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Bulgaria
Index
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Bulgaria, 1991
FOR MOST OF ITS HISTORY, Bulgaria has been a small, agricultural
nation whose location at the nexus of the European and Asian
continents brought strong cultural and political influences from
both east and west. Because of its location in the Balkans, on the
border of Asiatic Turkey, and just across the Black Sea from the
Russian and Soviet empires, Bulgaria received much attention from
the commercial, political, and military powers surrounding it. Some
of that attention was beneficial; much of it was harmful. In spite
of foreign influences, which included centuries of occupation by
the Byzantine and Ottoman empires and absolute loyalty to the
Soviet Union in the twentieth century, Bulgarian cultural and
social institutions maintained a unique national identity that was
again struggling to reemerge after the collapse of the Soviet
Empire in 1989.
When Bulgaria achieved autonomy within the Ottoman Empire in
1878, it was completely without modern political and social
institutions with which to govern itself and deal with the outside
world. Over the next seventy years, the process of inventing those
institutions was rocky and uneven, both internally and in foreign
relations. In spite of a very progressive constitution, Bulgaria's
constitutional monarchy was plagued by frequent changes of
government and governmental philosophy, including periods of
despotism, until World War II. The impact of a world depression and
being on the losing side of both world wars also hindered
Bulgaria's development before another expanding power, the Soviet
Union, incorporated it into another empire as a result of Soviet
victory in World War II. Then, when it emerged from the shadow of
the Soviet Union in 1989, Bulgaria was faced again with inventing
institutions that would enable its society, its economy, and its
government to prosper in a world whose evolution had continued
apart from them for many years.
The Byzantine and Ottoman occupations eclipsed the significant
cultural developments of two golden ages (in the tenth and
thirteenth centuries) when independent Bulgarian kingdoms dominated
their region. Despite the centuries of occupation, village cultural
and church life retained basic elements of ethnic identity that
fostered a national revival as Ottoman power dwindled in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
After finally regaining its independence at the end of the
nineteenth century, modern Bulgaria stood in the shadow of European
power politics through the first nine decades of the twentieth
century. In that period, three successive major geopolitical
antagonisms largely determined Bulgaria's place in the world: the
Ottoman Empire versus Slavic Europe, the Axis powers versus the
Allies, then the
Warsaw Pact (see Glossary)
opposing the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see Glossary).
In all three
cases, Bulgaria stood as a minor player placed at the critical
frontier separating the sides. Besides those conditions, Bulgaria's
location amid the constant turmoil of the Balkans also shaped
domestic life and foreign policy, even in the relatively uneventful
postwar totalitarian years.
For the first forty-five years of the post-World War II era,
Bulgaria was the East European country most closely allied
politically to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact member most
dependent economically on Soviet aid. During that time, all aspects
of life that a totalitarian government could control were redrawn
according to the Soviet model--from overemphasis on heavy industry
to the content of works of literature. When the totalitarian era
ended in 1989, it left behind many of the rigid structures and
stereotypes formed by such imitation. Although Bulgaria had strayed
from the prescribed Soviet path in noncontroversial areas such as
glorification of the nation's 1,300-year history and token
decentralization of economic planning, the machinery of independent
national policy making was decidedly rusty when the post-Soviet era
dawned suddenly.
At that point, Bulgaria was seemingly more liberated from
involvement in the power struggles of stronger neighbors than ever
before in its history. But this liberation also deprived the nation
of the economic and security protection those neighbors had
provided. In the early 1990s, a major reshaping of the economic
power balance on the European continent was under way. Because most
of Eastern Europe emerged from the economic and political dominance
of the Soviet Union at the same time in the late 1980s, competition
for new economic and political positions among the former Soviet
client states was very keen. In this new context, Bulgaria, a
nation of about 9 million persons located at the periphery of
Europe, required particular energy and leadership to establish
itself as an integral part of the new united Europe that began to
emerge in the early 1990s. At the same time, energy and leadership
were necessarily diverted to solving internal ethnic and political
problems--most notably the integration into society of a
substantial and vocal Turkish minority and the cultivation of an
efficient government structure based on shifting coalitions among
Bulgaria's traditionally large number of political parties. In the
background of those issues was an economy impoverished by decades
of dependence on resources from the Soviet-led
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,
Comecon--see Glossary) and poorly balanced
Soviet-style central economic planning.
Before World War II, Bulgarian society was overwhelmingly
agricultural, supported by rich farmland that grew a variety of
grains, vegetables, fruits, and tobacco for domestic use and
export. Well into the twentieth century, rural life remained
steeped in village traditions that had not changed for many
centuries, even under Ottoman rule. Cities such as Sofia and
Plovdiv were islands of commercial activity and points of contact
with other cultures. The fast-paced industrialization and
agricultural collectivization programs of the postwar communist
regimes brought four decades of intense migration into urban areas;
in 1990 two of every three Bulgarians lived in a city or town. The
migration process also reduced the isolation of remaining rural
populations, which maintained contact with friends and relatives
who had moved away. Despite this process, however, the traditional
dichotomy between cities and villages was still quite visible in
the national elections of 1990 and 1991: Bulgaria's urban
population largely supported economic and political reform
platforms, whereas the rural regions expressed skepticism about
reform by supporting the more conventional programs of the
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, formerly the Bulgarian Communist
Party (BCP)).
Besides speeding urbanization, postwar industrial policy put
most means of production under central BCP control. The state also
took over the Bulgarian financial system, and agriculture underwent
a series of collectivization phases between 1947 and 1958.
Following the standard recipe for centralized planning of the
economy, heavy industry received a high proportion of state
investment compared with agriculture and consumer production. The
quotas of five-year plans for all those sectors, however, reflected
unrealistic expectations of increased productivity. Although later
five-year plans aimed at more realistic goals, the centralized
Bulgarian economic system failed consistently to increase output
although it devoted huge amounts of resources to the effort.
Throughout the communist era, heavy industries lacked incentives
because of state subsidies, and state-run agriculture never matched
the productivity of remaining small private plots. The Zhivkov
government trumpeted major economic reform programs in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s, but they all remained within the restrictions of
the centralized system, contributing nothing to Bulgaria's economic
advancement.
As in the other East European countries, central planning of
the economy produced severe environmental damage in Bulgaria.
Damage was more localized in Bulgaria because its designated role
in Comecon required fewer "smokestack industries" than that of
Poland, Czechoslovakia, or the German Democratic Republic (East
Germany). Nevertheless, cities such as Ruse, Dimitrovgrad, and
Srednogorie suffered severe environmental deterioration from
manufacturing activities under the communist regimes, which
disregarded pollution in the name of progress. In 1988 public
concern over environmental quality spawned the first Bulgarian
protest groups, which played a central role in the overthrow of
Zhivkov and then evolved in the next three years into permanent
opposition parties with strong public support.
In October 1991, the Grand National Assembly passed a Law on
Protection of the Environment, and the coalition cabinet named
shortly thereafter included a member of the Ekoglasnost
environmental group as minister of the environment. Despite these
measures, however, the critical need for economic growth in the
postcommunist era hindered environmental recovery efforts. In 1992
auto emissions, heavy industry emissions, and power plants remained
beyond government control although they contributed heavily to air
pollution; excessive use of chemicals in agriculture polluted many
Bulgarian lakes and streams; and continued reliance on nuclear
power from unsafe equipment threatened a major radiation crisis.
Besides industrialization and urbanization, other important
changes had occurred under the conventional communist totalitarian
dictatorships that ruled Bulgaria under Georgi Dimitrov (1947-49),
Vulko Chervenkov (1949-56), and Todor Zhivkov (1956-89). Centuries
before, the Russian Empire had begun to assume the stature of
protector of the Slavs in the Ottoman Empire by the first in a long
series of wars with the Turks. In 1944, as Axis power retreated in
Europe, a strong Russophile element remained in Bulgarian society.
Accordingly, Bulgarians welcomed the arrival of the Red Army, whose
presence ended Bulgaria's participation as an Axis ally in World
War II and laid the foundation of the postwar political system.
Interwar commercial and cultural relations with Western Europe
(especially Germany and Italy) were curtailed when the postwar
communist regimes intensified Bulgaria's traditionally close ties
with the Russian Empire/Soviet Union. In 1949 this policy shift was
codified by Bulgaria's membership in Comecon, which created a new
network of East European trade relationships and subsidies
dominated by the Soviet Union.
Between 1947 and 1989, Bulgarian foreign and economic policy
followed scrupulously the policies of the Soviet Union.
Intermittent periods of rapprochement and hostility between the
Soviet Union and the West were mirrored in relations between
Bulgaria and the NATO countries of Europe. Thus, for example,
Zhivkov pulled back from newly invigorated relations with Western
Europe in order to lend vigorous support to the Soviet invasions of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. Bulgaria also
followed the Soviet lead in assisting developing nations and
supporting wars of national liberation.
The Bulgarian constitutions of 1947 and 1971 borrowed heavily
from their Soviet equivalents, and, especially in its early stages,
the Bulgarian centrally planned economy followed Soviet guidelines.
Periods of economic experimentation also coincided in the two
countries; Zhivkov's first large-scale restructuring of the
Bulgarian system occurred in the early 1960s, at the same time that
Nikita S. Khrushchev experimented with unorthodox economic
methodology in the Soviet Union. Zhivkov was able to experiment
more freely because the Bulgarian system was much smaller and more
homogeneous and because Bulgaria had earned a place as the most
trusted and loyal of the Comecon member nations. By the mid-1980s,
economic imitation of the Soviet Union had turned earlier
skepticism into cynicism in large parts of the Bulgarian public.
The communist regimes of the postwar era did accomplish
significant improvement in national education and health care.
Although the basic structure of prewar Bulgarian education remained
intact after 1947, the primary goal of centralized education
planning was to bring Marxist theory to as many Bulgarians as
possible; hence promotion of literacy and expansion of primary and
secondary education proceeded much more rapidly under the communist
regimes. On a basic level, those goals were reached through a
combination of rapid urbanization of the population and mandatory
training for children and adults. But the state educational program
was a carefully regimented, technology-oriented imitation of the
Soviet Union's system. After Zhivkov, the public education system
and universities officially banned political indoctrination and
activity in its institutions. Because many teachers and textbooks
remained from the era when only the party line was acceptable,
however, transition efforts encountered stubborn resistance in some
quarters.
The communist era had provided very basic health care in state
regional clinics available to most Bulgarians. Under the socialist
health system, indicators such as average life expectancy, infant
mortality rate, and physicians per capita improved steadily between
1947 and 1989. Nevertheless, post-Zhivkov governments embarked on
decentralization and modernization programs to improve specialized
care and raise the incentives for health care personnel and
entrepreneurs in private facilities. In the early 1990s, the new
programs underwent a difficult transition period that yielded
uneven results.
The overthrow of Zhivkov's orthodox communist regime in 1989
produced especially dramatic changes in Bulgarian political and
economic life. By the mid-1980s, the Zhivkov regime already had
wielded power for thirty-five years; by that time, the regime's
inability to deal with new political and economic realities was
obvious to many Bulgarians, especially the educated classes.
Zhivkov took token political restructuring measures in the late
1980s, but by 1988 formidable opposition groups were forming around
such issues as environmental protection of Bulgarian citizens and
the continued failure of the economic system to raise the standard
of living. In 1989 Zhivkov's heavy-handed campaign to assimilate or
exile Bulgaria's large Turkish ethnic minority depleted the labor
force and evoked strong protest from the international community
and many groups within Bulgaria. Shortly after an all-European
environmental conference in Sofia provided an international
audience for protesting groups, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP)
ousted Zhivkov to avoid losing power entirely.
Although the BCP strategy succeeded in the short run, Zhivkov's
communist successors were unable to meet the multitude of demands
that society unleashed upon them once the symbol of monolithic
state power had disappeared. Having lost the solid support of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union by 1990, the BCP hesitated
between full commitment to political and economic reform and
maintaining its still formidable grip on such sectors of Bulgarian
society as management of heavy industry and administration of
provincial government. A few months after Zhivkov's ouster, the
party had changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)
and introduced a series of government reform programs. But
opposition groups, combined in the Union of Democratic Forces
(UDF), refused to form a coalition government with the BSP or to
support BSP reform proposals. Because the UDF represented a growing
majority of Bulgarian society, by the end of 1990 the UDF strategy
of non-participation had forced a political stalemate and
resignation of the last communist-dominated cabinet, headed by
Andrei Lukanov. This development negated the broad 100-day economic
reform plan that Lukanov had proposed in the fall of 1990.
The old central planning system (that remained in place in
1990) had included excessive emphasis on heavy industry, distorted
pricing, declining agricultural productivity, and isolation from
foreign markets. By the end of 1990, those failures had brought the
Bulgarian economy to a severe crisis that included a drop of 11.5
percent in net material product
(NMP--see Glossary), drastic
increases in unemployment, curtailment of all payments to foreign
creditors, and a drop in the standard of living.
The period following Lukanov's fall was one of extreme crisis;
social unrest was very high, but political factions could not find
an acceptable compromise course. Finally, Dimitur Popov, a judge
with no political affiliation, became prime minister of a coalition
cabinet that would run the government until the 1991 national
elections chose a new National Assembly. Resolution of this crisis
was due in large part to the negotiating skills of President Zheliu
Zhelev.
In 1991 Bulgaria experimented with government coalitions to
promote major reform programs. Important legislative packages
included depoliticization of the army, the police, courts, state
prosecutors, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; amnesty for
political prisoners; restoration of property to political émigrés
and victims of repression; and reform of the local government
system that remained a stronghold of socialist bureaucrats. Such
reform legislation encouraged loans from the
World Bank (see Glossary)
and other Western sources in 1991.
In mid-1991, all political factions agreed that economic reform
was the government's top priority, but BSP members of parliament
obstructed reform proposals that would bring temporary but severe
economic dislocation. Instead, they favored a more gradual approach
that would not threaten party members still entrenched in state
industrial policy making. Although the National Assembly passed
major legislation in 1991 on land redistribution, private
commercial enterprises, and foreign investment, the key step of
enterprise privatization remained unresolved in early 1992, and the
land act required wholesale revision.
For a previously centrally planned system, privatization
brought many difficult dilemmas. The new government had to
distinguish state enterprises worth rehabilitation from those that
should be replaced by totally new private enterprises. Restitution
was needed for Bulgarians whose capital property had been seized by
the state, but resolution of claims proved extremely complex. And
rapid privatization inevitably displaced large numbers of workers
from former state enterprises, damaging productivity, national
morale, and earning power. In February 1992, the World Bank cited
the lack of privatization legislation in delaying a loan of $US250
million. Both the Popov government and the government of Filip
Dimitrov that followed spent months in fruitless debate of
redistribution and regulation of large industries formerly operated
by the state.
A vital economic support element, energy supply, became a
critical problem in late 1991 when the Soviet Union first ended
coal supply and then, following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, when Russia ended subsidized electric power supply to
Bulgaria. Because Bulgaria's domestic energy base was quite
inadequate to support an industrial system designed when outside
energy supplies were plentiful and cheap, economic recovery
depended on the single nuclear power plant at Kozloduy--a facility
judged unsafe by both domestic and international authorities in
1991. Lacking foreign currency to import fuels, however, Bulgarian
policy makers placed their hopes on Kozloduy's shaky technology to
provide as much as half the country's electricity throughout the
1990s.
Political developments in 1991 made accelerated economic reform
more likely by finally shrinking the power of remaining Zhivkov-era
officials to obstruct the transition away from authoritarian
government and a centrally planned economy. After considerable
delay, in July the Grand National Assembly, which had been elected
for the specific purpose of drafting a new constitution, produced
a document approved by a majority, but far from all, of its
legislators. Some constituent groups in UDF refused to sign because
they believed the constitution defended interests of the BSP, which
was still the majority party at that point. Among vital innovations
in the constitution were government by separation of powers,
specification of the principles of a market economy, and full
protection of the rights of private property.
The constitution also set conditions for election of a new
National Assembly under reformed election laws. The new laws
simplified the extremely cumbersome system used in 1990 and reduced
the size of the National Assembly from 400 to 240. In the national
election of October 1991, Bulgarian politics followed its long
tradition of fragmentation when forty-two parties and other groups
posted candidates. Of that number, thirty-five failed to receive
enough votes for representation in the legislature. UDF candidates,
running on three separate tickets, together won a plurality but not
a majority of seats. The BSP held the next largest block of seats,
making the twenty-four-vote block of the Movement for Rights and
Freedoms (MRF) capable of swinging majority votes for the UDF or
obstructing reform legislation. Because the MRF represented the
substantial ethnic Turkish minority, many Bulgarians feared that
the UDF would be coerced into pro-Turkish positions. The MRF
blunted some criticism by announcing support of most of the UDF
reform platform, however, shortly after the election.
The fourteen-member cabinet formed by Prime Minister Dimitrov,
leader of the UDF, was young (average age forty-nine),
professional, and included no BSP or MRF members. Among Dimitrov's
structural reforms in the cabinet (reduced from seventeen to
fourteen members) was abolition of the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations, formerly a stronghold of Zhivkovite officials. For the
first time, a civilian was named minister of defense. Key cabinet
figures were Minister of Defense Dimitur Ludzhev, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Stoyan Ganev, and Minister of Internal Affairs
Iordan Sokolov. As in previous cabinets, economic policy was
divided among several ministries. Dimitrov, who introduced no
formal program when he was appointed, listed ending inflation,
raising productivity, and stabilizing the economy as his chief
goals.
Despite the triumph of nonsocialist factions in the October
elections, however, the Bulgarian government remained unsettled in
the winter of 1991-92. Key constituent groups such as labor unions
and the Turkish population continued to be somewhat aloof from the
UDF coalition as 1992 began, and the coalition itself was
constantly strained by the diversity of its membership. In 1992 the
former communists remained the country's largest party, and the
oversized government bureaucracy created by the communist regimes
still controlled many parts of the national administration. But,
unlike his predecessor, Dimitrov had no opposition ministers in his
cabinet, and the UDF possessed a legislative majority if it could
avoid internal fragmentation and keep the loyalty of the MRF.
With the environmental demonstrations of 1988, Bulgarian
society renewed a long-dormant tradition of public protest, and
such activities continued during the crisis years of 1990-92.
Zhivkov's second campaign for assimilation of the Turkish minority
brought strong protests from Bulgarian intellectuals in mid-1989.
The proximate cause of Zhivkov's ouster was the mass demonstrations
in Sofia in October of 1989. When the new communist government
failed to account for the excesses of the Zhivkov regime and
economic conditions continued to deteriorate, a massive tent city
was established for several weeks in downtown Sofia in mid-1990. In
November 1990, the BSP government of Andrei Lukanov resigned during
nationwide labor and student strikes. The volatile ethnic issue of
Turkish minority rights evoked many boycotts and protests by both
Turks and Bulgarians between 1990 and 1992. And industrial strikes,
most organized by the Podkrepa labor union, protested working
conditions and unemployment throughout 1991 and early 1992.
Although Bulgarian society was ethnically relatively
homogeneous, especially compared with neighboring Yugoslavia, the
Turkish minority of about one million (estimates varied from
900,000 to 1.5 million in 1991) continued to present a delicate
political problem in 1992. Bulgarian-Turkish animosity was based on
the indelible Bulgarian memory of five centuries of occupation and
cultural suppression by the Ottoman Empire. On the Turkish side,
hostility was based on more recent memories of forced assimilation
and restriction of human rights by the Zhivkov regime. The Zhivkov
government had justified repression of the Turkish minority by
appealing to ethnic Bulgarian fears that empowering Turks within
Bulgaria would once again threaten Bulgarian security. When Zhivkov
fell, restoration of long-withheld civil rights became a central
issue in the newly open political atmosphere.
Minority rights found expression in the new political order;
the MRF was formed to advance those rights, and the UDF somewhat
cautiously advocated full use of the Turkish language in schools
and full civil rights for all Turkish citizens of Bulgaria.
Especially in eastern Bulgaria where the Turkish population was
largest, a strong undercurrent of hostility grew in 1991 and 1992
between ultranationalist Bulgarians and their Turkish neighbors.
Only a Supreme Court decision allowed the MRF to post candidates in
the 1991 election, and the issue of restoring the teaching of
Turkish in Bulgarian schools remained quite sensitive in 1992. In
late 1991, the BSP, shorn of its parliamentary majority,
accelerated its attacks on the MRF as a subversive organization
working for Turkey--a desperate effort to build new support among
Bulgarians fearful of new foreign domination.
In early 1992, the political situation left Turkish citizens
with only partially restorated civil rights, and school boycotts
were called in some areas where the use of Turkish remained
restricted. On this issue, the Bulgarian court system, which had
been a purely political institution under the Zhivkov regime, was
unable or unwilling to fully exercise the independence granted the
judiciary in the new constitution. This was partly because the new
antidiscrimination language of that document had never before been
tested and partly because of the lingering tradition of judicial
dependency on political officials. Meanwhile, politicians generally
treated the Turkish issue with great caution in 1991 and early
1992. Nationalist factions attacked the governing UDF for its
legislative "alliance" with the MRF, suggesting that UDF
compromises would jeopardize national security. These conditions
lessened the likelihood that the National Assembly would finally
attack and resolve the "national question."
Bulgarian foreign policy also changed markedly in the years
following 1989. As in domestic affairs, a strong body of opinion
favored maintaining pre-1989 policy, in this case continuing to
cultivate the Soviet Union as protector and economic benefactor.
Actual policy sought a compromise that would not only change
political relations but also ensure continued supply of raw
materials, especially fuels. Negotiations with the Soviet
government yielded promises of continued supply, but by 1991 the
Soviet republics responsible for delivery were able to ignore the
commitment. This situation deteriorated further when the Soviet
Union dissolved into constituent republics in the fall of 1991. By
January 1992, Bulgaria had established relations with Belarus,
Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states in an effort to reestablish
supply lines. In November 1991, Bulgaria joined a new economic
association, East European Cooperation and Trade, formed by
economic organizations in most of the former East European Comecon
member countries, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The aim was to
restore economic relations among those countries on a new basis.
Nevertheless, worrisome signs indicated in early 1992 that
Russia intended to maintain some of its traditional influence in
Bulgaria. The longtime link of Bulgarian security agents with the
KGB was believed reestablished in 1991; the Bulgarian government,
loath to resume a role as a Russian intelligence outpost, was
unable to identify the internal agents who might have been
reactivated. Some of the new Russian foreign trade companies were
believed to function as intelligence bases in Bulgaria. Russia also
retained access to the high-frequency radio lines still used for
secret Bulgarian diplomatic messages in the postcommunist era. And
in spring 1992, Russia pressured Bulgaria to sign a friendship
treaty prohibiting use of Bulgaria for "hostile acts" toward
Russia--seen by Bulgarian officials as an open-ended permit for
future intervention.
A top foreign policy priority of the Dimitrov government was
dismantling the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which was still dominated by BSP functionaries under Prime Minister
Popov. Shortly after his appointment, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ganev secured the recall of several ineffectual senior diplomats.
In early 1992, he reviewed the performance of all ministry
personnel in order to streamline the organization and purge
remaining members of Zhivkov's state security establishment, which
had been notorious for conducting espionage from diplomatic
outposts.
Beginning in 1990, President Zheliu Zhelev and other Bulgarian
officials met with Western officials to stress Bulgaria's
commitment to economic and political reform and cement relations
with the United States and the European Community
(EC--see Glossary).
The EC was the primary focus because Bulgarian policy
makers saw acceptance into the new European federation as the best
way to avoid isolation and hasten internal reform. With this goal
in mind, top-level diplomatic attention was divided among many West
European countries, while overtures to Eastern Europe declined
noticeably. In late 1991, France, Germany, Greece, and Italy
promised to support Bulgarian membership in the EC, although at
that point at least seven countries were ahead of Bulgaria on the
list of prospective EC members. In 1991 Bulgaria did achieve
associate status in the EC, together with Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland. From the Western viewpoint, a stable Bulgaria offered
a calming influence on the turbulent Balkans, where the
disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 threatened to trigger wider
conflict over ethnic and economic issues.
Bulgaria viewed the Yugoslav crisis of the second half of 1991
as a serious threat to regional stability. Throughout the crisis,
President Zhelev reiterated Bulgaria's policy of nonintervention
and the right of self-determination for all people in Yugoslavia.
This declaration was mainly to reduce accusations and fears in
Serbia that Bulgaria had or would assume a direct role in weakening
the Yugoslav Federation (now reduced to Serbia and Montenegro) to
renew century-old claims on Macedonian territory. Zhelev's
reassurances were also aimed at Greece, which feared annexation of
its part of Macedonia into a state of Greater Macedonia. Following
its advocacy of self-determination for Balkan states, Bulgaria
recognized the four former Yugoslav secessionist republics, Bosnia
and Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia in the winter of
1991. In late 1991, Bulgaria strongly backed mediation of the
conflict between Serbia and Croatia in Yugoslavia by the EC and the
United Nations, and Bulgaria embargoed military supplies and arms
bound for Yugoslavia.
Meanwhile, relations with Turkey improved after the triumph of
the UDF in the fall 1991 election. The UDF-MRF coalition pursued a
treaty of friendship, cooperation, and security to match the treaty
signed with Greece in October 1991. By early 1992, high-level
military talks had substantially eased tension with Turkey, which
maintained troops in Eastern Thrace close to the Bulgarian border.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ganev was seeking a trilateral summit
meeting with Turkey and Greece to enhance regional security as well
as a "mini-Helsinki" conference of Balkan states, to enhance
regional security. Cultivation of Turkey had the strategic role of
counterbalancing Greece and Serbia, two regional powers potentially
allied against Bulgaria over the Macedonia issue in 1992.
The overthrow of Zhivkov revealed a deep fascination in
Bulgarian society with the culture and ideals of the United States,
and a desire for closer relations. Although United States aid the
Bulgaria remained quite small compared with aid given to Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s, high-level official
contacts in that period were more friendly and frequent than ever
before. President Zhelev stated Bulgaria's position very forcefully
on two visits to Washington (1990 and 1991), and Prime Minister
Dimitrov had a productive stay in March 1992 that gained a promise
that the United States would accord Bulgaria the same aid status as
the three major East European aid recipients. In November 1991, the
United States officially granted Bulgaria most-favored-nation
status.
The demise of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 left Bulgaria without the
military protection of the Soviet Union and its allies. To bolster
its security position, Bulgaria obtained NATO assurances about
Turkey's military ambitions and established a special relationship
with NATO headquarters in 1991. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian military
establishment underwent reforms comparable to those elsewhere in
society. A central aim of the Dimitrov government was to bring the
military under civilian control, to end the separate, elite status
that followed the Soviet model, and to make the military an open
institution integrated into society. An immediate stimulus for this
reform was the role of national military establishments in
Yugoslavia's bloody internal conflict and the failed coup in the
Soviet Union in 1991. (The Bulgarian military took no part in any
of the political turmoil of 1989-91.) The military depolitization
decreed by the Bulgarian government in 1990 reduced BSP influence
in the ranks, but, as in other phases of Bulgarian life, positions
of power remained in the hands of reactionaries from the Zhivkov
era. By the end of 1991, however, about 85 percent of generals
active in 1989 had retired voluntarily or under pressure. The
resignation resulted in a net reduction of ninety-three generals
from a top-heavy officer corps. The military reform campaign also
sought to lift the status of the military as a profession and to
foster positive relations between the civilian and military
communities. In 1992, however, the army experienced a shortage of
officers because of its negative image in society.
Arms and spare-part supply to the Bulgarian military suffered
greatly when the overthrow of Zhivkov caused the Soviet Union to
abandon long-term contracts. At the same time, the
disproportionately large Bulgarian arms industry, a pillar of the
centrally planned economy, was hit hard by the loss of its Soviet
market. The new government limited the activities of Kintex,
Bulgaria's notorious arms export agency, prohibiting sales to
terrorists and totalitarian regimes. A long-term conversion program
begun in October 1991 gave new civilian production assignments to
many arms plants.
The Bulgarian military had a long history of cooperation with
its Soviet counterpart. Weapons systems, doctrine, and training
were interchangeable throughout the postwar era, and the Bulgarian
military relied on Soviet fuel supplies even more heavily than the
civilian economy. The sudden end of the Soviet partnership in 1990,
followed shortly by removal of the communist symbols and dogma that
had supported military morale, caused considerable turbulence and
confusion.
New international responsibilities also affected the Bulgarian
military establishment. To abide by the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe signed by the Warsaw Pact and NATO in 1990,
Bulgaria also faced reductions in military manpower and armaments
beginning in 1991. Bulgaria sought to retain the Soviet SS-23
missiles installed at an unknown date in the 1980s, however, on the
grounds that they predated the relevant nuclear disarmament treaty
and were vital to national defense.
As the 1990s began, Bulgaria was in a completely new phase of
national existence. For this phase to succeed, Bulgaria needed both
a substantive new self-image and a believable new international
posture. The postwar communist period had changed society by
forcible industrialization and urbanization; those processes were
accompanied by regimentation that suppressed cultural and economic
individuality, and by isolation from influences and challenges
outside the Soviet sphere. Then, in keeping with the wave of
democratization that had swept most of Eastern Europe in 1989,
Bulgaria made an abrupt about-face and began experimenting with
democratic institutions in a manner unprecedented in the country's
political history. After nearly fifty years of totalitarianism, and
having had marginal success with democratic institutions prior to
World War II, Bulgaria's experimentation was quite cautious at
first. By 1992, however, a new generation of capable leaders had
instilled impressive momentum in the transformation process.
Although the slow pace of economic restructuring promised continued
hardship, a large part of Bulgarian society was committed to
reform, and hard-line revisionism and social unrest had declined in
early 1992.
Besides adapting Western-type political and economic
institutions to unique domestic requirements, Bulgaria's most
difficult task was to overcome its Cold-War image as an obscure and
somewhat sinister nation whose total loyalty to the Soviet Union
had led it to support terrorists and assassins. By 1992 progress in
that direction was significant; Western approval raised Bulgaria's
status closer to that of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the
three former Soviet client states whose democratization had given
them a head start toward integration into the fabric of Europe. As
it strengthened its connections to the West in 1992, Bulgaria
finally had an opportunity to develop social and political
institutions appropriate to its needs under reduced pressure from
large-power European politics.
* * *
In the months following completion of this manuscript, Bulgaria
underwent serious political upheaval, and its economy failed to
move toward reform nearly as fast as planners had hoped. The
Dimitrov government elected in late 1991 showed early promise in
promoting economic reform and democratization. By mid-1992,
however, Dimitrov's leverage was reduced by shifting factions in
his political coalition and by rising public skepticism that
Bulgaria's painful reform program would yield a better standard of
living.
In 1992 Dimitrov's UDF coalition dominated political dialogue
and enjoyed a narrow majority in the National Assembly. This
position required that the coalition remain unified within itself
and allied with the much smaller MRF. But in the second half of
1992, UDF policies increasingly alienated influential parts of
Bulgarian society such as the Orthodox Church, parts of the media,
trade unions, and private businessmen, creating an atmosphere of
escalating confrontation.
Meanwhile, the MRF was taking increasingly independent
positions on many issues, seeking influence proportional to its
importance in supporting the UDF. In October 1992, judging the UDF
response inadequate, the MRF finally joined the Bulgarian Socialist
Party (BSP; second-largest party in parliament) and dissident UDF
members in a parliamentary vote of no confidence in the Dimitrov
government. By destroying the Dimitrov coalition, the vote created
another crisis period in which Bulgaria was unable to choose a
government. Nearly two months later, Lyuben Berov, an unaffiliated
economics professor, was approved as prime minister after both the
UDF and the BSP had failed to form governments.
The fate of the leading parties thus changed drastically at the
end of 1992. The BSP, which had remained aloof from political
struggle during the UDF's dominant period, found itself with the
political influence of a parliamentary plurality as the new
government took office. This happened in spite of the continued
split between BSP conservatives allied with former communist party
chief Aleksandur Lilov and the reformist branch of the party.
Observers questioned whether the BSP would use its new influence to
promote reform or to preserve the remaining Zhivkov-era party
bastions in state industry and provincial government. In early
1993, BSP support of the Berov government was decidedly pragmatic,
and experts saw a strong likelihood that support would be withdrawn
(and the government automatically toppled) if policies displeased
the BSP or if a new election would be advantageous.
Meanwhile, the disparate membership of the UDF wrote another
chapter in the acrimonious history of the coalition. The group
again split formally when one faction of constituent parties formed
a new coalition, the New Union for Democracy. Although Berov had
pledged to continue the UDF reform program, UDF members of
parliament refused all support for the Berov government. Relations
between the UDF and its former allies in the MRF remained hostile.
Several attempts at forming new coalitions and alliances failed for
various reasons in early 1993. The most notable coalition was the
Bulgarian Democratic Center, whose loss of two key member parties
left a void in the center of the political spectrum.
Besides the confusion of a fragmented political base, the
Dimitrov government left unforeseen financial woes. According to
one estimate, Bulgaria's internal debt doubled in 1992. The reasons
were inflation (which reached 6.6 percent per month in early 1993),
the Dmitrov government's concealing of budget deficits by
withholding funds from certain industries, and government
assumption of the debts of state companies. After the government
had borrowed heavily from the Bulgarian National Bank to pay its
debts, only an estimated 5 percent of domestic credit remained for
private investment. Experts forecast the same figure for 1993,
leaving no prospect of meaningful support for a larger private
sector.
In April 1993, Berov's coalition government was able to draft
a budget bill containing the same deficit as in 1992, despite the
debt left by Dimitrov. To do this, spending on education, health
care, culture, and national defense were reduced significantly; the
Ministry of National Defense would receive only half the money it
requested. Nevertheless, the proposed deficit, 7.9 percent of the
gross national product (see Glossary),
caused concern among
international lenders.
Economic reform in 1992 had limited success. The amended land
redistribution law passed in March 1992 effectively abolished
collective farms; nominally, nearly 80 percent of Bulgaria's total
arable land had been reclaimed by individual owners by midyear.
Although the legislative machinery was in place, however, by mid-
1993 less than 20 percent of designated land had actually been
restored, and Zhelev criticized the Berov government for neglecting
this aspect of economic policy. In April 1993, farmers demonstrated
in Sofia against inequities they perceived in the land law.
The political crisis stopped vital privatization legislation in
late 1992, delaying the pilot privatization of 100 companies. Berov
had called privatization the top priority of his government when he
took office, and subsequent adjustments were made in existing laws
to make conversion easier. Nevertheless, almost no privatization
activity took place in the first four months of 1993. In early
1993, President Zhelev recommended that privatization be delayed
until a large-scale national program, similar to those used in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, could be prepared. Meanwhile,
inefficient state industries went deep into recession, cancelling
the effects of what had been a rather successful economic
stabilization plan in 1991.
International lenders, whose assistance was considered a vital
ingredient in restructuring Bulgaria's economy, responded unevenly
to the events of 1992. Lenders demanded faster progress toward a
market system, but Bulgarian policy makers were wary of losing
public support by further cutting state subsidies for social
programs. In late 1992, Bulgaria agreed to repay part of the
interest overdue to its international commercial creditors, as a
good-faith step toward a 1993 debt settlement agreement. The
additional expense, however, promised to exacerbate the budget
deficit.
Prospects for Bulgaria's commercial relations with Western
Europe improved in late 1992 and early 1993. In March 1993,
Bulgaria signed an agreement with the EC to establish a free-trade
zone with that group over a ten-year transition period. A strong
incentive for the Europeans was bolstering Bulgaria as a
stabilizing influence in the chaotic Balkans. In an April
resolution on its relations with Bulgaria, the European Parliament
(legislative assembly of the EC) declared that no further
guarantees of reform were needed because Bulgaria was on an
irreversible line toward a market economy--a judgment likely
encouraged by Balkan geopolitics. The new EC-Bulgarian accords were
to go into effect in June 1993.
In March 1993, Bulgaria also signed a free-trade agreement with
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Although at that point
only 3.5 percent of Bulgaria's exports went to EFTA member nations
(Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland), the terms of the agreement made substantial expansion
possible. Were the agreement ratified, 95 percent of Bulgarian
industrial exports would have tariff-free access, while
agricultural exports would be governed by bilateral arrangements.
Besides the drive for inclusion in West European economic
groupings, the primary issue of Bulgarian foreign policy in early
1993 was preventing expansion of the Yugoslav crisis. In keeping
with its own consistent policy of nonintervention, Bulgaria warned
the other Balkan states to refrain from military involvement that
might return the entire region to the chaos that preceded World War
I. Bulgaria opposed lifting the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims,
predicting that such a move would expand the conflict between
Muslims and Serbs. Meanwhile, Bulgarian diplomats remained in
constant contact with Greece and Turkey while reiterating Bulgarian
support for the independence of all four former Yugoslav republics:
Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. Berov
traveled to Moscow in March to discuss the Balkan situation, trade,
repayment of Russian debts to Bulgaria, and economic cooperation.
No concrete decisions were made, although the representatives noted
their nations' harmony on the Balkan question. In early 1993,
Bulgaria confirmed, however, its intention to rely on Russia and
Ukraine as primary military suppliers, choosing to maintain
longstanding relations rather than incur the greater expense of
refitting its forces with Western equipment. According to official
Bulgarian statements, no security threat was perceived from
instability in any former Soviet republic.
Ethnic minority issues remained without solution in 1992,
although no major open conflict resulted from continued tension
between minorities and Bulgarian nationalists. Although 1992 human
rights legislation improved the legal status of minorities,
unemployment hit them especially hard, and as many as 40,000 Turks
left Bulgaria in 1992. In the fall of 1992, the Roma (Gypsies)
formed their first-ever national political organization in response
to their dire economic conditions. Prime Minister Berov, whose
government was nominally based on the ethnic-Turkish MRF, openly
discussed pressure tactics used by both Turks and Bulgarian
nationalists to influence ethnic self-identification in ethnically
mixed regions. In 1993 those tactics still included campaigns
against restoration of Turkish names (following Zhivkov's mass
renaming campaign) and against use of Turkish in schools with
Turkish populations, as well as forcible Turkicization of Bulgarian
Muslims preferring to live as Bulgarians. Berov pledged to prevent
human rights abuses on both sides, but little concrete change
occurred in the first half of 1993.
Bulgaria began the fourth year of the post-Zhivkov era with
prospects less optimistic than in the previous years. The momentum
of economic reform was slowed significantly by continued high
unemployment, rising inflation, low productivity, the resistance of
Zhivkov-era holdovers in large state industries, and, increasingly,
the cynicism of the Bulgarian public toward
the usefulness of short-term sacrifice on the road to a market
economy. The ominously growing shadow of the former Bulgarian
Communist Party hung over the country, whose political system again
collapsed into chaos in late 1992. International prospects seemed
somewhat better, mainly because Bulgaria's designated role as a
Balkan island of stability prompted increased Western support even
when internal political and economic conditions failed to match
Western expectations. But in 1993, the road from communism was
proving much more rocky than most Bulgarians had anticipated; for
many Bulgarians, living standards were lower than under the Zhivkov
regime, and the patience of many was wearing thin.
May 15, 1993
Glenn E. Curtis
Data as of June 1992
Background | | The Bulgars, a Central Asian Turkic tribe, merged with the local Slavic inhabitants in the late 7th century to form the first Bulgarian state. In succeeding centuries, Bulgaria struggled with the Byzantine Empire to assert its place in the Balkans, but by the end of the 14th century the country was overrun by the Ottoman Turks. Northern Bulgaria attained autonomy in 1878 and all of Bulgaria became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1908. Having fought on the losing side in both World Wars, Bulgaria fell within the Soviet sphere of influence and became a People's Republic in 1946. Communist domination ended in 1990, when Bulgaria held its first multiparty election since World War II and began the contentious process of moving toward political democracy and a market economy while combating inflation, unemployment, corruption, and crime. The country joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007.
|
Location | | Southeastern Europe, bordering the Black Sea, between Romania and Turkey
|
Area(sq km) | | total: 110,879 sq km land: 108,489 sq km water: 2,390 sq km
|
Geographic coordinates | | 43 00 N, 25 00 E
|
Land boundaries(km) | | total: 1,808 km border countries: Greece 494 km, Macedonia 148 km, Romania 608 km, Serbia 318 km, Turkey 240 km
|
Coastline(km) | | 354 km
|
Climate | | temperate; cold, damp winters; hot, dry summers
|
Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Black Sea 0 m highest point: Musala 2,925 m
|
Natural resources | | bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, coal, timber, arable land
|
Land use(%) | | arable land: 29.94% permanent crops: 1.9% other: 68.16% (2005)
|
Irrigated land(sq km) | | 5,880 sq km (2003)
|
Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 19.4 cu km (2005)
|
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 6.92 cu km/yr (3%/78%/19%) per capita: 895 cu m/yr (2003)
|
Natural hazards | | earthquakes; landslides
|
Environment - current issues | | air pollution from industrial emissions; rivers polluted from raw sewage, heavy metals, detergents; deforestation; forest damage from air pollution and resulting acid rain; soil contamination from heavy metals from metallurgical plants and industrial wastes
|
Environment - international agreements | | party to: Air Pollution, Air Pollution-Nitrogen Oxides, Air Pollution-Persistent Organic Pollutants, Air Pollution-Sulfur 85, Air Pollution-Sulfur 94, Air Pollution-Volatile Organic Compounds, Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic-Marine Living Resources, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
|
Geography - note | | strategic location near Turkish Straits; controls key land routes from Europe to Middle East and Asia
|
Population | | 7,204,687 (July 2009 est.)
|
Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 13.8% (male 509,544/female 484,816) 15-64 years: 68.5% (male 2,426,060/female 2,508,772) 65 years and over: 17.7% (male 518,711/female 756,784) (2009 est.)
|
Median age(years) | | total: 41.4 years male: 39.2 years female: 43.6 years (2009 est.)
|
Population growth rate(%) | | -0.79% (2009 est.)
|
Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 9.51 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
|
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 14.31 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
|
Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | -3.11 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
|
Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 71% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: -0.3% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
|
Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 0.97 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.68 male(s)/female total population: 0.92 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
|
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 17.87 deaths/1,000 live births male: 21.28 deaths/1,000 live births female: 14.25 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
|
Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 73.09 years male: 69.48 years female: 76.91 years (2009 est.)
|
Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 1.41 children born/woman (2009 est.)
|
Nationality | | noun: Bulgarian(s) adjective: Bulgarian
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Ethnic groups(%) | | Bulgarian 83.9%, Turk 9.4%, Roma 4.7%, other 2% (including Macedonian, Armenian, Tatar, Circassian) (2001 census)
|
Religions(%) | | Bulgarian Orthodox 82.6%, Muslim 12.2%, other Christian 1.2%, other 4% (2001 census)
|
Languages(%) | | Bulgarian 84.5%, Turkish 9.6%, Roma 4.1%, other and unspecified 1.8% (2001 census)
|
Country name | | conventional long form: Republic of Bulgaria conventional short form: Bulgaria local long form: Republika Balgariya local short form: Balgariya
|
Government type | | parliamentary democracy
|
Capital | | name: Sofia geographic coordinates: 42 41 N, 23 19 E time difference: UTC+2 (7 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time) daylight saving time: +1hr, begins last Sunday in March; ends last Sunday in October
|
Administrative divisions | | 28 provinces (oblasti, singular - oblast); Blagoevgrad, Burgas, Dobrich, Gabrovo, Khaskovo, Kurdzhali, Kyustendil, Lovech, Montana, Pazardzhik, Pernik, Pleven, Plovdiv, Razgrad, Ruse, Shumen, Silistra, Sliven, Smolyan, Sofiya, Sofiya-Grad, Stara Zagora, Turgovishte, Varna, Veliko Turnovo, Vidin, Vratsa, Yambol
|
Constitution | | adopted 12 July 1991
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Legal system | | civil and criminal law based on Roman law; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations
|
Suffrage | | 18 years of age; universal
|
Executive branch | | chief of state: President Georgi PARVANOV (since 22 January 2002); Vice President Angel MARIN (since 22 January 2002) head of government: Prime Minister Boyko BORISSOV (since 27 July 2009); Deputy Prime Ministers Simeon DJANKOV and Tsvetan TSVETANOV (since 27 July 2009); cabinet: Council of Ministers nominated by the prime minister and elected by the National Assembly elections: president and vice president elected on the same ticket by popular vote for a five-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held 22 and 29 October 2006 (next to be held in 2011); chairman of the Council of Ministers (prime minister) elected by the National Assembly; deputy prime ministers nominated by the prime minister and elected by the National Assembly election results: Georgi PARVANOV reelected president; percent of vote - Georgi PARVANOV 77.3%, Volen SIDEROV 22.7%; Boyko BORISSOV elected prime minister, result of legislative vote - 162 to 77 with 1 abstension
|
Legislative branch | | unicameral National Assembly or Narodno Sabranie (240 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms) elections: last held 5 July 2009 (next to be held mid-2013) election results: percent of vote by party - GERB 39.7%, BSP 17.7%, MRF 14.4%, ATAKA 9.4%, Blue Coalition 6.8%, RZS 4.1%, other 7.9%; seats by party - GERB 116, BSP 40, MRF 38, ATAKA 21, Blue Coalition 15, RZS 10
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Judicial branch | | independent judiciary comprised of judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates who are appointed, promoted, demoted, and dismissed by a 25-member Supreme Judicial Council (consists of the chairmen of the two Supreme Courts, the Chief Prosecutor, and 22 members, half of whom are elected by the National Assembly and the other half by the bodies of the judiciary for a 5-year term in office); three levels of case review; 182 courts of which two Supreme Courts act as the last instance on civil and criminal cases (the Supreme Court of Cassation) and appeals of government decisions (the Supreme Administrative Court)
|
Political pressure groups and leaders | | Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria or CITUB; Podkrepa Labor Confederation other: numerous regional, ethnic, and national interest groups with various agendas
|
International organization participation | | ACCT, Australia Group, BIS, BSEC, CE, CEI, CERN, EAPC, EBRD, EIB, EU, FAO, G- 9, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt, ICRM, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, MIGA, NATO, NSG, OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, OSCE, PCA, SECI, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNWTO, UPU, WCL, WCO, WEU (associate affiliate), WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC
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Flag description | | three equal horizontal bands of white (top), green, and red; the pan-Slavic white-blue-red colors were modified by substituting a green band (representing freedom) for the blue note: the national emblem, formerly on the hoist side of the white stripe, has been removed
|
Economy - overview | | Bulgaria, a former Communist country that entered the EU on 1 January 2007, has experienced strong growth since a major economic downturn in 1996. Successive governments have demonstrated a commitment to economic reforms and responsible fiscal planning, but have failed so far to rein in rising inflation and large current account deficits. Bulgaria has averaged more than 6% growth since 2004, attracting significant amounts of foreign direct investment, but corruption in the public administration, a weak judiciary, and the presence of organized crime remain significant challenges.
|
GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $93.98 billion (2008 est.) $88.66 billion (2007 est.) $83.48 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
|
GDP (official exchange rate) | | $49.9 billion (2008)
|
GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 6% (2008 est.) 6.2% (2007 est.) 6.3% (2006 est.)
|
GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $12,900 (2008 est.) $12,100 (2007 est.) $11,300 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
|
GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 7.3% industry: 30.5% services: 62.2% (2008 est.)
|
Labor force | | 2.67 million (2008 est.)
|
Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture: 7.5% industry: 35.5% services: 57% (2007 est.)
|
Unemployment rate(%) | | 6.3% (2008 est.) 7.7% (2007 est.)
|
Population below poverty line(%) | | 14.1% (2003 est.)
|
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: 3% highest 10%: 25.5% (2007)
|
Distribution of family income - Gini index | | 30.7 (2007) 26.4 (2001)
|
Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP) | | 33.4% of GDP (2008 est.)
|
Budget | | revenues: $22.24 billion expenditures: $20.74 billion (2008 est.)
|
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | 12.3% (2008 est.) 9.8% (2007 est.)
|
Stock of money | | $14.29 billion (31 December 2008) $15.58 billion (31 December 2007)
|
Stock of quasi money | | $19.67 billion (31 December 2008) $17.03 billion (31 December 2007)
|
Stock of domestic credit | | $32.04 billion (31 December 2008) $25.18 billion (31 December 2007)
|
Market value of publicly traded shares | | $8.858 billion (31 December 2008) $21.79 billion (31 December 2007) $10.32 billion (31 December 2006)
|
Economic aid - recipient | | $742 million (2005-06 est.)
|
Public debt(% of GDP) | | 14.1% of GDP (2008 est.) 41.9% of GDP (2004 est.)
|
Agriculture - products | | vegetables, fruits, tobacco, wine, wheat, barley, sunflowers, sugar beets; livestock
|
Industries | | electricity, gas, water; food, beverages, tobacco; machinery and equipment, base metals, chemical products, coke, refined petroleum, nuclear fuel
|
Industrial production growth rate(%) | | 1.5% (2008 est.)
|
Current account balance | | -$12.65 billion (2008 est.) -$8.716 billion (2007 est.)
|
Exports | | $22.71 billion (2008 est.) $18.58 billion (2007 est.)
|
Exports - commodities(%) | | clothing, footwear, iron and steel, machinery and equipment, fuels
|
Exports - partners(%) | | Greece 9.9%, Germany 9.2%, Turkey 8.9%, Italy 8.5%, Romania 7.2%, Belgium 5.9%, France 4.1% (2008)
|
Imports | | $35.64 billion (2008 est.) $28.65 billion (2007 est.)
|
Imports - commodities(%) | | machinery and equipment; metals and ores; chemicals and plastics; fuels, minerals, and raw materials
|
Imports - partners(%) | | Russia 14.6%, Germany 11.8%, Italy 7.9%, Ukraine 7.3%, Romania 5.6%, Turkey 5.5%, Greece 5.4%, Austria 4.1% (2008)
|
Reserves of foreign exchange and gold | | $17.93 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $17.54 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
|
Debt - external | | $51.46 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $42.62 billion (31 December 2007)
|
Stock of direct foreign investment - at home | | $42.91 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $33.91 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
|
Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad | | $1.292 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $559 million (31 December 2007 est.)
|
Exchange rates | | leva (BGN) per US dollar - 1.3171 (2008 est.), 1.4366 (2007), 1.5576 (2006), 1.5741 (2005), 1.5751 (2004)
|
Currency (code) | | lev (BGN)
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Telephones - main lines in use | | 2.258 million (2008)
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Telephones - mobile cellular | | 10.633 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: an extensive but antiquated telecommunications network inherited from the Soviet era; quality has improved; the Bulgaria Telecommunications Company's fixed-line monopoly terminated in 2005 when alternative fixed-line operators were given access to its network; a drop in fixed-line connections in recent years has been more than offset by a sharp increase in mobile-cellular telephone use fostered by multiple service providers; the number of cellular telephone subscriptions now greatly exceeds the population domestic: a fairly modern digital cable trunk line now connects switching centers in most of the regions; the others are connected by digital microwave radio relay international: country code - 359; submarine cable provides connectivity to Ukraine and Russia; a combination submarine cable and land fiber-optic system provides connectivity to Italy, Albania, and Macedonia; satellite earth stations - 3 (1 Intersputnik in the Atlantic Ocean region, 2 Intelsat in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean regions) (2008)
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Internet country code | | .bg
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Internet users | | 2.647 million (2008)
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Airports | | 212 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | gas 2,926 km; oil 339 km; refined products 156 km (2008)
|
Roadways(km) | | total: 40,231 km paved: 39,587 km (includes 331 km of expressways) unpaved: 644 km (2005)
|
Ports and terminals | | Burgas, Varna
|
Military branches | | Bulgarian Armed Forces: Ground Forces, Naval Forces, Bulgarian Air Forces (Bulgarski Voennovazdyshni Sily, BVVS) (2009)
|
Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 18-27 years of age for voluntary military service; as of May 2006, 67% of the Bulgarian Army comprised of professional soldiers; conscription ended January 2008; Air Forces and Naval Forces became fully professional at the end of 2006 (2008)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 1,701,979 females age 16-49: 1,691,092 (2008 est.)
|
Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 1,351,312 females age 16-49: 1,381,017 (2009 est.)
|
Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 38,263 female: 36,374 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | 2.6% of GDP (2005 est.)
|
Disputes - international | | none
|
Electricity - production(kWh) | | 40.25 billion kWh (2007 est.)
|
Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 47.8% hydro: 8.1% nuclear: 44.1% other: 0% (2001)
|
Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 31.08 billion kWh (2007 est.)
|
Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 8.441 billion kWh (2008 est.)
|
Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 3.097 billion kWh (2008 est.)
|
Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 3,357 bbl/day (2008 est.)
|
Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 124,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
|
Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 76,570 bbl/day (2007 est.)
|
Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 189,000 bbl/day (2007 est.)
|
Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 15 million bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
|
Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 300 million cu m (2008 est.)
|
Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 3.4 billion cu m (2008 est.)
|
Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008)
|
Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 5.663 billion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
|
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | less than 0.1% (2001 est.)
|
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | 346 (2001 est.)
|
HIV/AIDS - deaths | | 100 (2001 est.)
|
Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 98.2% male: 98.7% female: 97.7% (2001 census)
|
School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years) | | total: 14 years male: 13 years female: 14 years (2006)
|
Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | 4.5% of GDP (2005)
|
|
|