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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Iran
Index
According to Article 110 of the 1979 Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the
faqih (see Glossary) is
empowered to appoint and dismiss the chief of the Joint Staff, the
commander in chief of the Pasdaran, two advisers to the SDC, and
the commanders in chief of ground, naval, and air forces on the
recommendation of the SDC. He is also authorized to supervise the
activities of the SDC and to declare war and mobilize the armed
forces on the recommendation of the SDC. As faqih, Khomeini,
although maintaining the role of final arbiter, has delegated the
post of commander in chief to the president of the Republic.
In addition to specifying the duties of the commander in chief,
Article 110 establishes the composition of the SDC as follows:
president of the country, prime minister, minister of defense,
chief of the Joint Staff of the armed forces, commander in chief of
the Pasdaran, and two advisers appointed by the faqih. Other
senior officials may attend SDC meetings to deliberate national
defense issues. In the past, the minister of foreign affairs,
minister of interior, minister of the Pasdaran and his deputy, air
force and navy commanders in chief, War Information Office
director, and others have attended SDC meetings. The ground forces
commander in chief, Colonel Seyyed-Shirazi, is a member of the SDC
as a representative of the military arm for the faqih,
whereas Majlis speaker Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani
is representative of the political arm for the faqih.
Iran's strategic planning and the establishment of its military
and defense policies are the responsibilities of the SDC, which has
representatives at operational area and field headquarters to
provide political and strategic guidance to field commanders. SDC
representatives may also veto military decisions. But reports in
1987 indicated that SDC orders to regional representatives have
been modified to limit the heavy casualty rates caused by their
inappropriate advice. Inexperienced nonmilitary religious advisers
have seen their interference in purely technical matters
dramatically curtailed.
The Urumiyeh reorganization proposals recognized the
administrative separation of the services as part of Iran's
political reality. Consequently, as of 1987 there were two chains
of command below the SDC, one administrative and the other
operational. To some extent this dual chain of command existed
because the revolutionary government had retained a modified
version of the organizational structure of the IIAF, which was
modeled on the United States division of powers between the
administrative functions of the service secretaries and the
operational functions of the secretary of defense and chiefs of
staff. In addition, the IRP leaders wanted to limit friction
between the regular military and the Pasdaran. According to Speaker
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the service commanders in chief, the minister
of defense, and the minister of the Pasdaran were removed from the
operational chain to avoid further friction between the two groups.
In 1987 the Ministry of Defense continued to handle
administrative matters for the regular armed forces. The chain of
command flowed from senior unit commanders (division, wing, and
fleet) to intermediate-echelon service commanders and to service
commanders in chief and their staffs. Similarly, the Ministry of
the Pasdaran handled the administrative affairs of the Pasdaran.
The chain of command flowed from senior unit commanders
(operational brigades in the case of combat units) to the ministry
staff officers. In the case of internal security units, the chain
of command went from local commanders to provincial commanders (who
were colonels) and then to provincial general commanders (who were
generals).
The Joint Staff of the armed forces, composed of officers
assigned from the various services, the Pasdaran, the National
Police, and the Gendarmerie, was responsible for all operational
matters. Its primary tasks included military planning and
coordination and operational control over the regular services,
combat units of the Pasdaran, and units of the Gendarmerie and
National Police assigned to the war front. Joint Staff members were
also empowered to integrate fully the regular and paramilitary
forces in operational planning. The components of the armed forces
Joint Staff were modeled on the United States joint and combined
staff system.
Staff members of J1--Personnel and Administration--conducted
planning and liaison duties with their counterparts at the
ministries of defense, interior, and the Pasdaran. They also
supervised budgeting and financial accountability and the
preparation of operational budgets for Majlis approval for all the
armed services.
Personnel of J2--Intelligence and Security--carried out
operational control for intelligence planning, intelligence
operations, intelligence training, counterintelligence, and
security for all elements of the armed forces. They also handled
liaison with the komitehs (revolutionary committees) for
internal security matters and with SAVAMA for foreign intelligence
(see SAVAMA
, this ch.).
Staff members of J3--Operations and Training--conducted
training, operational planning, operations, and communications. The
operational planning and operations sections were further divided
into eleven subsections for planning and coordination of the
services, including: the Iranian Islamic Ground Forces (IIGF), IIGF
Aviation, IIGF Chemical Troops, IIGF Artillery Troops, IIGF
Engineer Troops, Iranian Islamic Air Force (IIArF), Iranian Islamic
Navy (IIN), IIN Aviation, the Pasdaran, the Gendarmerie, and the
National Police.
Personnel of J4--Logistics and Support--coordinated and
provided liaison for the services. Primary responsibility for
logistics and supply rested with the services through the
ministries of defense, interior, and the Pasdaran; collection and
coordination of supplies and coordination of transportation to the
war front, however, remained under the control of J4.
Staff members of J5--Liaison--handled liaison and coordination
with nonmilitary organizations and with those military
organizations not covered by Joint Staff-level arrangements.
Organizations covered by J5 included the Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of the Pasdaran, Office of the Prime
Minister, Council of Ministers' Secretariat, SDC, Majlis
(particularly the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee), the
Foundation for Popular Mobilization, the Foundation for the
Disinherited, the Foundation for Martyrs (Bonyad-e Shahid), the
Foundation for War Victims, and the Crusade for Reconstruction
(Jihad- e Sazandegi or Jihad).
The office of the staff judge advocate provided legal counsel
to the Joint Staff and facilitated liaison with the revolutionary
prosecutor general and the military tribunal system of the armed
forces. The Political-Ideological Directorate (P-ID) staff members
operated the political-ideological bureaus of the Joint Staff
components and the political-ideological directorates and bureaus
of the operational commands. This office also developed and
disseminated political-ideological training materials, in close
cooperation with the Foundation for the Propagation of Islam and
the Islamic associations of the services. Finally, P-ID members
conducted liaison duties between the Joint Staff and the Islamic
Revolutionary Court of the Armed Forces.
Members of the Inspectorate General handled oversight functions
over the staff components and liaison with the inspectors general
of the operational commands. Special Office for Procurements staff
members controlled and coordinated procurement of military
equipment and supplies from foreign sources through the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of the Pasdaran, the Ministry of Commerce and
Foreign Trade, and the Central Bank of Iran.
In general, operational area commands were subordinate to the
Joint Staff, and each armed force component was subordinate to the
operational area command in accordance with its own command
structure. In 1987 there was only the Western Operational Area
Command, which was responsible for the war with Iraq. Established
to provide more effective control of wartime operations, this area
may have been the precursor of the planned Northern, Southern, and
Eastern Operational Area Commands.
The Western Operational Area Command was similar in structure
to the armed forces Joint Staff except that it was also the lowest
operational echelon at which naval forces were integrated into
combined-services operations and planning. Although operational
area command Joint Staff members exercised operational control over
all troops within their area, they were subject to several
constraints. Generally speaking, Pasdaran, Gendarmerie, and
National Police units operating in an internal security mission,
particularly against insurgents, were detached from the operational
area command and subordinated to the senior Pasdaran commander in
the province in which they were engaged. Air and naval units
continued to be partially controlled by their service commanders
and responded to the Western Operational Area Command Joint Staff
through specialized liaison staffs. The commander of the
operational area was further burdened by the presence at his
headquarters of an SDC representative and a personal representative
of Khomeini. Both of these influential individuals could
effectively take any matter over the commander's head to higher
authority. In 1987 the SDC representative in the Western
Operational Area Command was also the Pasdaran commander for the
operational area command, a situation that further complicated the
command and control system.
Below the Operational Area Command were four field headquarters
(FHQ), code-named FHQ Karbala, FHQ Hamzeh Seyyed ash Shohada, FHQ
Ramadah, and FHQ An Najaf. The FHQs were organized on the model of
the Western Operational Area Command except that they did not have
naval integration. Subordinate to each FHQ were from three to eight
operational sectors. Each operational sector did not necessarily
have its own air support unit.
Additional echelons consisting of a commander and staff drawn
from the Joint Staff of the participating FHQs could be created
during major offensives. The purpose of these echelons was to
overcome logistical shortcomings, concentrate and deploy forces as
needed, and combine the services, particularly the naval forces, in
offensive operations.
The reorganization of the command-and-control system could
largely be attributed to the Urumiyeh proposals. The war with Iraq
naturally increased the level of integration, particularly between
regular military officers commanding Pasdaran units and Pasdaran
officers commanding regular military units. Logistical problems
also came under increasing scrutiny because of the war. The
military's weak infrastructure required the centralization of
logistics and supply. The sophisticated computer inventory and
accounting systems of the ground, air, and naval logistical
commands had been sabotaged during the Revolution, and the country
lost valuable time while bringing these systems back into service.
Improvements in logistical support proved quite rewarding,
revealing, for example, that Iran possessed twice as many critical
spare parts for its aircraft as were previously believed to exist.
Nevertheless, the Iranian armed forces faced a logistical dilemma
in deploying supplies to troops at the front; lack of maintenance
skills translated into a decreased repair and salvage capacity,
creating serious bottlenecks. Vehicles in need of repair had to be
transported to repair centers hundreds of kilometers from the
front, along stretches of poorly maintained roads and railroads.
Under such circumstances cannibalization of damaged equipment for
spare parts, particularly for sophisticated equipment, became the
norm. Without a solution in sight, Iranian authorities relied on
the "down time" between major offensives to resupply units before
resuming offensive operations. This practice further prolonged the
war, because multiphased operations could not be launched and
sustained.
Data as of December 1987
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