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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Chile
Index
The reversal of fortune for Chile's democratic
opposition came
very gradually. After massive protests in 1983,
spearheaded by
labor leaders buoyed by mass discontent in the wake of a
sharp
downturn in the nation's economy, party leaders sought to
set aside
their acrimonious disputes and make a collective effort to
bring an
end to the military government. By this point, even
influential
elements on the right were signaling their displeasure
with the
personalization of power, fearing that a prolongation of
the
Pinochet regime would only serve to radicalize Chilean
politics
further and set the stage for a popular uprising that
would
overwhelm the authorities.
But Pinochet seemed to relish the challenge of taking
on the
opposition and was determined to carry out his
self-appointed
mandate to reshape Chile's economic and political systems.
In a
strategic retreat made under pressure from regime
moderates,
Pinochet briefly permitted officials to open a dialogue
with
democratic opponents, only to refuse to make any change in
the
formula for transition outlined in the constitution of
1980. In
response to the continuing wave of protests, Pinochet
declared a
state of siege in November 1984 that included a crackdown
on all
demonstrations.
In August 1985, after months of delicate intraparty
negotiations backed by Chile's Roman Catholic cardinal
Juan
Francisco Fresno, a broad alliance of eleven political
groups, from
center-right to socialist, signed a document entitled the
National
Accord for Transition to Full Democracy. It called for a
gradual
transition to civilian rule without specifying a
particular
timetable; legalization of all political activity; an end
to
restrictions on civil liberties; and free, direct
presidential
elections rather than the plebiscite contemplated in the
constitution of 1980. The signing of the accord by such an
array of
groups meant that for the first time since 1973 Pinochet
could no
longer claim majority support. The regime appeared
vulnerable, and
many Chileans began to believe that Pinochet would agree
to
relinquish power.
And yet, the accord soon lost its momentum as Pinochet
and his
aides worked skillfully to sow mistrust and rancor within
the
fragile alliance. The general refused to acknowledge the
accord's
existence or meet with its leaders, despite a personal
plea from
Cardinal Fresno.
In the face of a determined military leader, opposition
forces
were at a clear disadvantage. They had no coherent
strategy to
force the regime to accept their point of view. The far
left, which
had refused to endorse the accord, hoped for a
Sandinista-style
insurrection that would drive Pinochet from power and give
the PCCh
and its allies, which included clandestine armed groups,
the upper
hand in the formation of a "provisional" alternative
government.
The moderate opposition envisioned a completely different
scenario:
some kind of breakdown of military support for Pinochet in
response
to peaceful civilian discontent, followed by free
elections.
With the erosion of support for the National Accord,
the
Chilean opposition fell back into partisan and ideological
quarrels. After years without national, local, or even
internal
party elections, opposition leaders were frozen in past
disputes,
incapable of gauging popular support for various policies.
Given
the parties' stasis, student elections on Chile's
university
campuses became bellwethers of political opinion. Often,
the
Christian Democratic and Communist candidates for student
offices
proved far more willing to compromise and form working
alliances
than their older counterparts.
The dramatic attempt on Pinochet's life by the Manuel
Rodríguez
Patriotic Front (Frente Patriótica Manuel Rodríguez--FPMR)
in
September 1986 further weakened the general's divided
opponents and
temporarily strengthened his own grip on power. The
elaborately
planned attack by the PCCh's armed branch, in which
commandos
stormed Pinochet's motorcade on a hillside road outside
Santiago,
left five bodyguards dead but the general unharmed.
Conservatives
rallied around the regime, Christian Democrats and
moderate
Socialists distanced themselves from the Communists, and
the
Western democracies tempered their support of the
opposition
movement. Over the ensuing months, several new campaigns
by the
democratic opposition fizzled, including a movement of
prominent
citizens calling for free elections. Key opposition
leaders,
notably Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin Azócar, began
to
emphasize the wisdom of trying to take on the regime in
the
upcoming plebiscite, rather than pressing for free
elections.
As 1987 began, Pinochet and his aides confidently
started
planning for the presidential plebiscite. The economy was
showing
signs of recovery. The Marxist left, decimated by arrests
and
executions following the attack on Pinochet, was
discredited. The
democratic opposition was torn between those who accepted
the
regime's transition formula and those who denounced it as
illegitimate. Moderate conservatives and some regime
insiders,
including the chiefs of the FACh and the National Police
(Policía
Nacional), urged Pinochet to permit open elections or to
allow a
candidate other than himself to stand for office. But the
general
was surrounded by sycophants who assured him that he was
the only
man capable of saving Chile from anarchy and chaos.
Pinochet viewed
politicians as demagogues determined to reverse the
accomplishments
of the military regime that only he, as a patriotic, self-
sacrificing soldier, could defend in the face of a
life-and-death
threat from the communist foe.
On August 30, 1988, Chile's four military commanders
met in
secret deliberation and unanimously nominated the
seventy-three-
year-old Pinochet to run for president in a plebiscite
that would
take place in just five weeks, on October 5. Any commander
who
might have opposed General Pinochet did not do so,
apparently
because of a belief in the principle of military unity, or
because
of intimidation by Pinochet's power. The vast resources of
the
regime were already mobilized to ensure Pinochet's
victory.
Military provincial governors and civilian mayors, all
appointed by
Pinochet, were acting as local campaign chiefs. A voter-
registration drive had begun in early 1987, with Pinochet
himself
the first to register. While opposition forces were denied
access
to the mass media, state television aired glowing
advertisements
for the government's accomplishments. The regime stepped
up
production of low-income housing, and Pinochet presided
over
countless ribbon-cutting ceremonies. The general's wife,
Lucía
Hiriart, who headed a vast network of women's aid and
mothers'
clubs, organized them into a grass-roots support network
for the
yes vote.
The turning point for the opposition had come in 1987,
when key
leaders concluded that their only hope to defeat the
military was
to beat it at its own game. Opposition leaders accepted
the
reality, if not the legitimacy, of constitutional
provisions they
despised by agreeing to register their followers in the
electoral
rolls set up by the junta, legalize political parties
according to
the regime's own prescriptions, and prepare to participate
fully in
a plebiscite they viewed as undemocratic.
By early 1988, fourteen parties had joined a loose
coalition
for the no vote. Moderate Socialists played a key role in
convincing dubious Chilean leftists to register to vote,
and the
more radical wing of the Socialist Party finally followed
suit.
With little money and only limited freedom to operate, an
all-
volunteer force led by Socialists and Christian Democrats
registered voters, organized training sessions for poll
watchers,
and collected the signatures needed to legalize parties.
By the
cutoff date, a record 92 percent of the voting-age
population had
registered to vote, and four parties had collected enough
signatures to register poll watchers for 22,000 voting
tables.
Despite inherently unfair campaign conditions, the
military
government made some efforts to provide a level playing
field. The
Constitutional Tribunal, to the annoyance of some
hard-liners in
the regime, issued a firm ruling arguing that the
constitution
requires the implementation of a series of measures that
would
guarantee an impartial vote and vote count. Ironically,
these
measures had not been applied in the plebiscite that had
ratified
the constitution itself in 1980. Although opposition
leaders did
not trust the government, a fair election was also in the
government's interest. Pinochet and his commanders were
confident
that the population's fear of a return to the
confrontations of the
early 1970s, in combination with signs of economic
recovery and a
campaign run with military efficiency, would permit
Pinochet to
overwhelm the fractious opposition and let his detractors,
both at
home and abroad, know that he enjoyed broad popular
legitimacy.
In the weeks before the plebiscite, the no campaign,
finally
granted access to television, stunned the nation with its
unity and
a series of upbeat, appealing advertisements that stressed
harmony
and joy in a reunited Chile, called for a return to
democratic
traditions, and hinted at the poverty and oppression
average people
had suffered under the dictatorship. In response, the
government
stepped up its official propaganda campaign, bombarding
the
airwaves with grim and far less appealing ads that
reminded voters
of the violence and disorder that had preceded the coup
and warned
that Pinochet's opponents offered only more of the same.
On October 5, 1988, the voting proceeded in a quiet,
orderly
fashion, with military guards at each polling place, per
tradition.
By 9:00 P.M., the opposition's computers had counted half
a million
votes and showed the no tally to be far ahead. However,
the
government kept delaying the release of its tallies, and
state
television finally switched to a comedy series from the
United
States.
After frantic behind-the-scenes negotiations and a
failed
effort by some government officials to provoke street
violence as
an excuse to cancel the plebiscite, government television
announced, at 2:40 A.M., that with 71 percent of the vote
counted,
the no was far ahead. The following night, a grim-faced
Pinochet
appeared on television and acknowledged his defeat: 54.5
percent
for the no, versus 43 percent for the yes. Pinochet's
acceptance of
his electoral loss was a remarkable event. Despite the
general's
evident ambition to remain in power, the firm discipline
within
Chile's military establishment and the commitment of the
other
junta commanders, who had pledged to guarantee the vote's
outcome,
prevented him from doing so.
Data as of March 1994
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