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Bolivia Index
Rural society reflected the complex history that
communities
experienced during the past several centuries. Hacienda
expansion, mining, and land reform affected regions and
the
communities within them differently. The uneven impact of
national political and economic developments combined with
ethnic
diversity and ecological complexity to create a highly
variegated
social landscape. The contrasts between communities that
had been
free Indian settlements and those that had been dominated
by a
hacienda persisted into the land-reform era. Regions with
a
lengthy history of commercial farming differed from those
geared
primarily to subsistence agriculture. Finally, a basic
cleavage
existed between haciendas of the densely populated Quechua
and
Aymara settlements in the Altiplano, valleys, and Yungas
and
plantations of the mestizo Oriente.
Historically, Quechua and Aymara settlements were
organized
either as haciendas, with a resident labor force of peons
who
owed labor to the landowner, or as free communities.
Social and
economic differences characterized both types of
settlements. On
the haciendas, residents received different-sized plots of
land
in return for varying amounts of service. The holdings of
former
peons reflected these initial inequities, as well as
different
levels of success in the decades following land reform.
Free
communities distinguished two or three different
categories of
members. Those descended from the original villagers had
full
access to and security of land tenure. Others who came as
landless laborers in the nineteenth century generally had
less
land and less security. Still others were landless and
relied on
the ties of kinship or ritual kinship and an ingrained
community
ethos about sharing to gain access to a field. If surplus
land
existed, the landless generally could obtain a plot for
nominal
rent.
Hacienda owners were casualties of the land reform. The
wealthiest left Bolivia or moved to La Paz. Many owners of
medium-sized haciendas moved to a provincial town and
entered
commerce. In some regions, land reform proved to be merely
the
final in a series of economic reversals that had begun
decades
earlier. In Cochabamba, for example, hacienda owners had
faced
the combined problems of estate fragmentation, a
contracting
market, and a well-organized and militant peasantry since
the
turn of the century. For them land reform was the coup de
grace.
In other regions, land reform had a very minimal
impact.
Haciendas in the lowlands, the mid-sized haciendas of
Monteagudo
in Chuquisaca Department, and the vineyards of the Cinti
Valley,
also in Chuquisaca Department, were generally spared.
Santa Cruz
lacked the large, well-organized Indian population of the
Altiplano, valleys, and Yungas. Landholders there not only
escaped land reform but also received the benefits of
government
development plans for the lowlands. Their major problem
was
securing an adequate (and adequately docile) labor force.
They
hired local subsistence farmers when possible and
contracted with
labor recruiters who toured Aymara and Quechua settlements
hiring
laborers for the sugarcane and cotton harvests.
In regions of limited hacienda expansion, preconquest
settlement
and land-use patterns sometimes persisted. Individual
extended
kin-groups known as
ayllus (see Glossary)
tried to gain
access to
the resources of as many different ecological zones as
possible.
During the Inca era, ayllus maintained permanent resident
colonies in each of the three natural regions, creating
what
anthropologist John V. Murra has termed a "vertical
archipelago."
These colonies ensured the Incas access to the varied
products of
plateau pasture and field, transitional zones, valleys,
and
tropics.
Peasants in the Altiplano, valleys, and Yungas
preferred
dispersed plots within a single natural region as well; in
addition, some cultivated scattered plots in different
regions.
Such land-use strategies served as a hedge against the
considerable uncertainty of farming in the Andes. Planting
small
amounts of a crop in a variety of different locations
ensured
against total loss in such unpredictable localized
disasters as
hail and frost. In addition, these agricultural practices
took
full advantage of the extreme variation in environment
within
even short distances.
The pattern persisted despite the upheavals of the
colonial,
postindependence, and modern eras. Under land-reform
legislation,
a kin-group's lowland holdings could be declared
"haciendas" and
made liable to expropriation. Development specialists
frequently
saw this mode of land use, scattering small plots at
considerable
distances from one another, as an impediment to
agricultural
production and economic development. Nonetheless, Andean
peasants
resisted efforts to consolidate their landholdings and
acted to
maintain their dispersed and diversified plots wherever
possible.
In the late 1970s, anthropologists found ayllus in
northern
Potosí Department farming roughly the same territory they
had
held in the sixteenth century. The territory used by these
ayllus
encompassed regions from the high plateau to semitropical
valley
bottoms. The distance from the highest pastures to the
lowest
fields was more than 100 kilometers and as much as 2,000
meters
in altitude. It took two weeks with fully loaded llamas to
traverse the territory. Households had access to the
products of
each region either by producing or by exchanging them with
kin.
The typical pattern of exchange saw llama herders
loading their
pack animals after harvest and traveling to the valley
bottoms.
Even households that did not have formal control of plots
in
other regions would spend a good part of the year in
different
territories. This seasonal movement gave all inhabitants a
detailed, extensive knowledge of the habitats their
territory
encompassed.
Before 1952 most villages shared little sense of
community with
neighboring groups or the nation as a whole. Political
participation, especially in Indian communities, was
negligible;
powerful outsiders--mestizos or whites--mediated links to
the
larger society. In either case, the community itself
remained a
largely self-sufficient, nonmonetary society with the
nuclear
family as the basic social unit. Strong kinship and ritual
kinship ties contributed to social cohesion, but little
additional community solidarity existed. A family's
existence
centered on its lands and a complex system of community
work and
fiesta obligations.
The reforms in the 1950s brought extensive changes to
Aymara and
Quechua communities. Agrarian reform and universal
suffrage meant
more than simply transferring land titles, eliminating
onerous
work obligations, or conferring voting rights. Many of
these
reforms had already been reiterated in every legal and
constitutional change since the time of Simón Bolívar
Palacio,
who began the postindependence era with decrees calling
for
distribution of land to landless Indians, equality for
all, and
the end of compulsory labor. The changes of the 1950s
fundamentally altered Indians' relationship to the larger
society. Political and economic links to town, city, and
nation
no longer remained the exclusive monopoly of mestizos and
whites.
Increasingly, Indians themselves served as their own
intermediaries and power brokers
(see Ethnic Groups
, this
ch.).
Overall, the postrevolutionary period from the 1950s to
the
1980s did much to erode the isolation of rural society;
peasants
came into contact with national society in ways
unanticipated by
an earlier generation. Improvements in communications
(radios)
and transportation (roads) made peasants aware of
alternatives.
Before the 1952 Revolution, only a few peasant products
had been
sold through mestizo intermediaries or hacendados. The
revolutionary reforms generated an explosion of markets
and of
marketing networks. In some regions, mestizo
intermediaries still
played a prominent role; indeed, many former hacendados
became
intermediaries when they lost their lands. In many areas,
however, marketing became a career for Indian and chola
women.
Increasing population pressure in the Altiplano and
expanding
economic opportunities elsewhere led to large-scale
migration.
Migrants' experience with the world beyond the hacienda
gave
villagers a new and very different connection with
national
society. Educational opportunities increased dramatically
at
every level. Traditionally, hacienda owners had done
everything
possible to limit their laborers' access to schools. Some
even
expelled peons who dared to send their children to school.
Increased educational opportunities for young Indians
expanded
their options for earning a living. Like migrants (and the
educated were frequently those who migrated), these
individuals
became a resource for their families and communities. So,
too,
did the increasing numbers of young men serving in the
military
(see Urbanization
, this ch.).
The rise of peasant organizations and administrative
reforms
meant job opportunities on the local level. Peasant
organizations
offered many individuals a springboard to improve their
own
status at the same time that they gave communities some
control
over local affairs. These developments sharpened
factionalism
among communities. Neighboring settlements, which might
have had
little interest in each other's existence a decade
earlier, for
example, found themselves vying to be designated as the
canton
seat
(see Departmental and Local Government
, ch. 4). Land
reform
made ex-hacienda peons and Indians in neighboring free
communities rivals for haciendas acquired in the twentieth
century.
Factionalism within communities sharpened as well. The
various
hamlets making up a single settlement often found little
besides
the community's school and fiestas as points of common
interest.
Marriages between various hamlets were a valuable link, as
in-
laws could serve as go-betweens in disputes.
Consensus formed the basis of community decision
making; strong
disagreement meant that a decision had to be postponed or
participants would seek another solution. In order to
resolve
pressing business, communities sometimes scheduled
meetings at
times that were inconvenient to opponents. The
strong-minded
could boycott meetings and refuse to comply with community
decisions. Households that felt deeply about a project
would
sometimes go ahead and begin work in the hope that the
recalcitrant would eventually follow suit. Such
community-wide
projects as road improvements and school buildings often
existed
in varying stages of completion, waiting for needed funds
or for
disinterested parties to finish their portion of the work.
Villages were reluctant to involve outside authorities to
pressure dissenters into compliance.
The reforms of the 1950s highlighted the need for a
knowledge of
Spanish as communities increased their dealings with the
government. Migrants who returned to their home
communities
during the 1950s and 1960s having learned Spanish played a
more
prominent role in community affairs. As most communities
resolved
disputes stemming from land reform, however, the volume of
dealings with the national government declined. An older
pattern
of leadership reasserted itself, and seniority and success
in the
fiesta system again emerged as major criteria in selecting
leaders. The fiesta system in its classic form consisted
of a
hierarchy of civil and religious offices, each of which
entailed
specific duties (cargos) and obligations. An individual
gained
prestige through completion of the cargos and upon
finishing the
entire hierarchy became a respected community elder. The
most
prominent offices were those where an individual assumed
the
sponsorship of a community fiesta celebrating a Roman
Catholic
feast or saint's day.
The organization of fiestas varied. Mestizo sponsors
could
canvass their settlements for donations, which limited
their own
financial outlays. In Indian communities, where the
sponsor bore
most of the cost, the fiesta required a major financial
sacrifice. In one survey, sponsors of major community
fiestas
spent from 12 to 80 percent of their cash income from the
sale of
agricultural products to discharge their fiesta
responsibilities.
On the whole, however, communities spent much less than
they had
before agrarian reform. Fiestas also required an enormous
expenditure of time, as sponsors began planning for the
most
prominent fiestas years in advance.
The fiesta was a forum for the acceptable display of
wealth and
socioeconomic status. An individual gained significantly
in
prestige and standing by sponsoring the major fiestas.
Friends
and relatives often helped by offering food, drinks, and
money.
Those who provided the assistance could expect similar
help when
they assumed a comparable office. Gifts were recorded in
written
form, and participants had a strong obligation to
reciprocate.
The late 1970s and 1980s were not easy for rural
Bolivians. The
peasant-military alliance that had been forged in the
1960s ended
in 1974 with the bloody repression of a peasant
demonstration
(see Political Forces and Interest Groups
, ch. 4). In
general,
the turnstile governments of the late 1970s and early
1980s were
unsympathetic to peasants. Economic stabilization packages
exacted a heavy toll. The generally difficult economic
situation
of the 1980s curtailed nonfarm employment at the same time
that
increasing population put pressure on land.
Data as of December 1989
A Quechua Indian musician in Potosí Department
Rural Society
Rural society reflected the complex history that
communities
experienced during the past several centuries. Hacienda
expansion, mining, and land reform affected regions and
the
communities within them differently. The uneven impact of
national political and economic developments combined with
ethnic
diversity and ecological complexity to create a highly
variegated
social landscape. The contrasts between communities that
had been
free Indian settlements and those that had been dominated
by a
hacienda persisted into the land-reform era. Regions with
a
lengthy history of commercial farming differed from those
geared
primarily to subsistence agriculture. Finally, a basic
cleavage
existed between haciendas of the densely populated Quechua
and
Aymara settlements in the Altiplano, valleys, and Yungas
and
plantations of the mestizo Oriente.
Historically, Quechua and Aymara settlements were
organized
either as haciendas, with a resident labor force of peons
who
owed labor to the landowner, or as free communities.
Social and
economic differences characterized both types of
settlements. On
the haciendas, residents received different-sized plots of
land
in return for varying amounts of service. The holdings of
former
peons reflected these initial inequities, as well as
different
levels of success in the decades following land reform.
Free
communities distinguished two or three different
categories of
members. Those descended from the original villagers had
full
access to and security of land tenure. Others who came as
landless laborers in the nineteenth century generally had
less
land and less security. Still others were landless and
relied on
the ties of kinship or ritual kinship and an ingrained
community
ethos about sharing to gain access to a field. If surplus
land
existed, the landless generally could obtain a plot for
nominal
rent.
Hacienda owners were casualties of the land reform. The
wealthiest left Bolivia or moved to La Paz. Many owners of
medium-sized haciendas moved to a provincial town and
entered
commerce. In some regions, land reform proved to be merely
the
final in a series of economic reversals that had begun
decades
earlier. In Cochabamba, for example, hacienda owners had
faced
the combined problems of estate fragmentation, a
contracting
market, and a well-organized and militant peasantry since
the
turn of the century. For them land reform was the coup de
grace.
In other regions, land reform had a very minimal
impact.
Haciendas in the lowlands, the mid-sized haciendas of
Monteagudo
in Chuquisaca Department, and the vineyards of the Cinti
Valley,
also in Chuquisaca Department, were generally spared.
Santa Cruz
lacked the large, well-organized Indian population of the
Altiplano, valleys, and Yungas. Landholders there not only
escaped land reform but also received the benefits of
government
development plans for the lowlands. Their major problem
was
securing an adequate (and adequately docile) labor force.
They
hired local subsistence farmers when possible and
contracted with
labor recruiters who toured Aymara and Quechua settlements
hiring
laborers for the sugarcane and cotton harvests.
In regions of limited hacienda expansion, preconquest
settlement
and land-use patterns sometimes persisted. Individual
extended
kin-groups known as
ayllus (see Glossary)
tried to gain
access to
the resources of as many different ecological zones as
possible.
During the Inca era, ayllus maintained permanent resident
colonies in each of the three natural regions, creating
what
anthropologist John V. Murra has termed a "vertical
archipelago."
These colonies ensured the Incas access to the varied
products of
plateau pasture and field, transitional zones, valleys,
and
tropics.
Peasants in the Altiplano, valleys, and Yungas
preferred
dispersed plots within a single natural region as well; in
addition, some cultivated scattered plots in different
regions.
Such land-use strategies served as a hedge against the
considerable uncertainty of farming in the Andes. Planting
small
amounts of a crop in a variety of different locations
ensured
against total loss in such unpredictable localized
disasters as
hail and frost. In addition, these agricultural practices
took
full advantage of the extreme variation in environment
within
even short distances.
The pattern persisted despite the upheavals of the
colonial,
postindependence, and modern eras. Under land-reform
legislation,
a kin-group's lowland holdings could be declared
"haciendas" and
made liable to expropriation. Development specialists
frequently
saw this mode of land use, scattering small plots at
considerable
distances from one another, as an impediment to
agricultural
production and economic development. Nonetheless, Andean
peasants
resisted efforts to consolidate their landholdings and
acted to
maintain their dispersed and diversified plots wherever
possible.
In the late 1970s, anthropologists found ayllus in
northern
Potosí Department farming roughly the same territory they
had
held in the sixteenth century. The territory used by these
ayllus
encompassed regions from the high plateau to semitropical
valley
bottoms. The distance from the highest pastures to the
lowest
fields was more than 100 kilometers and as much as 2,000
meters
in altitude. It took two weeks with fully loaded llamas to
traverse the territory. Households had access to the
products of
each region either by producing or by exchanging them with
kin.
The typical pattern of exchange saw llama herders
loading their
pack animals after harvest and traveling to the valley
bottoms.
Even households that did not have formal control of plots
in
other regions would spend a good part of the year in
different
territories. This seasonal movement gave all inhabitants a
detailed, extensive knowledge of the habitats their
territory
encompassed.
Before 1952 most villages shared little sense of
community with
neighboring groups or the nation as a whole. Political
participation, especially in Indian communities, was
negligible;
powerful outsiders--mestizos or whites--mediated links to
the
larger society. In either case, the community itself
remained a
largely self-sufficient, nonmonetary society with the
nuclear
family as the basic social unit. Strong kinship and ritual
kinship ties contributed to social cohesion, but little
additional community solidarity existed. A family's
existence
centered on its lands and a complex system of community
work and
fiesta obligations.
The reforms in the 1950s brought extensive changes to
Aymara and
Quechua communities. Agrarian reform and universal
suffrage meant
more than simply transferring land titles, eliminating
onerous
work obligations, or conferring voting rights. Many of
these
reforms had already been reiterated in every legal and
constitutional change since the time of Simón Bolívar
Palacio,
who began the postindependence era with decrees calling
for
distribution of land to landless Indians, equality for
all, and
the end of compulsory labor. The changes of the 1950s
fundamentally altered Indians' relationship to the larger
society. Political and economic links to town, city, and
nation
no longer remained the exclusive monopoly of mestizos and
whites.
Increasingly, Indians themselves served as their own
intermediaries and power brokers
(see Ethnic Groups
, this
ch.).
Overall, the postrevolutionary period from the 1950s to
the
1980s did much to erode the isolation of rural society;
peasants
came into contact with national society in ways
unanticipated by
an earlier generation. Improvements in communications
(radios)
and transportation (roads) made peasants aware of
alternatives.
Before the 1952 Revolution, only a few peasant products
had been
sold through mestizo intermediaries or hacendados. The
revolutionary reforms generated an explosion of markets
and of
marketing networks. In some regions, mestizo
intermediaries still
played a prominent role; indeed, many former hacendados
became
intermediaries when they lost their lands. In many areas,
however, marketing became a career for Indian and chola
women.
Increasing population pressure in the Altiplano and
expanding
economic opportunities elsewhere led to large-scale
migration.
Migrants' experience with the world beyond the hacienda
gave
villagers a new and very different connection with
national
society. Educational opportunities increased dramatically
at
every level. Traditionally, hacienda owners had done
everything
possible to limit their laborers' access to schools. Some
even
expelled peons who dared to send their children to school.
Increased educational opportunities for young Indians
expanded
their options for earning a living. Like migrants (and the
educated were frequently those who migrated), these
individuals
became a resource for their families and communities. So,
too,
did the increasing numbers of young men serving in the
military
(see Urbanization
, this ch.).
The rise of peasant organizations and administrative
reforms
meant job opportunities on the local level. Peasant
organizations
offered many individuals a springboard to improve their
own
status at the same time that they gave communities some
control
over local affairs. These developments sharpened
factionalism
among communities. Neighboring settlements, which might
have had
little interest in each other's existence a decade
earlier, for
example, found themselves vying to be designated as the
canton
seat
(see Departmental and Local Government
, ch. 4). Land
reform
made ex-hacienda peons and Indians in neighboring free
communities rivals for haciendas acquired in the twentieth
century.
Factionalism within communities sharpened as well. The
various
hamlets making up a single settlement often found little
besides
the community's school and fiestas as points of common
interest.
Marriages between various hamlets were a valuable link, as
in-
laws could serve as go-betweens in disputes.
Consensus formed the basis of community decision
making; strong
disagreement meant that a decision had to be postponed or
participants would seek another solution. In order to
resolve
pressing business, communities sometimes scheduled
meetings at
times that were inconvenient to opponents. The
strong-minded
could boycott meetings and refuse to comply with community
decisions. Households that felt deeply about a project
would
sometimes go ahead and begin work in the hope that the
recalcitrant would eventually follow suit. Such
community-wide
projects as road improvements and school buildings often
existed
in varying stages of completion, waiting for needed funds
or for
disinterested parties to finish their portion of the work.
Villages were reluctant to involve outside authorities to
pressure dissenters into compliance.
The reforms of the 1950s highlighted the need for a
knowledge of
Spanish as communities increased their dealings with the
government. Migrants who returned to their home
communities
during the 1950s and 1960s having learned Spanish played a
more
prominent role in community affairs. As most communities
resolved
disputes stemming from land reform, however, the volume of
dealings with the national government declined. An older
pattern
of leadership reasserted itself, and seniority and success
in the
fiesta system again emerged as major criteria in selecting
leaders. The fiesta system in its classic form consisted
of a
hierarchy of civil and religious offices, each of which
entailed
specific duties (cargos) and obligations. An individual
gained
prestige through completion of the cargos and upon
finishing the
entire hierarchy became a respected community elder. The
most
prominent offices were those where an individual assumed
the
sponsorship of a community fiesta celebrating a Roman
Catholic
feast or saint's day.
The organization of fiestas varied. Mestizo sponsors
could
canvass their settlements for donations, which limited
their own
financial outlays. In Indian communities, where the
sponsor bore
most of the cost, the fiesta required a major financial
sacrifice. In one survey, sponsors of major community
fiestas
spent from 12 to 80 percent of their cash income from the
sale of
agricultural products to discharge their fiesta
responsibilities.
On the whole, however, communities spent much less than
they had
before agrarian reform. Fiestas also required an enormous
expenditure of time, as sponsors began planning for the
most
prominent fiestas years in advance.
The fiesta was a forum for the acceptable display of
wealth and
socioeconomic status. An individual gained significantly
in
prestige and standing by sponsoring the major fiestas.
Friends
and relatives often helped by offering food, drinks, and
money.
Those who provided the assistance could expect similar
help when
they assumed a comparable office. Gifts were recorded in
written
form, and participants had a strong obligation to
reciprocate.
The late 1970s and 1980s were not easy for rural
Bolivians. The
peasant-military alliance that had been forged in the
1960s ended
in 1974 with the bloody repression of a peasant
demonstration
(see Political Forces and Interest Groups
, ch. 4). In
general,
the turnstile governments of the late 1970s and early
1980s were
unsympathetic to peasants. Economic stabilization packages
exacted a heavy toll. The generally difficult economic
situation
of the 1980s curtailed nonfarm employment at the same time
that
increasing population put pressure on land.
Data as of December 1989
- Bolivia-The United States FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE 1980s
- Bolivia-Mission and Organization THE ARMED FORCES
- Bolivia-Natural Regions
- Bolivia-Mountains and Altiplano
- Bolivia-Attitudes Toward Antinarcotics Forces
- Bolivia-Altiplano, Yungas, and Valley Indians
- Bolivia-Rural Society SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
- Bolivia-RELIGION
- Bolivia-The Private Sector
- Bolivia-Revolutionary Nationalism: Ovando and Torres
- Bolivia-Informal Sector
- Bolivia-Radical Military Government PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION, 1935-52
- Bolivia-Lowlands
- Bolivia-Struggle for Independence INDEPENDENCE FROM SPAIN AND THE EARLY NATIONAL PERIOD, 1809-39
- Bolivia-The Rise of New Political Groups
- Bolivia-The Media
- Bolivia-Migration MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION
- Bolivia-Petroleum and Natural Gas
- Bolivia-General Procedures
- Bolivia-The Middle Class
- Bolivia-GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
- Bolivia-Regional Civic Committees
- Bolivia-Whites
- Bolivia-MINING
- Bolivia-Transition to Democracy
- Bolivia -COUNTRY PROFILE
- Bolivia-Electricity
- Bolivia-The "Sexenio," 1946-52
- Bolivia-Civic Action
- Bolivia-Formal Sector LABOR
- Bolivia-The Economy of Upper Peru
- Bolivia-Radical Reforms THE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION, 1952-64
- Bolivia-The Banzer Regime
- Bolivia-State, Church, and Society
- Bolivia-HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY
- Bolivia-War of the Pacific FROM THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC TO THE CHACO WAR, 1879- 1935
- Bolivia-Chapter 1 - Historical Setting
- Bolivia-Mestizos and Cholos
- Bolivia-Reorganization of the Armed Forces, 1952-66
- Bolivia-Livestock
- Bolivia-The United States
- Bolivia-Other Foreign Military Ties
- Bolivia-Chapter 5 - National Security
- Bolivia-TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
- Bolivia-Fiscal Policy ECONOMIC POLICY
- Bolivia-The Military
- Bolivia-Coca
- Bolivia-Foreword
- Bolivia-Narcoterrorism
- Bolivia-Political Forces and Interest Groups
- Bolivia-Regional Police Structure
- Bolivia-Land Use
- Bolivia-Chapter 3 - The Economy
- Bolivia-Construction of Bolivia: Bolívar, Sucre, and Santa Cruz
- Bolivia-BOLIVIA
- Bolivia-The Peasantry
- Bolivia-SOCIETY
- Bolivia-Cash Crops
- Bolivia-Democracy and Economic Stabilization
- Bolivia-Military Justice
- Bolivia-Chapter 4 - Government and Politics
- Bolivia-Narcotics Corruption
- Bolivia-Early History EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY ROLE IN SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT
- Bolivia-MANUFACTURING AND CONSTRUCTION
- Bolivia-Foreign Trade FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
- Bolivia-The Presidency of Barrientos MILITARY RULE, 1964-82
- Bolivia-Revenues
- Bolivia-The Republican Party and the Great Depression
- Bolivia-POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DECLINE, 1839-79
- Bolivia-The 1989 Elections
- Bolivia-AGRICULTURE
- Bolivia-Crops
- Bolivia-Family and Kin
- Bolivia-The Counterinsurgency Decade
- Bolivia-NATIONAL SECURITY:
- Bolivia-The Unfinished Revolution
- Bolivia-Subversive Groups
- Bolivia-Land Reform and Land Policy
- Bolivia-Urbanization
- Bolivia-ETHNIC GROUPS
- Bolivia-Reconstruction and the Rule of the Conservatives
- Bolivia-POPULATION AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
- Bolivia-Communications
- Bolivia-The Criminal Justice System CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
- Bolivia-PRE-COLUMBIAN CIVILIZATIONS
- Bolivia-Conscription MANPOWER AND TRAINING
- Bolivia-CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
- Bolivia-ECONOMY
- Bolivia-Special Police Forces
- Bolivia-EDUCATION
- Bolivia-Departmental and Local Government
- Bolivia-Farming Technology
- Bolivia-The Penal System
- Bolivia-Recruitment and Training
- Bolivia-The Third World
- Bolivia-Forestry and Fishing
- Bolivia-GEOGRAPHY
- Bolivia-Expenditures
- Bolivia-Acknowledgments
- Bolivia-Military Schools
- Bolivia-Organized Labor
- Bolivia-Air Force
- Bolivia-Foreign Assistance
- Bolivia-Preface
- Bolivia-Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies
- Bolivia-ENERGY
- Bolivia
- Bolivia-Civil Aeronautics
- Bolivia-Land Tenure
- Bolivia-Defense Budget
- Bolivia-Narcotics Trafficking THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY
- Bolivia-The Electoral System
- Bolivia-The Legislature
- Bolivia-Conquest and Settlement CONQUEST AND COLONIAL RULE, 1532-1809
- Bolivia-Incidence of Crime
- Bolivia
- Bolivia-The Legacy of the 1952 Revolution POLITICAL DYNAMICS
- Bolivia-Extradition
- Bolivia-The Judiciary
- Bolivia-Tin and Related Metals
- Bolivia-Transportation
- Bolivia
- Bolivia-Army
- Bolivia
- Bolivia-Structure of the Mining Industry
- Bolivia-Other Metals and Minerals
- Bolivia-Balance of Payments
- Bolivia-Banking and Financial Services SERVICES
- Bolivia-The Executive GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE
- Bolivia
- Bolivia-The Soviet Union
- Bolivia-Military Intervention in Politics, 1970-85
- Bolivia-Bilateral and Legislative Antinarcotics Measures
- Bolivia
- Bolivia-Yungas and Other Valleys
- Bolivia-GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
- Bolivia-Chapter 2 - The Society and Its Environment
- Bolivia-The Legacy of the Chaco War
- Bolivia-Neighboring Countries
- Bolivia-The Chaco War
- Bolivia-GEOGRAPHY
- Bolivia-Lowland Indians
- Bolivia-Urban Society
- Bolivia-Navy
- Bolivia-INTRODUCTION
- Bolivia-The Liberal Party and the Rise of Tin
- Bolivia-FOREIGN RELATIONS
- Bolivia
- Bolivia-Debt
- Bolivia-The Upper Class
- Bolivia-Climate
- Bolivia-Impact of Narcotics Trafficking
Background | | Bolivia, named after independence fighter Simon BOLIVAR, broke away from Spanish rule in 1825; much of its subsequent history has consisted of a series of nearly 200 coups and countercoups. Democratic civilian rule was established in 1982, but leaders have faced difficult problems of deep-seated poverty, social unrest, and illegal drug production. In December 2005, Bolivians elected Movement Toward Socialism leader Evo MORALES president - by the widest margin of any leader since the restoration of civilian rule in 1982 - after he ran on a promise to change the country's traditional political class and empower the nation's poor, indigenous majority. However, since taking office, his controversial strategies have exacerbated racial and economic tensions between the Amerindian populations of the Andean west and the non-indigenous communities of the eastern lowlands. In December 2009, President MORALES easily won reelection, and his party took control of the legislative branch of the government, which will allow him to continue his process of change.
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Location | | Central South America, southwest of Brazil
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Area(sq km) | | total: 1,098,581 sq km land: 1,083,301 sq km water: 15,280 sq km
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Geographic coordinates | | 17 00 S, 65 00 W
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Land boundaries(km) | | total: 6,940 km border countries: Argentina 832 km, Brazil 3,423 km, Chile 860 km, Paraguay 750 km, Peru 1,075 km
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Coastline(km) | | 0 km (landlocked)
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Climate | | varies with altitude; humid and tropical to cold and semiarid
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Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Rio Paraguay 90 m highest point: Nevado Sajama 6,542 m
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Natural resources | | tin, natural gas, petroleum, zinc, tungsten, antimony, silver, iron, lead, gold, timber, hydropower
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Land use(%) | | arable land: 2.78% permanent crops: 0.19% other: 97.03% (2005)
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Irrigated land(sq km) | | 1,320 sq km (2003)
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Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 622.5 cu km (2000)
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Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 1.44 cu km/yr (13%/7%/81%) per capita: 157 cu m/yr (2000)
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Natural hazards | | flooding in the northeast (March-April)
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Environment - current issues | | the clearing of land for agricultural purposes and the international demand for tropical timber are contributing to deforestation; soil erosion from overgrazing and poor cultivation methods (including slash-and-burn agriculture); desertification; loss of biodiversity; industrial pollution of water supplies used for drinking and irrigation
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Environment - international agreements | | party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands signed, but not ratified: Environmental Modification, Marine Life Conservation
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Geography - note | | landlocked; shares control of Lago Titicaca, world's highest navigable lake (elevation 3,805 m), with Peru
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Population | | 9,775,246 (July 2009 est.)
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Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 35.5% (male 1,767,310/female 1,701,744) 15-64 years: 60% (male 2,877,605/female 2,992,043) 65 years and over: 4.5% (male 193,196/female 243,348) (2009 est.)
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Median age(years) | | total: 21.9 years male: 21.3 years female: 22.6 years (2009 est.)
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Population growth rate(%) | | 1.772% (2009 est.)
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Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 25.82 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 7.05 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
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Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | -1.05 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 66% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 2.5% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
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Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 0.96 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.79 male(s)/female total population: 0.98 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
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Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 44.66 deaths/1,000 live births male: 48.56 deaths/1,000 live births female: 40.57 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
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Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 66.89 years male: 64.2 years female: 69.72 years (2009 est.)
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Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 3.17 children born/woman (2009 est.)
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Nationality | | noun: Bolivian(s) adjective: Bolivian
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Ethnic groups(%) | | Quechua 30%, mestizo (mixed white and Amerindian ancestry) 30%, Aymara 25%, white 15%
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Religions(%) | | Roman Catholic 95%, Protestant (Evangelical Methodist) 5%
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Languages(%) | | Spanish 60.7% (official), Quechua 21.2% (official), Aymara 14.6% (official), foreign languages 2.4%, other 1.2% (2001 census)
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Country name | | conventional long form: Plurinational State of Bolivia conventional short form: Bolivia local long form: Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia local short form: Bolivia
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Government type | | republic; note - the new constitution defines Bolivia as a "Social Unitarian State"
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Capital | | name: La Paz (administrative capital) geographic coordinates: 16 30 S, 68 09 W time difference: UTC-4 (1 hour ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time) note: Sucre (constitutional capital)
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Administrative divisions | | 9 departments (departamentos, singular - departamento); Beni, Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Pando, Potosi, Santa Cruz, Tarija
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Constitution | | 7-Feb-09
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Legal system | | based on Spanish law and Napoleonic Code; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction; the 2009 Constitution incorporates indigenous community justice into Bolivia's judicial system
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Suffrage | | 18 years of age, universal and compulsory (married); 21 years of age, universal and compulsory (single)
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Executive branch | | chief of state: President Juan Evo MORALES Ayma (since 22 January 2006); Vice President Alvaro GARCIA Linera (since 22 January 2006); note - the president is both chief of state and head of government head of government: President Juan Evo MORALES Ayma (since 22 January 2006); Vice President Alvaro GARCIA Linera (since 22 January 2006) cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the president elections: president and vice president elected on the same ticket by popular vote for a single five-year term; election last held 6 December 2009 (next to be held in 2014); note - per the new constitution, presidents can serve for a total of two consecutive terms election results: Juan Evo MORALES Ayma elected president; percent of vote - Juan Evo MORALES Ayma 64%; Manfred REYES VILLA 26%; Samuel DORIA MEDINA Arana 6%; Rene JOAQUINO 2%; other 2%
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Legislative branch | | bicameral Plurinational Legislative Assembly or Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional consists of Chamber of Senators or Camara de Senadores (36 seats; members are elected by proportional representation from party lists to serve five-year terms) and Chamber of Deputies or Camara de Diputados (130 seats; 76 members are directly elected from their districts [7 or 8 of these are chosen from indigenous districts] and 54 are elected by proportional representation from party lists to serve five-year terms). elections: Chamber of Senators and Chamber of Deputies - last held 6 December 2009 (next to be held in 2015) election results: Chamber of Senators - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - MAS 26, PPB-CN 10; Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - MAS 89, PPB-CN 36, UN 3, AS 2
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Judicial branch | | Supreme Court or Corte Suprema (judges elected by popular vote from list of candidates pre-selected by Assembly for six-year terms); District Courts (one in each department); Plurinational Constitutional Court (five primary or titulares and five alternate or suplente magistrates elected by popular vote from list of candidates pre-selected by Assembly for six-year terms; to rule on constitutional issues); Plurinational Electoral Organ (seven members elected by the Assembly and the president; one member must be of indigenous origin to six-year terms); Agro-Environmental Court (judges elected by popular vote from list of candidates pre-selected by Assembly for six-year terms; to run on agro-environmental issues); provincial and local courts (to try minor cases)
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Political pressure groups and leaders | | Bolivian Workers Central or COR; Federation of Neighborhood Councils of El Alto or FEJUVE; Landless Movement or MST; National Coordinator for Change or CONALCAM; Sole Confederation of Campesino Workers of Bolivia or CSUTCB other: Cocalero groups; indigenous organizations (including Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia or CIDOB and National Council of Ayullus and Markas of Quollasuyu or CONAMAQ); labor unions (including the Central Bolivian Workers' Union or COB and Cooperative Miners Federation or FENCOMIN)
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International organization participation | | CAN, FAO, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, LAES, LAIA, Mercosur (associate), MIGA, MINUSTAH, MONUC, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPCW, PCA, RG, UN, UNASUR, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNFICYP, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCL, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
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Flag description | | three equal horizontal bands of red (top), yellow, and green with the coat of arms centered on the yellow band note: similar to the flag of Ghana, which has a large black five-pointed star centered in the yellow band; in 2009, a presidential decree made it mandatory for a so-called wiphala - a square, multi-colored flag representing the country's indigenous peoples - to be used alongside the traditional flag
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Economy - overview | | Bolivia is one of the poorest and least developed countries in Latin America. Following a disastrous economic crisis during the early 1980s, reforms spurred private investment, stimulated economic growth, and cut poverty rates in the 1990s. The period 2003-05 was characterized by political instability, racial tensions, and violent protests against plans - subsequently abandoned - to export Bolivia's newly discovered natural gas reserves to large northern hemisphere markets. In 2005, the government passed a controversial hydrocarbons law that imposed significantly higher royalties and required foreign firms then operating under risk-sharing contracts to surrender all production to the state energy company. In early 2008, higher earnings for mining and hydrocarbons exports pushed the current account surplus to 9.4% of GDP and the government's higher tax take produced a fiscal surplus after years of large deficits. Private investment as a share of GDP, however, remains among the lowest in Latin America, and inflation remained at double-digit levels in 2008. The decline in commodity prices in late 2008, the lack of foreign investment in the mining and hydrocarbon sectors, and the suspension of trade benefits with the United States will pose challenges for the Bolivian economy in 2009.
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GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $43.38 billion (2008 est.) $40.88 billion (2007 est.) $39.08 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP (official exchange rate) | | $16.6 billion (2008 est.)
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GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 6.1% (2008 est.) 4.6% (2007 est.) 4.8% (2006 est.)
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GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $4,500 (2008 est.) $4,300 (2007 est.) $4,200 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 11.3% industry: 36.9% services: 51.8% (2008 est.)
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Labor force | | 4.454 million (2008 est.)
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Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture: 40% industry: 17% services: 43% (2006 est.)
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Unemployment rate(%) | | 7.5% (2008 est.) 7.5% (2007 est.) note: data are for urban areas; widespread underemployment
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Population below poverty line(%) | | 60% (2006 est.)
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Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: 0.5% highest 10%: 44.1% (2005)
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Distribution of family income - Gini index | | 59.2 (2006) 44.7 (1999)
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Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP) | | 18% of GDP (2008 est.)
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Budget | | revenues: $8.039 billion expenditures: $7.5 billion (2008 est.)
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Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | 14% (2008 est.) 8.7% (2007 est.)
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Stock of money | | $3.998 billion (31 December 2008) $3.032 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of quasi money | | $6.339 billion (31 December 2008) $4.729 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of domestic credit | | $5.433 billion (31 December 2008) $4.759 billion (31 December 2007)
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Market value of publicly traded shares | | $NA (31 December 2008) $2.263 billion (31 December 2007) $2.223 billion (31 December 2006)
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Economic aid - recipient | | $582.9 million (2005 est.)
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Public debt(% of GDP) | | 45.2% of GDP (2008 est.) 46.3% of GDP (2007 est.)
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Agriculture - products | | soybeans, coffee, coca, cotton, corn, sugarcane, rice, potatoes; timber
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Industries | | mining, smelting, petroleum, food and beverages, tobacco, handicrafts, clothing
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Industrial production growth rate(%) | | 10.6% (2008 est.)
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Current account balance | | $2.015 billion (2008 est.) $1.984 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports | | $6.448 billion (2008 est.) $4.49 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports - commodities(%) | | natural gas, soybeans and soy products, crude petroleum, zinc ore, tin
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Exports - partners(%) | | Brazil 60.1%, US 8.3%, Japan 4.1% (2008)
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Imports | | $4.641 billion (2008 est.) $3.24 billion (2007 est.)
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Imports - commodities(%) | | petroleum products, plastics, paper, aircraft and aircraft parts, prepared foods, automobiles, insecticides, soybeans
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Imports - partners(%) | | Brazil 26.7%, Argentina 16.3%, US 10.5%, Chile 9.5%, Peru 7.1%, China 4.8% (2008)
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Reserves of foreign exchange and gold | | $7.722 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $5.318 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Debt - external | | $5.931 billion (31 December 2008) $5.385 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - at home | | $5.998 billion (31 December 2008)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad | | $NA
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Exchange rates | | bolivianos (BOB) per US dollar - 7.253 (2008 est.), 7.8616 (2007), 8.0159 (2006), 8.0661 (2005), 7.9363 (2004)
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Currency (code) | | boliviano (BOB)
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Telephones - main lines in use | | 690,000 (2008)
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Telephones - mobile cellular | | 4.83 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: privatization begun in 1995; reliability has steadily improved; new subscribers face bureaucratic difficulties; most telephones are concentrated in La Paz and other cities; mobile-cellular telephone use expanding rapidly; fixed-line teledensity of 7 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone density slighly exceeds 50 per 100 persons domestic: primary trunk system, which is being expanded, employs digital microwave radio relay; some areas are served by fiber-optic cable; mobile cellular systems are being expanded international: country code - 591; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2008)
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Internet country code | | .bo
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Internet users | | 1 million (2008)
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Airports | | 952 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | gas 4,883 km; liquid petroleum gas 47 km; oil 2,475 km; refined products 1,589 km (2008)
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Roadways(km) | | total: 62,479 km paved: 3,749 km unpaved: 58,730 km (2004)
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Ports and terminals | | Puerto Aguirre (inland port on the Paraguay/Parana waterway at the Bolivia/Brazil border); Bolivia has free port privileges in maritime ports in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay
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Military branches | | Bolivian Armed Forces: Bolivian Army (Ejercito Boliviano, EB), Bolivian Navy (Fuerza Naval Boliviana, FNB; includes marines), Bolivian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, FAB) (2009)
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Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 18-49 years of age for 12-month compulsory military service; when annual number of volunteers falls short of goal, compulsory recruitment is effected, including conscription of boys as young as 14; 15-19 years of age for voluntary premilitary service, provides exemption from further military service (2009)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 2,295,746 females age 16-49: 2,366,828 (2008 est.)
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Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 1,666,697 females age 16-49: 1,906,396 (2009 est.)
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Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 108,304 female: 104,882 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | 1.9% of GDP (2006)
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Disputes - international | | Chile and Peru rebuff Bolivia's reactivated claim to restore the Atacama corridor, ceded to Chile in 1884, but Chile offers instead unrestricted but not sovereign maritime access through Chile for Bolivian natural gas and other commodities; an accord placed the long-disputed Isla Suarez/Ilha de Guajara-Mirim, a fluvial island on the Rio Mamore, under Bolivian administration in 1958, but sovereignty remains in dispute
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Electricity - production(kWh) | | 5.495 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 44.4% hydro: 54% nuclear: 0% other: 1.5% (2001)
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Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 4.665 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 51,360 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 60,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 10,950 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 6,172 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 465 million bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
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Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 14.2 billion cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 2.41 billion cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 11.79 billion cu m (2008)
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Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 750.4 billion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | 0.2% (2007 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | 8,100 (2007 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - deaths | | fewer than 500 (2007 est.)
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Major infectious diseases | | degree of risk: high food or waterborne diseases: bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever vectorborne diseases: dengue fever, malaria, and yellow fever water contact disease: leptospirosis (2009)
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Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 86.7% male: 93.1% female: 80.7% (2001 census)
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Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | 6.4% of GDP (2003)
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