MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Iran
Index
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions
DURING IRAN'S LONG HISTORY, the country has evolved its own
great Persian civilization, in addition to forming a part of a
number of world empires. Iran has created sophisticated
institutions, many of which still influenced its Islamic regime in
the 1980s. Despite the turmoil surrounding the establishment of its
revolutionary government, Iran's development has shown continuity.
Major trends affecting Iran throughout much of its history have
been a tradition of monarchical government, represented in the
twentieth century by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi; the important
political role of the
Shia (see Glossary)
Islamic clergy, seen most
recently in Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini; and, since
the late nineteenth century, pressure for Westernization or
modernization.
Iran has been distinguished for having regimes that not only
conquered neighboring areas but also devised ingenious
institutions. The Achaemenids (550-330 B.C.)--who ruled the first
Iranian world empire, which stretched from the Aegean coast of Asia
Minor to Afghanistan, as well as south to Egypt--created the
magnificent structures at Persepolis, the remains of which still
exist. The Achaemenids also inaugurated a vast network of roads, a
legal code, a coinage system, and a comprehensive administrative
system that allowed some local autonomy, and they engaged in
wide-ranging commerce. Iran has also influenced its conquerors.
Following its conquest of Iran, the Muslim Umayyad Empire (A.D.
661- 750) adopted many Iranian institutions, such as Iran's
administrative system and coinage. Moreover, Tamerlane (1381-1405),
the famous Mongol ruler, made use of Iranian administrators in
governing his far-flung territories.
Despite their primarily tribal origin, for most of the
country's history the people of Iran have known only monarchical
government, often of an absolutist type. For example, the Sassanids
who ruled Iran for four centuries, beginning in A.D. 224, revived
the Achaemenid term shahanshah (king of kings) for their
ruler and considered him the "shadow of God on earth." This concept
was again revived in the late eighteenth century by the Qajar
monarchy, which remained in power until Reza Khan, a military
commander, had himself crowned as Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926. Many
considered Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza Shah, to be an absolutist
ruler in his later days, especially because of his use of the
internal security force SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat- e
Keshvar) to repress domestic opposition.
After the Muslim conquest, Iran was strongly influenced by
Islam and, specifically, the political role exercised by the Shia
clergy. Such influence was established under the indigenous
dynastic reign of the Safavids (1501- 1722). The Safavids belonged
to a Sufi religious order and made Shia Islam the official religion
of Iran, undertaking a major conversion campaign of Iranian
Muslims. The precedent was revived in 1979 in a much more
thoroughgoing theocratic fashion by Ayatollah Khomeini.
In contrast to this traditional element in Iranian history has
been the pressure toward Westernization that began in the late
nineteenth century. Such pressures initially came from Britain,
which sought to increase its commercial relations with Iran by
promoting modernization of Iran's infrastructure and liberalization
of its trade. British prodding had little effect, however, until
Iranian domestic reaction to the growing corruption of the Qajar
monarchy led to a constitutional revolution in 1905-1906.
This revolution resulted in an elected parliament, or
Majlis (see Glossary),
a cabinet approved by the Majlis, and a constitution
guaranteeing certain personal freedoms of citizens. Within less
than twenty years, the program of Reza Shah stressed measures
designed to reduce the powers of both tribal and religious leaders
and to bring about economic development and legal and educational
reforms along Western lines. Mohammad Reza Shah, like his father,
promoted such Westernization and largely ignored the traditional
role in Iranian society of conservative Shia religious leaders
(see Shia Islam in Iran
, ch. 2).
Mohammad Reza Shah also strengthened the military by
considerably expanding its role in internal security matters to
counteract the domestic opposition that arose after Mohammad
Mossadeq's prime ministership
(see Mossadeq and Oil Nationalization
, ch. 1). In addition, the shah stressed defense
against external enemies because he felt threatened by the Soviet
Union, which had occupied Iranian territory during and after World
War II. To counter such a threat, the shah sought United States
military assistance in the form of advisory personnel and
sophisticated weaponry. He also harshly repressed the communist
Tudeh Party and other dissident groups such as the Islamic
extremist Mojahedin (Mojahedin-e Khalq, or People's Struggle) and
Fadayan (Cherikha-ye Fadayan-e Khalq, or People's Guerrillas)
organizations.
Meanwhile, the shah promoted Iran's economic development by
implementing a series of seven- and five-year economic development
plans, of which the first was launched in 1948. The programs
emphasized the creation of the necessary infrastructure and the
establishment of capital-intensive industry, initially making use
of Iran's enormous oil revenues but seeking ultimately to diversify
the country's economy by expanding heavy industry. In the 1960s,
the shah also paid attention to land reform, but the redistribution
of land to peasants was slow, and in many instances the amount of
land allocated to individual farmers was inadequate for
economically viable agricultural production. Moreover, Iran
experienced high inflation as a result of the shah's huge foreign
arms purchases and his unduly rapid attempts at industrial
development and modernization. Members of the bazaar, or small
merchant class, benefited unevenly from the modernization and
gained less proportionately than the shah's Westernizing elite
(see Urban Society
, ch. 2). This lack of benefit from reforms was also
true of the inhabitants of most small villages, who remained
without electricity, running water, or paved roads
(see
Oil Revenues and the Acceleration of Modernization, 1960-79
, ch. 3).
Many factors contributed to the fall of the shah
(see The Coming of the Revolution
, ch. 1). Observers most often cited such
factors as concern over growing Western influences and
secularization, the ignoring of the religious leaders, the
repression of potential dissidents and of the Tudeh Party, and the
failure of the bazaar class to achieve significant benefits from
the shah's economic development programs. Following a brief secular
provisional government after the shah was overthrown in 1979,
clerical forces loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini took control and
launched a far- reaching Islamic revolution.
In Khomeini's revolutionary regime, the Ayatollah himself acted
as policy guide and ultimate decision maker in his role as the
pious jurist, or
faqih (see Glossary),
in accordance with
the doctrine of
velayat-e faqih (see Glossary),
under which
religious scholars guided the community of believers. Iran,
officially renamed the Islamic Republic of Iran, became a
theocratic state with the rulers representing God in governing a
Muslim people, something not attempted previously even by the
twelve Shia
Imams (see Glossary).
The Constitution of 1979 designates Khomeini as the
faqih for life. The Assembly of Experts in 1985 designated
Hojjatoleslam Hosain Ali Montazeri as the deputy to Khomeini and
thus in line as successor. In 1988 it was not clear, however,
whether the country would accept the choice of the experts when
Khomeini died.
Other than appointing Khomeini faqih for life, the
revolutionary Constitution provides for political institutions to
implement the legislative aspects of the government. An elected
legislative assembly, the Majlis, charged with approving
legislation devised by the executive, was dominated by Muslim
religious leaders. The Constitution also created the Council of
Guardians to ensure that laws passed by the Majlis conformed with
Islam. In practice, the Council of Guardians has been conservative
about economic legislation, blocking Majlis measures on land
reform, for example. To overcome this blocking of legislation, in
January 1988 Ayatollah Khomeini gave a ruling to President Ali
Khamenehi in which he claimed that the Islamic state had the same
powers as the Prophet Muhammad, who was God's vice regent;
therefore, the state could set aside the Quran with regard to
legislation if it were for the good of the community.
Other than through legislative instititutions, political
expression occurred in principle through political parties.
However, the dominant political faction, the largely clergy-led
Islamic Republican Party established in early 1979, was dissolved
in 1987 because it had become unmanageable. Subsequently, only one
legally recognized political party, the Iran Freedom Movement
(Nehzat-e Azadi-yi Iran), which had been established by former
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, operated in Iran. Estimates of the
number of persons opposed to the government or in prison varied.
Officially, the latter number was given as 9,000, but the
antigovernment Mojahedin maintained that 140,000 was a more
realistic figure. In 1988 opposition parties existed in exile,
primarily in Western Europe, and included ethnic Kurdish movements
and the Mojahedin Islamic extremists, as well as Marxists and
monarchists
(see
Opposition Political Parties in Exile
, ch. 4). The
Mojahedin also had created the Iranian National Army of Liberation,
which operated out of northern Iraq against the Khomeini regime.
After the Ayatollah's government came to power, it initially
executed or imprisoned many members of the shah's regime, including
officers of the various armed services. But, following the outbreak
of the war with Iraq in 1980, substantial numbers of military men
were released from prison to provide essential leadership on the
battlefield or in the air war
(see
Iranian Mobilization and Resistance
, ch. 5). As early as June 1979, a counterforce to the
regular military was created in the form of the Pasdaran
(Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami, or Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, or Revolutionary Guards), an organization charged with
safeguarding the Revolution. The Pasdaran became a significant
military force in its own right and was overseen by a cabinet-level
minister
(see
Special and Irregular Armed Forces
, ch. 5).
By 1988 the eight-year-old war with Iraq had evolved through
various stages of strategy and tactics
(see The Iran-Iraq War
, ch.
5). Because Iran's population was approximately three times that of
Iraq, Iran's military manpower pool was vastly superior.
Capitalizing on this advantage, in the early stages of the war Iran
engaged extensively in "human-wave" assaults against Iraqi
positions, frequently using youths in their early teens. This war
strategy proved extremely costly to Iran in terms of human
casualties; it was estimated that between 300,000 and 400,000
Iranians had been killed by 1987, and estimated losses of matériel
were also large. The hostilities included a tanker war in the
Persian Gulf and the mining of the Gulf by Iran, events that led to
the involvement of the United States and other Western nations,
which sought to protect their shipping and safeguard their
strategic, economic, and political interests in the area.
Furthermore, a "war of cities" was inaugurated in 1985, with each
side bombarding the other's urban centers with missiles. Iran
expended considerable effort in developing a domestic arms industry
capable of manufacturing or modifying weapons and war matériel
obtained from outside sources. Iran's principal arms supplier was
China, from which it acquired Silkworm HY-2 surface-to-surface
missiles, among other weapons systems. Iran also obtained missiles
from the Soviet Union, which attempted to maintain amicable
relations with both sides in the Iran-Iraq War. In addition, in the
ground war, which initially had favored Iraq but then turned
strongly in Iran's favor, in April 1988 Iraq succeeded in regaining
the Faw Peninsula. Iraq thus recovered a significant part of the
territory it had lost earlier to Iran.
The war has severely strained Iran's economy by depleting its
foreign exchange reserves and causing a balance of payments
deficit. It has also redirected manpower that would otherwise have
been engaged in agriculture and industry
(see The War's Impact on the Economy
, ch. 3). By 1987 Iran's overall war costs were
calculated at approximately US$350 billion. Moreover, wartime
damage to urban centers in western Iran, such as Abadan, Ahvaz,
Dezful, and Khorramshahr, caused refugees to flood into Tehran and
other cities, further aggravating the housing shortage. The
destruction of petroleum producing, processing, and shipping
installations on the Persian Gulf had reduced Iran's oil production
and its export capability, thereby cutting revenues. Sales of other
domestic commodities, such as carpets, agricultural products, and
caviar, were unable to compensate for the lost oil revenue, which
was further reduced by a world oil glut. Thus, in 1988 the
revolutionary regime faced a straitened economic future in which
basic structural problems--such as the degree of state involvement
in the economy and the successful implementation of agricultural
reform--remained to be addressed.
Iran's economic situation has influenced its foreign policy to
some extent. Although ideological considerations based on
revolutionary principles dominated in the early days of the
Revolution, Iran's policies became more pragmatic as the war with
Iraq continued. For example, because of its need for weapons and
other military matériel, the Khomeini regime was willing to
purchase arms from Western nations and even from Israel. Initially,
the revolutionary government had made a radical foreign policy
change from the pro-Western stance of the shah. The United States,
because of its support of the shah, was branded as the "Great
Satan" and the Soviet Union as the "Lesser Satan." Both capitalism
and socialism were condemned as materialistic systems that sought
to dominate the Third World. In practice, however, the United
States was the major target, as evidenced most clearly in the
seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran and the taking of
American diplomats as hostages in November 1979.
Because of the Khomeini regime's desire to export revolution,
regional monarchies with Western associations, such as Saudi
Arabia, the Gulf states, and Jordan, were regarded with some
hostility, particularly after these countries came to the support
of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War
(see Relations with Regional Powers
, ch. 4). Iran's militant foreign policy in the region was reflected
in the August 1, 1987, demonstrations during the Mecca pilgrimage.
As a result, over 400 pilgrims were killed (the majority of them
Iranian). As a protest against Iranian actions in the Gulf, in late
April 1988 Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with Iran.
Another instance of Iran's militant policy was its funding and
sponsorship of Islamic extremist organizations in Lebanon,
particularly Islamic Amal and Hizballah, which contributed to the
ongoing civil war in Lebanon.
In 1988 the country with which Iran had the most cordial
relationship was Syria. Iran also maintained active economic
relations with the Soviet Union, especially with respect to direct
trade, arms purchases, and the transshipment of goods via the
Soviet Union to Western Europe.
Iran's future course in the late 1980s hinged upon a number of
factors. These included the smoothness with which it would be able
to make the transition to Ayatollah Khomeini's successor; the
duration, cost, and settlement terms of the war with Iraq; the
direction of Iran's foreign policy, in relation both to the
superpowers and to the remainder of the world, particularly the
countries of the region; and the skill of Iranian technocrats in
taking the necessary steps to address the country's economic
difficulties.
June 20, 1988
* * *
After the manuscript was completed in June 1988, two
significant events occurred in July 1988 that contributed to Iran's
decision on July 18 to accept the United Nations (UN) proposal of
1987 for a cease-fire to the Iran-Iraq War. On July 3, 1988, the
United States Navy shot down in error a civilian Iranian airliner
that it believed was planning to attack a United States Navy ship
in the Persian Gulf. In a step indicative of moderation, Iran took
the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 to the UN, a body to which it
had paid little heed since 1981 because Iran felt the UN was
supporting the United States position on the hostage issue. Just
prior to the UN debate, President Ronald Reagan announced that the
United States, without accepting blame for the accident, was
prepared to make an ex gratia payment to the victims'
relatives.
In the more immediate conduct of the war, on July 13 Iraqi
forces advanced on the south central front, capturing Dehloran,
thirty kilometers inside Iran. They took about 5,000 prisoners as
well as substantial amounts of Iranian military equipment during
their three-day occupation of the area. Foreign experts surmised
that Iraq sought to strengthen its bargaining position in the event
peace negotiations were forthcoming.
On July 18 Iran announced its acceptance of UN Resolution 598
of July 1987, which called for a cease-fire. Khomeini, taking
responsibility for accepting this "poisonous chalice," while at the
same time recognizing the great sacrifices of the nation, stated
that, in view of recent "unspecified events" (presumably Iraq's
"war of cities" and its use of chemical warfare, together with the
intervention of the "Great Satan") and the advice of Iranian
political and military experts, he believed the cease-fire to be in
the interest of the Revolution. As of mid-May 1989, although the
cease-fire was holding, no significant progress had been made in
UN-sponsored Iranian-Iraqi peace negotiations, and Iraq was
insisting on sovereignty over the entire Shatt al Arab as a
condition for the settlement.
Khomeini had often stated that he would not agree to an end of
the war without the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's
regime. His reversal of position raised questions concerning the
future of the Revolution. There was evidence in the spring of 1989
that factionalism was increasing among revolutionary leaders. The
most dramatic example of this was Ayatollah Montazeri's being
obliged in late March to resign as successor to Khomeini. Montazeri
apparently fell from grace because he had become unduly critical in
public of the regime's policies. He had repeatedly criticized the
continued execution of numerous individuals on the ground that they
were hostile to the Revolution and had questioned whether Iran had
actually won the war with Iraq.
The realignments taking place among the top hierarchy were not
clear as of mid-May 1989. For example, in early March Khomeini had
concurred with the appointment of Hojjatoleslam Abdullah Nouri, a
friend of Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, as his
personal representative to the Pasdaran. This move was thought to
be part of Rafsanjani's strategy to diminish the influence of the
Pasdaran and to integrate them more closely with the army, because
the regime considered the army a more loyal force than the Pasdaran
in the postwar period. Even before the war ended, in early 1988,
the government had begun following a pragmatic policy, seeking to
regain friends for Iran in the world community through such means
as reestablishing diplomatic relations with France, Canada, and
Britain. Relations with Britain were again severed, however, in
late February 1989, as a result of Khomeini's imposition of the
death sentence on February 14 on British writer Salman Rushdie for
his authorship of The Satanic Verses.
Since the end of the war in July 1988 a major issue among the
different factions in the government has been the degree of foreign
involvement to be permitted in Iran's reconstruction. Despite some
dissent in this regard, the government has sought to obtain loans
and credits for Iran from various West European sources and from
Japan because oil income is not projected to be adequate to meet
rebuilding needs, let alone allow for development projects.
Preoccupation with reconstruction and the lack of funds had obliged
the revolutionary regime to postpone, if not abandon, any measures
to export the Revolution. Instead, Iran was seeking a
reconciliation with some of the Persian Gulf states and with the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, it appeared that in its budgetary
allocations for the new Iranian year beginning March 21 and for the
proposed new five-year development plan, the regime was increasing
its spending on agriculture and water projects and stressing
education, health, and social measures, all of which were designed
to show Islamic concern for the downtrodden.
A second issue among the various factions concerned the extent
to which governmental centralization was appropriate. One faction
maintained that more centralized policy direction was needed for
the successful implementation of reconstruction programs, and that
to achieve this end the presidency needed to be a strengthened.
Rafsanjani supported this position and was one of more than 100
signatories of a proposal made to Khomeini that one of the ways of
strengthening the executive would be to eliminate the office of
prime minister. In this connection, a letter was published in the
Iranian press on April 16, 1989, and signed by 166 Majlis
delegates, asking Khomeini to establish a committee to amend the
Constitution in three areas: the faqih, the presidency, and
the judiciary. Khomeini responded in late April by appointing
twenty members to a Commission for the Revision of the
Constitution, with the Majlis appointing five additional members.
Khomeini set out guidelines for the commission to use in looking at
eight areas of the Constitution, including the three requested.
Other aspects to be examined included the role of the Discernment
Council, appointed to reconcile differences among the Council of
Guardians, the Majlis, and the government. By mid-May the
commission had met several times.
The press has reported that the deliberations included debate
on draft proposals for amending the articles of the Constitution
pertaining to qualifications for the post of faqih so that
lower-ranking clergy could serve on a collective council of
faqihs. This would permit Rafsanjani and Khamenehi, for
example, to serve. Other debate centered around proposed changes in
the presidency that would entail the elimination of the post of
prime minister or allow the president to appoint the prime minister
without Majlis approval, thus making the prime minister responsible
to the president. As early as January 1989, Rafsanjani had hinted
that he might run for president to succeed Khamenehi when the
latter's term ended in August 1989. Although as of mid-May
Rafsanjani had not publicly committed himself to running, he had
gained the endorsement for this post from revolutionary leaders of
all factions. It appeared, therefore, that the revolutionary regime
was on the way to some major changes in the executive structure and
in its leadership.
May 18, 1989
Helen Chapin Metz
* * *
As this volume was in press, Ayatollah Khomeini died on June 3,
1989, of a heart attack, following intestinal surgery two weeks
earlier. After lengthy deliberations, on June 4 President Khamenehi
was named Khomeini's successors as faqih by a two-thirds
majority of the Assembly of Experts. The future of Iran's
government in consideration of possible collective leadership and
the proposed reforms to the constitution affecting the executive,
judicial, and administrative structures remained unclear.
June 5, 1989
Helen Chapin Metz
Data as of December 1987
|
|