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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Chile
Index
The constitutional document imposed by the regime in
1980
consisted of 120 "permanent" articles, which went into
full effect
after the transition to "constitutional government." The
document
also included thirty-four "transitional" articles applying
to the
transitional period from March 11, 1980, to March 11,
1990. The
transitional articles provided the regime with sweeping
powers and
outlined the procedures for the 1988-89 plebiscite on
constitutional amendments and the election of a
legislature. The
most controversial provision was Transitional Article 24,
which
eliminated due process of law by giving the president
broad powers
to curtail the rights of assembly and free speech and to
arrest,
exile, or banish into internal exile any citizen, with no
rights of
appeal except to the president himself.
The "permanent" articles of the constitution were
intended to
create a "modern and protected democracy," an
authoritarian version
of representative government that guarantees "national
security" by
severely circumscribing the will of the people. This was
to be
accomplished in three ways: through the establishment of a
permanent role for the armed forces as "guarantors" of the
nation's
institutions; through the imposition of restrictions on
political
activity, including the banning of movements or ideologies
hostile
to democracy; and through the creation of institutional
mechanisms
that would limit popular sovereignty.
The cornerstone of the military regime's constitutional
doctrine was, according to the 1980 document, the
establishment of
a permanent tutelary role for the armed forces. The
principal
manifestation of this "tutelage" was, according to the
1980
document, the National Security Council (Consejo de
Seguridad
Nacional--Cosena), a body composed of eleven members,
eight of whom
have enjoyed full voting rights since 1989 and only two of
whom
were to be elected officials (Article 95). Voting members
consisted
of the president of the republic, the president of the
Senate of
the Republic (Senado de la República; hereafter, Senate),
the
president of the Supreme Court (Corte Suprema), the
commanders in
chief of the armed forces, and the director general of the
Carabineros of Chile (Carabineros de Chile). This
arrangement
provided military leaders with an absolute majority on any
Cosena
vote. Nonvoting members included the ministers of defense;
economy,
development, and reconstruction; finance; foreign
relations; and
interior.
The 1980 constitution prescribed that Cosena could
"express to
any authority established by this constitution its opinion
regarding any deed, event, act, or subject matter, which
in its
judgment gravely challenges the bases of the institutional
order or
could threaten national security" (Article 96). Cosena was
thus
empowered to admonish top government leaders and
institutions,
including Congress and the president, on any matter Cosena
deemed
relevant to the nation's security as Cosena defined it.
Although
the fundamental law did not specify what would transpire
should an
authority ignore Cosena's opinion, the framers clearly
intended to
give the armed forces constitutional authority to take
matters into
their own hands should their views be ignored.
The 1980 constitution also gave Cosena significant
powers of
"authorization" and "nomination." The constitution
required the
president to seek approval from Cosena to impose any
state of exception (see
Glossary) and gave the council authority to
solicit
any information it deemed necessary in "national security"
matters
from any government agency. Under the 1980 charter, Cosena
was also
empowered to name four of the nine designated members of
the Senate
and two of the seven members of the powerful
Constitutional
Tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional), whereas the president
and the
Senate could nominate only one each. Finally, only Cosena
could
remove military commanders.
Perhaps the most significant protection of military
prerogatives was provided by Article 93, which severely
limits
civilian control over the armed forces. Although the
president
names the commanders of each of the military services and
the
director general of the Carabineros, nominees must be
selected from
a list of the five highest-ranking officers with greatest
seniority. Once a commander is appointed, that appointee
is safe
from presidential dismissal for the duration of the
individual's
four-year term, unless qualified charges are brought
against the
person.
A second set of instruments for the establishment of a
"protected" democracy excluded from political life those
individuals, parties, or movements whose views and
objectives are
judged hostile to democracy. The language of Article 8 was
aimed
specifically at the parties of the Marxist left, although
it could
be applied to other groups and movements as well.
According to the
article, "any act by a person or group intended to
propagate
doctrines that are antagonistic to the family or that
advocate
violence or a totalitarian concept of society, the state,
or the
juridical order or class struggle is illicit and contrary
to the
institutional order of the Republic." Furthermore, any
organization, movement, or political party that supports
such aims
is deemed unconstitutional. Article 19 barred parties from
intervening in any activities that are "foreign to them,"
including
the labor movement and local or community politics.
Finally,
Article 23 and Article 57 specifically barred leaders of
"intermediate groups," such as unions, community
organizations, and
other associations, from leadership of political parties,
and vice
versa; deputies or senators could lose their seats for
acting
directly on such groups' behalf.
Third, the military regime sought to limit the
expression of
popular sovereignty by placing a series of checks on
government
institutions whose existence derives from popular consent.
The most
dramatic example was the elimination of elected local
governments.
Since colonial times, Chileans had elected municipal
governments
with considerable local powers and autonomy. Although
modern local
governments were limited in their efficacy by the
overwhelming
power and financial resources of the state, participation
and
interest in local politics had always been high. Article
32 of the
constitution called for the direct presidential
appointment of
regional intendants (intendentes), governors
(governadores) of provinces, and mayors
(alcaldes) of
large cities. Other mayors could be appointed by
provincial
corporative bodies
(see Regional and
Local Government
, this ch.).
Reversing Chilean democratic practice, the constitution
created
an exaggerated presidentialism, severely limiting the
prerogatives
of Congress. Article 32 was particularly dramatic, giving
the
president the power to dissolve the lower house, the
Chamber of
Deputies (Cámara de Diputados), at least once in the chief
executive's term. Popular representation in Congress was
to be
checked through the appointment of nine "designated"
senators, more
than a fourth of the thirty-five-member chamber. Finally,
the
constitution made any reform in the basic text extremely
difficult
to implement by requiring the concurrence of the president
and two
succeeding legislatures, each of which would have to
approve an
amendment by a three-fifths vote.
Data as of March 1994
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