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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Chile
Index
La Moneda Palace, seat of the executive branch, in
Santiago
Courtesy Embassy of Chile, Washington
Figure 11. Government Structure, 1993
The constitution of 1925 sought to reestablish strong
presidential rule in order to offset the dominant role
assumed by
the legislature after the Civil War of 1891. Elected to
serve a
single six-year term, the president was given broad
authority to
appoint cabinets without the concurrence of the
legislature, whose
members were no longer eligible to serve in executive
posts. Formal
executive authority increased significantly in succeeding
years as
Congress delegated broad administrative authority to new
presidents, who increasingly governed by decree.
Constitutional
reforms enacted in 1947 and in 1970 further reduced
congressional
prerogatives.
Although the 1925 constitution gave Chilean presidents
increased power on paper, actual executive authority does
not
appear to have increased significantly. No president could
count on
gaining majority support without the backing of a broad
alliance of
parties. In 1932, 1938, 1942, and 1964, presidential
candidates
structured successful majority coalitions prior to the
presidential
election, promising other parties cabinet appointments and
incorporation of some of their programmatic objectives. In
1946,
1952, 1958, and 1970, because presidential candidates did
not
attract sufficient coalition support to win a majority of
the
votes, the election was thrown into Congress, which chose
the
winner from the two front-runners. Whether elected by a
majority of
the voters or through compromises with opposition parties
in
Congress, Chilean presidents found that governing often
amounted to
a balancing act. Only by structuring complex majority
coalitions
could the president pass legislative programs and prevent
the
censure of key ministers by Congress.
The presidential balancing act was complicated by
frequent
defections from the chief executive's coalition of
supporters, even
by members of his own party, particularly in the waning
months of
his constitutionally stipulated single term. One result
was that
the average cabinet often lasted less than a year (see
table 37,
Appendix). For example, in the government of Gabriel
González
Videla (1946-52), who was a member of the Radical Party
(Partido
Radical--PR), the average cabinet lasted six and one-half
months;
Allende's cabinets lasted slightly less than six months.
The
average duration of ministerial appointments was six
months and
seven months in the same two governments, respectively.
This
pattern resulted in frustrated presidents and policy
discontinuity
that belied the formal powers of the chief executive.
The authors of the constitution of 1980 sought to
address the
government's structural problems by creating a far
stronger
executive. The 1980 charter increases presidential terms
from six
to eight years but retains the prohibition against
immediate
reelection, and it gives broad new powers to the president
at the
expense of a weakened legislature. However, prior to the
transfer
of power in March 1994, the constitution was amended,
reducing the
presidential term back to six years.
The constitution specifies that the president should be
at
least forty years of age, meet the constitutional
requirements for
citizenship, and have been born on Chilean territory. The
president
is elected by an absolute majority of the valid votes
cast. The
1980 constitution did away with the traditional practice
of having
Congress decide between the two front-runners when no
candidate
receives an absolute majority of the votes. It institutes
instead
a second-round election aimed specifically at barring
political
bargaining in the legislature and ensuring the election of
a
president with the backing of a majority of the
population.
In addition to specific prerogatives and duties, the
constitution grants the president the legal right to
"exercise
statutory authority in all those matters that are not of a
legal
nature, without prejudice to the power to issue other
regulations,
decrees, or instructions which he may deem appropriate for
the
enforcement of the law" (Article 32). The president has
the right
to call plebiscites, propose changes to the constitution,
declare
states of emergency and exception, and watch over the
performance
of the court system. The president names ministers and, in
accord
with specific procedures, two senators, the comptroller
general,
the commanders of the armed forces, and all judges of the
Supreme
Court and appellate courts (cortes de apelaciones).
Departing from previous practice, which required
senatorial
confirmation of diplomatic appointments, the 1980
constitution bars
the legislative branch from any role in the confirmation
process.
Finally, it increases the legislative faculties of the
president
dramatically, making the chief executive a virtual
colegislator
(Article 32, in concordance with Article 60).
Ironically, although the CPD strongly criticized the
disproportionate powers given to the president in the 1980
constitution, President Aylwin moved with determination to
make
full use of those very powers. The son of a middle-class
family,
whose father was a lawyer and judge and eventually
president of the
Supreme Court, Aylwin was born on November 26, 1918, in
Viña del
Mar. He studied law and had faculty appointments at the
University
of Chile and the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile.
In 1945
he joined the National Falange (Falange Nacional), the
precursor of
the PDC, which he helped form in 1957. A former senator,
Aylwin
served seven terms as president of the PDC, a position he
held when
he was nominated as the PDC's presidential candidate. In
his work
as spokesman for the multiparty opposition coalition, he
displayed
great skills as a conciliator, gaining the confidence of
parties
and leaders on the left, who had vehemently opposed his
support for
the overthrow of the Allende government. A man of deep
religious
conviction, humble demeanor, and unimpeachable honesty,
Aylwin
impressed friends and foes alike when he successfully
negotiated
the constitutional reforms of 1989.
As president, Aylwin surprised even his closest
advisers with
his firm leadership, particularly his willingness to stand
up to
Pinochet, who remained army commander. For instance, in a
crucial
meeting of Cosena, Aylwin challenged Pinochet on a matter
directly
related to the issue of presidential authority and
received backing
from the other military commanders for his position.
Aylwin moved
cautiously but firmly in dealing with the human rights
abuses of
the past, appointing a commission that officially
acknowledged the
crimes of the security forces. Subsequent legislation
provided
compensation for victims or their families, even if
prosecution for
most of those crimes appeared unlikely ever to take place.
The Aylwin government also took great pains to assure
domestic
and foreign investors of its intention to maintain the
basic
features of the free-market economic model. The CPD was
keenly
aware that it needed to retain the confidence of the
national and
international business communities and show the world that
it too
could manage economic policy with skill and
responsibility. Indeed,
by showing that Chile could manage its economic affairs in
democracy, the government could provide an even more
favorable
economic climate, one not clouded by the political
confrontations
and potential instability of authoritarianism. The Aylwin
government appeared to meet this objective, as the Chilean
economy
grew at an average rate of more than 6 percent from 1990
through
1993.
The Aylwin government was cautious in proposing
constitutional
reforms for fear of alienating the military and the
opposition
parties of the right, which controlled the Senate. The key
constitutional reform, enacted on November 9, 1991,
created
democratically elected local governments by reestablishing
elections for municipal mayors and council members.
Additional
reforms of the judicial system were also approved.
Although it
indicated its desire to change the electoral system and
the nature
of civil-military relations, the Aylwin government was
unable to
achieve those objectives.
The executive branch in Chile is composed of sixteen
ministries
with portfolio and four cabinet-level agencies--the
Central Bank,
the Production Development Corporation (Corfo), the
National
Women's Service (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer--Sernam),
and the
National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía)
(see
fig. 11). Ministers serve exclusively at the president's
discretion.
Each ministry is required to articulate a series of firm
objectives
for each fiscal year, and the president uses these
ministerial
goals to judge the success of a particular department and
minister.
Every seven months, a formal evaluation (state of
progress) is
conducted to ascertain the progress of each ministry. The
president
writes a formal letter to each minister in January,
evaluating the
accomplishments or failures of the department in question.
Cabinet
officers have significant authority over their own
agencies.
Although important in setting the overall priorities of
the
government and coordinating a uniform response to issues,
cabinet
meetings deal primarily with general subjects. Critical
policy
questions, however, are often addressed at the ministerial
level by
interministerial commissions dealing with specific
substantive
areas. These include infrastructural, development,
economic,
socioeconomic, and political issues. If there is no
unanimity on a
particular matter, the question goes to "the second floor"
(the
president's office) for final disposition. The president
is kept
closely apprised of all matters under discussion at all
times by
the secretary general of the presidency, who has the
primary
responsibility of coordinating the work of ministerial
commissions.
Under President Aylwin, that position was held by Edgardo
Boeninger
Kausel, a former rector of the University of Chile.
Boeninger's
success resulted not from the power of his position, which
in
formal terms is unimportant, but from his skills as a
negotiator
and consensus builder and from the willingness of the
cabinet,
composed of individuals from different parties, to work in
a
collegial fashion. This style of authority might slow
decisions,
but it has the advantage of averting serious conflicts and
sparing
the president from having to micromanage policy or serve
as a
constant referee. Aylwin's secretary general of the
government,
Enrique Correa Rios, the government's chief spokesman,
also played
a prominent role in projecting the government's image and
serving
as a bridge to political parties and opposition leaders.
In addition to the office of the secretary general of
the
presidency and secondary general of the government, two
ministries
had key roles in the Aylwin administration. The Ministry
of Finance
had virtual autonomy in formulating and guiding overall
economic
and budgetary policy. The Ministry of Interior, the
principal
"political ministry" of the government, was charged with
law
enforcement and with coordinating government policy with
the
parties of the CPD.
Data as of March 1994
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