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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iran
Index
Since 1979 Iran has witnessed political and military changes
with long-lasting domestic repercussions. The shah relied on the
country's considerable military strength to implement his policy
goals. When his rule was replaced by a theocratic regime with a new
domestic agenda, political power presumably rested in the hands of
Khomeini and a group of cautious clerics bound by deeply
conservative religious values. In the turmoil of the Revolution,
the regular armed forces lost their preeminent position in society
primarily because of their close identification with the shah.
The military was paralyzed by fast-moving events and incapable
of effective action, and its downfall was accelerated when a number
of key senior officers fled the country, fearing reprisals from the
revolutionary regime. The public trials and executions of
high-ranking military officers further tainted the military's
image. On February 15, 1979, three days after the official
declaration of the republic, a secret Islamic revolutionary court
in Tehran handed down death sentences on four generals. Five days
later the regime ordered the execution of four more generals. Other
military officers were executed for the Islamic crimes of "causing
corruption on earth" and "fighting Allah," according to an
interpretation of
shariat (see Glossary).
The new regime
considered these officers as Pahlavi holdovers, lacking proper
Islamic credentials and therefore potential instigators of military
coups. When protests were voiced about summary executions,
Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, the cleric in charge of the
komitehs, replied, "We must purify society in order to renew
it." The resulting leadership vacuum in the military took several
years to fill.
Mobilized to fight a foreign enemy, the armed forces by 1981
were gradually developing autonomy and an esprit de corps, despite
their acrimonious infighting with the Pasdaran, whose independent
military power acted as a check on any possible coup attempts by
the armed forces. The Khomeini regime, aware of its dependence on
the armed forces, adopted a new strategy aimed at assimilating the
military into the Revolution by promoting loyal officers and
propagating Islamic values. Leaders recognized that as long as the
country was at war with Iraq and was experiencing internal
political turmoil, they would need a loyal army on the battlefield
as well as the loyal Pasdaran on the homefront. Despite the need
for military support, however, the revolutionary regime continued
to exercise tight control over the armed forces and to regard them
with some suspicion.
Political rivalries notwithstanding, the regular armed forces'
professionalism and impressive performance in the war stood as
clear alternatives to the early "human-wave" tactics of the
Pasdaran and Basij, which cost hundreds of thousands of lives and
achieved little. The armed forces' respectable military performance
also helped exonerate them from the role they had played during the
Pahlavi period. Since September 1980, the military has demonstrated
that it could and would defend the country and the legitimate
government.
Data as of December 1987
Status in National Life
Since 1979 Iran has witnessed political and military changes
with long-lasting domestic repercussions. The shah relied on the
country's considerable military strength to implement his policy
goals. When his rule was replaced by a theocratic regime with a new
domestic agenda, political power presumably rested in the hands of
Khomeini and a group of cautious clerics bound by deeply
conservative religious values. In the turmoil of the Revolution,
the regular armed forces lost their preeminent position in society
primarily because of their close identification with the shah.
The military was paralyzed by fast-moving events and incapable
of effective action, and its downfall was accelerated when a number
of key senior officers fled the country, fearing reprisals from the
revolutionary regime. The public trials and executions of
high-ranking military officers further tainted the military's
image. On February 15, 1979, three days after the official
declaration of the republic, a secret Islamic revolutionary court
in Tehran handed down death sentences on four generals. Five days
later the regime ordered the execution of four more generals. Other
military officers were executed for the Islamic crimes of "causing
corruption on earth" and "fighting Allah," according to an
interpretation of
shariat (see Glossary).
The new regime
considered these officers as Pahlavi holdovers, lacking proper
Islamic credentials and therefore potential instigators of military
coups. When protests were voiced about summary executions,
Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, the cleric in charge of the
komitehs, replied, "We must purify society in order to renew
it." The resulting leadership vacuum in the military took several
years to fill.
Mobilized to fight a foreign enemy, the armed forces by 1981
were gradually developing autonomy and an esprit de corps, despite
their acrimonious infighting with the Pasdaran, whose independent
military power acted as a check on any possible coup attempts by
the armed forces. The Khomeini regime, aware of its dependence on
the armed forces, adopted a new strategy aimed at assimilating the
military into the Revolution by promoting loyal officers and
propagating Islamic values. Leaders recognized that as long as the
country was at war with Iraq and was experiencing internal
political turmoil, they would need a loyal army on the battlefield
as well as the loyal Pasdaran on the homefront. Despite the need
for military support, however, the revolutionary regime continued
to exercise tight control over the armed forces and to regard them
with some suspicion.
Political rivalries notwithstanding, the regular armed forces'
professionalism and impressive performance in the war stood as
clear alternatives to the early "human-wave" tactics of the
Pasdaran and Basij, which cost hundreds of thousands of lives and
achieved little. The armed forces' respectable military performance
also helped exonerate them from the role they had played during the
Pahlavi period. Since September 1980, the military has demonstrated
that it could and would defend the country and the legitimate
government.
Data as of December 1987
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