, however, that Syria used its influence to prevent
the conference from adopting sanctions against Iran. The
animosities that have divided the rival Iraqi and Syrian factions
of the Baath appeared to be as firmly rooted as ever in early
1988.
Data as of May 1988
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