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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Chile
Index
The Allende experiment enjoyed a triumphant first year,
followed by two disastrous final years. According to the
UP, Chile
was being exploited by parasitic foreign and domestic
capitalists.
The government therefore moved quickly to socialize the
economy,
taking over the copper mines, other foreign firms,
oligopolistic
industries, banks, and large estates. By a unanimous vote
of
Congress in 1971, the government totally nationalized the
foreign
copper firms, which were mainly owned by two United States
companies, Kennecott and Anaconda. The nationalization
measure was
one of the few bills Allende ever got through the
opposition-
controlled legislature, where the Christian Democrats
constituted
the largest single party.
Socialization of the means of production spread rapidly
and
widely. The government took over virtually all the great
estates.
It turned the lands over to the resident workers, who
benefited far
more than the owners of tiny plots or the numerous migrant
laborers. By 1972 food production had fallen and food
imports had
risen. Also during 1971-72, the government dusted off
emergency
legislation from the 1932 Socialist Republic to allow it
to
expropriate industries without congressional approval. It
turned
many factories over to management by the workers and the
state.
In his first year, Allende also employed Keynesian
measures to
hike salaries and wages, thus pumping up the purchasing
power of
the middle and working classes. This "consumer revolution"
benefited 95 percent of the population in the short run
because
prices were held down and employment went up. Producers
responded
to rising demand by employing previously underused
capacity.
Politically, Allende faced problems holding his Popular
Unity
coalition together, pacifying the more leftist elements
inside and
outside Popular Unity and, above all, coping with the
increasingly
implacable opposition. Within Popular Unity, the largest
party was
the Socialist Party. Although composed of multiple
factions, the
Socialist Party mainly pressed Allende to accelerate the
transition
toward socialism. The second most important element was
the PCCh,
which favored a more gradual, legalistic approach. Outside
the
Popular Unity, the most significant left-wing organization
was the
MIR, a tiny but provocative group that admired the Cuban
Revolution
and encouraged peasants and workers to take property and
the
revolutionary process into their own hands, much faster
than
Allende preferred.
The most important opposition party was the PDC. As it
and the
middle sectors gradually shifted to the right, they came
to form an
anti-Allende bloc in combination with the Natinal Party
and the
propertied class. Even farther to the right were
minuscule,
paramilitary, quasi-fascist groups like Fatherland and
Liberty
(Patria y Libertad), determined to sabotage Popular Unity.
The Popular Unity government tried to maintain cordial
relations with the United States, even while staking out
an
independent position as a champion of developing nations
and
socialist causes. It opened diplomatic relations with
Cuba, China,
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea),
the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and
Albania. It
befriended the Soviet Union, which sent aid to the Allende
administration, although far less than Cuba received or
than
Popular Unity had hoped for.
Meanwhile, the United States pursued a two-track policy
toward
Allende's Chile. At the overt level, Washington was
frosty,
especially after the nationalization of the copper mines;
official
relations were unfriendly but not openly hostile. The
government of
President Richard M. Nixon squeezed the Chilean economy by
terminating financial assistance and blocking loans from
multilateral organizations, although it increased aid to
the
military, a sector unenthusiastic toward the Allende
government. It
was widely reported that at the covert level the United
States
worked to destabilize Allende's Chile by funding
opposition
political groups and media and by encouraging a military
coup
d'état. Most scholars have concluded that these United
States
actions contributed to the downfall of Allende, although
no one has
established direct United States participation in the coup
d'état
and very few would assign the United States the primary
role in the
destruction of that government.
During the second and third years of the UP, demand
outstripped
supply, the economy shrank, deficit spending snowballed,
new
investments and foreign exchange became scarce, the value
of copper
sales dropped, shortages appeared, and inflation
skyrocketed,
eroding the previous gains for the working class. A
thriving black
market sprang up. The government responded with direct
distribution
systems in working-class neighborhoods. Worker
participation in the
management of enterprises reached unprecedented
proportions. The
strapped government could not keep the economy from going
into free
fall because it could not impose austerity measures on its
supporters in the working class, get new taxes approved by
Congress, or borrow enough money abroad to cover the
deficit.
Although the right was on the defensive in Allende's
first
year, it moved on the offensive and forged an alliance
with the
center in the next two years. In Congress this
center-right
coalition erected a blockade against all Popular Unity
initiatives,
harassed Popular Unity cabinet ministers, and denounced
the
administration as illegitimate and unconstitutional, thus
setting
the stage for a military takeover. The most acrimonious
battle
raged over the boundaries of Popular Unity's "social
property area"
(área de propriedad social), which would
incorporate private
holdings through government intervention, requisition, or
expropriation. The Supreme Court and the comptroller
general of the
republic joined Congress in criticizing the executive
branch for
overstepping its constitutional bounds.
Allende tried to stabilize the situation by organizing
a
succession of cabinets, but none of them guaranteed order.
His
appointment of military officers to cabinet posts in 1972
and 1973
also failed to stifle the opposition. Instead, it helped
politicize
the armed services. Outside the government, Allende's
supporters
continued direct takeovers of land and businesses, further
disrupting the economy and frightening the propertied
class.
The two sides reached a showdown in the March 1973
congressional elections. The opposition expected the
Allende
coalition to suffer the typical losses of Chilean
governments in
midterm elections, especially with the economy in a
tailspin. The
National Party and PDC hoped to win two-thirds of the
seats, enough
to impeach Allende. They netted 55 percent of the votes,
not enough
of a majority to end the stalemate. Moreover, the Popular
Unity's
43 percent share represented an increase over the
presidential
tally of 36.2 percent and gave Allende's coalition six
additional
congressional seats; therefore, many of his adherents were
encouraged to forge ahead.
In the aftermath of the indecisive 1973 congressional
elections, both sides escalated the confrontation and
hurled
threats of insurgency. Street demonstrations became almost
daily
events and increasingly violent. Right-wing groups, such
as
Fatherland and Liberty, and left-wing groups, such as the
MIR,
brandished arms and called for a cataclysmic solution. The
most
militant workers formed committees in their neighborhoods
and
workplaces to press for accelerated social change and to
defend
their gains. The opposition began openly knocking on the
doors of
the barracks in hopes that the military would provide a
solution.
The regular armed forces halted an attempted coup by
tank
commanders in June 1973, but that incident warned the
nation that
the military was getting restless. Thereafter, the armed
forces
prepared for a massive coup by stepping up raids to search
for arms
among Popular Unity's supporters. Conditions worsened in
June,
July, and August, as middle- and upper-class business
proprietors
and professionals launched another wave of workplace
shutdowns and
lockouts, as they had in late 1972. Their 1973 protests
against the
government coincided with strikes by the trucking industry
and by
the left's erstwhile allies among the copper workers. The
Nationalists, the Christian Democrats, and conservative
students
backed the increasingly subversive strikers. They called
for
Allende's resignation or military intervention. Attempts
by the
Catholic Church to get the PDC and Popular Unity to
negotiate a
compromise came to naught. Meanwhile, inflation reached an
annual
rate of more than 500 percent. By mid-1973 the economy and
the
government were paralyzed.
In August 1973, the rightist and centrist
representatives in
the Chamber of Deputies undermined the president's
legitimacy by
accusing him of systematically violating the constitution
and by
urging the armed forces to intervene. In early September,
Allende
was preparing to call for a rare national plebiscite to
resolve the
impasse between Popular Unity and the opposition. The
military
obviated that strategy by launching its attack on civilian
authority on the morning of September 11. Just prior to
the
assault, the commanders in chief, headed by the newly
appointed
army commander, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, had
purged
officers sympathetic to the president or the constitution.
Allende committed suicide while defending (with an
assault
rifle) his socialist government against the coup d'état.
Although
sporadic resistance to the coup erupted, the military
consolidated
control much more quickly than it had believed possible.
Many
Chileans had predicted that a coup would unleash a civil
war, but
instead it ushered in a long period of repression.
Debate continues over the reasons for Allende's
downfall. Why
did he fail to preserve democracy or achieve socialism?
Critics of
the left blamed Allende for going to extremes, destroying
the
economy, violating the constitution, and undermining the
spirit if
not the letter of democracy. Right-wing critics in
particular
accused the left of even plotting an armed takeover, a
charge that
was never proved. Critics also assailed the UP for being
unclear
about the limits of its reforms and thus frightening the
middle
class into the arms of the opposition. Critics of the
right accused
Popular Unity, in conjunction with the United States, of
ruining
the economy and of calling out the armed forces to protect
its
property and privileges. Observers in general scolded the
far left
for its adventurous excesses. The far left retorted that
Popular
Unity failed because it was too timid to arm the masses.
Critics of
the Christian Democrats chastised them for refusing to
compromise,
locking arms with the rightist opposition, and failing to
defend
democracy.
Many analysts would concur that there was ample blame
to go
around. In the view of many Chileans, groups at all points
on the
political spectrum helped destroy the democratic order by
being too
ideological and too intransigent. Many observers agree
that a
minority president facing adamant domestic and foreign
opposition
was extremely unlikely to be able to uphold democracy and
create
socialism at the same time. In the late 1980s, polls also
showed
that most Chileans did not want to try the Popular Unity
experiment
again, especially in light of its aftermath.
Data as of March 1994
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