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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iran
Index
For most Iranians the reciprocal obligations and privileges
that define relations between kinsfolk--from the parent-child bond
to more distant ones--have been more important than those
associated with any other kind of social alignment. Economic,
political, and other forms of institutional activity have been
significantly colored by family ties. This has been true not only
for the nuclear family of parents and offspring but also for the
aggregate kinsfolk, near and distant, who together represent the
extended family at its outermost boundary.
Historically, an influential family was one that had its
members strategically distributed throughout the most vital sectors
of society, each prepared to support the others in order to ensure
family prestige and family status. Since the Revolution, this has
meant that each of the elite families of Tehran and the major
provincial centers included a cadre of clergy, bureaucrats, and
Pasdaran (Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami, or Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, or Revolutionary Guards--see
Special and Irregular Armed Forces
, ch. 5). Business operations have continued to be
family affairs; often large government loans for business ventures
have been obtained simply because the owners were recognized as
members of families with good Islamic and revolutionary
credentials. Political activities also followed family lines.
Several brothers or first cousins might join the Islamic Republican
Party. Another group of siblings might become members of a
clandestine opposition group such as the Mojahedin (Mojahedin-e
Khalq, or People's Struggle)
(see
Opposition Political Parties in Exile
, ch. 4). Similarly, one member of a family might join the
clergy, another the Pasdaran or the armed forces. Successful
members were expected to assist less successful ones to get their
start. Iranians have viewed this inherent nepotism as a positive
value, not as a form of corruption. A person without family ties
has little status in the society at large. The severing of ties is
acceptable only if a family member has done something repugnant to
Islam. Even then, the family is encouraged to make the person aware
of his deviance and encourage repentance.
Religious law supports the sanctity of the family in diverse
ways, defining the conditions for marriage, divorce, inheritance,
and guardianship. Additional laws have been passed by the Majlis
that reinforce and refine religious law and are designed to protect
the integrity of the family
(see The Judiciary
, ch. 4).
The head of the household--the father and the husband--expects
obedience and respect from others in the family. In return, he is
obligated to support them and to satisfy their spiritual, social,
and material needs. In practice, he is more a strict
disciplinarian. He also may be a focus of love and affection, and
family members may feel a strong sense of duty toward him.
Considerable conflict and irresolution have resulted in many
families, especially in urban areas, because young Iranians, imbued
with revolutionary religious views or secular values, have not been
able to reconcile these new ideas with the traditional values of
their fathers.
Marriage regulations are defined by Shia religious law,
although non- Shias are permitted to follow their own religious
practices. Before the Revolution, the legal marriage age was
eighteen for females and twenty- one for males, although in
practice most couples, especially among lower- class urban and
rural families, actually were younger than the law permitted when
they married. Consequently, the average marriage age for both sexes
was 18.9 years. Since the Revolution, the minimum legal age for
marriage for both males and females has been lowered to fifteen and
thirteen years, respectively, although even younger boys and girls
may be married with the permission of their fathers. The average
age of marriage is believed to have fallen as a result of official
encouragement of earlier marriages.
The selection of a marriage partner is normally determined by
customary preference, economic circumstances, and geographic
considerations. Among the Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, the
choice may be restricted by religious practice. There is a distinct
preference for marriage within extended kin networks, and a high
incidence of marriages among first and second cousins exists. A
traditionally preferred marriage is between the children of two
brothers, although this kind of consanguineous marriage was
declining among the old regime elite and secular middle class by
the eve of the Revolution.
Marriage arrangements in villages and among the lower and
traditional middle classes of urban areas tend to follow
traditional patterns. When a young man is judged ready for
marriage, his parents will visit the parents of a girl whom they
believe to be a suitable match. In many cases, the man will have
already expressed an interest in the girl and have asked his
parents to begin these formalities. If the girl's parents show
similar interest in the union, the conversation quickly turns to
money. There must be an agreement on the amont of the bride-price
that will be given to the bride's family at the time of marriage.
In principle this payment is supposed to compensate the girl's
family for her loss, but in practice it is used primarily to
finance the cost of the wedding. The exact sum varies according to
the wealth, social position, and degree of kinship of the two
families.
Once the two families have agreed to the marriage, the
prospective bride and groom are considered engaged. The courtship
period now commences and may extend for a year or more, although
generally the engagement lasts less than twelve months. The actual
wedding involves a marriage ceremony and a public celebration. The
ceremony is the signing of a marriage contract in the presence of
a mullah (see Glossary).
One significant feature of the marriage
contract is the mahriyeh, a stipulated sum that the groom
gives to his new bride. The mahriyeh usually is not paid at
the time of the marriage, especially in marriages between cousins.
The contract notes that it is to be paid, however, in the event of
divorce or, in case of the husband's death, to be deducted from his
estate before the inheritance is divided according to religious
law. If the mahriyeh is waived, as sometimes happens in
urban areas, this too must be stipulated in the marriage contract.
Marriage customs among the secularized middle and upper classes
tend to follow practices in the United States and Europe. The
prenuptial bride-price may be paid in installments or even
eliminated altogether, especially if a substantial mahriyeh
is guaranteed. It is typical for the marriage partners to have
chosen one another. The bride and groom usually sit together at the
reception, to which both male and female guests are invited.
Polygyny in Iran is regulated by Islamic custom, which permits
a man to have as many as four wives simultaneously, provided that
he treats them equally. During the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, the
government attempted to discourage polygyny through legal
restrictions, such as requiring the permission of the first wife
before the state would register a second marriage. The practice of
kin marriages also tended to work against polygynous marriages,
since families would exert pressure on men not to take a second
wife. No reliable figures existed on the number of polygynous
marriages in the 1960s and 1970s, but they were believed to be on
the decline and largely confined to the older generation. After the
Revolution, the republican government abolished the secular codes
relating to marriage and decreed polygyny acceptable as long as
such marriages were in accordance with Shia religious law.
Shia Islam, unlike Sunni Islam, also recognizes a special form
of temporary marriage called muta. In a muta
marriage, the man and woman sign a contract agreeing to live
together as husband and wife for a specified time, which can be as
brief as several hours or as long as ninety-nine years. The man
agrees to pay a certain amount of money for the duration of the
contract. Provision is also made for the support of any offspring.
There is no limit on the number of muta marriages that a man
may contract. Traditionally, muta marriages have been common
in Shia pilgrimage centers such as Mashhad and An Najaf in Iraq.
Under the monarchy, the government refused to grant any legal
recognition to muta marriages in an effort to discourage the
practice. Since the Revolution, however, muta marriages have
again become acceptable.
Under both Islamic law and traditional practice, divorce in
Iran historically has been easier for a man to obtain than for a
woman. Men could exercise the right of repudiation of wives
according to the guidelines of Islamic law. Women were permitted to
leave their husbands on narrowly defined grounds, such as insanity
or impotence. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the royal government
attempted to broaden the grounds upon which women could seek
divorce through the Family Protection Law. This legislation was
frequently criticized by the clergy and was one of the first laws
abrogated after the Revolution. In 1985, however, legislation was
passed permitting women to initiate divorce proceedings in certain
limited circumstances.
Statistics on divorce since the Revolution were unavailable in
early 1987. The government claimed that the divorce rate in Iran
was much lower than in industrialized countries. Furthermore,
members of the clergy have preached that divorce is "reprehensible"
under Islam even though it is tolerated.
Data as of December 1987
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