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Bahrain Index
Gulf states have not granted citizenship freely for two
reasons. First, they are reluctant to share wealth with
recent
arrivals; second, the tribal nature of gulf society does
not
admit new members easily. A tribe usually traces its
lineage to a
particular eponymous ancestor. The standard Arabic
reference to
tribe is bani fulan, or "the sons [bani] of
so-and-
so." The Bani al Murrah in Saudi Arabia, for example,
trace their
line back to a figure named Murrah, who lived some time
before
the Prophet.
Over a period of 1,500 years, the sons of Murrah, or
any
other ancient figure, have tended to become numerous,
making
further distinctions necessary. Accordingly, tribes are
divided
into clans and then into households (fukhud; sing.,
fakhd). Households include groups of single
families.
Together this extended group of families calls itself a
tribe.
Each tribe has certain characteristics, such as different
speech,
dress, and customs. But since the 1950s, speech has become
less
of a distinguishing factor because of the fluidity of gulf
society.
The name of a tribe may also reflect some past event.
For
example, the name Utub--the tribe to which the Al
Sabah of
Kuwait and the Al Khalifa of Bahrain belong--comes from
the
Arabic word for wander (atab). In 1744 the tribe
"wandered" out of the desert and into the gulf area and
became
the Utub.
Two of the most important tribal groups in Arabia are
the
Qahtan and the Adnan, whose roots stem from the belief
that
tribes in the north of the peninsula were descended from
Adnan,
one of Ismail's sons, and that tribes in the south were
descended
from Qahtan, one of Noah's sons. People in the gulf often
attribute the structure of tribal alliances to this
north-south
distinction, and many still classify their tribes as
Adnani or
Qahtani.
Historically, the tribal nature of society has
occasioned
petty warfare in the gulf. Arab tribes have attacked each
other
since before Islam, but tribal customs have prevented
these
attacks from turning into random violence. Clans, however,
have
defected from their tribe and made alliances with other
tribes,
and tribes have sometimes banded together to form a more
powerful
group.
Moreover, although some tribes may trace their lineage
to
some heroic figure, the real identity of the tribe lies in
the
people that currently compose it. In the tribe, an
individual
bases his or her sense of self-esteem on the honor of the
tribe
as a whole.
In Arabia it was impossible to survive in the desert
alone,
and so families banded together to find water and move
their
flocks to new grazing lands. Once they established the
necessary
resources through collective effort, they guarded them
jealously
and refused to share them with outsiders. It therefore
became
necessary to set up boundaries between members of the
group or
between the tribe and outsiders. The tribe worked to
restrict
membership in order to preserve its sense of solidarity.
As a
result, birth into the right family tended to be the only
way to
become a member of a tribe. Marriage sometimes extended
the
tribal line beyond blood lines, but, in general, people
tended to
marry within the tribe and only went outside to establish
alliances with other tribes.
The emphasis on the group precluded the rise of a
strong
leader. Accordingly, tribal leadership is often described
as "the
first among equals," suggesting a collective leadership in
which
one among a number of leaders is recognized as the most
authoritative. This principal leader must continue to
consult
with his lesser colleagues and so rules by consensus.
An extension of this pattern of leadership is the
concept of
leading families within the tribe. Although tribalism
tends to
discourage inherited authority, traditions of leadership
are
nevertheless passed down, and tribes expect that certain
families
will furnish them with leaders generation after
generation. This
pattern occurred when tribes that were previously nomadic
settled
down in oases or coastal areas. It then became more likely
that
certain families would accumulate wealth, whether in food
or in
goods, and with this wealth would increase their
authority. In
this way, the individual families that in the 1990s
controlled
the gulf states established themselves around 1800.
Relations
with the British and the discovery of oil continued that
process.
The existence of these ruling families is perhaps the
most
obvious manifestation of Arab tribalism in gulf society in
1993.
Another manifestation is the collective manner in which
these
families rule. In most of these states, the position of
amir is
not passed from father to son but alternates among
different
parallel patrilineal lines. This makes the appointment of
the
next amir an open issue and something on which the entire
family
must agree. The family also participates in the various
consultative bodies that exist to advise the leader. Such
bodies,
which include figures outside the ruling family, help to
institutionalize the first among equals system in these
states.
The way that government officials are appointed
reflects the
importance of tribal connections. Members of the ruling
family
are accommodated first, followed by families and tribes
with whom
the rulers have been traditionally allied. In Bahrain, for
example, the ruling Al Khalifa have given the major
positions in
the bureaucracy to Sunni Arabs from tribes that helped
them rule
the island in the nineteenth century. The Al Khalifa have
given
lesser positions to Shia Arabs from merchant families with
whom
they engaged in the pearl industry but with whom they had
no
tribal alliances. But the Al Khalifa have been reluctant
to give
positions of authority to Shia farmers of Iranian descent
to whom
they had neither tribal nor economic ties.
Tribal cohesiveness is also reflected in the efforts of
the
gulf states to restrict citizenship. The gulf has always
been
relatively cosmopolitan, and its port cities have included
Arab
Shia from Iraq, freed slaves from Africa, Indian pearl
traders,
and Iranian farmers and merchants, in addition to tribal
Sunni
Arabs. (In 1939, for example, before the oil boom started,
39
percent of Qatar's population was non-Arab.) The dominant
Arab
tribes have accommodated many of these groups, and those
who
arrived in the region before 1930 became full citizens of
the
gulf states, albeit without the connections of tribal
Arabs. The
tremendous influx since 1940, however, has caused the
naturally
restrictive nature of tribal society to reassert itself to
prevent a further dilution of tribal identities.
Ironically, those foreigners closest to the tribal
Arabs, the
nontribal Arabs, represent the greatest threat. Only Arabs
from
other Arab states might conceivably stay in the gulf and
expect
to be citizens. Others, even Muslims from the coasts of
Pakistan
and India, whose history is intertwined with that of the
gulf,
would have a difficult time arguing in the twentieth
century that
they should be citizens of an Arab state.
Modern Arab politics, however, often speaks of a single
Arab
nation in which all Arabs might be citizens. This has led
to the
notion that Arabs should have rights in the gulf states
simply
because of their ethnicity. The continuing exodus of
millions of
Palestinian Arabs since 1948, and their subsequent
residence
throughout the Arab world, has added urgency to the demand
that
individual Arab states define their qualifications for
citizenship. Many Arabs argue that Palestinians in
particular,
but other Arabs as well, should be accepted as citizens in
the
gulf. Gulf leaders have understandably opposed this for
fear that
nontribal Arabs would challenge traditional ways of rule.
Although people from all over the world may come to the
gulf to
work, sovereignty and citizenship are closely guarded by
the
predominantly tribal population that has its roots in the
Arabian
Peninsula. In this way, the Persian Gulf coast has
preserved its
ties with the Arab interior that form the essence of its
identity.
* * *
The literature on Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and
Oman
may be divided into two groups: books on Oman and books on
the
rest of the gulf states. Calvin Allen has a relatively
brief
study of the modern history of Oman entitled Oman: The
Modernization of the Sultanate. John C. Wilkinson has
written
a number of scholarly studies on Oman, including his
recent work,
The Imamate Tradition of Oman. This is an excellent
and
detailed study of most aspects of Omani history.
For the rest of the gulf, a number of brief studies
exist, of
which the most recent is The Arab Gulf and the Arab
World,
a collection of articles on various aspects of modern gulf
life
edited by B.R. Pridham; it contains little on the history
of the
region. For more historical background, the reader may
consult an
older but more substantial collection edited by Alvin
Cottrell
entitled The Persian Gulf States. Further history
can be
found in Donald Hawley's The Trucial States.
Of books on particular countries or issues, the best is
Fuad
Khuri's Tribe and State in Bahrain, which considers
the
social, religious, and ethnic divisions of the island
nation. A
recent brief work on the UAE by Malcolm C. Peck, The
United
Arab Emirates, is very good. Abdulrasool al-Mossa's
study,
Immigrant Labor in Kuwait, provides a description
of the
situation of foreign workers in the gulf. Religious
disturbances
in the gulf are discussed in relevant chapters of Robin
Wright's
Sacred Rage. (For further information and complete
citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of January 1993
Background | | In 1783, the al-Khalifa family captured Bahrain from the Persians. In order to secure these holdings, it entered into a series of treaties with the UK during the 19th century that made Bahrain a British protectorate. The archipelago attained its independence in 1971. Bahrain's small size and central location among Persian Gulf countries require it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger neighbors. Facing declining oil reserves, Bahrain has turned to petroleum processing and refining and has transformed itself into an international banking center. King HAMAD bin Isa al-Khalifa, after coming to power in 1999, pushed economic and political reforms to improve relations with the Shia community. Shia political societies participated in 2006 parliamentary and municipal elections. Al Wifaq, the largest Shia political society, won the largest number of seats in the elected chamber of the legislature. However, Shia discontent has resurfaced in recent years with street demonstrations and occasional low-level violence.
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Location | | Middle East, archipelago in the Persian Gulf, east of Saudi Arabia
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Area(sq km) | | total: 741 sq km land: 741 sq km water: 0 sq km
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Geographic coordinates | | 26 00 N, 50 33 E
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Land boundaries(km) | | 0 km
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Coastline(km) | | 161 km
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Climate | | arid; mild, pleasant winters; very hot, humid summers
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Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Persian Gulf 0 m highest point: Jabal ad Dukhan 122 m
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Natural resources | | oil, associated and nonassociated natural gas, fish, pearls
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Land use(%) | | arable land: 2.82% permanent crops: 5.63% other: 91.55% (2005)
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Irrigated land(sq km) | | 40 sq km (2003)
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Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 0.1 cu km (1997)
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Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 0.3 cu km/yr (40%/3%/57%) per capita: 411 cu m/yr (2000)
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Natural hazards | | periodic droughts; dust storms
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Environment - current issues | | desertification resulting from the degradation of limited arable land, periods of drought, and dust storms; coastal degradation (damage to coastlines, coral reefs, and sea vegetation) resulting from oil spills and other discharges from large tankers, oil refineries, and distribution stations; lack of freshwater resources (groundwater and seawater are the only sources for all water needs)
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Environment - international agreements | | party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Wetlands signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
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Geography - note | | close to primary Middle Eastern petroleum sources; strategic location in Persian Gulf, through which much of the Western world's petroleum must transit to reach open ocean
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Population | | 727,785 note: includes 235,108 non-nationals (July 2009 est.)
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Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 25.9% (male 95,224/female 93,241) 15-64 years: 70.2% (male 292,941/female 217,729) 65 years and over: 3.9% (male 15,106/female 13,544) (2009 est.)
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Median age(years) | | total: 30.1 years male: 33.2 years female: 26.7 years (2009 est.)
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Population growth rate(%) | | 1.285% (2009 est.)
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Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 17.02 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 4.37 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
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Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | 0.2 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 89% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 1.8% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
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Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.02 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.34 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 1.12 male(s)/female total population: 1.24 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
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Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 15.25 deaths/1,000 live births male: 17.81 deaths/1,000 live births female: 12.61 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
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Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 75.16 years male: 72.64 years female: 77.76 years (2009 est.)
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Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 2.5 children born/woman (2009 est.)
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Nationality | | noun: Bahraini(s) adjective: Bahraini
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Ethnic groups(%) | | Bahraini 62.4%, non-Bahraini 37.6% (2001 census)
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Religions(%) | | Muslim (Shia and Sunni) 81.2%, Christian 9%, other 9.8% (2001 census)
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Languages(%) | | Arabic, English, Farsi, Urdu
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Country name | | conventional long form: Kingdom of Bahrain conventional short form: Bahrain local long form: Mamlakat al Bahrayn local short form: Al Bahrayn former: Dilmun
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Government type | | constitutional monarchy
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Capital | | name: Manama geographic coordinates: 26 14 N, 50 34 E time difference: UTC+3 (8 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
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Administrative divisions | | 5 governorates; Asamah, Janubiyah, Muharraq, Shamaliyah, Wasat note: each governorate administered by an appointed governor
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Constitution | | adopted 14 February 2002
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Legal system | | based on Islamic law and English common law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
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Suffrage | | 20 years of age; universal
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Executive branch | | chief of state: King HAMAD bin Isa Al-Khalifa (since 6 March 1999); Heir Apparent Crown Prince SALMAN bin Hamad Al-Khalifa (son of the monarch, born 21 October 1969) head of government: Prime Minister KHALIFA bin Salman Al-Khalifa (since 1971); Deputy Prime Ministers ALI bin Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, MUHAMMAD bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Jawad al-ARAIDH cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the monarch elections: the monarchy is hereditary; prime minister appointed by the monarch
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Legislative branch | | bicameral legislature consists of the Consultative Council (40 members appointed by the King) and the Council of Representatives or Chamber of Deputies (40 seats; members directly elected to serve four-year terms) elections: Council of Representatives - last held November-December 2006 (next election to be held in 2010) election results: Council of Representatives - percent of vote by society - NA; seats by society - al Wifaq (Shia) 17, al Asala (Sunni Salafi) 5, al Minbar (Sunni Muslim Brotherhood) 7, independents 11; note - seats by society as of February 2007 - al Wifaq 17, al Asala 8, al Minbar 7, al Mustaqbal (Moderate Sunni pro-government) 4, unassociated independents (all Sunni) 3, independent affiliated with al Wifaq (Sunni oppositionist) 1
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Judicial branch | | High Civil Appeals Court
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Political pressure groups and leaders | | Shia activists; Sunni Islamist legislators other: several small leftist and other groups are active
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International organization participation | | ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, FAO, G-77, GCC, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt (signatory), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
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Flag description | | red, the traditional color for flags of Persian Gulf states, with a white serrated band (five white points) on the hoist side; the five points represent the five pillars of Islam
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Economy - overview | | With its highly developed communication and transport facilities, Bahrain is home to numerous multinational firms with business in the Gulf. Petroleum production and refining account for over 60% of Bahrain's export receipts, over 70% of government revenues, and 11% of GDP (exclusive of allied industries), underpinning Bahrain's strong economic growth in recent years. Aluminum is Bahrain's second major export after oil. Other major segments of Bahrain's economy are the financial and construction sectors. Bahrain is focused on Islamic banking and is competing on an international scale with Malaysia as a worldwide banking center. Bahrain is actively pursuing the diversification and privatization of its economy to reduce the country's dependence on oil. As part of this effort, in August 2006 Bahrain and the US implemented a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the first FTA between the US and a Gulf state. Continued strong growth hinges on Bahrain's ability to acquire new natural gas supplies as feedstock to support its expanding petrochemical and aluminum industries. Unemployment, especially among the young, and the depletion of oil and underground water resources are long-term economic problems. The global financial crisis is likely to result in slower economic growth for Bahrain during 2009 as tight international credit and a slowing global economy cause funding for many non-oil projects to dry up. Lower oil prices may also cause Bahrain's budget to slip back into deficit.
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GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $26.89 billion (2008 est.) $25.29 billion (2007 est.) $23.34 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP (official exchange rate) | | $21.24 billion (2008 est.)
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GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 6.3% (2008 est.) 8.4% (2007 est.) 6.7% (2006 est.)
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GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $37,400 (2008 est.) $35,700 (2007 est.) $33,400 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 0.4% industry: 66.2% services: 33.3% (2008 est.)
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Labor force | | 557,000 note: 44% of the population in the 15-64 age group is non-national (2008 est.)
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Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture: 1% industry: 79% services: 20% (1997 est.)
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Unemployment rate(%) | | 15% (2005 est.)
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Population below poverty line(%) | | NA%
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Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: NA% highest 10%: NA%
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Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP) | | 26.6% of GDP (2008 est.)
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Budget | | revenues: $6.934 billion expenditures: $5.612 billion (2008 est.)
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Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | 7% (2008 est.) 3.3% (2007 est.)
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Stock of money | | $NA (31 December 2008) $4.169 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of quasi money | | $NA (31 December 2008) $10.63 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of domestic credit | | $NA (31 December 2008) $10.32 billion (31 December 2007)
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Market value of publicly traded shares | | $21.18 billion (31 December 2008) $28.13 billion (31 December 2007) $21.12 billion (31 December 2006)
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Economic aid - recipient | | $103.9 million (2004)
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Public debt(% of GDP) | | 28.7% of GDP (2008 est.) 63.8% of GDP (2004 est.)
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Agriculture - products | | fruit, vegetables; poultry, dairy products; shrimp, fish
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Industries | | petroleum processing and refining, aluminum smelting, iron pelletization, fertilizers, Islamic and offshore banking, insurance, ship repairing, tourism
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Industrial production growth rate(%) | | 6.3% (2008 est.)
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Current account balance | | $2.257 billion (2008 est.) $2.907 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports | | $17.49 billion (2008 est.) $13.79 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports - commodities(%) | | petroleum and petroleum products, aluminum, textiles
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Exports - partners(%) | | Saudi Arabia 3.4%, India 2.7%, UAE 2.2% (2008)
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Imports | | $14.25 billion (2008 est.) $10.93 billion (2007 est.)
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Imports - commodities(%) | | crude oil, machinery, chemicals
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Imports - partners(%) | | Saudi Arabia 26.7%, Japan 8.9%, US 7.8%, China 6.2%, Germany 4.8%, South Korea 4.7%, UK 4.5% (2008)
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Reserves of foreign exchange and gold | | $3.803 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $4.101 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Debt - external | | $10.33 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $7.858 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - at home | | $15.01 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $13.31 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad | | $9.34 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $7.72 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Exchange rates | | Bahraini dinars (BHD) per US dollar - 0.376 (2008 est.), 0.376 (2007), 0.376 (2006), 0.376 (2005), 0.376 (2004)
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Currency (code) | | Bahraini dinar (BHD)
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Telephones - main lines in use | | 220,000 (2008)
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Telephones - mobile cellular | | 1.4 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: modern system domestic: modern fiber-optic integrated services; digital network with rapidly growing use of mobile-cellular telephones international: country code - 973; landing point for the Fiber-Optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG) submarine cable network that provides links to Asia, Middle East, Europe, and US; tropospheric scatter to Qatar and UAE; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia; satellite earth station - 1 (2007)
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Internet country code | | .bh
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Internet users | | 402,900 (2008)
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Airports | | 3 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | gas 20 km; oil 32 km (2008)
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Roadways(km) | | total: 3,498 km paved: 2,768 km unpaved: 730 km (2003)
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Ports and terminals | | Mina' Salman, Sitrah
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Military branches | | Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF): Ground Force (includes Air Defense), Naval Force, Air Force, National Guard
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Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 17 years of age for voluntary military service; 15 years of age for NCOs, technicians, and cadets; no conscription (2008)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 210,938 females age 16-49: 170,471 (2008 est.)
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Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 171,004 females age 16-49: 144,555 (2009 est.)
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Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 6,612 female: 6,499 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | 4.5% of GDP (2006)
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Disputes - international | | none
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Trafficking in persons | | current situation: Bahrain is a destination country for men and women trafficked for the purposes of involuntary servitude and commercial sexual exploitation; men and women from Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia migrate voluntarily to Bahrain to work as laborers or domestic servants where some face conditions of involuntary servitude such as unlawful withholding of passports, restrictions on movements, non-payment of wages, threats, and physical or sexual abuse; women from Thailand, Morocco, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia are trafficked to Bahrain for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation tier rating: Tier 2 Watch List - Bahrain is on the Tier 2 Watch List for failing to show evidence of increased efforts to combat human trafficking, particularly efforts that enforce laws against trafficking in persons, and that prevent the punishment of victims of trafficking; during 2007, Bahrain passed a comprehensive law prohibiting all forms of trafficking in persons; the government also established a specialized anti-trafficking unit within the Ministry of Interior to investigate trafficking crimes; however, the government did not report any prosecutions or convictions for trafficking offenses during 2007, despite reports of a substantial problem of involuntary servitude and sex trafficking (2008)
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Electricity - production(kWh) | | 10.25 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 100% hydro: 0% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
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Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 10.1 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 48,520 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 38,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 238,300 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 228,400 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 124.6 million bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
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Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 12.64 billion cu m (2008 est.)
|
Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 12.64 billion cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008)
|
Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 92.03 billion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | 0.2% (2001 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | fewer than 600 (2007 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - deaths | | fewer than 200 (2003 est.)
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Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 86.5% male: 88.6% female: 83.6% (2001 census)
|
School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years) | | total: 15 years male: 14 years female: 16 years (2006)
|
Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | 3.9% of GDP (1991)
|
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