MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Cambodia
Index
The most intractable foreign policy question facing the rival
Cambodian regimes in the 1980s was that of how to establish an
independent, neutral, and nonaligned Cambodia under a set of terms
agreeable to all those, both at home and abroad, who were
interested. Despite differing perceptions of potential gains and
losses, all parties to the Cambodian dispute were striving for
reconciliation. This was a positive sign, especially because in
1979 and in 1980, no one, except perhaps Sihanouk, believed that
reconciliation was possible.
In the first two years of the Cambodian crisis, the rival
Cambodian regimes had different priorities. The Heng Samrin
regime's overriding concern was to consolidate its political and
its territorial gains, while relying on the Vietnamese to take the
lead in foreign affairs and in national security. The political
price of this external dependence was high because it contributed
to Phnom Penh's image as a Vietnamese puppet. Vietnam also paid a
price for its assertion that it had intervened only "at the
invitation" of Heng Samrin "to defend the gains of the revolution
they have won...at a time when the Beijing expansionists are
colluding with the United States." Phnom Penh and Hanoi also
asserted speciously that political turmoil inside Cambodia
constituted a civil war and was, therefore, of no concern to
outsiders. Vietnam's attempts to shield the Cambodian crisis from
external scrutiny led its noncommunist neighbors to suspect that
Hanoi was finally moving to fulfill its historical ambition of
dominating all of Indochina.
Anti-Heng Samrin resistance groups pursued an opposite course.
Their strategy was to internationalize the Cambodian question--with
political support from China and from the ASEAN nations--as a case
of unprovoked Vietnamese aggression, in order to put pressure on
Vietnam and to undermine the legitimacy of the Heng Samrin
administration. At the same time, the resistance groups sought to
destabilize the Heng Samrin regime by challenging the Vietnamese
occupation forces. The regime in Phnom Penh, with support from
Vietnam and from the Soviet Union, nevertheless continued to
consolidate its gains.
In 1981 the rival camps pressed on with their confrontational
tactics. The anti-Vietnamese resistance factions, despite their
long-standing, internal feuds, began to negotiate among themselves
for unity against their common enemy. On the diplomatic front, they
worked closely with ASEAN to convene the UN-sponsored International
Conference on Kampuchea, which took place from July 13 to July 17,
1981, in New York. The conference, attended by representatives from
seventy-nine countries and by observers from fifteen countries,
adopted a declaration of principles for settling the Cambodian
crisis. The central elements of the declaration were those
contained in the UN General Assembly resolution of 1979 and in the
proposals for Cambodian peace announced by the ASEAN countries in
October 1980. The declaration called for the withdrawal of all
foreign forces in the shortest possible time under the supervision
and the verification of a UN peacekeeping-observer group; for
arrangements to ensure that armed Cambodian factions would not
prevent or disrupt free elections; for measures to maintain law and
order during the interim before free elections could be held and a
new government established; for free elections under UN auspices;
for the continuation of Cambodia's status as a neutral and
nonaligned state; and for a declaration by the future elected
government that Cambodia would not pose a threat to other
countries, especially to neighboring states. The declaration also
called on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council
(China, France, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States)
and on all other states to pledge to respect Cambodia's
independence, its territorial integrity, and its neutral status and
to declare that they would neither draw Cambodia into any military
alliance, nor introduce foreign troops into the country, nor
establish any military bases there. The declaration's principles
were reaffirmed in successive UN General Assembly resolutions, and
they formed the basis of the ASEAN-sponsored framework for
resolving the Cambodian question in the 1980s.
Since 1979 the ASEAN countries have played a significant role
on behalf of the Cambodian resistance factions. Individually and
collectively, through the annual conferences of their foreign
ministers, these countries consistently have stressed the
importance of Vietnam's withdrawal as a precondition for a
comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian question. They
have rejected all moves by Hanoi and Phnom Penh that were aimed at
legitimizing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the Heng
Samrin regime. Together with China, they also were architects of
the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.
Phnom Penh's principal foreign policy spokesman has been
Vietnam, and its major diplomatic moves have been coordinated by
and proclaimed by the annual conference of foreign ministers of the
three Indochinese states meeting consecutively in Hanoi (or Ho Chi
Minh City), in Phnom Penh, and in Vientiane. Hanoi's position on
Cambodia has been that the "so-called Kampuchean problem is but the
consequence of Chinese expansionism and hegemonism," that Vietnam's
military presence in Cambodia was defensive because it was meeting
the Chinese threat to Cambodia and to Vietnam, and that Hanoi would
withdraw from Cambodia when the Chinese threat no longer existed.
Thailand's stance on the Cambodian issue has been of particular
concern to Phnom Penh and to Hanoi. ASEAN initially maintained the
position that Thailand was not a party to the Cambodian conflict
but an "affected bystander" entitled to adopt a policy of
neutrality. Hanoi and Phnom Penh denounced that posture as "sham
neutrality" and accused Thailand of colluding with China; they
alleged that Thailand allowed shipment of Chinese arms through its
territory to the "remnants of [the] Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique,"
which was operating inside the Thai border. They also claimed that
Bangkok sheltered and armed Pol Pot's guerrillas and other
Cambodian "reactionaries."
Nevertheless, the Heng Samrin regime made friendly overtures to
Bangkok. In June 1980, for example, it proposed a meeting to
discuss resuming "normal relations" and turning their common border
into "a border of friendship and peace." The Heng Samrin regime
stated that its primary concern was the elimination of "all hostile
acts" between the two countries and that it was willing to forget
the past and "all the provocations launched by Thailand against
Cambodia." Thailand replied that talks with the Heng Samrin regime
would solve nothing. Besides, Thai officials said, such talks would
lend an inappropriate appearance of recognition to the Phnom Penh
regime. They also stressed that Vietnam had to withdraw from
Cambodia before constructive talks could take place.
In July 1980, the three Indochinese states proposed the signing
of multilateral or bilateral treaties of peaceful coexistence,
nonaggression, and noninterference among themselves and Thailand.
They added that the treaties should also be signed by "other
Southeast Asian countries." The proposal also called for the
creation of a Southeast Asian zone of peace and stability and for
a demilitarized border zone between Cambodia and Thailand. Bangkok,
however, viewed the proposal as an attempt to divert international
attention from the fundamental question of Vietnamese occupation
and as a gambit to get indirect or "back-door" recognition for the
Heng Samrin regime.
The Indochinese states sought to open a dialogue with the ASEAN
countries in 1981 by proposing a regional conference, which was to
be attended also by observers such as the UN secretary general and
by representatives from several countries. The proposal was Hanoi's
way of internationalizing the Cambodian issue: Vietnam would be
able to link its role in Cambodia to the roles of Thailand and of
China in aiding the anti-Vietnamese resistance groups. To highlight
the linkage, Hanoi made two suggestions: first, the regional
conference could address "the Cambodian question" if the Thai and
Chinese connections also were discussed; and second, Vietnam would
immediately withdraw some of its troops if and when Thailand
stopped aiding the resistance groups and if the UN withdrew its
recognition of Democratic Kampuchea.
In July 1982, Hanoi, aware that no one was taking it seriously,
departed from its previous position. It announced that it had gone
ahead with a partial withdrawal and now demanded only that Thailand
promise to stop aiding Khmer insurgents. At that time, the
Indochinese foreign ministers revealed that "in the immediate
future," the PRK would not plan to reclaim the Cambodian seat at
the United Nations if the Pol Pot clique were expelled from that
organization. The Thai government dismissed Hanoi's statement as a
rhetorical concession designed only to mislead the world and
characterized the partial withdrawal as nothing more than a
disguised troop rotation.
At the first Indochinese summit held on February 22 and
February 23, 1983, in Vientiane, the participants declared that all
Vietnamese "volunteers" would be withdrawn when external threats to
Cambodia no longer existed, but that Hanoi, would reassess its
option to return to Cambodia if a new threat emerged after it had
withdrawn from the country.
Hanoi contended that its partial withdrawal was a positive
first step toward eventual restoration of peace in Cambodia, but
some observers felt that the real reason for the withdrawal was
Hanoi's realization that a deadlock over the Cambodian issue would
create too much of a drain on its limited resources. Another likely
reason for the withdrawal was the growing Cambodian irritation with
the movement of Vietnamese nationals into Cambodia's fertile lands
around the Tonle Sap
(see Migration and Refugees
, ch. 2). This
population migration was a potential source of renewed ethnic
conflict.
In July 1983, the Indochinese foreign ministers denied "the
slanderous allegation of China, the United States, and a number of
reactionary circles within the ASEAN countries" that Vietnam was
aiding and abetting Vietnamese emigration to Cambodia. (Khmer Rouge
sources claimed that as of 1987, between 600,000 and 700,000
Vietnamese immigrants were in Cambodia; the Heng Samrin regime put
the number at about 60,000.)
In September 1983, ASEAN foreign ministers issued a joint
"Appeal for Kampuchean Independence," proposing a phased Vietnamese
withdrawal, coupled with an international peacekeeping force and
with assistance in rebuilding areas vacated by the Vietnamese.
Hanoi rejected the appeal, however, seeking instead a position of
strength from which it could dictate terms for a settlement.
Vietnam launched a major dry-season offensive in 1984 in an attempt
to crush all resistance forces permanently. The offensive destroyed
most, if not all, resistance bases.
In January 1985, the Indochinese foreign ministers claimed that
the Cambodian situation was unfolding to their advantage and that
the Cambodian question would be settled in five to ten years with
or without negotiations. At that time, PRK Prime Minister Hun Sen
revealed Phnom Penh's readiness to hold peace talks with Sihanouk
and with Son Sann, but only if they agreed to dissociate themselves
from Pol Pot. On March 12, Hun Sen proposed a dialogue with rival
factions under a six-point plan. The proposal called for the
removal of the Pol Pot clique from all political and military
activities; for a complete Vietnamese withdrawal; for national
reconciliation and for free elections under UN supervision; for
peaceful coexistence in Southeast Asia; for cessation of external
interference in Cambodian affairs; and for the establishment of an
international supervisory and control commission to oversee the
implementation of agreements. Shortly afterward, Hanoi stressed
that the question of foreign military bases in Cambodia was an
issue that could be negotiated only between Vietnam and Cambodia.
Hanoi also signaled that the Khmer Rouge regime could participate
in the process of Cambodian self-determination only if it disarmed
itself and broke away from the Pol Pot clique.
Data as of December 1987
- Cambodia-Illicit Trade with Thailand and with Singapore
- Cambodia-THE KAMPUCHEAN (OR KHMER) UNITED FRONT FOR NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND DEFENSE
- Cambodia-Politics under the Khmer Rouge
- Cambodia-Chapter 1 - Historical Setting
- Cambodia-Airports
- Cambodia-First Plan, 1986-90
- Cambodia-Vietnamese Aid
- Cambodia-The Economy
- Cambodia-Local People's Revolutionary Committees
- Cambodia-Austronesian
- Cambodia-The March 1970 Coup d'Etat
- Cambodia-The Constitution
- Cambodia-Fisheries
- Cambodia-Water Transportation Railroads
- Cambodia-The Khmer People's National Liberation Front
- Cambodia-The Economy under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79
- Cambodia-Handicrafts
- Cambodia-SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
- Cambodia-Establishing Democratic Kampuchea
- Cambodia-Taxes
- Cambodia-Intraparty Conflict
- Cambodia-ECONOMIC SETTING
- Cambodia-CAMBODIA UNDER SIHANOUK, 1954-70
- Cambodia-INDUSTRY
- Cambodia-Other Religions
- Cambodia-Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces
- Cambodia-The Fall of Phnom Penh
- Cambodia-Petroleum
- Cambodia-HEALTH AND WELFARE
- Cambodia-East Germany
- Cambodia-The Successor State of Chenla
- Cambodia-People's Security Service LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTERSUBVERSION
- Cambodia-Conditions of Service
- Cambodia-Livestock
- Cambodia-PREFACE
- Cambodia-THE ANGKORIAN PERIOD
- Cambodia-GEOGRAPHY
- Cambodia-Natural Resources
- Cambodia-THE MEDIA
- Cambodia-The Second Indochina War, 1954-75
- Cambodia-Democratic Kampuchea
- Cambodia-Composition and Deployment
- Cambodia-FOREIGN AFFAIRS
- Cambodia-CAMBODIA
- Cambodia-Origins of the Coalition
- Cambodia-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
- Cambodia-The French Protectorate
- Cambodia-ECONOMY
- Cambodia-Distribution Dynamics
- Cambodia-Revolutionary Terror
- Cambodia-Soviet Aid
- Cambodia-Sihanouk's Peacetime Economy, 1953-70
- Cambodia-Public Health
- Cambodia-Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance
- Cambodia-The Geneva Conference
- Cambodia-Protection under the Law
- Cambodia-ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
- Cambodia-Coalition Government Resistance Forces
- Cambodia-Origins of Buddhism on the Indian Subcontinent
- Cambodia-The Japanese Occupation, 1941-45
- Cambodia-Social Stratification and Social Mobility
- Cambodia-Other Groups
- Cambodia-DOMESTIC COMMERCE
- Cambodia-Public School System
- Cambodia -COUNTRY PROFILE
- Cambodia-The Time of Greatness, A.D - 802-1431
- Cambodia-From "Proximity Talks" to a "Cocktail Party"
- Cambodia-Early Indianized Kingdom of Funan
- Cambodia-The Purge
- Cambodia-PREHISTORY AND EARLY KINGDOMS
- Cambodia-National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful, Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia
- Cambodia-Soviet Union
- Cambodia-The KPRP Second Congress
- Cambodia-The First Indochina War, 1945-54
- Cambodia-The Council of Ministers
- Cambodia-INTO THE MAELSTROM: INSURRECTION AND WAR, 1967-75
- Cambodia-Vietnam
- Cambodia-Welfare Programs
- Cambodia-The Council of State
- Cambodia-Collectivization and Solidarity Groups
- Cambodia-Early Khmer Rouge Atrocities
- Cambodia-Hydroelectric Power
- Cambodia-Period of Decline, 1431-1863
- Cambodia-Private Education
- Cambodia-Poland
- Cambodia-The Chinese
- Cambodia-Composition of Trade
- Cambodia-THE KAMPUCHEAN, (OR KHMER) PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
- Cambodia-MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN POSTWAR CAMBODIA
- Cambodia-THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA
- Cambodia-The Colonial Economy
- Cambodia-The Khmer
- Cambodia-FOREIGN TRADE AND AID
- Cambodia-Drainage
- Cambodia-AGRICULTURE
- Cambodia-Other Food and Commercial Crops
- Cambodia-Migration and Refugees
- Cambodia-Major Manufacturing Industries
- Cambodia-DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, 1975-78
- Cambodia-Domestic Developments
- Cambodia-Cambodian Adaptations
- Cambodia-Role of Buddhism in Cambodian Life
- Cambodia-The Coalition's Strategy
- Cambodia-Regional Divisions
- Cambodia-Chapter 2 - The Society and Its Environment
- Cambodia-Foreign Troops and Advisers
- Cambodia-Austroasiatic-Mon-Khmer LANGUAGES
- Cambodia-Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia
- Cambodia-New Economic Policy and System
- Cambodia-THE FRENCH COLONIAL PERIOD, 1887-1953
- Cambodia-Housing
- Cambodia-The Vietnamese
- Cambodia-Roads and Highways
- Cambodia-The Widening War
- Cambodia-Ports
- Cambodia-Chapter 4 - Government and Politics
- Cambodia-The French Protectorate, 1863-1954
- Cambodia-National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
- Cambodia-Coalition Structure
- Cambodia-Major Trading Partners
- Cambodia-Penal System
- Cambodia-Dress
- Cambodia-TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
- Cambodia-Chinese Religion
- Cambodia-NATIONAL SECURITY
- Cambodia-Buddhism RELIGION
- Cambodia
- Cambodia-The Emergence of Nationalism
- Cambodia-Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste
- Cambodia-ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
- Cambodia-The Search for Peace
- Cambodia-Other Ethnic Groups
- Cambodia-The Wartime Economy, 1970-75
- Cambodia-Climate
- Cambodia
- Cambodia-Threats and Capabilities
- Cambodia
- Cambodia-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AFTER INDEPENDENCE
- Cambodia-Chapter 5 - National Security
- Cambodia-Government Structure
- Cambodia-Khmer Rouge Armed Forces MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE
- Cambodia-POPULATION
- Cambodia-Topography
- Cambodia-The Judiciary
- Cambodia-Islam
- Cambodia-International and Western Aid
- Cambodia-EDUCATION
- Cambodia
- Cambodia-Diet
- Cambodia
- Cambodia-GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
- Cambodia-The Cambodian Left: The Early Phases
- Cambodia-CAMBODIA'S STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, 1432-1887
- Cambodia-Foreword
- Cambodia-Cambodia in Turmoil
- Cambodia-Domination by Thailand and by Vietnam
- Cambodia-TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
- Cambodia-Background MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1977-81
- Cambodia-FINANCE
- Cambodia-Religious and Minority Communities
- Cambodia-The Paris Student Group
- Cambodia
- Cambodia-Mission and Doctrine
- Cambodia-Nonaligned Foreign Policy
- Cambodia-Phnom Penh and Its Allies
- Cambodia
- Cambodia-Organization and Control
- Cambodia-Chapter 3 - The Economy
- Cambodia-COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
- Cambodia-Labor Force
- Cambodia-Buddhist Education
- Cambodia
- Cambodia-Rice Production and Cultivation
- Cambodia-Currency Banking
- Cambodia-Society under the Angkar
- Cambodia
- Cambodia-Tenuous Security
- Cambodia-ENVIRONMENT
- Cambodia-Education and Health
- Cambodia-INTRODUCTION
- Cambodia
Background | | Most Cambodians consider themselves to be Khmers, descendants of the Angkor Empire that extended over much of Southeast Asia and reached its zenith between the 10th and 13th centuries. Attacks by the Thai and Cham (from present-day Vietnam) weakened the empire, ushering in a long period of decline. The king placed the country under French protection in 1863 and it became part of French Indochina in 1887. Following Japanese occupation in World War II, Cambodia gained full independence from France in 1953. In April 1975, after a five-year struggle, Communist Khmer Rouge forces captured Phnom Penh and evacuated all cities and towns. At least 1.5 million Cambodians died from execution, forced hardships, or starvation during the Khmer Rouge regime under POL POT. A December 1978 Vietnamese invasion drove the Khmer Rouge into the countryside, began a 10-year Vietnamese occupation, and touched off almost 13 years of civil war. The 1991 Paris Peace Accords mandated democratic elections and a ceasefire, which was not fully respected by the Khmer Rouge. UN-sponsored elections in 1993 helped restore some semblance of normalcy under a coalition government. Factional fighting in 1997 ended the first coalition government, but a second round of national elections in 1998 led to the formation of another coalition government and renewed political stability. The remaining elements of the Khmer Rouge surrendered in early 1999. Some of the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders are awaiting trial by a UN-sponsored tribunal for crimes against humanity. Elections in July 2003 were relatively peaceful, but it took one year of negotiations between contending political parties before a coalition government was formed. In October 2004, King Norodom SIHANOUK abdicated the throne and his son, Prince Norodom SIHAMONI, was selected to succeed him. Local elections were held in Cambodia in April 2007, and there was little in the way of pre-election violence that preceded prior elections. National elections in July 2008 were relatively peaceful.
|
Location | | Southeastern Asia, bordering the Gulf of Thailand, between Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos
|
Area(sq km) | | total: 181,035 sq km land: 176,515 sq km water: 4,520 sq km
|
Geographic coordinates | | 13 00 N, 105 00 E
|
Land boundaries(km) | | total: 2,572 km border countries: Laos 541 km, Thailand 803 km, Vietnam 1,228 km
|
Coastline(km) | | 443 km
|
Climate | | tropical; rainy, monsoon season (May to November); dry season (December to April); little seasonal temperature variation
|
Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Gulf of Thailand 0 m highest point: Phnum Aoral 1,810 m
|
Natural resources | | oil and gas, timber, gemstones, iron ore, manganese, phosphates, hydropower potential
|
Land use(%) | | arable land: 20.44% permanent crops: 0.59% other: 78.97% (2005)
|
Irrigated land(sq km) | | 2,700 sq km (2003)
|
Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 476.1 cu km (1999)
|
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 4.08 cu km/yr (1%/0%/98%) per capita: 290 cu m/yr (2000)
|
Natural hazards | | monsoonal rains (June to November); flooding; occasional droughts
|
Environment - current issues | | illegal logging activities throughout the country and strip mining for gems in the western region along the border with Thailand have resulted in habitat loss and declining biodiversity (in particular, destruction of mangrove swamps threatens natural fisheries); soil erosion; in rural areas, most of the population does not have access to potable water; declining fish stocks because of illegal fishing and overfishing
|
Environment - international agreements | | party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Life Conservation, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, Whaling signed, but not ratified: Law of the Sea
|
Geography - note | | a land of paddies and forests dominated by the Mekong River and Tonle Sap
|
Population | | 14,494,293 note: estimates for this country take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, higher death rates, lower population growth rates, and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected (July 2009 est.)
|
Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 32.6% (male 2,388,922/female 2,336,439) 15-64 years: 63.8% (male 4,498,568/female 4,743,677) 65 years and over: 3.6% (male 197,649/female 329,038) (2009 est.)
|
Median age(years) | | total: 22.1 years male: 21.4 years female: 22.8 years (2009 est.)
|
Population growth rate(%) | | 1.765% (2009 est.)
|
Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 25.73 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
|
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 8.08 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
|
Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | NA
|
Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 22% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 4.6% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
|
Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.04 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.02 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 0.95 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.6 male(s)/female total population: 0.96 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
|
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 54.79 deaths/1,000 live births male: 61.84 deaths/1,000 live births female: 47.42 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
|
Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 62.1 years male: 60.03 years female: 64.27 years (2009 est.)
|
Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 3.04 children born/woman (2009 est.)
|
Nationality | | noun: Cambodian(s) adjective: Cambodian
|
Ethnic groups(%) | | Khmer 90%, Vietnamese 5%, Chinese 1%, other 4%
|
Religions(%) | | Buddhist 96.4%, Muslim 2.1%, other 1.3%, unspecified 0.2% (1998 census)
|
Languages(%) | | Khmer (official) 95%, French, English
|
Country name | | conventional long form: Kingdom of Cambodia conventional short form: Cambodia local long form: Preahreacheanachakr Kampuchea (phonetic pronunciation) local short form: Kampuchea former: Khmer Republic, Democratic Kampuchea, People's Republic of Kampuchea, State of Cambodia
|
Government type | | multiparty democracy under a constitutional monarchy
|
Capital | | name: Phnom Penh geographic coordinates: 11 33 N, 104 55 E time difference: UTC+7 (12 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
|
Administrative divisions | | 23 provinces (khett, singular and plural) and 1 municipality (krong, singular and plural) provinces: Banteay Mean Cheay, Batdambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Spoe, Kampong Thum, Kampot, Kandal, Kaoh Kong, Keb, Krachen, Mondol Kiri, Otdar Mean Cheay, Pailin, Pouthisat, Preah Seihanu (Sihanoukville), Preah Vihear, Prey Veng, Rotanah Kiri, Siem Reab, Stoeng Treng, Svay Rieng, Takev municipalities: Phnum Penh (Phnom Penh)
|
Constitution | | promulgated 21 September 1993
|
Legal system | | primarily a civil law mixture of French-influenced codes from the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) period, royal decrees, and acts of the legislature, with influences of customary law and remnants of communist legal theory; increasing influence of common law; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations
|
Suffrage | | 18 years of age; universal
|
Executive branch | | chief of state: King Norodom SIHAMONI (since 29 October 2004) head of government: Prime Minister HUN SEN (since 14 January 1985) [co-prime minister from 1993 to 1997]; Permanent Deputy Prime Minister MEN SAM AN (since 25 September 2008); Deputy Prime Ministers SAR KHENG (since 3 February 1992); SOK AN, TEA BANH, HOR NAMHONG, NHEK BUNCHHAY (since 16 July 2004); BIN CHHIN (since 5 September 2007); KEAT CHHON, YIM CHHAI LY (since 24 September 2008); KE KIMYAN (since 12 March 2009) cabinet: Council of Ministers named by the prime minister and appointed by the monarch elections: the king is chosen by a Royal Throne Council from among all eligible males of royal descent; following legislative elections, a member of the majority party or majority coalition is named prime minister by the Chairman of the National Assembly and appointed by the king
|
Legislative branch | | bicameral, consists of the Senate (61 seats; 2 members appointed by the monarch, 2 elected by the National Assembly, and 57 elected by parliamentarians and commune councils; members serve five-year terms) and the National Assembly (123 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms) elections: Senate - last held 22 January 2006 (next to be held in January 2011); National Assembly - last held 27 July 2008 (next to be held in July 2013) election results: Senate - percent of vote by party - CPP 69%, FUNCINPEC 21%, SRP 10%; seats by party - CPP 45, FUNCINPEC 10, SRP 2; National Assembly - percent of vote by party - CPP 58%, SRP 22%, HRP 7%; NRP 6%; FUNCINPEC 5%; others 2%; seats by party - CPP 90, SRP 26, HRP 3, FUNCINPEC 2, NRP 2
|
Judicial branch | | Supreme Council of the Magistracy (provided for in the constitution and formed in December 1997); Supreme Court (and lower courts) exercises judicial authority
|
Political pressure groups and leaders | | Cambodian Freedom Fighters or CFF; Partnership for Transparency Fund or PTF (anti-corruption organization); Students Movement for Democracy; The Committee for Free and Fair Elections or Comfrel other: human rights organizations; vendors
|
International organization participation | | ACCT, ADB, APT, ARF, ASEAN, EAS, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (subscriber), ITU, MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMIS, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
|
Flag description | | three horizontal bands of blue (top), red (double width), and blue with a white three-towered temple representing Angkor Wat outlined in black in the center of the red band note: only national flag to incorporate an actual building in its design
|
Economy - overview | | From 2004 to 2007, the economy grew about 10% per year, driven largely by an expansion in the garment sector, construction, agriculture, and tourism. Growth dropped to below 7% in 2008 as a result of the global economic slowdown. With the January 2005 expiration of a WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Cambodian textile producers were forced to compete directly with lower-priced countries such as China, India, Vietnam, and Bangladesh. The garment industry currently employs more than 320,000 people and contributes more than 85% of Cambodia's exports. In 2005, exploitable oil deposits were found beneath Cambodia's territorial waters, representing a new revenue stream for the government if commercial extraction begins. Mining also is attracting significant investor interest, particularly in the northern parts of the country. The government has said opportunities exist for mining bauxite, gold, iron and gems. In 2006, a US-Cambodia bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was signed, and several rounds of discussions have been held since 2007. The tourism industry has continued to grow rapidly, with foreign arrivals exceeding 2 million per year in 2007-08, however, economic troubles abroad will dampen growth in 2009. Rubber exports declined more than 15% in 2008 due to falling world market prices. The global financial crisis is weakening demand for Cambodian exports, and construction is declining due to a shortage of credit. The long-term development of the economy remains a daunting challenge. The Cambodian government is working with bilateral and multilateral donors, including the World Bank and IMF, to address the country's many pressing needs. The major economic challenge for Cambodia over the next decade will be fashioning an economic environment in which the private sector can create enough jobs to handle Cambodia's demographic imbalance. More than 50% of the population is less than 21 years old. The population lacks education and productive skills, particularly in the poverty-ridden countryside, which suffers from an almost total lack of basic infrastructure.
|
GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $28.01 billion (2008 est.) $26.67 billion (2007 est.) $24.2 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
|
GDP (official exchange rate) | | $11.25 billion (2008 est.)
|
GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 5% (2008 est.) 10.2% (2007 est.) 10.8% (2006 est.)
|
GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $2,000 (2008 est.) $1,900 (2007 est.) $1,800 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
|
GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 29% industry: 30% services: 41% (2007 est.)
|
Labor force | | 8.6 million (2008 est.)
|
Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture: 75% industry: NA% services: NA% (2004 est.)
|
Unemployment rate(%) | | 3.5% (2007 est.) 2.5% (2000 est.)
|
Population below poverty line(%) | | 35% (2004)
|
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: 3% highest 10%: 34.2% (2007)
|
Distribution of family income - Gini index | | 43 (2007 est.) 40 (2004 est.)
|
Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP) | | 22.4% of GDP (2008 est.)
|
Budget | | revenues: $1.274 billion expenditures: $1.592 billion (2008 est.)
|
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | 25% (2008 est.) 5.9% (2007 est.)
|
Stock of money | | $591.7 million (31 December 2008) $513.6 million (31 December 2007)
|
Stock of quasi money | | $2.328 billion (31 December 2008) $2.309 billion (31 December 2007)
|
Stock of domestic credit | | $1.67 billion (31 December 2008) $1.131 billion (31 December 2007)
|
Market value of publicly traded shares | | $NA
|
Economic aid - recipient | | $698.2 million pledged in grants and concession loans for 2007 by international donors (2007)
|
Agriculture - products | | rice, rubber, corn, vegetables, cashews, tapioca, silk
|
Industries | | tourism, garments, construction, rice milling, fishing, wood and wood products, rubber, cement, gem mining, textiles
|
Industrial production growth rate(%) | | 8% (2008 est.)
|
Current account balance | | -$1.06 billion (2008 est.) -$506.3 million (2007 est.)
|
Exports | | $4.708 billion (2008 est.) $4.089 billion (2007 est.)
|
Exports - commodities(%) | | clothing, timber, rubber, rice, fish, tobacco, footwear
|
Exports - partners(%) | | US 54.4%, Germany 7.7%, Canada 5.9%, UK 5.5%, Vietnam 4.5% (2008)
|
Imports | | $6.534 billion (2008 est.) $5.424 billion (2007 est.)
|
Imports - commodities(%) | | petroleum products, cigarettes, gold, construction materials, machinery, motor vehicles, pharmaceutical products
|
Imports - partners(%) | | Thailand 26.8%, Vietnam 19%, China 14.5%, Hong Kong 8.1%, Singapore 6.9% (2008)
|
Reserves of foreign exchange and gold | | $2.641 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $2.143 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
|
Debt - external | | $4.127 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $3.89 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
|
Exchange rates | | riels (KHR) per US dollar - 4,070.94 (2008 est.), 4,006 (2007), 4,103 (2006), 4,092.5 (2005), 4,016.25 (2004)
|
Currency (code) | | riel (KHR)
|
Telephones - main lines in use | | 45,100 (2008)
|
Telephones - mobile cellular | | 4.237 million (2008)
|
Telephone system | | general assessment: mobile-phone systems are widely used in urban areas to bypass deficiencies in the fixed-line network; fixed-line connections stand at well less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage, aided by increasing competition among service providers, is increasing and stands at 30 per 100 persons domestic: adequate landline and/or cellular service in Phnom Penh and other provincial cities; mobile-phone coverage is rapidly expanding in rural areas international: country code - 855; adequate but expensive landline and cellular service available to all countries from Phnom Penh and major provincial cities; satellite earth station - 1 Intersputnik (Indian Ocean region) (2008)
|
Internet country code | | .kh
|
Internet users | | 74,000 (2008)
|
Airports | | 17 (2009)
|
Roadways(km) | | total: 38,093 km paved: 2,977 km unpaved: 35,116 km (2007)
|
Ports and terminals | | Phnom Penh, Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville)
|
Military branches | | Royal Cambodian Armed Forces: Royal Cambodian Army, Royal Khmer Navy, Royal Cambodian Air Force (2009)
|
Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | conscription law of October 2006 requires all males between 18-30 to register for military service; 18-month service obligation (2006)
|
Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 3,759,034 females age 16-49: 3,784,333 (2008 est.)
|
Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 2,673,383 females age 16-49: 2,763,256 (2009 est.)
|
Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 177,881 female: 175,332 (2009 est.)
|
Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | 3% of GDP (2005 est.)
|
Disputes - international | | Cambodia and Thailand dispute sections of boundary with missing boundary markers and claims of Thai encroachments into Cambodian territory; maritime boundary with Vietnam is hampered by unresolved dispute over sovereignty of offshore islands; Thailand accuses Cambodia of obstructing inclusion of Thai areas near Preah Vihear temple ruins, awarded to Cambodia by ICJ decision in 1962, as part of a planned UN World Heritage site
|
Electricity - production(kWh) | | 1.273 billion kWh (2007 est.)
|
Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 65% hydro: 35% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
|
Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 1.272 billion kWh (2007 est.)
|
Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
|
Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 167 million kWh (2007 est.)
|
Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 0 bbl/day (2008 est.)
|
Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 4,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
|
Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 0 bbl/day (2007 est.)
|
Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 30,970 bbl/day (2007 est.)
|
Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 0 bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
|
Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008 est.)
|
Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008 est.)
|
Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008)
|
Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 0 cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
|
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | 0.8% (2007 est.)
|
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | 75,000 (2007 est.)
|
HIV/AIDS - deaths | | 6,900 (2007 est.)
|
Major infectious diseases | | degree of risk: very high food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever vectorborne diseases: dengue fever, Japanese encephalitis, and malaria note: highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been identified in this country; it poses a negligible risk with extremely rare cases possible among US citizens who have close contact with birds (2009)
|
Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 73.6% male: 84.7% female: 64.1% (2004 est.)
|
School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years) | | total: 10 years male: 10 years female: 9 years (2006)
|
Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | 1.7% of GDP (2004)
|
|
|