About  |   Contact  |  Mongabay on Facebook  |  Mongabay on Twitter  |  Subscribe
Rainforests | Tropical fish | Environmental news | For kids | Madagascar | Photos

Bahrain-INDEPENDENCE





MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)







WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
Email:


Bahrain Index

With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Arab coast of the gulf was ruled by ten families: in Kuwait the Al Sabah; in Bahrain the Al Khalifa; in Qatar the Al Thani; in the present-day UAE the Al Nuhayyan in Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuaimi in Ajman, the Al Sharqi in Al Fujayrah, the Al Maktum in Dubayy, the Al Qasimi in Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah, and the Al Mualla in Umm al Qaywayn; and the Al Said in present-day Oman. These families owed their positions to tribal leadership; it was on this traditional basis that the British had negotiated treaties with their leaders in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.

A major provision of these treaties was the recognition of sovereignty. The British were concerned that rulers of the weaker gulf families would yield some of their territory under pressure from more powerful groups, such as the Al Saud or the Ottomans. Accordingly, the treaties signed between 1820 and 1916 recognized the sovereignty of these rulers within certain borders and specified that these borders could not be changed without British consent. Such arrangements helped to put tribal alliances into more concrete terms of landownership. This meant that the Al Nuhayyan of Abu Dhabi, for example, not only commanded the respect of tribes in the hinterland but also owned, as it were, the land that those tribes used--in this case, about 72,000 square kilometers of Arabia.

Controlling, or owning, land became more important with the discovery of oil. When oil companies came to explore for oil, they looked for the "owner" of the land; in accordance with British treaties, they went to the area's leading families and agreed to pay fees to the heads of these families. As oil revenues increased, the leaders became rich. Although the leaders spent much of their new wealth on themselves, they also distributed it in the area they controlled according to traditional methods, which initially consisted mostly of largesse: gifts for friends and food for whomever needed it. As time passed, the form of largesse became more sophisticated and included, for example, the construction of schools, hospitals, and roads to connect principal cities to towns in the interior.

Oil revenues did not change traditional tribal ideas about leadership. New money, however, increased the influence of area leaders by giving them more resources to distribute. Because of oil exploration, tribal boundaries became clearer, and areas were defined more precisely. Distinctions among tribes also became more evident. A new sense of identity appeared in gulf shaykhdoms and aroused a growing expectation that they should rule themselves. To do this, shaykhs had to cut themselves off from British control and protection.

By the early 1960s, this was something to which the British had little objection. India and Pakistan won their independence in 1947; this meant that Britain no longer had to worry about protecting the western flank of the subcontinent. Britain was also burdened by the tremendous sacrifices it made during World War II and could not be as globally involved as it had been before the war. Therefore, Britain yielded many of its strategic responsibilities to the United States in the postwar period or gave them up entirely. However, the British were bound to the gulf by treaties and so remained in the region, but it was clear by the 1960s that they sought to leave the gulf.

Kuwait was the first state to terminate the agreement connecting it with Britain. Oil production in Kuwait had developed more quickly than in neighboring states; as a result, Kuwaitis were better prepared for independence. They declared independence in 1961 but ran into immediate trouble when Iraq claimed the territory. The Iraqis argued that the British had recognized Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait before World War I and, because the Ottomans had claimed to rule Kuwait from what was then the province of Iraq, the territory should belong to Iraq.

The British immediately sent troops to Kuwait to deter any Iraqi invasion. British and Kuwaiti positions were supported by the newly formed League of Arab States (Arab League), which recognized the new state and sent troops to Kuwait. The Arab League move left the Iraqis isolated and somewhat intimidated. Accordingly, when a new Iraqi government came to power in 1963, one of its first steps was to give up its claim and recognize the independence of Kuwait.

The experience of Kuwait may have increased the anxiety of other gulf leaders about declaring their independence. Even into the 1970s, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to make claims on territory in Bahrain and the UAE, although by the end of 1971 those states were independent, and nothing came of those claims. Gulf leaders also faced uncertainty about the form their state should take. Should they all, with the exception of Oman whose situation was different in that its treaty relationship with Britain did not guarantee its borders as did treaties of the other gulf states, band together in the largest entity possible? Or should they break up into nine separate states, the smallest of which had little territory, few people, and no oil?

British action forced gulf leaders to decide. Because of domestic financial concerns, Britain decided in the late 1960s to eliminate its military commitments east of Suez. As a result, the gulf shaykhs held a number of meetings to discuss independence. Initially, leaders considered a state that would include all nine shaykhdoms; Qatar had even drawn up a constitution to this effect. In the end, however, so large a federation proved unworkable.

An obstacle to creating a "superstate" was the status of Bahrain, which had been occupied by Iran at various times. The shah of Iran argued that he had a stronger claim to the island than the Al Khalifa, who had only come to Bahrain in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, the shah indicated that Iran would not accept a federation of Arab states that included Bahrain.

In the end, the United Nations (UN) considered the issue of Bahrain; it decided to deny the Iranian claim to the island and to allow the Bahrainis to form an independent state. Bahrain was better suited to independence than some of the other shaykhdoms because the island had been a center of British administration and had a more developed infrastructure and education system than its neighbors. Ironically, the greater British presence on Bahrain made residents more resentful of treaty ties to Britain. Bahrain was the only place in the gulf where demonstrations against Britain occurred.

Backed by the UN decision, Bahrain declared its independence on August 15, 1971. On September 3, 1971, Qatar followed, removing another state from any potential federation. Although Qatar had minimal contact with Britain, it was well suited to independence because it had a history of support from the Al Saud that went back to the beginnings of the Wahhabi state. Accordingly, at independence, Qatar could expect continued support from Saudi Arabia. It could also anticipate substantial oil revenues that had been increasing since the 1950s.

The same was not true for the other gulf states. The five southern shaykhdoms--Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayn--had little oil in their territory and so could not afford self-sufficiency as countries. Although substantial deposits had been discovered in Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, these two states preferred the security of a confederation rather than independence. Abu Dhabi, for example, had an outstanding border dispute with Saudi Arabia and a history of poor relations with that country because of Abu Dhabi's opposition to Wahhabi Islam. Abu Dhabi might have protected itself by forming a federation with the five southern shaykhdoms, but this would not have suited Dubayy. Although Dubayy had oil of its own, its rulers, the Al Maktum, had a history of hostility toward their relatives in Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuhayyan, from whom they split in the early nineteenth century. The Al Maktum would not have liked the Al Nuhayyan to dominate a confederation of gulf leaders while they were isolated in Dubayy.

Powers beyond the gulf coast also had an interest in the state to be formed. The Saudis no longer sought to control the gulf coast, but they remained concerned about stability on the eastern border. The British and other oil-consuming countries in the West were similarly concerned, and all parties believed that the largest state would also be the most stable. Accordingly, many forces were applying pressure in 1970 to convince the seven shaykhs to stay together.

Thus, in 1971 soon after Qatar became independent, the remaining shaykhs, with the exception of the Al Qasimi in Ras al Khaymah, took the preliminary constitution that Qatar had originally drawn up for a nine-member confederation and adapted it to a six-member body. On December 2, 1971, one day after the British officially withdrew, these six shaykhdoms declared themselves a sovereign state.

Ras al Khaymah originally refused to join the confederation. The Al Qasimi, who ruled the area, claimed a number of islands and oil fields within the gulf to which Iran laid claim as well. In the negotiations to form the UAE, the Al Qasimi sought support for their claims from Arab states on the peninsula as well as from some Western powers. When their efforts proved unsuccessful, the Al Qasimi pulled out of the negotiations. They quickly realized, however, that they could not exist on their own and joined the union in February 1972.

Oman was never considered a possible confederation member. Always geographically separate from its neighbors to the north, Oman had never entered into the agreements with Britain that governed other gulf rulers. The British had been closely involved in Oman since the middle of the nineteenth century, but they were under no official obligation to defend it.

The issue in Oman was one of internal unity rather than of sovereignty over foreign affairs. The historical split between coast and interior had continued through the second half of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth. In 1920 the Al Said sultan, Taimur ibn Faisal, came to terms with this split by granting limited sovereignty to the tribes of the interior. Because of ambiguous language, the peoples of the interior believed that the treaty cut them off from the Al Said; the Al Said, however, never gave up their claim to all of Oman.

The dispute between the two groups was exacerbated by the exploration for oil, which began in Oman in 1924. The oil fields lay in the interior, and the oil companies negotiated for access to them with the Al Said in Muscat. This Al Said sultan gladly sold them rights to the Omani oil fields, although the tribes of the interior claimed sovereignty over the area. When the oil men went inland to explore, they were attacked by the tribes, whom the sultan considered to be rebels, leading the oil companies to complain to the British government. Their complaints encouraged the British to continue their aid to the sultan, hoping that he would pacify the area and ensure Western access to Omani oil.

The sultan was eventually successful. In 1957 forces loyal to Said ibn Taimur captured the town of Nazwah, which the Al Said had not controlled since the nineteenth century. In 1958 the sultan withdrew to his palace in the coastal city of Salalah in Dhofar, a southern province that the Al Said had annexed in the nineteenth century, and took little interest in maintaining stability in the country. While keeping his military relationship with the British, he restricted Oman's contact with the rest of the world, discouraged development, and prohibited political reform.

In the end, the Al Said control over a united Oman survived, but Said ibn Taimur did not. Although the sultan had partially reestablished his authority in the Omani interior, he was unable to handle the increasing complexity of domestic politics. By the 1960s, Omani affairs had become international issues. Western oil companies sought to work in the interior of the country, and foreign governments, such as the Marxist state of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, were sending arms to the rebels in Dhofar.

The Al Said hold over the region remained problematic, however, and in 1964 another rebellion arose, this time in Dhofar. The Dhofar rebellion, which was not brought under control until 1976, obliged the sultan to seek foreign military assistance; therefore, British forces, particularly the air force, resumed action in the country. The rebels pointed to British involvement as an indication of the sultan's illegitimacy and brought their case to the UN, which eventually censured Britain for its continuing involvement in Oman.

Said ibn Taimur's policies frustrated many, not only in Oman but also in Britain, whose citizens were heavily involved in the sultan's military and intelligence apparatus. By 1970 these elements decided they could bear with the situation no longer; a coalition of Omani military and civilian forces, as well as British forces, attacked the palace and forced Said ibn Taimur to abdicate. They replaced him with his son, Qabus ibn Said Al Said, who had played no role in Said ibn Taimur's government. The sultan had actually locked his son in the palace for fear that Qabus ibn Said, who had been educated in Britain, would challenge his archconservative policies.

On his release, Qabus ibn Said consolidated the sultanate's hold over the interior and then solicited regional rather than British help to put down the rebellion in Dhofar. Other Arab leaders, as well as the shah of Iran, sent troops to Oman in response to Qabus ibn Said's requests; with the help of this coalition, by 1976 the sultan ended the Dhofar rebellion.

Qabus ibn Said was not an Ibadi imam as the first rulers in his line had been, but in 1970 this was less important than it had been in earlier times. Only about 60 percent of Oman's population was Ibadi, concentrated in the northern mountains. Furthermore, the province of Dhofar had a relatively short history of association with the rest of Oman.

Data as of January 1993



BackgroundIn 1783, the al-Khalifa family captured Bahrain from the Persians. In order to secure these holdings, it entered into a series of treaties with the UK during the 19th century that made Bahrain a British protectorate. The archipelago attained its independence in 1971. Bahrain's small size and central location among Persian Gulf countries require it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger neighbors. Facing declining oil reserves, Bahrain has turned to petroleum processing and refining and has transformed itself into an international banking center. King HAMAD bin Isa al-Khalifa, after coming to power in 1999, pushed economic and political reforms to improve relations with the Shia community. Shia political societies participated in 2006 parliamentary and municipal elections. Al Wifaq, the largest Shia political society, won the largest number of seats in the elected chamber of the legislature. However, Shia discontent has resurfaced in recent years with street demonstrations and occasional low-level violence.
LocationMiddle East, archipelago in the Persian Gulf, east of Saudi Arabia
Area(sq km)total: 741 sq km
land: 741 sq km
water: 0 sq km
Geographic coordinates26 00 N, 50 33 E
Land boundaries(km)0 km

Coastline(km)161 km

Climatearid; mild, pleasant winters; very hot, humid summers

Elevation extremes(m)lowest point: Persian Gulf 0 m
highest point: Jabal ad Dukhan 122 m
Natural resourcesoil, associated and nonassociated natural gas, fish, pearls
Land use(%)arable land: 2.82%
permanent crops: 5.63%
other: 91.55% (2005)

Irrigated land(sq km)40 sq km (2003)
Total renewable water resources(cu km)0.1 cu km (1997)
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural)total: 0.3 cu km/yr (40%/3%/57%)
per capita: 411 cu m/yr (2000)
Natural hazardsperiodic droughts; dust storms
Environment - current issuesdesertification resulting from the degradation of limited arable land, periods of drought, and dust storms; coastal degradation (damage to coastlines, coral reefs, and sea vegetation) resulting from oil spills and other discharges from large tankers, oil refineries, and distribution stations; lack of freshwater resources (groundwater and seawater are the only sources for all water needs)
Environment - international agreementsparty to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Wetlands
signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
Geography - noteclose to primary Middle Eastern petroleum sources; strategic location in Persian Gulf, through which much of the Western world's petroleum must transit to reach open ocean
Population727,785
note: includes 235,108 non-nationals (July 2009 est.)
Age structure(%)0-14 years: 25.9% (male 95,224/female 93,241)
15-64 years: 70.2% (male 292,941/female 217,729)
65 years and over: 3.9% (male 15,106/female 13,544) (2009 est.)
Median age(years)total: 30.1 years
male: 33.2 years
female: 26.7 years (2009 est.)
Population growth rate(%)1.285% (2009 est.)
Birth rate(births/1,000 population)17.02 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population)4.37 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)

Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population)0.2 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Urbanization(%)urban population: 89% of total population (2008)
rate of urbanization: 1.8% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
Sex ratio(male(s)/female)at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female
under 15 years: 1.02 male(s)/female
15-64 years: 1.34 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 1.12 male(s)/female
total population: 1.24 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births)total: 15.25 deaths/1,000 live births
male: 17.81 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 12.61 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)

Life expectancy at birth(years)total population: 75.16 years
male: 72.64 years
female: 77.76 years (2009 est.)

Total fertility rate(children born/woman)2.5 children born/woman (2009 est.)
Nationalitynoun: Bahraini(s)
adjective: Bahraini
Ethnic groups(%)Bahraini 62.4%, non-Bahraini 37.6% (2001 census)

Religions(%)Muslim (Shia and Sunni) 81.2%, Christian 9%, other 9.8% (2001 census)
Languages(%)Arabic, English, Farsi, Urdu

Country nameconventional long form: Kingdom of Bahrain
conventional short form: Bahrain
local long form: Mamlakat al Bahrayn
local short form: Al Bahrayn
former: Dilmun
Government typeconstitutional monarchy
Capitalname: Manama
geographic coordinates: 26 14 N, 50 34 E
time difference: UTC+3 (8 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
Administrative divisions5 governorates; Asamah, Janubiyah, Muharraq, Shamaliyah, Wasat
note: each governorate administered by an appointed governor
Constitutionadopted 14 February 2002

Legal systembased on Islamic law and English common law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Suffrage20 years of age; universal
Executive branchchief of state: King HAMAD bin Isa Al-Khalifa (since 6 March 1999); Heir Apparent Crown Prince SALMAN bin Hamad Al-Khalifa (son of the monarch, born 21 October 1969)
head of government: Prime Minister KHALIFA bin Salman Al-Khalifa (since 1971); Deputy Prime Ministers ALI bin Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, MUHAMMAD bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Jawad al-ARAIDH
cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the monarch
elections: the monarchy is hereditary; prime minister appointed by the monarch

Legislative branchbicameral legislature consists of the Consultative Council (40 members appointed by the King) and the Council of Representatives or Chamber of Deputies (40 seats; members directly elected to serve four-year terms)
elections: Council of Representatives - last held November-December 2006 (next election to be held in 2010)
election results: Council of Representatives - percent of vote by society - NA; seats by society - al Wifaq (Shia) 17, al Asala (Sunni Salafi) 5, al Minbar (Sunni Muslim Brotherhood) 7, independents 11; note - seats by society as of February 2007 - al Wifaq 17, al Asala 8, al Minbar 7, al Mustaqbal (Moderate Sunni pro-government) 4, unassociated independents (all Sunni) 3, independent affiliated with al Wifaq (Sunni oppositionist) 1

Judicial branchHigh Civil Appeals Court

Political pressure groups and leadersShia activists; Sunni Islamist legislators
other: several small leftist and other groups are active
International organization participationABEDA, AFESD, AMF, FAO, G-77, GCC, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt (signatory), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
Flag descriptionred, the traditional color for flags of Persian Gulf states, with a white serrated band (five white points) on the hoist side; the five points represent the five pillars of Islam

Economy - overviewWith its highly developed communication and transport facilities, Bahrain is home to numerous multinational firms with business in the Gulf. Petroleum production and refining account for over 60% of Bahrain's export receipts, over 70% of government revenues, and 11% of GDP (exclusive of allied industries), underpinning Bahrain's strong economic growth in recent years. Aluminum is Bahrain's second major export after oil. Other major segments of Bahrain's economy are the financial and construction sectors. Bahrain is focused on Islamic banking and is competing on an international scale with Malaysia as a worldwide banking center. Bahrain is actively pursuing the diversification and privatization of its economy to reduce the country's dependence on oil. As part of this effort, in August 2006 Bahrain and the US implemented a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the first FTA between the US and a Gulf state. Continued strong growth hinges on Bahrain's ability to acquire new natural gas supplies as feedstock to support its expanding petrochemical and aluminum industries. Unemployment, especially among the young, and the depletion of oil and underground water resources are long-term economic problems. The global financial crisis is likely to result in slower economic growth for Bahrain during 2009 as tight international credit and a slowing global economy cause funding for many non-oil projects to dry up. Lower oil prices may also cause Bahrain's budget to slip back into deficit.
GDP (purchasing power parity)$26.89 billion (2008 est.)
$25.29 billion (2007 est.)
$23.34 billion (2006 est.)
note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP (official exchange rate)$21.24 billion (2008 est.)
GDP - real growth rate(%)6.3% (2008 est.)
8.4% (2007 est.)
6.7% (2006 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP)$37,400 (2008 est.)
$35,700 (2007 est.)
$33,400 (2006 est.)
note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP - composition by sector(%)agriculture: 0.4%
industry: 66.2%
services: 33.3% (2008 est.)
Labor force557,000
note: 44% of the population in the 15-64 age group is non-national (2008 est.)

Labor force - by occupation(%)agriculture: 1%
industry: 79%
services: 20% (1997 est.)
Unemployment rate(%)15% (2005 est.)
Population below poverty line(%)NA%
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%)lowest 10%: NA%
highest 10%: NA%
Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP)26.6% of GDP (2008 est.)
Budgetrevenues: $6.934 billion
expenditures: $5.612 billion (2008 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%)7% (2008 est.)
3.3% (2007 est.)

Stock of money$NA (31 December 2008)
$4.169 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of quasi money$NA (31 December 2008)
$10.63 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of domestic credit$NA (31 December 2008)
$10.32 billion (31 December 2007)
Market value of publicly traded shares$21.18 billion (31 December 2008)
$28.13 billion (31 December 2007)
$21.12 billion (31 December 2006)
Economic aid - recipient$103.9 million (2004)

Public debt(% of GDP)28.7% of GDP (2008 est.)
63.8% of GDP (2004 est.)
Agriculture - productsfruit, vegetables; poultry, dairy products; shrimp, fish
Industriespetroleum processing and refining, aluminum smelting, iron pelletization, fertilizers, Islamic and offshore banking, insurance, ship repairing, tourism

Industrial production growth rate(%)6.3% (2008 est.)

Current account balance$2.257 billion (2008 est.)
$2.907 billion (2007 est.)
Exports$17.49 billion (2008 est.)
$13.79 billion (2007 est.)

Exports - commodities(%)petroleum and petroleum products, aluminum, textiles
Exports - partners(%)Saudi Arabia 3.4%, India 2.7%, UAE 2.2% (2008)
Imports$14.25 billion (2008 est.)
$10.93 billion (2007 est.)

Imports - commodities(%)crude oil, machinery, chemicals
Imports - partners(%)Saudi Arabia 26.7%, Japan 8.9%, US 7.8%, China 6.2%, Germany 4.8%, South Korea 4.7%, UK 4.5% (2008)

Reserves of foreign exchange and gold$3.803 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$4.101 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Debt - external$10.33 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$7.858 billion (31 December 2007 est.)

Stock of direct foreign investment - at home$15.01 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$13.31 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad$9.34 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$7.72 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Exchange ratesBahraini dinars (BHD) per US dollar - 0.376 (2008 est.), 0.376 (2007), 0.376 (2006), 0.376 (2005), 0.376 (2004)

Currency (code)Bahraini dinar (BHD)

Telephones - main lines in use220,000 (2008)
Telephones - mobile cellular1.4 million (2008)
Telephone systemgeneral assessment: modern system
domestic: modern fiber-optic integrated services; digital network with rapidly growing use of mobile-cellular telephones
international: country code - 973; landing point for the Fiber-Optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG) submarine cable network that provides links to Asia, Middle East, Europe, and US; tropospheric scatter to Qatar and UAE; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia; satellite earth station - 1 (2007)
Internet country code.bh
Internet users402,900 (2008)
Airports3 (2009)
Pipelines(km)gas 20 km; oil 32 km (2008)
Roadways(km)total: 3,498 km
paved: 2,768 km
unpaved: 730 km (2003)

Ports and terminalsMina' Salman, Sitrah
Military branchesBahrain Defense Forces (BDF): Ground Force (includes Air Defense), Naval Force, Air Force, National Guard
Military service age and obligation(years of age)17 years of age for voluntary military service; 15 years of age for NCOs, technicians, and cadets; no conscription (2008)
Manpower available for military servicemales age 16-49: 210,938
females age 16-49: 170,471 (2008 est.)
Manpower fit for military servicemales age 16-49: 171,004
females age 16-49: 144,555 (2009 est.)
Manpower reaching militarily significant age annuallymale: 6,612
female: 6,499 (2009 est.)
Military expenditures(% of GDP)4.5% of GDP (2006)
Disputes - internationalnone

Trafficking in personscurrent situation: Bahrain is a destination country for men and women trafficked for the purposes of involuntary servitude and commercial sexual exploitation; men and women from Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia migrate voluntarily to Bahrain to work as laborers or domestic servants where some face conditions of involuntary servitude such as unlawful withholding of passports, restrictions on movements, non-payment of wages, threats, and physical or sexual abuse; women from Thailand, Morocco, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia are trafficked to Bahrain for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation
tier rating: Tier 2 Watch List - Bahrain is on the Tier 2 Watch List for failing to show evidence of increased efforts to combat human trafficking, particularly efforts that enforce laws against trafficking in persons, and that prevent the punishment of victims of trafficking; during 2007, Bahrain passed a comprehensive law prohibiting all forms of trafficking in persons; the government also established a specialized anti-trafficking unit within the Ministry of Interior to investigate trafficking crimes; however, the government did not report any prosecutions or convictions for trafficking offenses during 2007, despite reports of a substantial problem of involuntary servitude and sex trafficking (2008)
Electricity - production(kWh)10.25 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - production by source(%)fossil fuel: 100%
hydro: 0%
nuclear: 0%
other: 0% (2001)
Electricity - consumption(kWh)10.1 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - exports(kWh)0 kWh (2008 est.)
Electricity - imports(kWh)0 kWh (2008 est.)
Oil - production(bbl/day)48,520 bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - consumption(bbl/day)38,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - exports(bbl/day)238,300 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - imports(bbl/day)228,400 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - proved reserves(bbl)124.6 million bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
Natural gas - production(cu m)12.64 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - consumption(cu m)12.64 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - exports(cu m)0 cu m (2008)
Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m)92.03 billion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%)0.2% (2001 est.)
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDSfewer than 600 (2007 est.)
HIV/AIDS - deathsfewer than 200 (2003 est.)
Literacy(%)definition: age 15 and over can read and write
total population: 86.5%
male: 88.6%
female: 83.6% (2001 census)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years)total: 15 years
male: 14 years
female: 16 years (2006)
Education expenditures(% of GDP)3.9% of GDP (1991)








Copyright mongabay 2000-2013