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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iraq
Index
King Faisal II inaugurating Parliament December 1956
Courtesy United States Information Agency
The Baath Party that orchestrated the overthrow of Qasim was
founded in the early 1940s by two Syrian students, Michel Aflaq
and Salah ad Din al Bitar. Its ideological goals of socialism,
freedom, and unity reflected the deeply felt sentiments of many
Iraqis who, during the monarchy, had suffered from the economic
dislocationa that followed the breakup of the old Ottoman domain,
from an extremely skewed income distribution, and from the
suppression of political freedoms. Beginning in 1952, under the
leadership of Fuad Rikabi, the party grew rapidly, especially
among the Iraqi intelligentsia. By 1958 the Baath had made some
inroads into the military. The party went through a difficult
period in 1959, however, after the Mosul and Kirkuk incidents,
the failed attempt on Qasim's life, and disillusionment with
Nasser. The Baath's major competitor throughout the Qasim period
was the ICP; when Qasim was finally overthrown, strongly pitched
battles between the two ensued. The Baath was able to consolidate
its bid for power only with the emergence of Ali Salih as Saadi
as leader.
Upon assuming power, the Baath established the National
Council of Revolutionary Command (NCRC) as the highest policy-
making body and appointed Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, one of the Free
Officers, as prime minister and Arif as president. The real
power, however, was held by the party leader, Saadi. Despite the
dominance of the newly established NCRC, the Baath's hold on
power was extremely tenuous. The organization was small, with an
active membership of fewer than 1,000, and it was not well
represented in the officer corps or in the army at large. Its
leadership was inexperienced, and its ideology was too vague to
have any immediate relevance to the deep-seated problems
besetting Iraq in the early 1960s. Its ambiguity of purpose had
served the party well during the Qasim era, enabling it to
attract a diverse membership sharing only a common aversion for
"the sole leader." In the post-Qasim period, that ambiguity was
tearing the party asunder.
The party's lack of cohesion and lack of a coherent program
had two major effects on Baath policy. First, it led party
strongman Saadi to establish a one-party state that showed little
tolerance for opposing views. Second, in the absence of strong
ideological ties, the Baath increasingly was pervaded by cliques
from the same village, town, or tribe. This tendency became even
more pronounced during the 1970s.
Troubled by internal dissension and unable to suppress a new
wave of Kurdish unrest in the north, the Baath held power for
less than a year. Most damaging was the foundering of unity talks
with Nasser and the new Baathist regime in Syria. When the unity
plan collapsed, Nasser launched a vituperative campaign
challenging the legitimacy of the Baath in Iraq and in Syria.
Nasser's attacks seriously eroded the legitimacy of a regime that
had continually espoused pan-Arabism. Another factor contributing
to the party's demise was Saadi's reliance on the National Guard-
-a paramilitary force composed primarily of Baath sympathizers--
to counter the Baath's lack of support in the regular army. By
bolstering the guard, Saadi alienated the regular army. Finally,
the Baath was sharply divided between doctrinaire hard-liners,
such as Saadi, and a more pragmatic moderate wing.
With its party ranks weakened, the Baath was overthrown by
Arif and a coterie of military officers in a bloodless coup in
November 1963. Upon assuming power, Arif immediately announced
that the armed forces would manage the country. The governing
core consisted of Arif; his brother, Abd ar Rahman Arif; and his
trusted colleague, Colonel Said Slaibi. Arif was chairman of the
NCRC, commander in chief of the armed forces, and president of
the republic; his brother was acting chief of staff, and the
colonel was commander of the Baghdad garrison. The Arif brothers,
Slaibi, and the majority of Arif's Twentieth Brigade were united
by a strong tribal bond as members of the Jumailah tribe.
Other groups who participated in the 1963 coup included
Nasserites--an informal group of military officers and civilians
who looked to Nasser for leadership and who desired some kind of
unity with Egypt--and Baathists in the military. By the spring of
1964, Arif had adroitly outmaneuvered the military Baathists and
had filled the top leadership posts with civilian Nasserites.
Arif and the Nasserite officers took steps to integrate the
military, economic, and political policies of Iraq with those of
Egypt; this was expected to lead to the union of the two
countries by 1966. (The United Arab Republic [UAR], which Iraq
expected to join, existed from 1958 to 1961 and consisted of
Egypt and Syria. Arif proposed that Iraq join [partly as an
anticommunist measure] but this union never occurred.) In May
1964, the Joint Presidency Council was formed, and in December
the Unified Political Command was established to expedite the
ultimate constitutional union of the two countries. In July 1964,
Arif announced that henceforth all political parties would
coalesce to form the Iraqi Arab Socialist Union. Most important
for the future, Arif adopted Nasser's socialist program, calling
for the nationalization of insurance companies, banks, and such
essential industries as steel, cement, and construction--along
with the tobacco industry, tanneries, and flour mills. Arif's
nationalization program proved to be one of the few legacies of
the proposed Egyptian-Iraqi union
(see Industrialization
, ch. 3).
By 1965 Arif had lost his enthusiasm for the proposed union,
which had received only lukewarm support from Nasser. Arif began
ousting Nasserite officers from the government. As a result, the
newly appointed prime minister, Brigadier Arif Abd ar Razzaq, who
was also a leading Nasserite, made an unsuccessful coup attempt
on September 12, 1965. In response, President Arif curtailed
Nasserite activities and appointed fellow tribal members to
positions of power. Colonel Abd ar Razzaq an Nayif, a fellow
Jumailah, became head of military intelligence. Arif also
attempted to bring more civilians into the government. He
appointed the first civilian prime minister since the days of the
monarchy, Abd ar Rahman Bazzaz. Bazzaz strongly advocated the
rule of law and was determined to end the erratic, military-
dominated politics that had characterized Iraq since 1958. He
also tried to implement the First Five-Year Economic Plan
(1965-70) to streamline the bureaucracy and to encourage private
and foreign investment.
In April 1966, Arif was killed in a helicopter crash and his
brother, Major General Abd ar Rahman Arif, was installed in
office with the approval of the National Defense Council and the
cabinet. Abd ar Rahman Arif lacked the forcefulness and the
political acumen of his brother; moreover, he was dominated by
the ambitious military officers who were responsible for his
appointment. The government's weak hold on the country thus
became more apparent. The most pressing issue facing the new
government was a renewed Kurdish rebellion.
The 1964 cease-fire signed by Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani
and Abd as Salaam Arif was short-lived; by April 1965, the two
sides were again engaged in hostilities. This time military
support provided by the shah of Iran helped the Kurds win
important victories over the Iraqi army. Kurdish inroads in the
north and escalating Iraqi-Iranian tensions prompted Iraq's prime
minister Bazzaz to propose a more
far-reaching settlement to the Kurdish problem. Some of the more
salient points of Bazzaz's proposal included amnesty, use of the
Kurdish language in Kurdish areas, Kurdish administration of
their educational, health, and municipal institutions, and the
promise of early elections by which the Kurds would gain
proportional representation in national as well as in provincial
assemblies. When Barzani indicated that he approved of these
proposals, the Kurdish conflict appeared to have ended.
The army, however, which had opposed having Bazzaz as a
civilian head of the cabinet, feared that he would reduce their
pay and privileges; consequently, it strongly denounced
reconciliation with the Kurds. President Arif yielded to pressure
and asked for Bazzaz's resignation. This ended the rapprochement
with the Kurds and led to a collapse of civilian rule. The new
prime minister was General Naji Talib, a pro-Nasserite who had
been instrumental in the 1958 Revolution and who strongly opposed
the Kurdish peace plan.
Arif also sought to further the improved relations with Iran
initiated by Bazzaz. This rapprochement was significant because
it denied the Kurds access to their traditional place of asylum,
which allowed recovery from Iraqi attacks. Arif visited Tehran in
the spring of 1967; at the conclusion of his visit, it was
announced that the countries would hold more meetings aimed at
joint oil exploration in the Naft-e Shah and Naft Khaneh border
regions. They also agreed to continue negotiations on toll
collection and navigation rights on the Shatt al Arab and on the
demarcation of the Persian Gulf's continental shelf.
During the winter of 1966-67, Arif faced a crisis emanating
from a new source, Syria. The IPC transported oil from its
northern fields to Mediterranean ports via pipelines in Syria. In
1966 Damascus claimed that the IPC had been underpaying Syria,
based on their 1955 agreement. Syria demanded back payments and
immediately increased the transit fee it charged the IPC. When
the IPC did not accede to Syrian demands, Syria cut off the flow
of Iraqi oil to its Mediterranean ports. The loss of revenue
threatened to cause a severe financial crisis. It also fueled
anti-Talib forces and increased public clamor for his
resignation. In response, Talib resigned, and Arif briefly headed
an extremely unsteady group of military officers.
In the opinion of Phebe Marr, a leading authority on Iraq, on
the eve of the June 1967 War between Israel and various Arab
states, the Arif government had become little more than a
collection of army officers balancing the special interests of
various economic, political, ethnic, and sectarian groups. The
non-intervention of Iraqi troops while Israel was overtaking the
Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies and was conquering large
tracts of Arab territory discredited the Arif regime in the eyes
of the masses. To stave off rising discontent, Arif reappointed
strongman Tahir Yahya as prime minister (he had first been
appointed by Arif in November 1963). Yahya's only accomplishment
was to lessen Iraq's economic dependence on the Western-owned
IPC: on August 6, his government turned over all exploitation
rights in the oil-rich North Rumailah field to the state-
controlled INOC
(see
Post-World War II Through the 1970s
, ch. 3).
The Arif government, however, had lost its base of power. Lacking
a coherent political platform and facing increasing charges of
corruption, the government was only hanging on.
Ultimately two disaffected Arif supporters--Colonel Abd ar
Razzaq an Nayif and Ibrahim ad Daud--were able to stage a
successful coup against Arif, and the Baath quickly capitalized
on the situation. Nayif and Daud had been part of a small group
of young officers, called the Arab Revolutionary Movement, that
previously had been a major source of support for Arif. By July
1968, however, reports of corruption and Arif's increased
reliance on the Nasserites (whom both Nayif and Daud opposed) had
alienated the two officers. Nayif and Daud acted independently
from the Baath in carrying out the coup, but lacked the
organizational backing or the grass-roots support necessary to
remain in power. In only a few weeks, the Baath had outmaneuvered
Nayif and Daud, and, for the second time in five years, had taken
over control of the government.
Data as of May 1988
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