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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Chile
Index
General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, chief of state, 1973-
90
Courtesy Embassy of Chile, Washington, and El
Mercurio, Santiago
President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte reviewing troops at the
19th of September Armed Forces Day parade in Santiago in 1985
Courtesy David Shelton
In the immediate aftermath of the 1973 coup, there was
extensive repression, including summary executions of
prisoners.
During this period, the number of people who were detained
so
exceeded the capacities of the existing penal institutions
that for
a time stadiums, military grounds, and naval vessels were
used as
short-term prisons. Subsequently, at least five prison
camps were
established for political prisoners, mostly in the remote
south and
the far north. The intelligence service that was created
after the
coup, the National Intelligence Directorate (Dirección
Nacional de
Inteligencia--DINA), also kept secret detention centers,
where
torture of prisoners was a routine practice. All of these
places of
detention had been closed down by the time of the return
to
civilian government in 1990.
During the four-and-one-half years following the 1973
coup,
Chile was officially in a state of siege
(see Glossary, state of
exception) and
functioned under martial law. The
military
tribunals expanded their jurisdictions to include all
violations
(including those perpetrated by civilians) of the much
more
encompassing security laws enacted by the government. At
the end of
this period, the state of siege was replaced by a state of
emergency, which restored a larger degree of authority to
the
civilian courts, although military tribunals continued to
deal with
cases involving public security.
The Aylwin government reestablished the competence of
the
civilian courts to deal with all matters pertaining to
civilians.
It therefore opened the way for these courts to reexamine
cases of
human rights violations that had been previously dismissed
by the
military tribunals as lacking in evidence or as falling
under the
amnesty law approved by the military government in 1978.
It enacted
a significant constitutional amendment that reduces the
power of
military courts only to that of trying offenses committed
by
military personnel acting in the line of duty or on
military bases.
Military courts can no longer try civilians.
The Aylwin government also established the National
Commission
on Truth and Reconciliation, or Rettig Commission, to
inquire into
human rights abuses during the 1973-90 period of military
rule. It
eventually produced a voluminous report holding the
security forces
responsible for 2,115 deaths, including those of 957
detainees who
disappeared and an additional 164 victims of political
violence.
The military's reputation for apolitical
professionalism was
tarnished by the 1973 military coup and subsequent
repression. A
national survey conducted in March 1991 by the Center for
Contemporary Reality Studies (Centro de Estudios de la
Realidad
Contemporánea--CERC), after the release of the Rettig
Commission
report, showed that 75.3 percent of the population
assigned "much"
blame to the military for violations of human rights.
Another 14.4
percent thought the armed forces had at least "some"
responsibility, and only 3.8 percent thought they had
"none."
An amnesty law has protected military officers involved
in
human rights abuses committed between 1973 and 1978.
However, by
1993 as many as 600 officers, mainly from the army, had
been cited
in 230 cases involving rights abuses. The numerous calls
from
civilian courts for military officers to testify regarding
cases of
disappearances that occurred during the military
government, the
decision of an independent state office that oversees
cases of
corruption to investigate the circumstances under which
the army
paid General Pinochet's sons about US$3 million for his
interest in
a bankrupt firm that manufactured arms, and certain delays
of the
Ministry of Defense in issuing decrees demanded by the
army for the
promotion of its officers led to a highly visible
demonstration
(boinazo) by the army in Santiago on May 28, 1993.
About
sixty heavily armed officers and elite troops in full
battle dress
mobilized to guard a meeting of the Corps of Army
Generals,
themselves in battle dress, in the armed forces building
across the
street from La Moneda, the presidential palace. The
president was
on an official trip to Europe, and the minister of
interior, in
charge of the government as vice president, thought that
the events
were so critical that they could well lead to a military
coup. On
his return to the country, President Aylwin initiated an
intensive
round of consultations with General Pinochet, political
parties,
and human rights groups, but he reaffirmed his
unwillingness to
back the enactment of a blanket amnesty law, such as the
one
approved in Uruguay. Instead, he sponsored a law that
would expand
the number of special civilian court judges examining the
cases of
the disappeared and permit the officers summoned to
testify to do
so in secret without their names appearing in the press.
This
proposed law was, however, rejected by the National
Congress
(hereafter, Congress), and therefore no changes resulted
from the
demonstration of May 28.
Data as of March 1994
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