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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iran
Index
Foreign influence on the regular armed forces has historically
been massive, vital, and controversial. Around the turn of the
century, before Reza Shah unified the military, officers from
Sweden, Britain, and Russia commanded various Iranian units
(see Historical Background
, this ch.). These officers were unpopular
because they were perceived as occupiers rather than as advisers,
and the seeds of xenophobia were planted. Aware of these
sentiments, Reza Shah tried to minimize direct foreign military
influence, although an exception was made for Swedish officers
serving with the Gendarmerie. Between the two world wars, a large
number of Iranian officers attended military academies in France
and Germany, where they received command and technical training. In
a further effort to counter the influence of both Britain and
Russia (by that time, the Soviet Union) in Iranian affairs, Reza
Shah attempted to establish closer ties with Germany, a
relationship that would be controversial during World War II. After
1945 the United States gradually became more influential and had a
significant impact on the Pahlavi dynasty's leadership and the
military.
With the establishment during World War II of a small United
States military mission to the Gendarmerie (known as GENMISH) in
1943, Washington initiated a modest military advisory program. In
1947 the United States and Tehran reached a more comprehensive
agreement that established the United States Army Mission
Headquarters (ARMISH). Its purpose was to provide the Ministry of
War and the Iranian army with advisory and technical assistance to
enhance their efficiency. As a result, the first Iranian officers
began training in the United States, and they were followed by many
more over the next three decades. The United States initiated its
military assistance grant program to Iran in 1950 (the bilateral
defense agreement between Iran and the United States was not
concluded until 1959) and established a Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG) to administer the program. In 1962 the two
missions were consolidated into a single military organization,
ARMISH-MAAG, which remained active in Iran until the Islamic
revolutionary regime came to power in 1979. Between 1973 and 1979,
the United States also provided military support in the form of
technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), through which civilian
experts instructed Iranians on specific equipment on a short-term
basis. Although the GENMISH program ended in 1973, United States
military assistance to Iran rose rapidly in the six years before
the Revolution.
United States military assistance to Iran between 1947 and 1969
exceeded US$1.4 billion, mostly in the form of grant aid before
1965 and of Foreign Military Sales credits during the late 1960s.
The financial assistance programs were terminated after 1969, when
it was determined that Iran, by then an important oil exporter,
could assume its own military costs. Thereafter, Iran paid cash for
its arms purchases and covered the expenses of United States
military personnel serving in the ARMISH-MAAG and TAFT programs.
Even so, in terms of personnel the United States military mission
in Iran in 1978 was the largest in the world. Department of Defense
personnel in Iran totaled over 1,500 in 1978, admittedly a small
number compared with the 45,000 United States citizens, mostly
military and civilian technicians and their dependents, living in
Iran. Almost all of these individuals were evacuated by early 1979
as the ARMISH-MAAG program came to an abrupt end. Ended also was
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program,
under which over 11,000 Iranian military personnel had received
specialized instruction in the United States.
Washington broke its diplomatic ties with Tehran in April 1980,
closing an important chapter with a former CENTO ally whose
security it had guaranteed since 1959. The relationship had evolved
dramatically from the early 1950s, when Iran depended on the United
States for security assistance, to the mid-1970s, when the
government-to-government Foreign Military Sales program dominated
other issues. Arms transfers increased significantly after the 1974
oil price rise, accelerating at a dizzying pace until 1979. From
fiscal year
(FY--see Glossary)
1950 through FY 1979, United States
arms sales to Iran totaled approximately US$11.2 billion, of which
US$10.7 billion were actually delivered.
The transfer of such large volumes of arms and the presence of
thousands of United States advisers had an unmistakable influence
on the Iranian armed forces. The preponderance of American weapons
led to a dependence on the United States for support systems and
for spare parts. Technical advisers were indispensable for weapons
operations and maintenance.
After the Revolution, Iranians continued to buy arms from the
United States using Israeli, European, and Latin American
intermediaries to place orders, despite the official United States
embargo. Israeli sales, for example, were recorded as early as
1979. On several occasions, attempted arms sales to Iran have been
thwarted by law enforcement operations or broker-initiated leaks.
One operation set up by the United States Department of Justice
foiled the shipment of more than US$2 billion of United States
weapons to Iran from Israel and other foreign countries. The
matériel included 18 F-4 fighter-bombers, 46 Skyhawk
fighter-bombers, and nearly 4,000 missiles. But while the
Department of Justice was attempting to prevent arms sales to Iran,
senior officials in the administration of President Ronald Reagan
admitted that 2,008 TOW missiles and 235 parts kits for Hawk
missiles had been sent to Iran via Israel. These were intended to
be an incentive for the release of American hostages held by
pro-Iranian militiamen in Lebanon. Unverified reports in 1987
indicated that Iranian officials claimed that throughout 1986 the
Reagan administration had sold Iran ammunition and parts for F- 4s,
F-5s, and F-14s. In addition, Tehran reportedly purchased United
States-made equipment from international arms dealers and captured
United States weapons from Vietnam.
Despite official denials, it is believed that Israel has been
a supplier of weapons and spare parts for Iran's American-made
arsenal. Reports indicate that an initial order for 250 retread
tires for F-4 Phantom jets was delivered in 1979 for about US$27
million. Since that time, unverified reports have alleged that
Israel agreed to sell Iran Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, radar
equipment, mortar and machinegun ammunition, field telephones, M-60
tank engines and artillery shells, and spare parts for C-130
transport planes.
By 1986 Iran's largest arms suppliers were reportedly China and
North Korea. China, for example, is believed to have supplied Iran
with military equipment in sales funneled through North Korea.
According to an unconfirmed report in the Washington Post,
one particular deal in the spring of 1983 netted Beijing close to
US$1.3 billion for fighters, T-59 tanks, 130mm artillery, and light
arms. China also delivered a number of Silkworm HY-2
surface-to-surface missiles, presumably for use in defending the
Strait of Hormuz. As of early 1987, China denied all reported
sales, possibly to enhance its diminishing position in the Arab
world. North Korea agreed to sell arms and medical supplies to Iran
as early as the summer of 1980. Using military cargo versions of
the Boeing 747, Tehran ferried ammunition, medical supplies, and
other equipment that it purchased from the North Korean government.
According to unverified estimates, total sales by 1986 may have
reached US$3 billion.
Other countries directly or indirectly involved over the years
in supplying weapons to Iran have included Syria (transferring some
Soviet-made weapons), France, Italy, Libya (Scud missiles), Brazil,
Algeria, Switzerland, Argentina, and the Soviet Union. Direct
foreign influence, however, was minimal because most purchases were
arranged in international arms markets. Moreover, the influence of
the major arms suppliers was balanced by other international
relationships. Many of the above-mentioned West European states in
1988 had arms embargoes against shipments to Iran, but nevertheless
some matériel slipped through. Also, West European states often
wished to keep communication channels open, no matter how difficult
political relations might have become. For example, despite strong
protests from the United States, the British government in 1985
transferred to Iran a fleet-refueling ship and two landing ships
without their armament. The British also allowed the repair of two
Iranian BH-7 Hovercraft. In 1982 Tehran began negotiations with
Bonn for the sale of submarines. Iran also approached the
Netherlands and, in 1985, purchased two landing craft, each
sixty-five meters long and having a capacity exceeding 1,000 tons.
The influence of the Asian arms- supplying countries was further
minimized because purchases were made in cash upon delivery with no
strings attached. Finally, foreign influence was less pronounced in
1987 than at any time since 1925 because a defiant Tehran espoused
"independent" foreign and military policies, based on a strong
sense of Islamic and nationalistic values.
Data as of December 1987
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