MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Iran
Index
The Pahlavi regime identified the Fadayan, the Tudeh, and
several ethnic groups as opponents to the shah's rule. To meet
their rising challenge, the shah relied on security forces whose
agents infiltrated many underground organizations. By early 1970,
a sophisticated intelligence-gathering system was in place,
reporting all currents of political dissent directly to the
monarch.
In 1970 opposition forces took the initiative by launching a
terrorist campaign against the regime. At the time, this was
perceived as a nuisance and an embarrassment to the shah, because
the monarchy was not "threatened." Nevertheless, opposition to the
shah grew stronger when the monarch authorized unrelenting
punishment of those accused of security violations. Hundreds of
young Iranians were arrested, tried, and sentenced. Many were
tortured and some executed for their unwavering opposition. In 1976
opposition forces clashed with the police in a series of gun
battles that mobilized thousands in the streets of Tehran. With
heightened visibility, terrorist groups mounted successful attacks
on police posts, further threatening the regime's hold on internal
security. By 1978 organized opposition to the monarchy reached a
high point with ideologically incompatible groups joining in
efforts to overthrow the shah. Leftist guerrillas joined student
and religious organizations in calling for political change.
The two most important leftist guerrilla groups operating in
Iran in 1978 were the Mojahedin and the Fadayan
(see Antiregime Opposition Groups
, this ch.). The Mojahedin had changed its name at
least three times since its formation in 1960 under the name of
Nehzat-e Azadi-yi Iran, or the Iran Freedom Movement (IFM).
Although it was not formally a religious party, its rank-and-file
membership was religiously oriented, a fact that helped mobilize
clerical support in 1978. Unlike the clerical forces, however, the
Mojahedin and the Fadayan conducted a systematic assassination
campaign in 1977 and 1978 against Iranian security officials and
United States military and defense-related personnel stationed in
Tehran. The shah was also a target, as evidenced by periodic
uncoverings of assassination plots. This wave of violence was met
by an equally strong and determined campaign of arrests and
executions. Iranian students abroad also became part of a cycle of
action and counteraction: in the United States and Western Europe,
students who protested against the shah were kept under
surveillance so that punitive action could later be taken against
them. In addition, the Mojahedin and the Fadayan conducted a
propaganda campaign in support of "the Iranian armed struggle" and
against the shah, SAVAK
(see SAVAK
, this ch.), and what was termed
"institutionalized repression in Iran."
Within Iran's borders, stiff government security measures
notwithstanding, organized opposition was never eliminated.
Although the shah had declared illegal all opposition political
parties, labor unions, peasant organizations, and university
student groups, antigovernment sentiments remained high, especially
among the clerical community. By late 1977, student demonstrations
increased in frequency, with a vocal minority calling on Iranians
to "raise their voices against absolute rule." These protests,
timed to call President Jimmy Carter's attention to the human
rights situation in Iran, resulted in the arrest of hundreds of
demonstrators, many of whom were allegedly tortured by SAVAK
forces.
In January 1978, conservative religious students demonstrated
in the holy city of Qom to express the long-standing clerical
opposition to the shah's land reform policies, which had resulted
in the expropriation of vaqf (religious endowment) and other
lands. Religious leaders were also outraged at what they perceived
to be the shah's violations of sacred Islamic laws in such areas as
the role of women in society and the imposition of a secular legal
system that usurped clerical authority. Attempts by the police to
disperse demonstrators resulted in several deaths.
The religious leadership called for a general strike across the
country for February 18, to highlight the forty-day mourning period
for those killed in Qom. Far more serious disturbances erupted on
that day in Tabriz and Tehran, precipitating the worst riots since
1963. After several days of widespread arson directed at banks,
movie theaters, and hotels in Tabriz, the army moved in to restore
order. Similar measures were taken in Tehran and other major
cities. According to the government 12 persons were killed in
Tabriz and 250 persons arrested. In reality, the casualty figure
was much higher and the arrests more numerous. Ironically, the
deaths presented the next opportunity for confrontation. When
demonstrators, commemorating the forty-day mourning period,
defiantly marched through the streets of Tabriz, the armed forces
reacted as expected. To protect themselves and restore order, they
opened fire, killing and injuring more civilians. The result was a
sequence of events in which the opposition, led by influential
clerics, conducted "religious commemorations," and the government
interpreted them as challenges to law and order. With neither side
relenting, the cycle of violence spread.
Observers of these tragic events pointed out that the
reemergence of large-scale protest demonstrations was only made
possible because of the shah's more liberal policies toward the
nonviolent expression of dissent. Indeed, the shah confirmed on
several occasions his commitment to more "liberal" political
reforms, but at the same time he warned that the dissident movement
was "completely illegal" and that he would "not let it get out of
hand." Illegal or not, mass protest demonstrations did get out of
control when the shah openly chastised the clerics for "destroying
the country." The shah could not end these demonstrations, which
gathered more support throughout 1978. Workers from the oil
industry, heeding the call of the religious authorities, slowly
paralyzed Iran's economic sector. It became only a matter of time
before the shah lost control over Iran's internal security.
Data as of December 1987
|
|