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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Chile
Index
The armed forces constitute an essentially autonomous
power
within the Chilean state. An entire chapter of the
constitution
(Chapter 10) is devoted specifically to the armed forces,
granting
them a status comparable to that of Congress and the
courts.
Although the opposition felt that it had reduced the
tutelary role
of the armed forces with the constitutional reforms of
1989 by
softening the language dealing with Cosena's powers, the
military
continued to have a constitutionally sanctioned right to
discuss
politics and policy and make its views known to the
democratically
elected authorities.
Whether or not the commanders of the services
"represent" their
views "or make them known," the political fact remains
that the
armed forces are defined by the constitution as the
"guarantors of
the institutional order of the Republic." Thus, their
leadership
exercises tutelage over the conduct of the elected
government and
other state bodies. This privilege is given only to the
commanding
officers. The 1980 constitution lays down strict rules
requiring
lower-ranking officers to refrain from any political
activity or
expression and to conform strictly to the orders of their
superiors.
The 1989 reforms did not change the provisions that
insulate
the commanders in chief of the armed services and the
National
Police from democratically elected leaders. Although the
military
commanders and the head of Chile's paramilitary police,
the
Carabineros, are chosen by the president from among those
officers
having the most seniority in their respective services,
the
appointment is for four years, during which time the
commanders
cannot be removed except by Cosena under exceptional
circumstances.
The constitution also specifies that entry into the
armed
services can only be through the established military
academies and
schools that are governed exclusively by the services
without
outside interference. The Organic Constitutional Law on
the Armed
Forces (Law 18,948 of February 1990) governs in detail
military
education, hierarchy, promotion, health, welfare, and
retirement.
It also provides the armed forces with a specific minimum
budget
that cannot be reduced. Other legislation provides the
military
with a set percentage from the worldwide sales of the
state-run
copper companies.
Despite seventeen years of military rule, the armed
forces are
remarkably uncontaminated by factionalism or partisan
politics. No
major divisions within the services are apparent. However,
because
the military enjoyed privileged treatment during
Pinochet's rule,
any attempt to tamper with military prerogatives was
likely to be
strongly resisted.
Pinochet's insistence on retaining his position as
commander in
chief of the army displeased the Aylwin government. As
commander of
the army, the general affirmed the military's
determination to
resist prosecution for human rights violations. Yet the
army's
credibility was badly damaged by allegations of financial
wrongdoing by Pinochet's son, the discovery of mass graves
containing corpses of individuals who died while in
military hands,
and the illegal export of arms to Croatia. The report of
the
National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, known as
the
Rettig Commission, confirmed many of the allegations of
military
abuses.
The Aylwin government contended that the full
consolidation of
democracy could not be accomplished without a fundamental
change in
the relationship between civil and military authority.
Members of
the CPD asserted that presidential control of the armed
forces
existed in all modern democracies and since 1822 had been
an
essential element in Chile's constitutional tradition.
A proposal for reform of the Organic Constitutional Law
on the
Armed Forces was signed by President Aylwin on March 29,
1992, and
sent to Congress. Aylwin's initiative dealt specifically
with
Article 7 and Article 53 of the organic laws of the armed
forces
and police, which limit presidential prerogatives in
relation to
the hiring, firing, and promotion of members of the
military. Among
the suggested reforms was a provision providing the
president with
the right to choose commanders of the armed forces from
among the
ten most senior officers, instead of the top five. These
proposals
were opposed, however, by both parties of the right,
making it
impossible to envision any constitutional reform on this
matter in
the foreseeable future.
The opposition contended that the tenure of the
commanders had
contributed to the stability and moderation of the Chilean
transition. It argued that these reforms would result in
the
politicization of the armed forces by undermining the
hierarchy,
discipline, and professionalism of military institutions.
The
rightist parties also contended that the reform proposals,
if
successful, would upset the counterweights on presidential
power
and would disturb the institutional balance existing
between the
president, the Constitutional Tribunal, Congress, and
Cosena. This
balance, they argued, helped guarantee the success of the
Chilean
transition by insulating the armed forces from overt
political
pressures
(see
Civil-Military Relations
, ch. 5).
Data as of March 1994
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