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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iran
Index
A street vendor sells photographs of political leaders in the early 1980s
Courtesy United Nations (John Isaac)
The Revolution of 1979 brought about a fundamental change in
Iranian attitudes toward politics. Under the monarchy the political
culture had been elitist in the sense that all major governmental
decisions were made by the shah and his ministers. Most of the
population acquiesced in this approach to politics. The fusion of
traditional Shia Islamic ideals with political values during the
Revolution resulted in the emergence of a populist political
culture. The principal characteristics of this political culture
are pervasive feelings that the government is obligated to ensure
social justice and that every citizen should participate in
politics. These feelings are acknowledged by the political
leadership, which constantly expresses its concern for the welfare
of the mostazafin (disinherited) and persistently praises
the people's work in a host of political and religious
associations.
The transformation of the political culture owed much to the
charisma of Khomeini. He was determined not simply to overthrow the
monarchy but also to replace it with a new society that derived its
values from Islam. Khomeini believed that the long-term success of
such an ideal Islamic government was dependent on the commitment
and involvement of the masses. He envisaged the clergy as
responsible for providing religious guidance, based on their
expertise in Islamic law, to the people as they worked to create a
new society in which religion and politics were fused. Khomeini's
reputation for piety, learning, and personal integrity, as well as
his forceful personality, have been important factors in the
mobilization of thousands of committed followers to carry out the
desecularization of the country's political institutions.
Mass political involvement has been both an objective and a
characteristic of postrevolutionary Iran. Political participation,
however, is not through political parties but through religious
institutions. The mosque has become the single most important
popular political institution. Participation in weekly
congregational prayers, at which a political sermon is always
delivered, is considered both a religious and a civic duty. For
political aspirants, attendance at the weekly prayers is mandatory.
Numerous religiopolitical associations are centered on the mosques.
These organizations undertake a wide variety of activities, such as
distributing ration coupons, investigating the religious
credentials of aspirants for local offices, conducting classes in
subjects ranging from the study of Arabic to superpower
imperialism, and setting up teams to monitor shop prices and
personal behavior. These organizations tend to be voluntary
associations whose members devote several hours per week to their
activities. Although most of these voluntary associations are for
men, several are specifically for women.
Religious, rather than secular, organizations thus have the
most important political roles. Factories, schools, and offices
also have Islamic associations that undertake functions similar to
those of the mosque voluntary associations. Although many secular
groups exist, the majority of such associations as industrial and
professional unions, university clubs, and mercantile organizations
have acquired religious overtones. These private organizations
generally have religious advisers who provide guidance to members
on prayer ritual, Islamic law, and Shia history. Associations that
try to avoid mixing religion with business are suspected of being
anti-Islamic and risk having their articles of incorporation
revoked.
The Iranians who accept the dominant role of religion refer to
themselves as hezbollahis. They tend to be fervent both in
their profession of religious belief and in their loyalty to the
Islamic Republic. Self-identified hezbollahis join the
numerous mosque-related voluntary associations, the Pasdaran, and
the personal staffs of the leading ayatollahs. Given their strong
commitment to the regime, it was inevitable that hezbollahis
would resent those whom they perceived as critical of the
government. By 1987, however, it was still not possible, owing to
the lack of field research in Iran from the time of the Revolution,
to estimate what percent of the adult population considered
themselves true hezbollahis, what percent was generally
indifferent and simply acquiesced to regime policies, or what
percent strongly disapproved of the government.
Data as of December 1987
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